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Xtf THE IHXRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CDUST 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH 
HILL, ROBERT KENT 
VS 
PLAINTIFF 
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DEFENDANT 
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CASE NUMBER 830908099 CV 
DATE 01/18/90 
HONORABLE DAVID S.-YOUNG 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK NP 
THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A "FIR.ST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT" IS DENIED. THIS MATTER MUST PROCEED TO TRIAL WITH 
DISPATCH. THE CASE IS NOW IN IT'S SEVENTH (7TH) YEAR. 
MR. HANNI IS TO PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT HEREWITH AND 
WITH HIS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HILL, ROBERT KENT 
VS 
PLAINTIFF 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 830908099 CV 
DATE 05/25/90 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
COURT REPORTER 9 
COURT CLERK NP 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. LAUCHNOR, WALLACE R. 
D. ATTY. HANNI, GLENN C. 
RECEIVED 
JUNO 119901 
VEHAR, BEPPIER, UWIflY, 
ROSE & BOAU RC. 
THE DEFENDANT STATE FARM'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS 
GRANTED CONSISTENT WITH THE MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF. 
SINCE THE COURT HAS GRANTED THE MOTION, NO ORAL ARGUMENT IS 
NECESSARY AND IS THUS DENIED. 
MR. HANNI IS REQUESTED TO PREPARE A JUDGMENT CONSISTENT 
HEREWITH AND WITH HIS PLEADINGS IN THIS MATTER. 
C.C. TO COUNSEL 
U&U MVH 2W-QA SSSO £9. .OC I frfr:Q0 1 0 - 9 0 - 0 G 5 
Glenn C. Hanni #A1327 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually 
and as personal representative 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE 
•HILL, deceased, ana LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, Individually and as 
personal representative of the 
heirs Of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, 
DECEASED, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-8099 
Judge David S. Young 
TO: PLAINTIFFS THROUGH THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
You are hereby notified that judgment in the above-
referenced matter was entered on March 26, 1990. 
DATED this nc day of April, 1990. 
STRONG & JMLNNI 
-^*-^ 7 
100187 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Entry of Judgment was mailed, postage 
prepaid, on April 3 1990, to the following: 
Roy A. Jacobson, Jr-
V. Anthony Vehar 
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose 
P. O. Box 189 
Kemmerer, WY 83101 
Wallace R. Laucbnor 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
50 South Main #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
100157 2 
6/i\Mo 
RECEIVED 
GLENN C. HANNI, #A1327 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
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VEHAn. 3EPPIER, LAVERY 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HI 
and as persona 
of the heirs o 
HILL, deceased 
CALDWELL, Indi 
personal repre 
heirs of TROY 
deceased, 
vs. 
LL, Individually 
1 representative 
f TAMARA ELAINE 
; and LORIN DEAN 
vidually and as 
sentative of the 
NEIL CALDWELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant, 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-8099 
Judge David S. Young 
TO THE PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
You and each of you will please take notice that the court 
on June 11, 1990, entered a judgment in favor of defendant and 
against plaintiff Lorin Dean Caldwell, Individually and as 
personal representative of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased, 
no cause of action. 
Dated this 14th day of June, 1991 
STRONG ($/Ei 
Glenn C. Hanni 
a t t o r n e y s for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of June, 1990, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Entry of 
Judgment, first-class postage prepaid, to: 
Wallace R. Lauchnor 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
50 South Main #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Roy A, Jacobson, Jr. 
V. Anthony Vehar 
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose 
P. 0. Box 189 
Kemmerer, WY 83101 
Glenn C. Hanni #A1327 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7 080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually 
and as personal representative 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE 
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, Individually and as 
personal representative of the 
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff Hill 
and for partial summary judgment as to plaintiff Caldwell was 
heard by the Honorable David S. Young, District Judge, pursuant 
to notice, on March 12, 1990. Glenn C. Hanni of the law firm of 
Strong & Hanni appeared on behalf of defendant, and V. Anthony 
Vehar of the law firm of Vehar, Beppler, Jacobsen,*Lavery & Rose, 
P.C., and Wallace R. Lauchnor, Esquire, appeared on behalf of 
plaintiffs. 
JUDGMENT 
C i v i l No. C83-8099 
Judge David S. Young 
The court, having reviewed defendant's motion and memoranda, 
plaintiffs' memorandum, having considered oral argument, and 
being advised in the premises, now, therefore; 
IT IS HERE3Y ORDERED, ADJUDGED, FOUND, AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. The court finds that since the Supreme Court's decision 
i n
 Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 
1988), State Farm has paid the $5,510 plus interest to 
plaintiffs. Therefore, the only remaining claims are for bad 
faith and punitive damages. 
2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff 
Hill is granted on the following grounds: 
(a) Hill's claim for bad faith against defendant is an 
insurance first-party bad faith claim similar to Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). Since Hill was not 
in privity of contract with defendant there was no duty owed to 
him by defendant and he has no cause of action for first-party 
insurance bad faith against State Farm; 
(b) Hill has no claim to recover punitive damages against 
State Farm because he has alleged no independent tortious conduct 
against State Farm. No punitive damages may be awarded for a 
claim of first-party insurance bad faith because such claim 
constitutes a contract action, not a tort action. 
2 
3. Summary judgment dismissing Hill's complaint against 
State Farm should be entered, with prejudice, on the merits, no 
cause of action; 
4. State Farm's motion for partial summary judgment as to 
Caldwell's claim for punitive damages is granted on the grounds 
that Caldwell's complaint against State Farm is for first-party 
insurance bad faith, which is a contract claim, and for which no 
punitive damages may be awarded absent an allegation of 
independent tortious conduct. Caldwell has failed to allege any 
independent tortious conduct against State Farm which would be 
the basis for punitive damages; 
5. Partial summary judgment should be entered in favor of 
defendant and against plaintiff Caldwell dismissing Caldwell's 
claim for punitive damages, with prejudice, on the merits, no 
cause of action; 
6. The court further finds that the issues raised by 
plaintiffs' claims of first-party bad faith against State Farm 
are and have been throughout the pendency of this action fairly 
debatable issues. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of state 
Farm and against plaintiff Hill, and Hill's complaint and all 
claims contained therein against State Farm, are dismissed with 
3 
prejudice, on the merits, no cause of action; 
2. Partial summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of 
State Farm and against plaintiff Caldwell as to plaintiff 
Caldwell's claims for punitive damages against State Farm, and 
said claims for punitive damages are dismissed with prejudice, on 
the merits, no cause of action. 
DATED this day of March, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
By 
Honorable David S. Young 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, on March / 
1990, to the following: 
Roy A. Jacobson, Jr. 
V. Anthony Vehar 
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose 
P. O. Box 189 
Kemmerer, WY 83101 
Wallace R. Lauchnor 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
50 South Main #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
M o f f a t , P a u l s e n , Lauchnor & Young 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f s 
S u i t e 300 
261 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 521-7500 
Defendant's Address: 
Roger C. Day 
Utah Insurance Department 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
3-&3?9 
ROBERT KENT HILL, individu-
ally and as personal 
representative of the heirs 
of TAMARA ELAINE HILL, 
deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, individually and 
as personal representative 
of the heirs of TROY 
NEIL CALDWELL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTO-
MOBILE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
oooOooo 
The Plaintiffs, for cause of action against the Defendant, 
allege as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, had an insurance 
policy with the Defendant, insuring an automobile owned by 
said Defendant, on or about the 6th day of June, 1982, and 
that said insurance coverage provided by the Defendant on said 
o n n r> n A ; 
-2-
automobile included collision damage coverage. 
2. That the Defendant is an insurance company licensed 
to do business within the State of Utah and the Plaintiffs 
are residents of the State of Utah. 
3. That on or about the 6th day of June, 1982, at or 
near the intersection of 3900 South Street, where the same 
intersects with 700 East Street, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, a vehicle owned by Plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell 
and insured by the Defendant, was involved in an automobile 
accident with a vehicle being driven by Kenneth Paul Bryan, 
and insured by the Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. 
4. That said collision was caused by the negligence and 
intoxication of the Defendant driver, Kenneth Paul Bryan. 
5. That as a direct and proximate result of the negligence 
and intoxication of the said driver, the driver of the vehicle 
insured by the Defendant and son of Plaintiff, Caldwell was 
killed by said collision and at the time of his death was a 
minor under the age of eighteen (18) years. 
6. That as a further direct and proximate result of 
said collision, the Plaintiff, Robert Kent Hill, suffered the 
loss of his daughter, who was accidentally killed while riding 
in the automobile with the minor decedent, Caldwell, as a 
passenger at the time of said accident. 
ooe:oo:; 
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7. That neither the driver or the passenger of the 
Caldwell vehicle was negligent in any manner in causing said 
accident. 
8. That as a direct and proximate result of said accident 
the above-named Plaintiffs brought suit against Kenneth Paul 
Bryan and others for the wrongful death of the above-named 
minors. 
9. That as a result of said accident, the automobile of 
Plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, was damaged in the sum of 
$5,510. 
10. That the Defendant driver, Kenneth Paul Bryan, was 
driving an automobile insured by the Cumis Insurance Society, 
Inc.# with a single limit insurance coverage on the automobile 
in the amount of $50,000. 
11. That the wrongful deaths of the Plaintiffs' children 
exceeded in value the sum of $25,000 per wrongful death, or 
a total of $50,000, as insurance afforded by the single limit 
policy aforementioned. 
12. That the above-named Plaintiffs arrived at a compromise 
solution and settlement with the driver of the vehicle causing 
said accident in the sum of -the policy limits of $50,000, but 
were unable to conclude their settlement of the litigation 
because the above-named Defendant failed and refused, and still 
OOO-CGM 
-4-
refuses to acknowledge that there was insufficient insurance 
coverage to satisfy the entire claim of the Plaintiffs, and 
has demanded that the sum of $5,510 in collision payment made 
to Lorin Dean Caldwell be reimbursed to the Defendant out of 
the insurance policy limits of the driver of said vehicle 
causing said accident, 
13. That Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company failed to join in said litigation and refused to 
cooperate in settlement of said litigation by the Plaintiffs 
for the insufficient funds afforded by the insurance coverage 
evidencing bad faith toward its insureds in attempting to 
settle saj lid litiqation 
14. That Plaintiffs investigated the feasibility of 
litigation and possible recovery against the Defendant driver, 
independent of the insurance coverage and determined that 
said driver was insolvent. 
15. That Plaintiffs have in their possession a check 
drawn by the Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. in the sum of 
$5,510 payable to the Defendant and its insured Lorin Dean 
Caldwell. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that the Defendant be required 
to endorse said check payable to the Plaintiffs for the 
$5,510 remaining unpaid on the death claim of the Plaintiffs 
as personal representatives of said minor decedents, that 
0000005 
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Plaintiffs recover their attorney's fees in a reasonable sum 
to be determined by the court herein, t^ogetherj^hfc_pnni hive 
damage_s_for bad faith in obstructing settlement of Plaintiffs' 
claim against a tort feasor and causing unnecessary litigation 
where it is obvious that the insurance coverage afforded 
by the tort feasor's vehicle was inadequate to satisfy said 
death claims, together with Plaintiffs' costs of suit incurred 
herein, and such other and further relief as the Court deems 
proper in the premises, [ u ^ ^ ^ i ^ ^ 4 ) 
DATED this day of November, 19 83. 
MOFFAT, PAULSEN, LAUCHNOR & YOUNG 
Wallace R. Lauchnor 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs f Address 
261 East Broadway, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
A n t\ r n -;» 
TabB 
R. Scott Williams, 3498 
Strong & Hanni 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, et al., 
Plaintiffs, COUNTER CLAIM 
vs. : CIVIL NO. C83-8099 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE Judge Judith M. Billings 
INSURANCE COMPANY, : 
Defendant. 
Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company for it's Counter Claim against plaintiff alleges as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are residents of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff Caldwell had an insurance policy with 
defendant, insuring an automobile owned by Caldwell, on or about 
the sixth day of June, 1982, and that the insurance coverage 
provided by defendant on said automobile included collision 
damage coverage. 
ooee^s 
3. That on or about the 6th day of June, 1982, at 
or near the intersection of 3900 South Street and 700 East Street, 
the said vehicle owned by plaintiff Caldwell and insured by 
defendant, was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle 
driven by Kenneth Paul Bryan, and insured by Cumis Insurance Society, 
Inc. 
4. As part of the insurance policy between plaintiff 
Caldwell and defendant, defendant paid plaintiff Caldwell approximate 
$5,510.00 under it's collision coverage for damage done to Caldwell's 
vehicle. 
5. Under the terms of the above referenced policy of 
insurance, defendant was subrogated to all of the insured's rights 
of recovery and the insured was required to do whatever is necessary 
to secure such rights and to do nothing to prejudice such rights 
of subrogation. 
6. That plaintiffs, on behalf of their deceased 
children, without the knowledge of defendant, filed suit against 
Kenneth Paul Bryan and or entered into settlement negotiations 
with Cumis Insurance Society, Inc., for claims of wrongful death. 
7. Without the knowledge or consent of defendant, 
plaintiffs settled their claims against Bryan and signed complete 
and full Releases in favor of Bryan. 
8. Plaintiffs executed said complete and full 
Releases with knowledge that State Farm had paid $5,510,00 in 
favor of plaintiff Caldwell under the collision portion of the 
0000053 
insurance policy and that State Farm had a subrogation right against 
Bryan. 
9. By signing said Releases, plaintiffs prejudiced 
the subrogation rights of defendant and thereby breached the 
insurance contract with defendant, and defendant is entitled to 
damages by reason of said breach in the amount of $5,510.00, it's 
subrogation claim against Bryan. 
10. Plaintiff Caldwell as part of the Release signed 
in favor of Bryan, acknowledged that $5,510.00 of the consideration 
being received by Caldwell for the Release was for property damage 
incurred to Caldwellfs vehicle, and by such acknowledgement 
Caldwell specifically itemized that amount of the settlement funds 
as reimbursement for property damage, for which Caldwell had already 
been reimbursed by defendant State Farm. 
11. That Caldwell is not entitled to be reimbursed 
twice for the property damage he suffered as a result of the 
accident, and that by itemizing the $5,510.00 as reimbursement 
for property damage, plaintiffs are bound to deliver that said 
$5,510.00 to defendant, under it's subrogation rights against 
Bryan. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays for judgment against 
plaintiffs in the amount of $5,510.00, for costs of court 
incurred, interest, and for such other and further relief as to 
the court seems just and equitable. 
0 0 f* o o * : 
U V U ^ V \J 'i 
Dated this day of , 1984. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By 
R. Scott Williams 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby do certify that on the 22nd day of June, 
1984, that true and correct copies of the Counter Claim were 
hand delivered to the following: 
Mr. Wallace Lauchnor 
CSB Tower 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
R. Scott Williams, 3498 
Strong & Hanni 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM INSURANCE AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant, 
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
CIVIL NO. C83-8099 
Judge Judith M. Billings 
STATE FARM INSURANCE AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Third Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH PAUL BRYAN, 
Third Party 
Defendant. 
Third party plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, for it's Third Party Complaint against Kenneth 
Paul Bryan alleges as follows: 
0000050 
1. That Third Party Defendant is a resident of 
Salt Lake County from the State of Utah. 
2. A Complaint has been filed against third party 
plaintiff by Robert Kent Hill and Loren Dean Caldwell, individually 
and as personal representatives of Tamera Elaine Hill, deceased, 
and Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased, respectively, in which the said 
plaintiffs make certain claims against third party plaintiff relating 
to the settlement of the said plaintiff's claims against the 
third party defendant. 
3. The plaintiff's claims arise out of an accident 
which occurred on or about the 6th day of June, 1982, at or near 
the intersection of 3900 South and 700 East in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, involving a vehicle owned by plaintiff Caldwell, 
and a vehicle driven by third party defendant. 
4 . The third party plaintiff insured the vehicle 
owned by plaintiff Caldwell and provided collision coverage on 
said vehicle. 
5. As a result of the accident involving the 
Caldwell vehicle and the vehicle driven by third party defendant, 
third party plaintiff provided approximately $5,510.00 to it's 
insured, plaintiff Caldwell, for collision damage incurred as a 
result of the above specified accident. 
6. Third party plaintiff is subrogated to the rights 
of it's insured against third party defendant to the extent of the 
payments made by the third party plaintiff to it's insured for 
property damage caused by the above specified accident. 
00C005T 
7. That on information and belief, the accident 
caused to the Caldwell vehicle was a direct and proximate 
result of the negligence and/or other misconduct of the 
third party defendant, and in the event Judgment is entered 
in favor of plaintiffs against third party plaintiff with 
respect to $5,510.00 of the settlement proceeds from the 
settlement of plaintiff's claims against the third party 
defendant, then third party plaintiff is entitled to the 
indemnified and is entitled to judgment over and against 
the third party defendant for the full amount of the judgment, 
if any awarded to plaintiffs and against third party plaintiff. 
WHEREFORE, third party plaintiff prays for judgment 
against third party defendant in the amount of any judgment 
entered in favor of plaintiff and against third party plaintiff, 
for costs of court incurred thereon, interest, and for such 
other and further relief as to the court seems just and 
equitable. 
Dated this day of , 1984. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By 
R. Scott Williams 
0C0f,05-
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby do certify that on the 22nd day of June, 
1984, that true and correct copies of the Third Party Complaint 
were hand delivered to the following: 
Mr. Wallace Lauchnor 
CSB Tower 
50 S. Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
TabC 
Glenn C. Hanni, A1327 
R. Scott Williams, 3498 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant & 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, et al., : 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant and Civil No. C83-8099 
Third-Party : 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Judge Judith M. Billings 
KENNETH PAUL BRYAN, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. : 
Pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
State Farm moves this court for summary judgment as to 
plaintiffs1 claims against State Farm and also as to plaintiffs1 
counterclaim against defendant on the grounds that there are 
no genuine issues of any material fact and that State Farm is 
000009.1 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Dated this J&tK day of September, 1984. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Glenn C. Hanni 
R. Scott Williams 
Attorneys for Defendant & 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this \&£tr day of September, 
1984, true and correct copies of the foregoing Motion for 
Summary Judgment were hand delivered to: 
Wallace Lauchnor, Esq. 
CSB Tower, Suite 300 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
J. Anthony Eyre, Esq. 
Kipp & Christian 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Third-Party 
Defendant 
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GLENN C. HANNI, A1327 
R. SCOTT WILLIAMS, 34 98 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, individu-
ally and as personal 
representative of the heirs 
Of TAMARA ELAINE HILL, 
deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, individually and'> 
as personal representative 
of the heirs of TROY 
NEIL CALDWELL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH PAUL BRYAN, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
J U D G *M--E-N- T 
Civil No. C83-8099 
Honorable Judith M. Billings 
0000135 
On September 28, 1984, this matter came on for hearing 
before the Honorable Judith M. Billings, one of the judges of 
the above-entitled court, on motion for summary judgment of 
defendant State Farm, and on motion for summary judgment of 
third-party defendant Kenneth Paul Bryan. Plaintiffs were 
represented by their attorney, Wallace R. Lauchnor. Defendant 
State Farm was represented by its attorney, Glenn C. Hanni of 
the firm of Strong & Hanni. Third-party defendant was represented 
by his attorney, Heinz J. Mahler of the firm of Kipp and Christian. 
It was stipulated by plaintiffs and defendant State Farm 
that a copy of the depositions that have been taken in this case 
could be used with the same force and effect as the original. 
The court having heard arguments of counsel and being 
fully advised, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
granted and judgment is hereby entered on plaintiffs1 complaint 
in favor of defendant State Farm and against plaintiffs and all 
of them, no cause of action. 
2. Defendant State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on its counterclaim against plaintiffs is hereby granted and 
judgment is hereby entered in favor of State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company and against plaintiff, Lorin Dean 
Caldwell, for the sum of $5510.00 with interest on said sum at 
the rate of 10% per annum from March 16, 1983, being the date 
that Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. delivered its check to plaintiff, 
00C0I3G 
Lorin Dean Caldwell, which said check was payable to defendant 
State Farm and Lorin Dean Caldwell, to the date hereof, making 
a total judgment in favor of State Farm and against plaintiff, 
Lorin Dean Caldwell of Six Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Three 
and 11/100 Dollars ($6,393.11) together with costs in the amount 
of $ . This judgment shall bear interest at the rate 
of 12% per annum from the date hereof until paid. 
3. Plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, shall forthwith 
endorse said Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. check and shall 
deliver the same to counsel for defendant State Farm. 
4. The motion of third-party defendant, Kenneth Paul 
Bryan, for summary judgment is hereby granted and judgment is 
hereby entered in favor of Kenneth Paul Bryan and against State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company on the third-party 
complaint, no cause of action. 
Dated this JJ£> day of October, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
15. 
Hondrable Judith M. Billings, Judge 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PATSY WYATT, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Strong &. Hanni, Attorneys 
f0r Defendant and Th i rd -Pa r ty P l a i n t i f f S t a t e Farm Mutual 
he rein; that she served the attached proposed Judgment 
upon a l l counsel 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to; 
Wallace Lauchnor 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s 
CSB Tower 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Heinz J. Mahler 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid thereon, 
in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 16th day of 
October • 1984- f~^S__ V 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of October 
198 4. 
^>^^^^^VQjk 
/ Notary Public 
My commission expires; Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
5/13/85 
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GLENN C. HANNI, A1327 
R. SCOTT WILLIAMS, 3 4 98 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Salt Lake 
Telephone 
City, Utah 84111 
(801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, individu-
ally and as personal 
representative of the heirs 
of TAMARA ELAINE HILL, 
deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, individually and 
as personal representative 
of the heirs of TROY 
NEIL CALDWELL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
KENNETH PAUL BRYAN, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-8099 
Honorable Judith M. Billings 
0000130 
TO THE PLAINTIFFS AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
You will please take notice that judgment was entered 
in the above case in favor of defendant State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company and against plaintiffs on the 
22nd day of October, 1984, by the above-entitled court. 
Dated this 1st day of November, 1984. 
STRONG Sc HANNI 
By 
Glenn C. Hanni 
Attorneys for Defendant State Farm 
OOOOJUO 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PATSY WYATT, being duly sworn, s a y s : 
That she is employed in the offices of Strong & Hanni, Attorneys 
for D e f e n d a n t and T h i r d - P a r t y P l a i n t i f f S t a t e Farm Mutual 
he re in ; that she se rved the attached N o t i c e of E n t r y of Judgment 
upon a l l c o u n s e l 
by placing a t rue and co r r ec t copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Wal lace Lauchnor 
A t t o r n e y fo r P l a i n t i f f s 
CSB Tower 
50 South Main S t r e e t 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101 
Heinz J . Mahler 
A t t o r n e y fo r T h i r d - P a r t y De fendan t 
600 Commercial Club B u i l d i n g 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
and deposit ing the s a m e , sealed, with first c l a s s postage prepaid thereon. 
in the United States mai l at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 1 s t day of 
November $ 198 L \ 
Subscr ibed and sworn to before me th i s ' 1 s t day of November » 
1 9 8 4 
"J Notary pub l ic 
My commiss ion exp i r e s : Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
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WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR , No. 1905 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CSB Tower, Suite 500 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: 521-7500 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Third-Party 
PIaintiff. 
vs . 
KENNETH PAUL BRYAN, 
T h i r d - P a r t y 
Defendant . 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CIVIL NO. C83-8099 
Plaintiffs hereby appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from 
the Summary Judgment entered herein in favor of Defendant, 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and against 
the Plaintiffs. 
DATED this / / day of November, 1984. 
'JsJ? i-L^^-l-L- <^v 
R. Lauchnor 
Attorney for Plaintiffs -inO" I <!/ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
• * * 
ROBERT KENT HILL, et al., : 
Plaintiffs, : Civil No. C83-8099 
: Judge Judith M. Billings 
-vs- : 
: Deposition of: 
STATE FARM INSURANCE AUTOMO- : 
BILE INSURANCE COMPANY, : LORIN DEAN CALDWELL 
Defendant. : 
STATE FARM INSURANCE AUTOMO- : 
BILE INSURANCE COMPANY, : 
Third Party Plaintiff, : 
-vs- : 
KENNETH PAUL BRYAN, : 
Third Party Defendant. : 
• * • 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of August, 1984, the 
deposition of LORIN DEAN CALDWELL, produced as a witness 
herein at the instance of the defendant and third party 
plaintiff, herein, in the above-entitled action now pending in 
the above-named court, was taken before BRAD J. YOUNG, a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 1:15 p.m. of said day 
at the offices of STRONG & HANNI, Sixth Floor Boston Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to notice. 
* • * 
BRAD J. YOUNG QQQn 
Associated Professional Reporters M 
420 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 322-3441 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiffs: 
For the Defendant 
and Third Party 
Plaintiff: 
Also Present: 
WALLY LAUCHNOR 
PAULSEN, LAUCHNOR & DAVIS 
Attorneys at Law 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
R. SCOTT WILLIAMS 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys at Law 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Janet Hill 
Robert Hill 
LaRue Caldwell 
• * • 
I N D E X 
WITNESS 
LORIN DEAN CALDWELL 
Examination by Mr. Williams 
• * * 
PAGE 
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Defendant's Exhibit 1 25 
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LORIN DEAN CALDWELL, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, being first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WILLIAMS: 
Q This is the deposition of Lorin Dean Dean Caldwell. The 
deposition is pursuant to notice, governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Would you state your name, please. 
A Lorin Dean Caldwell. 
Q Your present age? 
A 55. 
Q Date of birth? 
A June 3, 1929. 
Q Your address? 
A 7311 Chris Lane. 
Q How long have you lived there? 
A 19 years. 
Q That's in Salt Lake County? 
A Yes. 
Q You are married? 
A Yes. 
Q Your wife's name? 
3 
A Mary LaRue. 
Q Have you ever had your deposition taken before? 
A No. 
Q J u s t so we u n d e r s t a n d each o t h e r - - and you have been 
o b v i o u s l y s i t t i n g in w h i l e I a sked Mr. H i l l q u e s t i o n s , so you 
u n d e r s t a n d t h e p rocedu re of a d e p o s i t i o n ; i s t h a t r i g h t ? 
A Yes, I guess I u n d e r s t a n d i t . 
Q I f t h e r e i s a q u e s t i o n t h a t I ask and you d o n ' t 
u n d e r s t a n d t h a t q u e s t i o n , p l e a s e t e l l me so t h a t I can 
r e p h r a s e i t . Okay? 
A Y e s . 
Q Otherwise, I will assume that you understand my 
questions. All right? 
A Okay. 
Q Tell me how many children you have presently. 
A How many children I have living? 
Q Yes. 
A Four. 
Q What are their ages, names and ages, if you can tell me, 
roughly? 
A Colleen — do you want their last name or the married? 
0 Yes. 
A Colleen Herriman, who is 31 — 33. 
Q She is married? 
A Yes. 
4 
0 Her husband's name? 
A Keith. They have two boys, two children. I have another 
daughter, Barbara Ann Romaro. 
Q She is married? 
A She is married and has three children. 
Q Her age? 
A Her age is 31. 
Q What is her husband's name? 
A Carl. 
Q The other two? 
A I have one, Chet Bryan. And he is 24. 
Q Still living at home? 
A No. He is married, living away from home. His wife's 
name is Wendy Humpherys. 
Q And finally? 
A And Todd. He is a twin brother of Troy. 
Q So he is what? 
A 19. 
Q Is he living at home? 
A Yes. 
Q Is he in college? 
A No. He is working. 
Q Where is he working? 
A Utah Power & Light. 
Q Mr. Caldwell, I understand that you had a son Troy Neil 
5 
Caldwell; is that correct? 
A That* s right. 
Q He was killed as a result of an accident on June 6, 19R2; 
is that correct? 
A That's right. 
Q At the tine of that accident he was how old, 
approximately? 
A 16 — 17. 
Q Do you know his date of birth? 
A May 7, 1965. 
Q That p a r t i c u l a r n i g h t , t h e n i g h t of t h e accident, was he 
d r i v i n g your v e h i c l e ? 
A T h a t ' s t r u e . 
Q You were the owner of a 1979 Honda? 
A Y e s . 
Q Troy had h i s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e ? 
A Yes . 
Q How long had he had it, do you remember? 
A Probably several months. He got it when he was through 
the drivers education. 
MRS. CALDWELL: He had a year and probably two months, 
three months. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I think that as we go along in this 
deposition, the way it probably would help Brad the best is 
that you try to answer the question, and then if you need your 
6 
wife's help, ask for it, and then we will get it that way. Or 
I may direct some questions to you. 
THE WITNESS: I might on my dates, a little b:t. 
Q (By Mr* Williams) How long had you owned that vehicle? 
A Since 1979. 
Q Can you tell me, just very briefly, your understanding as 
to how the accident happened? Then I will ask you a little 
bit about how you have gained that information. 
A Actually how the accident happened? 
Q Yes, as far as you understand it, very briefly. 
A My son Troy and his girlfriend Tammy had went to a show 
at Trolley Corners. They was coming home on 7th East. 
Q Going southbound? 
A Going southbound on 7th East. They approached a red 
light at 39th South and 7th East. They was in the far outside 
lane, or the right lane. And they waited -- I am not sure 
whether -- how many other vehicles were there at the time, but 
as they proceeded through, as the light changed and they 
proceeded through the intersection, there was a four-wheel 
drive vehicle eastbound on 39th South at a high rate of speed, 
and hit them broadside in the middle of the intersection, and 
they was pushed from the impact all the way across 7th East 
and in front of the Arctic Circle hamburger place on the east 
side of 7th East. 
Q Do you know the names of any witnesses to the accident? 
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A I have heard then but I do not recall who they are. 
Q Have you ever talked with Kenneth Paul Bryan? 
A No. 
Q As you understand it, he was the party in the four-wheel 
drive vehicle? 
A That is right. 
Q Have you ever talked with his parents? 
A No. 
Q Has your wife ever talked with either Kenneth Bryan or 
his parents? 
A Yes. 
Q Did she relate to you what the results of those 
conversations were? 
A Well, just the fact that she — 
Q Let me ask you this, so we get the necessary background. 
How many times did she talk to them, do you know? 
A Probably once to each one, to my knowledge. 
Q Did she ever talk to Kenneth Paul? 
A I don't know that she talked directly to him. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Let me ask her. Did you ever talk with 
him? 
MRS. CALDWELL: No. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) So, as far as you know, she talked 
with the mother and the father on one occasion? 
A I don't know that she talked to the father. I think she 
8 
talked to the mother only, as far as I know. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Is that right? 
MRS. CALDWELL: Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Do you know when that conversation 
took place, in the chain of events? Was it early on or later 
on? 
A Early on. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Maybe I can shortcut this by asking 
Mrs. Caldwell a couple of questions. 
MRS. CALDWELL: It was a few days after the death of 
Troy. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Where did the conversation take place? 
MRS. CALDWELL: I called her at her home, and wanted her 
to know what kind of a boy Troy was and Tammy was and what her 
son had done. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Was there anything else said in the 
conversation? 
MRS. CALDWELL: She said she was very sorry. She 
proceeded to tell me the tragic life that Paul had had, and 
she was very sorry for what he had done. And I told her that 
I felt like they had responsibility in that, too, because they 
knew that he did not have a driver's license, it had been 
revoked. He had been convicted of DUI's and they still let 
him drive their vehicle. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Did she say that she or her husband had 
9 
actually given him permission to drive that car? 
MRS. CALDWELL: They said they give him that truck 
because he had to have it to live in. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Was there any discussion about the facts 
of the accident with her? 
MRS. CALDWELL: No. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Back to you, Mr. Caldwell. Did you go 
to the hearing for the criminal matter? 
A No. 
Q Was it your understanding that Mr. Bryan was convicted of 
some offense? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know what he was convicted of? 
A I don't know what he was convicted of. Whatever it was, 
it was — he was sentenced to a lesser charge. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Mrs. Caldwell? 
MRS. CALDWELL: They tried to get him on murder charges, 
which there had not been a case on this particular thing that 
they could charge because they said there was not intent of 
the person that was — and so he was charged with 
manslaughter. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Do you understand that he is in prison 
at the present time? 
A Yes. 
Q I understand, Mr. Caldwell, that you were insured through 
10 
State Farm at the time of this accident; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And I understand that shortly after the accident you were 
paid some money by State Farm; is that right? 
A Yes, that's true. 
Q Again, as I understand it, they paid you approximately 
$5,600 for property damage? 
A That is correct. 
Q You had $100 deductible on the policy; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q There was also $5,000 paid for survivor benefits, wasn't 
there? 
A Yes, that is true. 
Q Did they also pay $1,000 for funeral expenses? 
A I think that was correct, yes. 
Q You didn't have any complaints, did you, about the 
timeliness of those payments? 
A No. 
Q After the accident, tell me what was the first thing you 
did in terms of talking to anyone to help you understand your 
rights against Mr. Bryan and his insurance company. 
A As far as the insurance company? 
Q Or rights against him, either one. 
A We just went to the insurance company to see what we had 
to do. 
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0 That was CUMIS Insurance? 
A No. We went to State Farm. We didn't know at that time 
who CUMIS even was. 
Q Who did you talk to at State Farm? 
A I talked to Clark Davis. He was the adjuster. 
Q Who went with you? 
A My wife was with me. 
Q Were Mr. and Mrs. Hill with you? 
A No, not at that time. 
Q What was discussed about what you were entitled to, othe 
than what State Farm was paying you? 
A Well, they said that they would recoup for the loss of 
the damage — for the automobile, and that was all at that 
time. 
Q Did you talk to State Farm, with Mr. Davis at that time, 
about Mr. Bryan's insurance company or anything like that? 
A Yes, I think I did. 
Q What was said about that? 
A I think at that time they told us that we would be paid 
for the loss of the automobile, which was around $5,600 or 
whatever it was. And that they was going to take money from 
the other insurance company to make themselves whole on the 
$5,600 that they was giving us. 
Q As early as that first conversation with Clark Davis, he 
was telling you that? 
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A Yes. 
Q What about the next contact? What was that? With 
anybody concerning trying to get some money from some source. 
A Well, we probably went back to Clark. I am not sure just 
how the sequence went. 
Q What happened in that conversation? 
A Basically, the same thing. They told us that they would 
give us the money for the automobile, but as far as the death 
benefits and the funeral, they was going to recoup that out of 
the other insurance money. And at that time I felt real 
uneasy about it, to think that they would want to take the 
insurance money that was to go to us, and they was going to 
take their share out of that portion. 
Q What did you know at that time about. what insurance 
Mr. Bryan had and how much insurance? 
A I don't know at that time whether we knew exactly how 
much that policy — well, I think that we knew that his 
parents had the policy and that, but I am not sure whether we 
knew how much it was or anything like that. 
Q What I am trying to get at, was there some contact with 
CUMIS before you talked with Clark Davis about those things? 
A I guess there must have been. Like I say, I am not sure 
just how the events went. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I think your wife wants to make a 
comment. 
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MRS. CALDWELL: Mr. Winget from CIJMIS Insurance was out 
at our home, probably four days after the accident, with this 
one paper, wanting us to sign for that $25,000 for us and 
$25,000 for Hills. He came to our home with that. And then 
my husband went back. Then State Farm, we talked to Clark 
Davis in the meantime, and he told us that would not be so 
because they were going to go back and recoup for the benefits 
that they had given us and the benefits they had given Hills. 
So we went back and talked to State Farm. That's when they 
told us they were going to recoup it all, this Mr. Clark 
Davis. 
And my husband said he would like to speak to someone 
else in State Farm. So we talked to someone else. While we 
were in there, talking with them, they called, I guess, back 
East or somewhere and told us at that time that they would not 
take, recoup the death benefits that they had given the Hills 
and that they had given us, that they did want their money for 
the automobile. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Mr. Caldwell, do you remember that 
initial visit where Greg Winget came to your home? 
A Yes. 
Q In that conversation with him, do you remember that he 
offered you essentially $25,000? 
A I think that at that time, yes, that they wanted to 
settle. 
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Q Did he present in front of you a release at that time, 
for you to sign for the money? 
A I think they wanted us to sign the release. As I recall, 
we wanted to get some legal advice or something before we 
signed any papers or that. 
Q Do you remember a meeting at CUMIS with Mr. and Mrs. Hill? 
A Yes. 
Q Was that about three weeks after the accident? 
A I guess. 
Q It could have been? 
A Yes. 
Q Was money offered to you at that time? 
A I am not sure. I think that it could have been, but, 
like I say, there was so much going on at that time, one thing 
and another, I was, I guess, kind of confused as to whether 
they wanted to — I think also at that time that they had to 
have approval through their home office or something, in order 
to authorize payment or something like that. That took quite 
awhile. 
Q Do you remember some question coming up about whether 
there was actually insurance coverage for this accident? 
A Yes, there was. They said there was coverage. I think 
they stated it was $50,000 single — 
Q Limit liability? 
A That's total limit or whatever. Anyway, whatever it was. 
15 
Q When did you first contact an attorney? 
MR. LAUCHNOR: I am not sure when it was. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) How many months after the accident, 
approximately? 
A I would say three months, but I don't know. I am not 
sure. 
Q Who did you first contact? What lawyer did you make 
contact with? 
A I think at that time the one that we contacted was Ton 
Crowther, 
Q Was Dennis Haslam working for them at that time? 
A Yes, that's right. 
Q He became the one that — 
A Was handling it, yes. 
Q Did you have some specific questions for him or did you 
just generally want him to handle your case and take care of 
your interests? 
A I guess we just wanted him to tell us just through the 
legal advice, as to what is best. How do you pursue the 
thing? 
Q Did you have any additional meetings with anybody from 
CUMIS at that earlier time period, within the first three or 
four months? 
A We might have had one other one, as far as I recall. 
Q Was there anything that happened in that other contact 
16 
that is different from what you have told me? 
A I think at that time they said that there was a third 
party or something that wanted part of that money. 
Q Meaning who? 
A Meaning State Farm. 
Q Your memory is that CUMIS was telling you that State Farm 
wanted their money as early as three or four months after the 
accident? 
A I am not sure just what the time frame was. 
Q What did CUMIS say about that, in general terms? I 
assume we are talking about Greg Winget; is that correct? 
A That's correct, Greg Winget and Cornevaux or whatever her 
name was, Mary. 
Q What did he or she say about State Farm's interest? 
A Well, I think at that time they just was indicating that 
State Farm was in for their money that they had paid us, and 
they wanted to recoup that money. Of course, I told them that 
that was a bunch of nonsense, that they wasn't entitled to 
that. If in fact they wanted to pursue the thing, they could 
go a different route, rather than taking the money that was to 
be paid out on insurance. 
Q Were Mr. and Mrs. Hill present with you at that time? 
A I think they was, yes. 
Q Had you obtained an attorney by the time that you were 
talking with Mr. Winget on this last occasion you were telling 
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me about? 
A I don't remember whether it was then or a little later. 
Q From what source did you get the information that you had 
that told you State Farm was not entitled to that money? 
A My own judgment. 
Q Just common sense or something? 
A Yeah, I guess. 
Q Did you read the policy for your — your own insurance 
policy, for example? Did you do that? 
A I don't know how you read a policy, like I am, and come 
out with anything that you can understand. I just — 
Q Okay. Did you ask your attorney, Dennis Haslam, about 
that question, whether State Farm was entitled to some of that 
money or not? 
A Probably in the conversation, we -- that question 
probably came up, yes. 
Q What did he say? 
A I don't recall. 
Q After you went to Mr. Haslam, what happened next in the 
chain of events that was part of your effort to pursue a claim 
against Bryan and his insurance company? 
A I guess they pursued the thing to see if maybe we could 
maybe recoup some money through his insurance, through the 
place where Mr. Bryan was drinking, which was — 
Q It was a bar? 
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A A bar on State Street and about 40th South. They also 
wanted to pursue, I guess, what they call the Drain Shop Act or 
whatever it is. I am not too faniliar with that. 
Q Was your attorney investigating the assets of Mr. and 
Mrs. Bryan, as far as you know? 
A I think they did, yes. 
Q He was also looking into the Dram Shop Act, the 
possibility of that kind of a case against the bar? 
A Yes. 
Q How long did this investigation go on, approximately? 
A Well, it went on for a few months. I am not sure just 
what it was, but it was several months that it went on. 
Q What was the next event or contact that took place? 
A I think after they was satisfied that they pursued all 
avenues that they thought they could, they said at that time 
that they didn't think there was anything that was available 
through the Dram Shop Act, through Mr. Brown, the fellow that 
served Mr. Bryan. And he didn't have any insurance. I don't 
know whether he actually owned the bar or whether he was just 
managing it or what. But there was no insurance there. 
Q So the problem was lack of assets for the bar to make it 
worth pursuing? 
A I guess, yes. 
Q Is that what Mr. Haslam told you? 
A Yes. 
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Q Did you ever file — did Mr. Haslan on your behalf ever 
file a lawsuit, do you know? 
A I don't know whether they did or not. I don't think they 
did. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Mrs. Caldwell? 
MRS. CALDWELL: I think that there was. The suit was 
brought against — but we never actually went to court on it. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Did you have an attorney fee 
arrangement with Mr. Haslam? 
A Ours was just on just — they was going to take a 
percentage or whatever, I guess. 
Q Was it like Mr. Hill's arrangement, where you were to pay 
him a percentage of what he was able to get over the $25,000? 
Do you understand what I am saying? Let me back up and see if 
we can explain that. There was an offer already from CUMIS to 
pay you $25,000. 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Did Mr. Haslam, after you employed him, intend to take 
any of that $25,000 as part of his fee? 
A I don't think so, no. 
Q If he was to get any contingency fee, it was from money 
that was collected in addition to that $25,000? 
A Right. 
Q Since there was no effort to pursue that case, I assume 
Mr. Haslam didn't get paid anything; is that correct? 
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A The only thing we paid him was sone money for what they 
call, what, in-office expense or whatever. 
Q Can you give me a time frame, approximate date or year 
that Mr. Haslam told you the case isn't worth pursuing? 
A No. 
Q Was it within the first six months after the accident or 
after that, do you know? 
A Probably within the first six months. 
Q I assume that during this time the investigation was 
going on, you were communicating with Mr. Hill; is that 
correct? 
A That's right. 
Q Were you talking about the merits of pursuing a lawsuit 
together? 
A I don't know that we was talking about a lawsuit. I 
think all we were talking about was trying to collect the 
money that we felt was ours, that should have been coming to 
us through the insurance companies. 
Q Is it true and correct, as Mr. Hill has testified, that 
before you got your lawyers involved it was your decision not 
to take at that point in time the $25,000 that they had 
offered you? 
A Yes, that's right. 
Q You were intending to investigate the case before you 
decided to sign a release? 
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A I think that's probably true, yes. 
Q At some point in time you wanted the insurance company 
now to pay you the money, $2 5,000; is that correct? The 
investigation was complete. Now you wanted the company to pay 
you the money? 
A Yes. 
Q What was the first contact you had with CUMIS to give 
them that understanding? Did you go in and talk to Mr. Winget? 
A As I recall, that's what we did, is either went in and 
talked to him or over the phone or something. 
Q Do you remember a meeting with him after your lawyer had 
finished the investigation? 
A I remember two or three different meetings but I can't 
tell you exactly the time frame of when they was. 
Q Were you always present with the Hills at those meetings? 
A Not always. 
Q Sometimes you met with Mr. Winget alone? 
A I think the first time we was alone, as far as I remember 
it. But I am not sure. 
Q That was when he came to your house? 
A Well, yes. 
Q Did you ever go out there to his office alone, just you 
and your wife? 
MRS. CALDWELL: I don't think so. 
THE WITNESS: Maybe not. I don't remember. 
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Q (By Mr. Williams) On the first meeting after your lawyer 
told you the case isn't worth pursuing, on this first meeting 
with CUMIS, after that — I am trying to key into some 
events -- tell me what happened in terms of the discussions in 
that meeting. 
A I can't tell you exactly what took place in that meeting. 
Q Do you remember wanting to settle the case at that time? 
A Yeah, we wanted to settle the case right from the start. 
But we didn't want to settle it on their terms. 
Q What were their terms at that time? 
A Their terms was that State Farm wanted part of that money. 
Q For the reimbursement of the property damage? 
A That's right, yes. 
Q Did CUMIS tell you that's the way it had to be done? 
A They told us that's the way -- I guess they told us 
that's the way it had to be done. I am not sure whether they 
said it had to or not. But there was the third party involved, 
Q You were unwilling to accept that? 
A Yes. 
Q At that time had you sought legal advice about whether 
that was an appropriate thing to do? 
A I don't remember at what time frame that we sought Wally 
Lauchnor's help. I am not sure when it was. 
Q Mr. Hill was of some value because he was doing some 
legal research? 
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A That1s true. 
Q I guess you were relying to a certain extent on what he 
was telling you? 
A That's true, yes. 
Q Mr. Caldwell, after this meeting with CUMIS, where they 
told you they are not going to release the money without also 
paying State Farm, what did you do at that time? Did you go 
to Mr. Lauchnor or was there something else that happened 
before that? 
A I think that's probably when we went to Wally, through 
some — I don't remember who it was that referred us to Wally. 
MR. LAUCHNOR: Probably Brett Paulsen in the office. 
THE WITNESS: I guess that's who it was, yeah. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) You met with Mr. Lauchnor and told him 
the problem, and I assume that you then left it in his hands; 
is that correct? 
A That is true, yes. 
Q Then do you remember a time when you were told that the 
money could be paid with certain reservations? 
A I think that that was true, yes. 
Q You had a meeting where you were presented with a 
settlement agreement or with a release? 
A Yes. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Let's mark this as an exhibit. 
• * • 
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(Defendant's Exhibit 1 was 
marked for identification.) 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Let me show you what has been marked 
as Exhibit 1, and ask you if you recall seeing that document 
before or a copy of it? 
A This is probably the one, as far as I can determine. 
Q That appears to be the release that you were presented 
with by the attorneys for CUMIS? 
A Yes. 
Q You understand that your lawyer had participated in 
negotiating for that release? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you sign this document? 
A I guess I did. At that time I didn't know what I was 
signing or anything else. I must have signed it, yes. 
Q Did you read the document before you signed it? 
A Yeah. 
Q Did your wife sign it? 
A To my knowledge, yes. 
MR. WILLIAMS: You did sign it, didn't you? 
MRS. CALDWELL: I think so, yes. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Did you ask your lawyer to help you 
understand the release? 
A Yes, I guess. 
Q Did he do that? 
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A Yes. 
Q Did you feel like when you signed this document that you 
knew what it meant? 
A Yeah. 
Q I guess by signing the agreement you intended that there 
were no other terms or understandings with CUMIS, other than 
what is in this agreement. Is that a fair statement? 
A We was just going on our — the lawyer's advice that we 
should sign it. 
Q Was there anything that was part of your understanding 
that was not contained in this document, as far as you know? 
A No. 
Q By signing this agreement you intended that, as it says, 
$27,755 was to be paid to you, but that approximately $5,500 
was to be kept out for property damage? 
A Yes, that's right. 
Q And that that would be a dispute as to who gets that 
between you and State Farm? 
A Yes. 
Q At the tine you signed this agreement, were you aware of 
the rights of State Farm to pursue what you have called a 
recoupment of their money that they have paid for property 
damage? 
MR. LAUCHNOR: I am going to object to the question as i 
calls for a legal conclusion as to what their rights are, and 
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instruct him not to answer. 
0 (By Mr. Williams) Okay, I will ask it a different way. 
Did you have some kind of an understanding as to what kind of 
what we call subrogation rights State Farm had? Did you have 
some kind of an understanding about that? 
A Well, they told me, I guess in the conversation, that 
they was going after that money, and at that time that's when 
1 told them that I didn't think that they should pursue it in 
that direction. 
Q Did you have some kind of an understanding from some 
source about, assuming State Farm didn't go after that money 
from the $50,000, that they could go after Mr. and Mrs. Bryan 
or their son for the money? Did you have any understanding 
about their rights to do that? 
A That State Farm could go after them? 
Q Yes. 
A No, I didn't have any idea about that. 
Q Your attorney didn't tell you about that? 
A To my knowledge, he didn't. He might have, but I don't 
know. 
Q Did anyone tell you that by signing that agreement State 
Farm wouldn't be able to do that? 
A I don't think so. 
Q Did you have an understanding about that one way or 
another? 
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A Mo. 
Q Were there any discussions before you signed this 
document, Exhibit 1, with anyone from State Farm, other than 
the early contacts you have told me about? 
A I don't recall whether there was or not. 
Q You don't remember talking to Clark Davis about what 
State Farm's position was before the money was paid? 
A Yeah, we talked to Clark Davis several times. 
Q You understood he was with State Farm? 
A That's right. 
Q When was the last time that you talked with him about 
these matters? 
A I don't know. 
Q Was it before you signed this release document? 
A Probably. 
Q Tell me what was said in substance in that conversation, 
that last conversation. 
A I can't tell you. I don't know. I don't remember. 
Q Can you tell me generally what his position was? 
A His position was that they was going to get part of that 
money from CUMIS. 
Q What part? 
A The part of the $50,000 on the policy. 
Q Did you have a dispute with him about that? 
A I sure did. 
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1 Q What was your position? 
2 A My position was that they didn't have any right in that 
3 part of the money. In fact, I not only talked to Clark Davis 
4 but I asked to talk to his boss also. 
5 Q Do you know who that was? 
6 A His boss -- I can't remember what his name was. 
7 Q Does Grant Cutler sound familiar? 
ft A That name came up. But there was another name, Morgan. 
9 I am not sure whether it was Morgan or — I don't remember 
10 what his boss' name was, but it was his boss. 
11 Q Did you talk to that person, whoever it was? 
12 A Yes, I sure did. 
13 Q Was that in a meeting or a telephone call? 
14 A That was in a meeting. 
15 Q At State Farm? 
16 A That's right. 
17 Q Again, we are talking about -- correct me if I am 
18 wrong -- but a time period prior to the time you signed this 
19 release? 
20 A That's right. 
21 Q Whoever it was, the boss -- by the way, who else was 
22 present in that meeting? Was your wife? 
23 A I think there was me and my wife and Clark and, as far as 
24 I remember, his boss. 
25 Q What was said, in substance? Tell me their position. 
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A I have told you just what has been said before, that the 
fact renained that they wanted to pursue in getting money 
from CUMIS out of the $50,000 that was owed to us. And that's 
what Clark told us to begin with. And I insisted on having a 
meeting with his boss. And he rejected that at first. And I 
told him that I insisted on having a meeting with him. 
Q When you say he rejected it, he didn't want you to talk 
to his boss? 
A That's right. He wanted to handle the thing himself. I 
insisted on talking to him. 
0 You were able to get the audience with the boss. What 
did the boss say? 
A I think the boss read some documents or whatever and got 
on the phone and called the head office or whatever and said 
that's the way it was. I think at that time that they -- the 
$5,000 — they paid us for the $5,600 for the automobile, and 
they said that they would go with the -- I think the death 
benefit, but as far as the other, that they would not — they 
couldn't do it, that they was going after that money. 
Q Was there a discussion by either Clark Davis or this 
fellow who was his supervisor --* was there some discussion 
about their rights to proceed against Paul Bryan or his 
parents? 
A Well, I am not sure whether there was anything said as 
far as Paul Bryan or the parents. They was going — as far as 
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I recall, it was after the insurance company and not them. To 
my knowledge. I don't remember. 
Q Were there any discussions with anyone from State Farm 
concerning their getting involved to try to recover their 
money in the lawsuits that you were contemplating? Was there 
any discussion about that? 
A Not that I know of. 
Q At the time that you signed this release -- by the way, 
had your attorney explained what the terms of the release were 
going to be before you were invited to come in and sign it? 
Did you know in advance what you were going to be doing? 
A Yes. 
Q That was Mr. Lauchnor that explained that to you? 
A Yes, I think so. 
Q Did you ever contact anyone from State Farm to tell them 
what you were going to do? 
A To my knowledge, no. 
Q Do you know if your attorney did? Did he tell you that 
he had contacted State Farm? 
A I am not sure. He might have done. But I don't remember, 
Q You have alleged in your complaint that State Farm was 
aware of this agreement. Is that something that your attorney 
knows more than you do? 
A I am sure. 
(An o f f - the - record d i s c u s s i o n was h e l d . ) 
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Q (By Mr. Williams) Were there any other contacts w^ 'th 
anyone from CUMIS after this document was signed? Did you 
have any reason to go back and talk to them? 
A After they had released the money? 
Q Right. 
A To my knowledge, no. For me, you mean? My personal? 
Q Yes. 
A No, I didn't talk to them. 
Q I want to ask you some questions about Troy in the same 
manner that I asked about Tamara. Here, I will expect, we 
will be getting some help from Mrs. Caldwell. I just ask you 
to keep in mind that the reporter has to somehow make a note 
who is talking here. So we have to try to do this carefully. 
Was Troy just going into his junior year at high school? 
A Troy had just finished junior high and was going into 
senior class, the following year. 
Q You mean sophomore class? 
A He was going into his senior year. He was going to be a 
senior at Brighton High School the following year. 
Q So he had not just finished junior high, he had finished 
his junior year? 
A Yes. 
Q You said junior high. That's what threw me off. 
A Just finished his junior class. 
Q He would have graduated in 1983? 
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work <it S t o k e s R r o t h e r s . He w a s , ^ i y m e t i c u l o u s I n h i s w o r k . 
He L ij 1 '" 'in id1 in1 i" I t" a ; , T ' e e1* q h t h n u r ; worV 
f o r e i g h t h o u i s n a y . H*j we'nt f i ^ i * * ^ i t u r 1*1} 1 » 1 
horn* i n abou*" t h r e e h o u r s . We s a i d , " . iw c o n e , Ti 1 N w c o r e 
you ri r H in n , j
 t rtinjL > i n«.| "* K» s i 1 T gn' 1 r' ivor'' don^ He 
s a 1 1] Ther*1 i s no s e n s e < n f,e s t a y i n g o v e r h e r e , i r aw i 1 1 :: p a j , 
when t -her^ } - n ' t a r r ; * n r k t o <iu. H» w 1 3 t h a t t y p e . 
M |
 , t : k e \ a I << ..a*> j - o r e " " ' »* 1,,*M ^ i s a • ••• - u a c w i l l ^o 
«i I c n g w a y s I n t h i s c o m p a n y . 
0 A:i r" a i a s you =} r e a w a r e , h ' 1 v,^\ t h ' s e a r l y ' n h ; L> - -
b e L . r e h i s s e n i I T
 i < 111 lie i In 11 1 111 " *M^ <-K^ S w i t h a n y 
o o P ^ g e s c o n c e r n i n g e n t r a n c e if*"*" he g r a d u a t e d ? 
( c - o n ^ L h : n* he K ifi ^ •* n, W r ^ l e d q e , t h e r e wi i 
p r o b a b l y some s t u r : 1 it c 1 i< n u < , i h r e u ^ t h e m a i l . 
Ru I "in no1 ' jure i u s ' what T t w i s . 
Q Do you ^ ow ^ he had a s p e c i f i c c o l l e g e m r ^-, 1 hlcl*-_ 1 > 
was g o i n g t 3 go t o ? 
A I don ' * Wn'rf, n o . 
Mih , WI LLIAMS ; Mrs , C al iwe 1 1 ? 
MPT -nJAvlxLj , 1 ^ .,1 LIIM 1 • 11 t"« • 11 '•ook o v e r 
T r o y ' s p l a c e a s be 1 'ng p r e s i d e n t of t h e s e n 1 or c l K o , h ; s 
k7tPtvVM' r imp MD t'^ us ah g r a d u a t i o n and s a ^ d t h a t : Troy r e a l l y 
s hi"-a 1 i he g e t t i n g t ht v.\i< 1 11 .HI M I M I I MI , 1' 
b e c a u s e I t w.t,» g i v e n t o t h e »en io r c l a s s p r e s i d e n t , ar d w i t h 
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I I I , . 4 f-T r o y ' s g r a d e s ih was a fAl Svj'nol W "' ; !"'J ^ " 
s h o u l d h a v e been T r e y ' s . 
0 f ri', " I Wd s he a c t i v e 1 y pu r s u i nq ob t a : n : n q a 
schc l a r s h 1 . p f "i e l 1 HI en t rance . 1 " Wet^ yc u aw.n \,'t '1; h, ". r.; I n 
i n *: "uit i e q a r d ? 
2 M ' 
Q In a d d i t i o n t « ^ ^ wa<= ^ a V i n c oa '" iv- ,iM i ,, i 
f u l l t ime t h a t s u n n e r , a i d * •:* Vo- * "' • ; ~ rey r r c n ariy o t h e r 
1
 I ) ! II I I 1 | I I I I | I ' " 
Mo. 
0 You did provide sor.e of his support? 
t*\ i ( » 
C D i d bp p v e r f i. 1 e any i ncome *" =»v r e*: u r n <= f ~-: 
e n p l o y r ° n - 7 
i i • • 
0 •- - > t h e r e e v e r a r e a s o n f o r h i m t o p a y y o u n o n e y ? 
A P r o b a b 1 y n o r e a s o n 3 u t s e v e r a 1 t i m e s , h e wo u 1 a c 1 v e :. 
some money . I Ui iJ<j,
 t i i ::: p a 1 1 e r i :i s• at 
n VThtV was t h a t fni "» 
\ He would cnMnp hoTIe and maybe g i ve u s $ 1 0 o r 3 1 5 t o he 1 p 
i I  1 1 - i i i i i , i i i *• M • *• i . 
MPS, CALDWELL: H>s b r o t h e r was on a m i s s i o n and ne 1: e ' r. 
1 iV ' ' I-/as q o i n q t o h^ a f a m i l y , ,sn pa'-h p a y c h e c k T r o y w o u l : 
g i < « i i ! Ji i l h i I I i I f i 1 ' ' I ' J i U " « 1 1 1 I ' ! " | ."'"' ' i "I! ( l "' i 1 1 I ! i "! " " 
brother on h s mission each *.-•*• 
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(By M> 
Q Which brother went on a n : ss: DO ? 
A Chet. 
Q w;uM 1 1 • j o V ^ „r, ' i. i,:t; -> 
A May. 
MRS, CALDWELL: S i x w e e k s b e f o r e t h e a c c i d e n t . 
TH! LVIPIL J,J i in i i i > , 'pV • b e f o r e t h e 
a c e I den 1 I mf j n t d I s« ' b a y t i l l ' I 1 . I . < i"/ m j i
 t - ' 
j o u r n a l ? 1 m n ' t know how l o n g Tamny k e p t a J o u r n a l , \ u t 
pre m i
 i in i i iw y i r- , i i i|>' >,ent . *uie f ^ r r *'r y e a r s 
pr ' - \> i h i s c e a t h . He o r t e n «*rc t e a b o u t t n m g s * ^  ^  J 
h a p n ^ n 1 i ^ p ^hnn P r e s i d e n t P e a g a n was s h o t . When ny d a u g h t e r 
hau i n • L 11 iue hi i ii » i '1' in . i n c . now "he 
l o v e i Tamny. And jus t , d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . 
A
 w " i - 0 f -^ ,* ip a n y n - ^ r r ; a^e n l a n s d i s c u s s e d b e f o r e h e was 
- I I i ! I I i j f i t * i < i >g n i i 
^ No. If trie p l a n s t o r c a r r i a g e , ;t would nave b e e n 
1 on.;-1 : e r r , h p ' n u s e th r i y w a n t e i t "» p u r s u e t h e i r e d u c a t i o n and 
. ; i i c • - 1 .M" ) i p t * M i ' 11 11 _i r D " . * f p i . 
Q Was T r o y e v e r a* a n y f * I P ' I I t r o u b l e w i t h tl: :L ES 1 a t i ? 
A Mr , 
n j. n k ^ o u s a I a? 
i e s 
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Q He had not, however, got to the point where he could own 
his own car? 
A That's true, financially. 
Q Did he have any other property of substance, other than 
clothes and usual things? 
A Motorcycle. 
Q He did have a motorcycle? 
A Yes. 
Q Was it a dirt bike? 
A Yes. 
Q How long had he been riding that? 
A Since he was eight years old. 
Q Other than the contribution to help while his brother was 
on a mission, can you tell me some of the other things he did 
for the family that for which the whole family somehow got 
some benefits or which the parents got benefit for? 
A Nothing, other than like I say, he was just a real 
generous and considerate boy. 
Q Did he have some jobs that were assigned to him around 
the home? 
A Yeah, I guess. Not definite assignments, but he helped 
around the house, yes. 
Q You didn't have to get after him to help you with the 
yard or anything like that? 
A No. 
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Q I guess he and Todd sort of were close? 
A Very close. 
Q How about the other kids? Did he have a good 
relationship with the other children? 
A Yes, had a real good rapport with all of his brothers and 
sisters. 
Q Did he stay with projects once he started them, pretty 
much? 
A Yes. 
Q Is there anything you would like to add about his 
personality that you haven't already told ne about, that would 
help me understand it a little more? 
A Nothing other than he was just a top-notch boy. He had 
the ability to read the paper or whatever it might be and 
glean things from what he read, and had a real good use. He 
had the ability to — he knew what was going on. 
Q You mean current events? 
A Current events. 
Q What kind of a relationship did you have with him 
personally? 
A Real good relationship. 
Q During the year before he died, did you spend some time 
with him alone? 
A Yes. 
Q How of ten , genera l ly speaking? 
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A Oh, probably days, maybe two or three days, whatever, out 
of each month. 
Q Were there things that you and he liked to do together? 
A Yes. 
Q Like what? 
A We liked to play baseball together. We liked to ride 
motorcycles together. We done some fishing and some hunting 
together. Although, he liked to stay home with his mother 
when I would go hunting, he would usually like to stay home 
with mother. Him and his mother had a very close 
relationship. More so than any of the other children. 
Q Did he have any health problems prior to his death? 
A No. 
Q Who were his closest friends before he died? 
A Well, his brother was his closest, his twin brother. 
Q Who else? 
A Bill Holt and Ron Wade was, I guess, one of his closest. 
Q Anybody else that comes to your mind? 
A Well, he just had — I guess everybody was his friend. 
Q Any idea what Bill Holt is doing nowadays? 
A Yes. Bill Holt is living at home and working. I don't 
know exactly where he works. 
Q What is his father's name, do you know? 
A Herbert. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Mrs. Caldwell? 
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MRS. CALDWELL: Bill is one of the best players for 
U.S.C. College basketball, 
THE WITNESS: He is going to school but he is hone now. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) S.U.S.C? 
A In Price. 
Q That's College of Eastern Utah. 
A Right. He is one of their top basketball players there. 
Q And Ron Wade, do you know what he is doing? 
A Ron Wade is on a mission. 
Q Do you know which one? 
MRS. CALDWELL: He is in Brazil, I think. His father is 
president of Dixie College. 
THE WITNESS: Alton Wade is his father. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I think that's all I have. 
MR. LAUCHNOR: I don't have anything. 
(Whereupon, at 2:30 p.m. this deposition was concluded.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF ) 
COUNTY OF ) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have read the foregoing testimony j 
consisting of 42 pages, numbered from 3 to 44, inclusive, 
and the same is a true and correct transcription of said J 
testimony except as I have corrected it in ink, giving my J 
reasons therefor and affixed my initials thereto. j 
i 
i 
i 
LORIN DEAN CALDWELL 
* * • 
Subscribed and sworn to at , this 
day of , 1984. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My commission expires: 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the deposition of LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, the witness in the foregoing deposition named, was 
taken before me, BRAD J. YOUNG, a Certified Shorthand Reporter 
and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, residing at 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
That the said witness was by me, before examination duly 
sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 
the truth in said cause. 
That the testimony of said witness was reported by me in 
Stenotype and thereafter caused by me to be transcribed into 
typewriting, and that a full, true and correct transcription 
of said testimony so taken and transcribed is set forth in the 
foregoing pages numbered from 3 to 44 inclusive, and said 
witness deposed and said as in the foregoing annexed 
deposition. 
I further certify that after the said deposition was 
transcribed, the original of same was held at the offices of 
Associated Professional Reporters, 420 Kearns Building, Salt 
Lake City, for the witness to read, signed before a Notary 
Public, and to be returned to me for filing with the Clerk of 
the said Court. 
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I further certify that I am not of kin or otherwise 
associated with any of the parties to said cause of action, 
and that I am not interested in the event thereof. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this ^&fa day of A^v.^ , 1984. 
My commission expires: 
December 8, 1986 
BRAD J. Yi w NG// 
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RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the payment to the under-
signed at this time of the sum of TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN 
HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($27,755.00) , the receipt c 
which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned, being of lawful 
age, individually, as parents, natural guardians, and representa-
tives of the estate of Troy Neil Caldwell, and for and on behalf 
of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased, do hereby release, 
acquit, and forever discharge KENNETH PAUL BRYAN, FARRELL L. 
BRYAN, ILENE M. BRYAN, NORMAN L. BROWN dba SPOT II, their agents 
servants, employees, and insurers, of and from any and all actio; 
causes of action, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of servi^ 
loss of society, comfort, and companionship, expenses, loss of 
income or other compensation, on account of, or in any way grcwi: 
out of all known and unknown injuries and/or damages, resulting 
or to result from that particular automobile accident that occur: 
on or about the 6th day of June, 1982, at or near the intersectic 
of 3900 South Street and 7th East Street in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, wherein a vehicle operated by Kenneth Paul Bryan 
collided with a vehicle in which Troy Neil Caldwell was riding, 
resulting in his death. 
IT IS UNDERSTOOD that of the above amount, FIVE THOUSA: 
FIVE HUNDRED TEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($5,510.00) represents damage 
to the undersigned's automobile and that such amount will be made 
payable by separate check to State Farm Mutual Insurance Company 
and Lorin D. Caldwell, wherein a controversy exists between State 
Farm Mutual Insurance Company and Lorin D. Caldwell as to who is 
entitled to the said amount, and that the matter will be resolvec 
between the two or by payment into court or by judicial determine 
tion. 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY DECLARE AND REPRESENT that in 
making this release and agreement it is understood and agreed 
that the undersigned rely wholly upon their own judgment, belief, 
and knowledge of the nature and extent of said damages, and that 
the undersigned have not been influenced to any extent whatsoever 
in making this release by any representations or statements 
regarding the accident, or regarding any other matters, made by 
the persons, firms, or corporations who are hereby released, or 
by any person or persons representing them. 
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that this settlemer. 
is the compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim, and that the 
payment made pursuant to this release is not to be construed as 
an admission of liability on the part of the parties released 
hereby, by whom liability is expressly denied. 
THE UNDERSIGNED UNDERSTAND AGREE that the accident 
resulting in the death of Troy Neil Caldwell, described in this 
release of all claims, may have caused damages, the existence 
of which and the consequences of which are nov; unknown but which 
may become known in the future. The undersigned nevertheless 
intend to and do release, for and on their own behalf, on behalf 
of the estate of Troy Neil Caldwell, and on behalf of all the 
heirs of the estate of Troy Neil Caldwell, all claims for all 
injuries and damages to the undersigned, the estate and/or the 
heirs of the estate of Troy Neil Caldwell, whether now known or 
unknown and whether now in existence or hereinafter to arise. 
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that should the 
undersigned commence legal action against any third party, not 
released under this release, for the damages resulting from the 
accident and subsequent death of Troy Neil Caldwell, as described 
in this release, that such third party will be entitled to a seto 
for the amounts paid under this release or the percentage of 
responsibility that might be attributable to the parties released 
herein, if any, whichever is greater, and this release is intende, 
to comply with the provisions of Section 73-27-42 and Section 
78-27-43 of Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
THIS RELEASE contains the entire agreement between the 
parties hereto, and the terms of this release are contractual 
and not a mere recital. 
THE UNDERSIGNED FURTHER STATE that they have carefully 
read the foregoing release and know the contents thereof, and the 
undersigned sign the same as their own free act. 
DATED this day of March, 1933. 
LORIN DEAN CALDWELL, Individually and 
as Father, Natural Guardian, and Rep-
resentative of the Estate and Heirs 
of Troy Neil Caldwell 
-2-
M. LARUE HENDERSON CALDWELL, Individi 
ally and as Mother, Natural Guardian, 
and Representative of the Estate and 
Heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell 
! Witness 
- ^  -
TabG 
( M M -MW 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, et 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
al. , : 
STATE FARM INSURANCE AUTOMO- : 
BILE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
STATE FARM INSURANCE AUTOMO- : 
BILE INSURANCE COMPANY, : 
Third Party Plaintiff, : 
-vs-
KENNETH PAUL BRYAN, 
Third Party Def< andant. : 
Civil No. C83-8099 
Judge Judith M. Billings 
Deposition of: 
ROBERT KENT HILL 
* * • 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of August, 1984, the 
deposition of ROBERT KENT HILL, produced as a witness herein 
at the instance of the defendant and third party plaintiff, 
herein, in the above-entitled action now pending in the above-
named court, was taken before BRAD J. YOUNG, a Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of 
Utah, commencing at the hour of 10:50 a.m. of said day at the 
offices of STRONG & HANNI, Sixth Floor Boston Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to notice. 
• * * 
BRAD J. YOUNG 
Associated Professional Reporters 
420 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 322-3441 
0000175 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiffs: 
For the Defendant 
and Third Party 
Plaintiff: 
Also Present: 
WALLY LAUCHNOR 
PAULSEN, LAUCHNOR & DAVIS 
Attorneys at Law 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
R. SCOTT WILLIAMS 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys at Law 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Janet Hill 
Dean Caldwell 
LaRue Caldwell 
I_ N D E X 
WITNESS 
ROBERT KENT HILL 
Examination by Mr. Williams 
Examination by Mr. Lauchnor 
Further Examination by Mr. Williams 
Further Examination by Mr. Lauchnor 
Further Examination by Mr. Williams 
Defendant's Exhibit 1 
• * • 
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A 
1 
0 
5 
0 
2 ROBERT KENT HILL, 
3 called as a witness by and on behalf of the Defendant and 
4 Third-Party Plaintiff, being first duly sworn, was examined 
5 and testified as follows: 
6 EXAMINATION 
7 BY MR, WILLIAMS; 
8 Q Let the record show this is almost the time and the place 
9 for the taking of the deposition of Robert Hill. The 
10 deposition is pursuant to notice and governed by the Utah 
11 Rules of Civil Procedure. 
12 Would you state your name, please, for the record. 
13 A Robert Kent Hill. 
14 Q What is your age, Mr. Hill? 
15 A 45. 
16 Q Your present address? 
17 A 3213 East Danforth Drive, Salt Lake. 
18 Q Have you ever had your deposition taken before for any 
19 reason? 
20 A I don't recall. I don't believe I have. 
21 Q Just so we understand what this procedure is about today, 
22 I intend to ask you questions about the nature of this lawsuit 
23 that we have going and a little bit about your deceased 
24 I daughter. If you don't understand any of my questions, I 
25 | would appreciate it if you would let me know so that we know 
3 
we are communicating. Is that fair? 
A Yeah, I will. 
Q If you don't tell me, I will assume you understand my 
questions. 
Mr. Hill, tell me where you are presently employed. 
A Presently I am employed for Rick Warner Ford. 
Q In what capacity? 
A Automobile salesman. 
Q Used cars? 
A New; primarily new. 
Q How long have you been there? 
A About six and a half, seven weeks. 
Q Tell me just briefly what your educational background is 
A I graduated fro© Brigham Young University with a 
Bachelor's in Spanish and a minor in accounting in August of 
1963. 
Q Any additional schooling after that? 
A Just various classes at the universities and colleges in 
various towns since then but no degree, no other degree. 
Q You have how many children presently? 
A We have five children. 
Q What is your wife's name? 
A Janet. 
Q Tamara Elaine Hill was your daughter; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
4 
Q Would she have been the sixth child? 
A She would have been the second child. 
Q I mean you would have six children if she were still 
alive? 
A That's right. 
Q Tell me just briefly the names of the others and their 
approximate ages. 
A Okay, Lisa is our oldest. She is 21. Tammy was 16, so 
she would be 18. Teresa is 15, Teresa Helen. Then there is 
Tina Irene. She is nine. Then there is Robbie, Robert John. 
He is seven. And then Richard. He is one year. 
Q Are these, all of your children, natural children? 
A They are all natural children, every one of them. 
Q Both you and your wife, Janet? 
A That's right. We have never been married before. This 
is our family. 
Q I understand that Tamara was killed as a result of an 
accident on June 6, 1982; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q That accident apparently happened at the intersection of 
7th East and 3900 South; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Tamara would have been a passenger in a vehicle that Troy 
Caldwell was driving? 
A That's right. 
5 
Q As far as you know, she would have been sitting in the 
front seat, I assume, the information you have? 
A That's the information I have. I never did visually 
verify it but I am sure that's correct. 
Q Apparently, Troy — do you understand that Troy was 
driving his father's automobile at the time? 
A That's right. 
Q Did you know Troy Caldwell prior to this day? 
A Yes. 
Q How did you happen to become acquainted with him? 
A Well, he liked our daughter, and they dated a little bit, 
and he had been over to our home a few times. 
Q How long had they dated prior to June 6 of 1982? 
A About six months, I guess. 
Q Was that a pretty steady dating relationship? 
A Well, she was 16, and he was 17. I would say for that 
age, relatively so. 
Q Once a week? Were they together once a week for a date? 
A Sometimes. Sometimes more than that, depending. They 
weren't going "steady" that I am aware of in terms of what the 
social mores of the kids is. 
Q They certainly were not engaged? 
A No. 
Q They had not talked with you about any plans for marriage? 
A Oh, no, not to me. 
6 
Q You hadn't heard of those plans from any other source, I 
guess? 
A Well, I think the subject was broached in terms of them 
thinking an awful lot of each other. But in terms of any 
seriousness of approaching that idea, no. 
Q Tell me just briefly, again from whatever source, your 
information as to how the accident happened, very briefly. 
A Well, very briefly, Troy and Tammy were in the Honda 
Prelude. Troy was driving south on 700 East, about midnight 
of that night. They were returning from a show downtown in 
Salt Lake City. I also have some information of a friend who 
was in a car right in front of them. 
MRS. HILL: Behind. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Who was that person? 
A His name is John — he works for Imperial Realty. 
MRS. HILL: Nielsen. 
THE WITNESS: So he has verified that as the only real 
personal contact I have had. They were driving down that 
road, and they came to a stop light, which was at 3900 South 
intersection. They were in not the left most lane but --
well, I don't know exactly which lane they were in — but they 
came to a stop, and the light changed, and they proceeded — 
now, John Nielsen's wife spoke to him — 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Spoke to who? 
A To John. They were in the car behind them. And said — 
7 
you know, she was watching, and said, Don't go. She must have 
seen the other vehicle coining. But they proceeded into the 
path of the vehicle driven by Kenneth -- Paul Kenneth Bryan, 
and he broadsided them with impact and pushed them almost 
over to the intersection where the Arctic Circle drive-in 
was. The impact of the pickup being driven by Paul Bryan 
striking them broadside was where Tammy was seated. He was 
going at a fairly high rate of speed -- this was all taken in 
the testimony of the court — it is a matter of record -- 50 
miles an hour, perhaps in excess, and knocked the car clear 
over there by the corner of where the Arctic Circle drive-in 
was. 
Q Was there anything else that you wanted to say? 
A Just that we understand that Tammy was killed instantly 
and Troy died very shortly, within less than a half hour 
thereafter. 
Q From your understanding, Mr. Bryan would have been 
traveling westbound? 
A No. He was traveling eastbound on 3900 South. 
Q That's right, because Caldwell was traveling southbound, 
you say? 
A South on 7th East. 
Q You mentioned something about t h i s John Nie l sen . Did 
you persona l ly ta lk to him? 
A After i t was a l l over, I d i d , because he came to work a t 
8 
1 Imperial Realty after this was all over. I had known him 
2 previously but I had not spoken to him about it. It was 
3 rather interesting that we sat down and had this conversation. 
4 He was so close that they could have been involved. 
5 Q They were in the vehicle immediately behind — 
6 A I don't even know if they were in the same lane or not. 
7 Q You mentioned something about the fact that Mrs. Nielsen 
8 reported that she could see Paul Bryan's vehicle coming? 
9 A She said something to him. I don't know any other 
10 details about that. 
11 Q It is your understanding that she told her husband not to 
12 go because of the vehicle coming? 
13 A Yeah. He felt like he could have been in their place. I 
14 have reason to believe that they weren't in the same lane. 
15 But they did not proceed. 
16 Q You mentioned also that there was a court hearing. I 
17 assume that that was on the negligent homicide action that was 
18 brought against Mr. Bryan; is that right? 
19 A Prosecution of Paul Bryan. 
20 Q Did you go to that hearing? 
21 A I did not. I read through transcripts of it. I didn't 
22 feel emotionally — I didn't want to meet Paul Bryan face-to-
23 face. 
24 Q Did you --
25 A For my own personal reasons, which I won't tell here. 
Q I understand. I assume you know how the court case came 
out. 
A That's right. 
Q The result. Can you tell us what that was, from your 
understanding? 
A Well, rather sketchy. He was convicted on a lesser 
count than was originally charged. And, gee, I think they 
were pressing for the most serious charge that could have been 
brought against someone driving under those conditions. Quite 
frankly, I don't remember the terms as to just exactly what it 
was reduced to. But he was convicted and sentenced to the 
prison, which is unusual in those cases. 
Q Is it your understanding that he is still in prison? 
A As far as I know. 
Q Have you ever at any time talked with Paul Bryan? 
A Never. 
Q Have you ever talked with an attorney who represented 
Mr. Bryan? 
A Yes. 
Q Was that an attorney that represented him on the criminal 
action or one that was hired by his insurance company, do you 
know? 
A One hired by his insurance company. 
Q I will ask you about that in a few minutes. 
I understand that Mr. Caldwell was insured by State Farm 
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at the time of this accident. Were you insured at the time on 
any vehicles you owned? 
A I probably was but I didn't make any --
Q Do you know the name of the company that you were insured 
with? 
A No. I didn't come prepared to answer that. 
Q I understand. 
I understand also, Mr. Hill, that after your daughter's 
death that there was a certain amount of money paid to you 
under what they call the no fault benefits of Mr. Caldwell's 
policy; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Am I correct in stating that that was approximately 
$6,000? 
A $5,000 was paid to me on about the 17th of June, and I 
understand that another $1,000 was paid to the mortuary 
direct. Well, I am sure that was paid — I verified that — 
by State Farm. 
Q At some point in time did you obtain the services of an 
attorney after your daughter's death? 
A Yes, we did. 
Q Who did you contact first? 
A Well, I contacted the bar to get some references, some 
referrals. They gave me Dale Kent and one other one, one 
other attorney. I went to see Dale Kent, but I don't recall 
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the name of the other one. I am not sure I called, I made 
several inquiries to try to get some sort of referral through 
either the bar or this referral service they have for 
attorneys. And we did have a meeting with Dale Kent. 
Q What were you hoping to accomplish by going to see 
Mr. Kent? What was the reason for that? 
A Well, okay, now, this all boils down to a highly 
emotional situation. I would have to interject that right 
shortly after the accident, CUMIS, CUNA Mutual Insurance, 
called us in, the Caldwells and Janet and I, to make us an 
offer of the amount of the insurance coverage, as soon as they 
had gone through their rigmarole of death certificates and so 
forth. And I don't remember whether we contacted an attorney 
before or after that. I think it was after that. 
Q Let's go back to that, just take things chronologically. 
Your first contact with anybody from CUMIS was in response to 
a phone call from them? 
A I don't remember how that was initiated. I think our 
first contact with an insurance company was with State Farm. 
I talked to Mr. Davis, and I went in and saw Mr. Davis. And I 
think as a result of that we were able to supply him with 
death certificates or whatever he required for the no fault 
benefits that were subsequently paid. And then somehow — of 
course, the Caldwells and Janet and I worked together on 
this — either through State Farm or through our own resources 
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we somehow got in touch with CUMIS. Perhaps they called us. 
Q Can you give me a time frame that that might have taken 
place, from the date of the accident? 
A I wasn't able to find my correspondence file with CUMIS. 
Q Just approximately how many months after? 
A Well, like I say, CUMIS made us an offer, us and the 
Caldwells, within a relatively — you know, within three weeks 
of the time, maybe a month or less. I don't remember exactly. 
We went to their office, and they wanted us to sign the 
release. 
Q You and your wife went? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And Mr. and Mrs. C a l d w e l l went i n ? 
A T h a t ' s r i g h t . 
Q Who did you meet with at CUMIS, do you remember? 
A Greg Winget. 
Q Is that W-e-n-g-e-t? 
A I think it is W-i-n-g-e-t. I don't know exactly haw it 
is spelled. I remember in our conversations, I also talked 
with Mary Cornevaux. 
Q Prior to the actual meeting in the office of CUMIS, can 
you tell me anything about the substance of conversations you 
had with anybody from CUMIS over the phone? 
A Yeah. It had to do with a question as to whether or not 
they were liable in the accident, as to whether — that's 
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where i t s t a r t e d . Now t h a t I r e c a l l , my mind i s s t a r t i n g t o 
come back . They d i d n ' t c l a im any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i t a t t he 
o u t s e t , in our i n i t i a l c o n v e r s a t i o n s . 
Q T e l l me about t h a t , 
A Well ~ 
Q Who did you talk to and what was said? 
A Either Mary Cornevaux or Greg Winget. There may have 
been one other individual. You know, we were pursuing the 
insurance claim. One of the reasons is because I wasn't 
particularly well — I wasn't financially strong at the time. 
I didn't have any savings. And there was some people that 
gave us some money, because I was totally incapable of working 
right at first. The emotional impact of it was a surprise to 
me. I didn't realize that I would be incapacitated the way I 
was. 
Q I understand. 
A So we pursued the insurance thing, and they had to call 
their home office and see if actually there was liability, 
because there was a question as to whether or not they were 
liable for the insurance on the vehicle because Paul Bryan was 
not a licensed driver at the time and his parents were the 
ones who provided him with the vehicle — my understanding -— 
and they were the ones who carried the insurance on the 
vehicle he was driving, on the pickup. 
Q Let me see if I can summarize that to your satisfaction. 
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Apparently, you initiated the contacts with CUMIS, based on 
your memory now? 
A I can't say for a fact whether or not I initiated or 
whether they did. I honestly do not recall. 
Q In any event, you are asking the question about trying to 
get some insurance proceeds? 
A Yeah. We got together, that's right. 
Q You wanted to get paid some money from their insurance 
policy; is that right? 
A (The witness nods head in the affirmative.) 
Q And you let them know that; is that right? 
A (The witness nods head in the affirmative.) 
MR, LAUCHNOR: Answer audibly. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) They said, in short, there may be a 
question about whether there is coverage that would require 
the insurance company to pay? 
A That's right. That was definitely a question at first. 
Q Your understanding of that coverage question relates to 
the fact that he wasn't a licensed driver? 
A Well, the fact that the vehicle was not registered in his 
name, apparently. That, I can't state for a fact. But I do 
know that he had had his license revoked on several occasions, 
so he was incapable of purchasing insurance on his own. And 
the vehicle was insured by his parents. He was driving the 
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vehicle — and there is no question about that — at the tine 
of this accident. So CUMIS did raise a question that they 
were liable. And they had to determine that. And part of 
that was corresponding with their home office and getting a 
certified copy of the policy. It had to be registered in the 
county wherever the policy was issued, back in the Mid-West 
and so forth. 
Q What is the next thing that happened? 
A That was at the time they made us the offer. 
Q They brought you in after they had done their initial 
checking? 
A Yes. They determined that they were liable, to their own 
satisfaction. 
Q Then they invited you in? 
A Brought us in and made -us an offer, at which time they 
wanted us to sign a release of all claims. 
Q Tell me, as best you remember, everything that was said 
in that meeting. 
A Mr. Winget came in. We were all seated there. He had 
the form. He was polite and gracious and made reference to 
the fact that they had to deal with this, and made a 
statement, and of course, it was in writing on the release of 
all claims. They made a full offer of the full limits of the 
liability — the coverage under that policy, which was a total 
combined limit of $50,000, divided equally between the 
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Caldwells and ourselves. So that would have been $25,000 for 
each. That offer was made in writing and verbally. And that 
was in the form of a release of all claims, that they wanted 
us to sign at that time, at that meeting. 
Q What else was said or what else happened in that meeting? 
A Well, we declined to sign it. 
Q Declined to sign the release? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). We declined their offer. 
Q For what reason? 
A Well, I think by that time we had contacted another 
attorney. Yeah. I think we had contacted Keith Nelson, and 
suggested that that may not be a wise thing to do. 
Q Let's back up a little bit. Prior to going into the 
meeting at CUMIS, you apparently met with Dale Kent? 
A Yes. That was one of the first things we did. 
Q I assume, though I don *t want to put words in your mouth, 
that you were going to Mr. Kent for legal advice about — 
A That's right. 
Q — what to do with — 
A The broader background of it would be this. I have never 
been involved in a lawsuit before. I have never been through 
a traumatic situation like this in my life. And I was a 
little befuddled and I was a little unsure what was the best 
thing to do. There was a very deep moral issue involved as to 
whether or not I should just forgive the man, take the 
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insurance money offered and let it go. So there was this old 
human motive of whether or not I should pursue that family. 
I learned very early on that his parents were aged. One 
of them was infirmed. They didn't have great assets. And 
that if we sued, we would be suing them, not this guy. His 
life was in a mess. He didn't have control of his life or he 
wouldn't have done this. So we — in my own mind, it was a 
very conscience-oriented thing as to whether or not I should 
even consider suing them. I knew I wouldn't be suing this 
yokel. I would be suing his parents. He had no assets. So 
it was a conscience issue with me. I did not want to sue. 
But I was correlating the wishes of my wife and the 
Caldwells. We were all heated. And it was not a unilateral 
action or choice on my part. I did not make all the 
decisions. I was trying to reconcile the points of view of 
three other parents. And that is the reason that I consulted 
an attorney in the first place. 
Q That must have been within the first three weeks you saw 
Mr. Kent? 
A Yes. 
Q Prior to the time you went in to see Mr. Kent, had you 
done some of your own investigation about the financial 
abilities of the Bryans? 
A Well, I think there had been some conversations between 
the Caldwells and the Bryans, as I recall, early on. I did 
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not personally go to see then until much later in the 
proceedings. But I did — you know, the word got out very 
quickly that they were very sorry about it, the parents. He 
was an adopted child. They were very sorry. I did not feel 
emotionally prepared to confront them or him. 
And so I just went on the information that we got through 
phone calls and -- you know, there were other people that were 
intensely interested in this. There were law enforcement 
officers. This Officer Odor was deeply involved in it. He 
took it very seriously. He did a lot of investigation. He 
was helpful, nice. I received information from many sources. 
It was very early on, right after the accident, that I 
ascertained the parents provided the insurance. They were 
older, infirmed and penitent. They felt very bad about it. 
Q Did they appear to have assets, and, if so, can you tell 
me what they had? 
A It was just hearsay at first, that they didn't have 
anything much, and so then after we saw Dale Kent, we decided 
not to go with him, we talked with Keith Nelson, he suggested 
there may be other insurance coverages. He suggested there 
may be some insurance in the bar where this guy was served. 
According to the Utah Dram Shop Act, he should not have been 
served when he was under the influence of alcohol. It abetted 
the situation so he committed what he did. None of these 
decisions were based on one or two items. They were based on 
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the feelings, emotions of the other people involved. 
Q Let me see if we can just focus in on one event at a time. 
A But all these things happened at once. All these bits of 
information were at my disposal very early on so I could make 
a determination, shall I forget these people and just let it 
go and take the offer, or shall we pursue it from a legal 
standpoint? Because my motive I have was not just money. We 
had been hurt. We felt perhaps maybe some sort of warped 
justice could be done. Because there were heated feelings on 
all of our parts. To be very frank, my first reaction was, it 
is done. The poor guy, you know. He has really loused it 
up. I can't better my situation. So I really didn't want to 
sue at first. 
Q You went to Dale Kent. You decided not to use Mr. Kent? 
A That's right. 
Q Can you tell me why? 
A Just thought that perhaps Keith Nelson would be better. 
I knew Keith. We grew up together. He was a better attorney. 
And he had some knowledge and expertise in this field. 
Q It wasn't because of anything Mr. Kent said? 
A No. He was nice and fine. It was just I didn't feel 
like — it is all relative. If one man is more qualified than 
another, I will go with the man I feel I can trust, first of 
all, because I knew Keith. I knew his family. I knew his 
background. To me, he was trustworthy and I could rely on 
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his expertise as well as the fact that he would be square. 
Q Did you meet with Keith Nelson prior -- just so I am 
clear on this — prior to the meeting at CUMIS? I think you 
implied that but I am not sure, 
A I think I did on an informal — I am not sure. I do not 
remember exactly. I met with Keith once before we met at his 
office. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Let's see if your wife can help us, if it 
is all right with you, Wally. 
MR. LAUCHNOR: Fine. 
MRS. HILL: I think it was exactly two weeks, I remember, 
meeting with Keith in their home. 
THE WITNESS: Was that before we met with CUMIS and they 
made us the offer? 
MRS. HILL: I think so. 
THE WITNESS: I am still not sure about that. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) In any event, when you went to see 
CUMIS, you had reservations from someplace about whether it 
was the best thing to do to sign the release at that time? 
A Yeah. As a matter of fact, even on the simple basis of 
whether or not I was properly oriented and emotionally clear 
at the time to be able to do that. 
Q You didn't take their money at that time, and you told 
them that. What is the next thing that happened in the chain 
of events, as far as you can remember? 
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A And then we proceeded with Keith Nelson and Mr. Davies, 
his assistant, who started an investigation into the -- all of 
the avenues of possibility. 
Q That was Lynn Davies? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). Simultaneously, they were 
investigating The Spot II, which was the bar where Paul Bryan 
had had his last drink. At the same time they were checking 
into the possibility of any other insurance coverage or 
whatever that the Bryans may have had. To make a long story 
short, they found out there wasn't much, and after it drug on 
and on and on, I finally went out to see the parents of 
Kenneth Bryan myself. I made an appointment with them and 
went out and saw them and talked with them face-to-face. I 
could see their situation. 
Q Let me stop you there for a second. After you saw 
Mr. Nelson again, and he started the investigation, was there 
any contact during that period of time, any further contact 
during that period of time, with anybody from CUMIS, before 
you go to see the Bryans? 
A Well, I am sure there was. Okay, I have a letter here 
that shows when Keith Nelson sent a letter to CUMIS, telling 
them to withhold payment of all claims until they had been --
any claims had been satisfied. So that's — so I don't 
remember exactly what happened after then, it was kind of a 
waiting period for the Nelson — Keith Nelson and his 
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assistant to do their thing. 
Q That was approximately how long a period of time before 
you went to see them? 
A The letter was dated in August, where he sent it to 
CUMIS, telling them to not pay any claims until all claims 
were satisfied through his office. Then the investigation 
continued. 
Q Can I see that letter, so we just don't have to ask any 
more questions about it? 
A Yes. 
Q We are looking at a letter dated August 4, 1982, to Mary 
Cornevaux of CUMIS Insurance, signed by Keith Nelson and Lynn 
Davies. 
Mr. Hill, how long after this letter do you think it may 
have been before you went to see Mr. and Mrs. Bryan? 
A Oh, it was probably at least six weeks, maybe two months. 
It may have been more than that. Because the whole thing drug 
on until February of the next year. 
Q You think you saw them in the fall of 1982 sometime? I 
understand it is hard to come up with dates. 
A I think it was towards the fall. I really do. It may 
have been even a little later than that. Because, you know, 
the other investigation was taking place, and we took — you 
know, they took depositions from this guy that had 
The Spot II, and that was fruitless. 
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Q Did Mr. Nelson file a lawsuit at some time in your behalf? 
A That's right, there was a lawsuit filed against the 
Bryans and against this guy that owned The Spot II — that had 
The Spot II . 
Q That lawsuit would have been filed approximately August 
of 1982; is that right? 
A Shortly after this letter, I am quite sure. They just 
went right into it. 
Q Mr. Nelson was representing you and your wife in that 
case? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). And Mr. Davies. 
Q As I understand it, The Spot II, Norman L. Brown, he 
represented himself in that action? Does that sound right to 
you? 
A For a while, until it came to the point of the 
depositions, and then he had an attorney. 
Q Who was his attorney at that point? Do you remember? If 
you don't, that's fine. 
A I could probably think of the name. He was a local 
attorney. 
Q I assume you would agree that Tony Eyre represented 
Kenneth Bryan in that case? Does that sound familiar? 
A There was two or three attorneys involved there. There 
was Tony Eyre. And I talked to him. And I also talked to — 
Q And Leonard Russon? 
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A Yes. 
Q Leonard Russon was representing the parents, though. 
Does that sound right? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative), that firm. 
Q Both Mr. Russon and Mr. Eyre, as far as you understand, 
would have been hired by Bryan's insurance company? 
A I guess. I don't really know for a fact whether they 
were hired by them personally or the insurance company. 
Q You went to see Mr. and Mrs. Bryan. First of all, did 
you go with your wife? 
A I went alone. I made an appointment with them on the 
telephone. We had talked briefly on the telephone. 
Q What was said in the telephone conversation, briefly? 
A Oh, I don't know, just things like -- you know, they were 
so sorry. It was usually the woman that I talked to. She was 
a little more talkative. And I just told them, you know, I 
don't hold anything against you personally, but I would like 
to come out and talk to you. I want to get this resolved. 
Q So you met with them. Tell me what was said, briefly, in 
that conversation. 
A Well, I just went to their home in Tooele. I had made 
the appointment. They were there and a daughter of theirs 
was there, in their living room. They talked a lot about 
Kenneth, how they adopted him, their lives. He even talked 
about his earlier life, and how he had had all these 
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problems, and they were so sorry. 
So I finally asked them a few pointed questions about 
assets. And he said he didn't have any except his home, which 
was free and clear. But I wasn't about to proceed against 
them to take their home away, because they were aged. They 
were beyond 70. They seemed like nice people, decent people. 
So I must have been there half an hour. We talked around 
those subjects. I talked about my daughter, our family. He 
talked about his son and their family. He talked quite a bit 
about his early life and his relationship with his family, as 
I recall. 
Q Was their story about the assets they had consistent 
with what you had learned before? 
A Yes. 
Q Apparently, Mr. Nelson and the attorneys from that firm 
had done their own investigation into the assets? 
A That's right. 
Q And they told you essentially the same thing; is that 
correct? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). Of course, my purpose for going 
out there was not primarily to check into assets. That was 
part of it. I just wanted to meet them face-to-face because 
to me the moral issue was more important than the legal. I 
mean, you know, in the Bible it says that you are supposed to 
forgive. So I wanted to meet them so that I would have 
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something in my mind to grab onto to help me to come to grips 
with my own feelings in the matter, I am not a mercenary 
person, I was not angry or vehement towards them. I was 
polite the whole time. I did ask them a couple of pointed 
questions about their assets. If they had been wealthy 
people and it wouldn't have hurt them, maybe it would have 
been right to pursue it. It would have hurt them in a time in 
their life where it maybe could have caused physical harm to 
them had we proceeded further with this. And they were 
anxious to get it settled and over with. Because it was an 
anxious time for them. They suffered in a way just as much as 
we did, I am sure. 
Q Is it fair to say that from the point that the lawsuit 
had been filed that your contacts with CUMIS were through the 
attorneys representing CUMIS? 
A Pretty much for a period of time there, while we were 
waiting to see if we could, you know, do anything. 
Q Can you tell me the course of events, what is the next 
thing that happened that you feel is significant? 
A Just before I went to see the Bryans, I felt — I don't 
remember whether that was actually — the turning point was 
the deposition of this Brown. And Keith Nelson said, Well, 
you know, I don't think there is anything to be gained by 
going against either one of them. They were both — either 
the owner of the — not the owner but the man who had 
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The Spot II. He didn't own the real estate, this Norman 
Brown, He didn't have any assets. And they weren't able to 
ascertain that there was anything to be accomplished by 
pursuing the Dram Shop Act. So he advised me to drop it. So 
that's when I went to see the Bryans. And then, you know, we 
told them, Okay, we are going to get it wrapped up. 
Q As I understand it, Mr. Nelson is not representing the 
Caldwells during that time period; is that right? 
A That's right. He was representing us alone. 
Q Mr. Caldwell, though we can ask him, apparently was 
getting counsel from someone else? 
A That's right. 
Q Is there a reason why, in your discussions with 
Mr. Caldwell, you decided not to use the same attorney? 
A I don't even remember, except that we didn't agree 
100 percent on the approach of this. Like I said, I didn't 
want to sue at first, but — anyway, we ended up doing it. We 
just got different attorneys. I guess I just felt good about 
seeing Keith. I really didn't know what to do. I just — 
Q I understand. 
A You understand, the moral issue is this. 
Q You told me. 
A If you sue a rich man and you don't break him, it is an 
altogether different thing than getting blood out of a poor 
man, which would serve no purpose. That was my whole feelings 
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at the tine. If there were something they were hiding, I 
thought we should find out. Because it was still concert of 
all of us rather than just my decision. 
Q Tell me what the next event is that you think is 
significant. 
A Well, then, after we decided to drop the suit, then the 
delays started, and then we couldn't get settlement. 
Q When you say the delays started, you mean --
A Well — 
Q What do you mean? 
A We got Nelson to withdraw officially from the case, which 
had to be done. 
Q Tell me about that. Why is that? 
A Well, because he went on record as representing our 
interest, and nothing was to be paid, as that letter 
indicated, out, without their approval. It is a legal action 
that would enable him to speak in our behalf and to receive 
moneys in our behalf, whatever came out of the suit. 
Q Did you have some kind of a fee arrangement with 
Mr. Nelson — I assume you did — where he was to be paid 
somehow for legal services rendered? 
A That's right. 
Q What was the arrangement? 
A It started out as a verbal agreement. And I don't 
remember exactly what it was. 
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Q Did he take the case on what we call a contingency fee? 
A Yes, that was the agreement. 
Q Was there a discussion about whether he would be entitled 
or whether he would take money from out of the $2 5,000 that 
you had already been offered? 
A There was. 
Q What was that discussion? 
A I think it was something in the nature of one third. I 
don't recall. We had a verbal agreement, and then when it 
came in writing, it was different. 
Q Do you have a copy of an attorney fee contract that he 
provided you? 
A I probably do if I can locate — when I locate my file. 
I wasn't able to locate that file but I really didn't start to 
look for it soon enough. 
Q Just so I understand what you were saying a minute ago, 
are you'saying that when it came time to drop the case against 
Mr. and Mrs. Bryan and against The Spot II that Mr. Nelson 
backed out of representing you? 
A Yeah. That was the only thing to do. I asked him to 
withdraw because we weren't going to pursue it any more, based 
on his investigation, our accumulation of facts and 
information and our own feelings, decided to drop it. And 
that would necessitate his withdrawing legally so that we 
could proceed to claim the money that they had offered us 
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initially. 
Q Is there some reason why he didn't at that point continue 
the negotiations with CUMIS, or is it just that you felt he 
wasn't needed at that point? 
MR. LAUCHNOR: Maybe I can help here Scott, save some 
time. Correct me if I am wrong. It was my understanding that 
you hired Keith after they had offered you the policy limits 
to see if there was any other assets and to find out all of 
the facts, that Keith came back and said they had thoroughly 
investigated all of these other possible defendants and the 
boy and found there was nothing available in assets to pursue 
further, other than the insurance with CUMIS, and his 
contingent fee, as I understand it, was based upon anything he 
was going to find over what you had already been offered. 
THE WITNESS: That's right exactly. 
MR. LAUCHNOR: They couldn't find anything, Keith 
withdrew. 
THE WITNESS: That's right. I am sorry, I didn't 
remember that. That's what it was. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) That makes sense, then. I appreciate 
that, Wally. 
So at that point you were prepared, ready to go to CUMIS 
yourself? Is that what you are saying? 
A Yes. We figured, well, let's get it over with. 
Q Had the Caldwells reached the same point in their 
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investigations, where they were ready to go with you to CUMIS? 
A Their attorney was a little slower, and they couldn't get 
positive response so they could act at the same time we could, 
Q We will go into that with them. Tell me, did you then 
have a meeting with CUMIS or did you talk with them on the 
phone? What happened next? 
A We resumed our correspondence. A lot of it was on the 
telephone. I went in to see Greg a few times and then some 
other things started to happen in regards to the change in the 
initial offer was — the initial offer was no longer extant. 
Q At the time that — let me see if I can clarify some 
things in my own mind. At the time you were given the initial 
offer by CUMIS, had you already been paid by State Farm for 
the $5,000? 
A We had been paid the no fault benefits for the — 
Q Death benefits? 
A For the death, right. 
Q Carrying us through now to the time that you are going 
back to CUMIS, ready to negotiate a settlement yourself with 
them, are you telling me that their offer somehow changed? 
A That's right, in addition to — they had made the initial 
offer of $25,000 each, and after all of this had been done, in 
the meantime State Farm came in and said. Through our right of 
subrogation, we want $5,500 of that money. They had 
originally wanted all the death benefits too, apparently. 
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That, I wasn't personally involved in. That was Dean. He was 
insured by State Farm. The car they were killed in was paid 
for. And they wanted that taken out of the proceeds of the 
$25,000. Initially, they wanted the death benefits that we 
both received taken out of the total $50,000 that CUMIS had. 
Q How did you find out about that? 
A Through the Caldwells and I worked closely together. 
We each knew what the other was doing. 
Q Did you ever personally talk with anybody from State Farm 
prior to that meeting with CUMIS, where they tell you that the 
settlement has been changed? 
A I honestly do not recall. I remember meeting with 
Mr. Davis. I may have talked to him one other time. I was 
keeping some notes on the chronological progression of this, 
but I don't know if it is in those notes or not. I could only 
find a page or two of them. 
Q Did you bring your notes with you today? 
A Just one page of them. 
Q If you need to refer to your notes to help you with these 
questions, I would appreciate it if you would do so. 
MR. LAUCHNOR: Do you understand what he is asking you? 
He wants to know if before you went back to Greg Winget to 
tell them you decided to go ahead and take the $25,000, had 
State Farm, the adjuster or whoever at State Farm you were 
dealing with, told you that they wanted out of that $25,000 to 
33 
be repaid the damage on the car and your no fault benefits 
that you had been paid? 
THE WITNESS: I think I got that indirectly through the 
Caldwells, quite frankly. Because Dean really went to bat 
with him because he had paid premiums to them for 20 years or 
more. If I did make contact with them, I may have made 
telephone contact, but I don't honestly recall at this point. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) You went into CUMIS. What did they 
tell you? 
A Then they told me that the amount was reduced to the 
$5,500 less than the $50,000 that was going to be split. 
Q Is that the total $50,000 was reduced or was your $25,000 
reduced? 
A Well, our $25,000 was reduced by $2,250. 
Q That was the offer they made to you? 
A Yeah. That was drawn up on the second release. I think 
we — I don't remember if we went out there or what. 
Q Was that Greg Winget that was carrying on this discussion? 
A Primarily, yeah. 
Q What happened then? 
A Well, that's when we started to demonstrate against that 
and said. That isn't fair. We don't feel that's right. It 
was a concerted effort. We weren't alone in it. The 
Caldwells were with it. 
Q At this point you were not personally represented by a 
34 
lawyer? 
A In between, we weren't, no. 
Q At the time you went out to meet with them, you were not 
represented? 
A When they made the first offer, we were -- I don't think 
we were represented. 
Q I am talking now about the time they said the offer was 
reduced. 
A I can't remember if we went out there again. I think we 
did. Yes, I know we did. The Caldwell's and Janet and I went 
out there again, trying to get it settled. It was in the same 
room, the same type of form, except the figures were changed 
from $25,000 each. They were changed to $22,250 each. 
Q There is the first time back before you ever filed a 
lawsuit? 
A That's right. 
Q And this is the second time you are now talking about, 
where they said you have got to take $22,500 or whatever it 
was? 
A That's right. $22,250. 
Q That was Greg Winget? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Did he tell you why you had to take that reduced amount? 
A Well, the reason was that State Farm had paid $5,500 out 
for the car, the Prelude, that they were killed in, and they 
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wanted it through their rights of subrogation* It was a total 
combined limit. Technically, it was a problem as far as from 
their point of view, 
Q Did he say anything else about it that you can now 
remember? 
A Well, there was a lot of correspondence, primarily on the 
telephone, between myself and Greg Winget. 
Q There was some written correspondence? 
A I think there was some. Very little. There was a lot of 
verbal. 
Q Whatever is written, you have now misplaced someplace and 
hope to be able to find it? 
A Yeah, I can find it. I just wasn't able to find it. I 
didn't start looking early enough. But the essence of it was 
that once we were ready to drop the suit, had dropped the 
suit, they would not pay us the money without deducting that 
amount. If we were willing to sign then, they would pay it. 
Q That was their firm offer, and they were not going to 
deviate from that? Is that what you understand? 
A That's right. 
Q Their position is, we have got to pay this to State Farm? 
A That's right. 
Q Can you tell me now what is the next thing that 
happened — here, what I am looking for, I want to try to get 
this in chronological order — did you then go to see an 
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attorney again or did you then go to see State Farm? Tell me 
what happened next. 
A I don't recall that I personally went to State Farm, 
because it would just have been redundant. Dean was — Dean 
Caldwell was doing that. I was aware of what he was doing. 
Q He was talking to them? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q What do you understand the substance of those 
conversations to be? 
A Well, that he didn't feel it was fair, either. As far as 
I understand, if he hadn't have gone to them and raised Cain, 
they would have deducted the amount of the death benefits from 
this. So he went down there, and spoke very strongly in our 
behalf, with State Farm, and they said they would waive that, 
quote unquote. I don't know about the correctness of that. 
But that's the term they put it in. 
MR. LAUCHNOR: You mean the death benefits? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. They were going to initially take 
that out of the proceeds. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) I will ask Mr. Caldwell more about 
that. 
A I am just trying to give you what I did personally. This 
is all second. 
Q Were the two of you more or less working together at that 
point in time, you and Mr. Caldwell? 
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i! Eial: ! "I ii i Ei' a 1 ways c o o p e r a t e d or 
I, DIcl yoi i c o n s u 1 *; wI th an ,111or ney d u r i n g t h a t p e r i.•>.3 o f 
t i n i e n • • 
Mi int j^ i: ven i nq o e r i o d f ' M I I HI i i MM-« M M hi w 
mm li we were ]us^ t r y i n g t o g e t ; t s e t t l e d , D u r i n q t h a t 
pei * "id n f M n • I « i'Hf f> "i h he S •• Ma Department* of I n s u r a n c e , 
t j 1 MM * M, • ' , n J *\ [)l • , « nfl i ,,b ,,,. ,, i k 
h e l p f u l , He w.is an a t t o r n e y . 
inn wi" t n a ^ 1 Ii ymi di ni' i renernber f h . v "s t i n e 
III I i l l K I Ml M l 1 hi . Ii 11 I II I « I i II II I i - ( ( " II I ' 1 e ' I 1 1 1 . 
II Whtu you say he was a l m o s t h e l p f u l , what 
Mebody ^ I s e was, I f- -i I l ed t o *" w<^  o r t h r e e p e o c ! - t h e r e 
('i I M i l ' M i ' M j . i i c i I I n i i j i in ' mi i i i I I ' i I  N i r e 
c l 1 i n s u r a n c e company e m p l o y e e s , J I M t my s a i j r I i.it1 » t h e i r 
r i g h t . They would ius t f o r g e t M I'M'1, man u n d e r s t o o d t h a t 
Mn i I*'! i i i i i in i'( i i i i i r " "mif 'on i M n n 11 J M wn i was on 
tlu s u r f a c e t h a t eve ryone was e m o t i n g . 
f*M 1 w»int t n the law l i b r a r y a t t h e u n i v e r s i t y a n d 
i , i f t i r f t ; r, , ( «, nil- , i 'po f f l , ' r v} n , i 1 (*" , n a '-< *" t h e r e 
wei e MI t a c t p r e c e a e o t s t h a t L n d ' c a t e i Mhey n- n l In i ! i 2 
r i g h t , u n q u e s t i o n e d r i g h t , t o u s e t h e r i g h t of s u b r o g a t i o n 
a q i i n s t a l l t h i n g s A f3 a n a t t e r nf f a c t , Mn c e r t a i n c a s e s , 
1 1MMHI i i pa j i .ii i i 11 i I I KJ ' ci I ' i I 
*- p o l i c y . \r s - r whc* =t . r.cepr. * e aw *: make 
tr ie i n j u r e d p a r c ^ wuuic, wrh^v_n
 w ^ one s e e d e d LO ^ - ^ e - damn 
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a b o u t . 
i How d i d y o u f i r s t b e c o n e a w a r e "if t h a ^ : o n c e p t t h a t t h e 
i n luiruh D«U *• y ha i •: i ho H J J J > w h o l e ? 
I I I 1 I ' • i M i 1J f i.» i i i I i I I ( 1 , i i i H i I i j i j ( i 
WH hdsi h e e u i r i ] u i e t i i ri di, " r r e p a r a b l e w a y , 
under s t - and , Buf- who f i r «* f * n 1 d y n u a b o u t IT ' 
I I I i l i i i I i 11 in i a "i a a i 11 I I ' i ' a i i I 
h c 11 j r 3 a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f U t a h law 1 1 b r a r y , r e f e r e n c I n g I 
<]f I it- dowi I I J ' M si me c o p i e s n£ p r e c e d e n t s a n d s o f o r t h . 
n l i l l l i i I i * > c i J • a I, i • i k a (( M v- e i: e i :i' ' t a b 1 e t • ::: 1 i e 1 ]:::: • in, e a 
h a k rt a li > a t t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t o f I n s u r a n c e I g a i n e d 
a l o t o f i n f o r m a t i o n up t h e r e . 
I i | i i 11 i I i i i he 11 I mi i ,11111 I i i'i ii" !" o q e ^ h a t 
anal d e c i d e d ' J ga t a n o t h e r a t t o r n e y T h e y w o u l d n ' t q i n e n ; 
ou r mon<«: w i t h o u t h o l d i n g t h a t o u t . 1 had "just e n o u g h b a s i c 
ii i f T( 11 n i J u r i j i ii •! i 'a^p ' w ^ i 1,1^ 111 i ip i f in f"-) p u r s u e 
t h s . T h a t ' . i mhen 1 c o n t a o t u Q "L h a u o h u i u I c o n t a c t e d 
B r e t t P a u l a e n t o <jet a r e f e r r a l , a n d h e s a i d t h a f Mr, i . a u c h n o i 
11 i I c ni v e x p e r t i s e i n t h a t a r e a . 
U He* w i J -e f y HI 1 I j M i I I l e a I iiua1". I . 'new ,„ 11 a1 in t o r 
W, ii; ] i 
I t h ink: I a s k e d t h i s b e f o r e bi i t I th: i nk we g o t 
s I < I € 11: " c i :::"Ik e < III! Z :; • : ' , i :. < • 1 II; i 1 , ,\ , I!!' I C i 111 ! 1 w « 11! II 1 ) 1 d y o u wa s 
State Farm's position about the $5,500? . 
A That they just flat refused to let It go, tl: tat tl ma sy 
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w a n t e d t h a t o\ i t o f til le p r o c e e d s , 
Q So y o u w e n t t o s e e Mr L a u c h n o r Tl l a t was a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
w 1 i a t p e r i o d o f t i m e ? 
•\ a p p r o x i m a t e l y J u j u i r j I I 
Q Did Mr, L a u c h n o r a t t h a t p o i n t h a n d l e d i s c u s s i o n s w ; t h 
^T TM T «- r s 11 ^ e p i r '-1 o r d "* i y nj i j *• i n v o 1 v e d i n t h e s e ? 
i t I ' l l u i | i i i I I <i I I i i i ii i l i e "i ' i f:i" i * f" I I f 
a n d s o I ^ n o w w h i f " t w a s «i « I I v e t y s i m n l y w*-* h e 
RM a b l e f-^ ^ a r e l e a s e s i g n e d so tha** t h e y c o u l d h o l d t h e 
V 1 I I | M M | ,< | j | I l f > | | f | | i , i I t I I ! I I 
wa s no t i n q u e s t i o n , w h i c h wn we i P nn a b 1 e t o di o a r s e 1 - e *-
-Mi e : i * h ^ t il ] -i n n t V ' n g . T> w i s p : f h p r t a k e i t « : " h t h e 
,i 111 11 I , I , I ' 11 MI i 11 , | | i i I I i | f < n * > f m ^  . 
Ann t h a * w a i i r e a l p r o b l e m t i m e , 
? hi*"*" i i s h o r f r^w Mr, n a i i n n n o r w o r k e d w t h C U M I S ' s 
i n J i mi i n i u ' r I I I e r a I P I ii h M S f * ' n f rfr 11 I i j i « »nu 
t h e m o n e y b u ' a l l o w l/«.u t ^ c o n t e n t t h e i s s u t w ' t i S t a t i F a r m ? 
Ts ' l i a 1 w h a t y o u a r P s a y i n g ? 
IIIII i i 11 I i f f" i ' J 11 ' i' *• Ii i i M-,
 f i w * i , i u < i j , i j 1 1 j n ' t h a v e 
r e t e ' v e u d * enl1 , Tlit" r h a d r e t u s n d t u p a y ^ u t a n y m o n e y s n 
Wf s i g n e d t h e r e l e a s e , b a s e d on i nar. a m o u n t , a n a r e l e a s i n g 
p v c i v o n e £ r o m e v e r y t h i n g , 
II Do y o u h a v e a copr, n t t in 1 i > Ina ( .n in j JI I I IJ 
I p r o b a b l y ri i b it 1 don* t Ii iv*> i r w i r 'i m KI . 
MR. WILLIAMS: L e t ' s m a i k t h a t . 
.10 
( D e f e n d a n t ' s E x h l b t h 1 w a s 
marV pd f "H i d e n t i f I c a t i c n . ) 
I I
 i 11 l i l l i;i . I L* I i i i i /1 I In i i \ MHI ii i r VP<1 
E x h i b i t ; I I o y o u r d e p o s i t i o n m a uil- y HJ i i , i h i e aeon 
\t d o c u n e n f b e f o r e or a c o p y r f t h e d o c u m e n t ? 
i i MM i p l e a . H ,
 a £ ^ e r w e O D t : a i n e a t ^ e s e r v i c e s 
Mi . L a u c l i n o r . 
rtrho d i d you u n d e r s t a n d a c t u a l l y p r e p a r e d t h i s r e l e a s e ? 
hr- ] in f : f " * ! e ^ n a r d P u s s o n , \ , M r s y^ii k n ? w ? 
Ml , L \!l HNOI 1 J II . ' i I ( w II 1 i I ,i H ii
 ; h \ ! 
w i n g . 
Tfir WITNESS: I il n |u r « jei 1 ! , 
I L i j I I II Al I 1 » i U l r i I ' 1 I I l - l i l l l h i III h I  I 
c o p y o f w h i c h 1 d o n ' t h a v e y n n s i - j n a t u r ^ , D i d y o u . s i g n 
i g ? 
Y e s , we d i J S , I " h i . 
I t i s d a t e d b l a n k d a y o f M a r c h , 1 9 P 1 , Do yn t i remnsih^r - -
T h a t * : 7 a b o u t r i q h t . 
' J , i i P I M } T i l ? 
U h - h u h ( a f f i r n a t i v e ) . 
MR. WILLIAMS: Dt i y o u h i v e x s i q n e d c o p y of Mi l* W a l l y ? 
Ml ! .TirffNOT 1 i ; ] i ! ok MI | I •" V n \ I d ' Ts t h a t 
c o p y 1 p r o v i d e d I n
 ; :m • n i n s ^ ^ r J f l n t o r r ^ g . i 1 T *' 
MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, , I a s s u m e d y o u d i d n ' t h»n»p a s i g n e d 
r , , j r j w o u | ( : j [ h a v e q f v e n i t t o j i e . 
4 1 
THE WITNESS: R e t o r e we got I t h ' i p in1 f li>'i« HI I I» 
s e v e r a l heaven c o n v e r s a t i o n s , you n i g h t s a y , and 1 even had 
iii " ' r jiee*'rvq wi th Gteq Wlnqe*" t r y i n ] *• • <P* "" i s r e s o l v e d 
An J ' r .jet t trie p o i n t wher ' I niilnn i I1 ml * i ' n I n i m i n i { 
rnote b e c a u s e 1 e o u l n n i ' t ge^ * iny s a t i s f a c t i o n . 
x\ ',', fTrTfNOP ' l o n ' t s e e , o f f h a n d , a s i g n e d c o p y . I 
I Ry Mi W i l l i a m s ) You i n d i c a t e d t h a t you h a d met wl t h 
i n J t u i i'T t i j t .*» i i / i i 
i ' t i s t h ! t ' a lorn* <JI was your l a w y e r w i t h y o u ? 
I w 11 s a l o n e , ^h * 9 was b e f n i: e I h a d g o t t e n Ml n: L a u c h n o r . 
A f t e r 1 got " Lauchnoc , thfii „ ' n , ' ! 1 - / , -' . 
B e c a u s e t h e e m o t i o n a l p a r t of i ^ was g e t t i n g t o be t o n g r e a t , 
(i [in* f^p p s s e n r " nf Mr, W l n q p t ' s c l a i m , <u h i s p o s ' t i o n 
si M u ] ;i "j .i j1 i '-i * < in in 11 PM • I I I in i In f 11 t* ' T'' i H <• i i • i i • I 11 '-i I in i 
g o i n g t o pay i t w i t i c a t p a y i n g S t a t e Fatrn; ; .* th.i1, i • V^ 1"-"-1 
/. IJh-huh ( a f f i r m a t i v e ) . 
M ! H I 'J 'Ml 1 t I in II i i n . "h in il i l l I  lim1 nit «g it-, I j t - «H1 t ' n r v r n t- hi l S 
release of all claims which you signed? 
A (The witness nods head in the a f f i r m a t i v e . ) 
0 1 ! I I i1! 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
f
»* Did your wife sign it as w^l l"1 
7 c 
42 
» 'lece yu i ni i" fill iii « I1 'in i in » in 'i' 1 i r r ' e i e a s e w a s 
p r r v i d e d t c the C a l d w e l l s for t h e n t o
 3 . j n 1 
I ! l*i ink MP wcr p 
III i | J y r \ y >j i 11 i I I * • i i i i i i i i I I [ t« ( hi 11 i -1 
t V t; 11 \ i , WV d i d most t h i n«] s f" o g e t he n » a.* m ueh i .i f -< • i ?j : \ 11e
 # 
n Did you reai* L.*C r e l e a s e b e f o r e you s i g n e d < t ? 
""/ e -i , 
Did y r u f e e l l i k e you u n d e r s t o o d 
i "W'l But it has b e e n March • I don'*" know t h a t 1 n a y 
1
 Whai i an1 s a y i m j a" tin n ' r yrui s i g n e d ' i i h |Hi i 
f ^ e l tha f" y r , t u n d e r s t o o d i t " 
1 Lh i1 : s h t u ^
 rt«;i s c 1 e i r 1 y s t -i t e d , 
i Your 1 awy e r , a na n e f„ a ff H. i 11 • i <» * [ MI I ' 11 i i i 
» S u r e , he d i d . 
1
 i ih'ffc,i i * ' h i t d o e s no1" a p p e a r on t h i s r e l e a s e 
t h a t you t e a l war; pa i t of y o u r uriue "' y t ana i ii'j in I qi eaTl en t w i t h 
CVMIS? Or ,3 i t a l l c o n t a i n e d «n t h i s r e l e a s e , as f i r a s you 
i A J t a r a s I IJIUIOE .IL<J< \\ i h i i i H e . 
h1 In i i •* » ther«-« "s a p a r t in her. e» i s r • t b ^ r e , •: I a t s j y 
1
 - * *i t h p e n t i r e a g r e e m e n t ? Dn you r e r e n b e r t h a t p i r t ? 
LI i i i i i i 11 ie m t e r r i of *" h i s 
, elease was to leave it upp i * ,i lib t:i pursue t h J c if ''er 
j 3 e c a u s e w e didn't feel like we had been dealt fairly ^!tv . 
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1 1 
1 
1 3 
1 4 
l i 
J * 
Th . i t 1 s t h e p r e m i s e of t h e who1*3 r e a s o n we a r 2 I iei:v 2 . 
C Do you r e c a l l t i k i n g t h e t ] ;ie or even b e l n g c u r i o u s 
MI in,t.fii i i J M i I i^i'l I r p 1 e i ^ f1 h i cpp how f-hey '"'ompatred? 
j i„ T> M i I I M n n ^ , b e c a u s e 1 a s s u r e d t h •»'. i»-jx c '. 
', A e e o r d m q t^ t r s r e l e a s e , ind a s you u n d e r s t a n d *r ye , 
MI | ' "1 M c ? W e l l , t h e r e l e a s e n c l e a r . 1 don i 
need t o go i n t o l fc 
B e f o r e you s i g n e d t h e r e l e a s e s , ynu were c l e a r l y awarp o f 
, ' ii * I w:\ } r «i L r i m - a s 1 n i i d n r s t a n d i t , Mie i pr *- t i o n 
was t n e y were e n t i t l e d t o g e t r • i sui i j < i ii: 
c o r r e c t ? 
ii !iV , MMt was the whole ba 11 ri if t-he d i f f i c u l t y , 
H Were you aware ot t h e t^"1 I uP , ud.oij t in \ !J I i b ' I i r TI 
d i d n ' t g e t f, he money which t h e y s a i d s h o u l d come t o !• icrrt t £ ^m 
i i , ii f\1^ -P pr} ' rvp tha1" * hey c o u l d a l s o p u r s u e a 
:.-i«brcgat l nn c I a J O i g a ' n s 1 I. MJ ' / HI,.,1 '^L» . -«'ar of t h a t ? 
No, 
1
 hii *" m o n e y ? 
[ p e a k i,';| iypoth'-. j f ,i " " , ' '"h ih * r ir • had u?t t a k e n 
;
 " V' r ^ ? i t i o n t h a t Miey wer-;1 e n t i t l e d K" MI*"LI ' rnocey * • ?n Li « 
n s u r a n c e p o l i c y , art? yrMj t e l l 1 n g a e t h a t y o n WH» e n/ ' aw i 
,1,
 ( , ( , | , i i i r, n r i r a n s ? 
• i s n o t . Up t o th i :> p o u t T was n o t , 
\ ^ - e you aware that by s i g n i n g t h e r e l e a s e t h a t you i n 
i iii 111 t n-111 "'" i f *« F i cm ttoa d o i ny t h a t ? 
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M ) i L A U ' - M N i i H i ^ I M . . , . > i t t o answer t h a t . 
I t Mi l* , t M i 1 ega 1 c o n c l u s i o n . 
"J r" M ^ i i l l a n u i 1 L P " n*» ask i t t h i s way, t h e T Tere 
/ i iiJ >i *M r i L r 3m any i i 11 r n r i r IM M * I I i t S *" a t P F I r n * ^ 
r i g h t s would be a f t n r >ou s i g n e d t h e r e l e a s e ' l l . 1 7** ^  -i f-
* 1 w f ed.7" ibou*" f" l i t ? 
1 11 1 1111 J. 11 j J 1 »1 p i i L u ^ L l| i h f ' c ^ u s e 
T *^uld have been t h i n k i n g at"out t h a t a1 t h J * o> ' ' " 
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1 accident? 
2 A Sophomore. 
3 Q Just completed her sophomore year or just going into it? 
4 A Just completing it. 
5 Q She was at what high school? 
6 A Brighton. 
7 Q What kind of grades did she get in school? 
8 A She got B plus. I would have to check Janet with that. 
9 Isn't that correct? 
10 MRS. HILL: B average. 
11 Q (By Mr. Williams) Were you, as a father, satisfied with 
12 her grades in terms of her potential? 
13 A Well, not entirely, because I knew she was capable of a 
14 little better grades. But I also knew that she was highly 
15 socially oriented. She was an approval-oriented child. So it 
16 was more important to her to be active in all kinds of affairs 
17 and not spend quite so much time studying. That was her 
18 nature. 
19 Q What were her best courses, as far as you know? 
20 A Well 
21 MR. WILLIAMS: Mother, if you can help on some of these, 
22 I would invite it. 
23 THE WITNESS: She did pretty well in English. She did 
24 well in modeling. She did well in PE. Didn't she have 
25 something else? 
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MRS. HILL: She liked literature 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Did she have some preferences for a 
career that she discussed with you or your wife? 
A She was a cheerleader and she wanted to be in modeling. 
MRS. HILL: She also wanted to be a hairdresser. 
THE WITNESS: She was interested a little bit in 
cosmetology. 
MRS. HILL: She was going to do both, modeling and 
hairdressing. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Had she taken any courses toward a 
cosmetology degree? 
MRS. HILL: She had -- what would be the word -- under 
Loujene. She could have gotten a scholarship because she 
worked under a friend of mine that had a beauty shop in her 
basement. 
THE WITNESS: She took that modeling course at school. 
She did well in that. She worked for Denver Manufacturing, 
modeling this western wear. 
MRS. HILL: So early in her life to have gotten 
everything completed. SY\e was starting but really hadn't had 
a chance to finish anything. 
Q (3y Mr. Williams) Did she have some part-time jobs? 
A She had just taken a job at Wolfe's, Jack Wolfe 
Ranchwear, worked a couple of days. 
MRS. HILL: That was in Fashion Place Mall. 
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0 (By Mr. Williams) Was that a job that she was to work 
full time through the summer? 
MRS. HILL: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. WILLIAMS: That's a yes over there? 
MRS. HILL: Yes. 
MR. WILLIAMS: This is probably better than taking two 
depositions. But it is a little hard on Brad. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Had she worked part time anywhere else 
prior to that? 
A Only as a babysitter and that sort of thing that the kids 
do. 
Q I assume at Jack Wolfe's she was just going to be a 
salesclerk? 
A That's right. 
MRS. HILL: She sold more in those two days, though, than 
some of their people had in two months. She was a goer. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Did she have some particular skills 
that you want to tell me about that I haven't asked about 
already, skills or — 
A Well, Tammy's greatest assets were her ability to deal 
with humanity. She had the gift of friends, I call it. 
Q Did she have some particular talents that she had 
developed? I understand this may be emotional for you to go 
into. If you would like to take a break, we can. 
A She was — 
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MR. LAUCHNOR: Do you want to take a five minute break? 
THE WITNESS: No, let's get it done. She was a very 
intelligent child. She was very outgoing. She was very 
loving and very understanding. I had a better relationship 
with her than I have ever had with any of my other children. 
Excuse me. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Let me ask your wife a couple of 
questions. You are affected, too. 
Can one of you tell me, did she play any musical 
instruments? 
MRS. HILL: She played piano. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Had she reached the point of excellence in 
that, or was she just sort of hit and miss with it? 
MRS. HILL: She took it for about two years. What she 
did learn in those two years, she did very well. 
THE WITNESS: Her forte was dancing and that sort of 
thing. She was a cheerleader. She was the elite of Brighton 
High School. The president, the student body president was in 
their group. They were just really good, clean kids. They 
were leaders. They were just cream of the crop, you might 
say. She had that ability to mix with all of those kids. 
They liked her. 
MR. WILLIAMS: You say she was a cheerleader. Was that a 
sophomore or freshman cheer leading group? 
MRS. HILL: Sophomore. 
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MR. WILLIAMS: It wasn't the varsity cheer leading? 
MRS. HILL: She would have been her junior year. She was 
junior varsity. She was elected. 
THE WITNESS: But she never got to fulfill that. 
MR, WILLIAMS: What other clubs or activities at school 
did she engage in? 
MRS. HILL: She was in DECCA Club. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Anything else? 
MRS. HILL: In fashion class. I think she took 
gymnastics, too. That helped her in her cheerleading, 
anyway. She also took a dance class from a private 
individual. 
THE WITNESS: She also worked. 
MRS. HILL: One thing she did is she cut a lot of — she 
had a lot of clientele in our neighborhood in school. She 
cut my hair and permed. I didn't to go a beauty shop for 
about three years. She cut his hair, too. 
MR. WILLIAMS: That was for a period of how long? 
MRS. HILL: About two years, she did that. She couldn't 
charge a fee but people would give her money. They would say. 
How much do you charge? She would say, I can't charge you, 
but they would pay her. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Have you ever sat down and calculated the 
amount of money she saved you, for example? 
MRS. HILL: On perms alone, probably $100 or more. 
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MR. WILLIAMS: Did she cut the other children's hair? 
MRS, HILL: She did all of our hair, everybody's hair. 
Did she even do Troy's? She did Troy's hair, too. 
MR. WILLIAMS: She cut Troy's hair, too? 
MRS. HILL: Yes. Like I say, she was talented. It 
sounds like she might have been a little frivolous. She had 
talent in every area. If we talked about her four years 
later, I an sure she would have definite --
THE WITNESS: We talked to all of her teachers on the 
parent-teacher conference. 
MRS. HILL: She had no enemies. 
THE WITNESS: She always participated in the discussions 
and was constructive. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Did she have any special awards that 
she had received or achievements, school or otherwise? 
A We thought being selected to cheerleader was quite an 
achievement twice in a row. And her modeling. 
MRS. HILL: In junior high she was class representative 
several times. They got awards for that. 
THE WITNESS: She was very active in her church work. 
MRS. HILL: She had started to inquire about Junior Miss. 
She wanted to be in that pageant. In fact, my doctor called 
me and said, I know a lady that is in charge of this. I think 
you ought to sign her up for that. My doctor. 
THE WITNESS: She had a lot of poise and confidence and 
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feminine grace. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Did she indicate any plans for college? 
A Yes. 
MRS. HILL: She wanted to go to Rick's College. That's 
where we are from. 
THE WITNESS: She was dyed-in-the-wool LDS. She was 
active in the church. She wanted to go to Rick's College. 
She wanted to marry a returned missionary. She was a very 
religious girl. She was very close to her Father in Heaven. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) I take it that other than the 
babysitting jobs and the money she would get on the occasion 
for cutting hair, her support was pretty much provided by you 
as parents; is that correct? 
A Yeah. She made most of her own spending money, but we 
always — 
Q Did she ever file any income tax returns? 
A We have got some W-2s from that job and that's about all, 
two days worth. 
Q Did she ever pay any money to you as the parents, for any 
reason? 
A No. She wasn't obligated to. She may have borrowed five 
bucks from time to time and paid it back or something like 
that. 
Q There was no payment for room and board and things like 
that? 
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A None of that. She was only 16. Oh, no. 
Q She was never in trouble with the law, I take it? 
A Mo. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Did she have a driver's license at the 
time? 
MRS. HILL: She had turned 16 in January and she had been 
out there twice to take it. That's the only test she couldn't 
pass. That's not unusual, though, for kids that age. Our 
oldest daughter went out there four times before she passed. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) I suppose other than clothes and 
incidental things, she didn't have any assets or property of 
note? 
A No. 
Q Did she have a checking account, savings account? 
A Savings account. She may have had, what, $15 or $20 in 
it. She wasn't much for saving. I am the one that got her to 
open that account. 
Q Other than the services for hair, cutting hair and 
permanents, just briefly tell me what other services or 
activities she was involved in that supported the family. 
A Well, gee, she tended her younger brother and sisters. 
They loved her. 
MRS. HILL: She fixed dinner. 
THE WITNESS: She did the housework. She helped her 
mother around the home. 
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MRS. HILL: I worked for many years. She had to take on 
the responsibility. At that time there was five of them. So 
the older girls had to — they took turns babysitting for me 
after school. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) How tall was she? 
A 5'8". 
MRS. HILL: I don't think she was quite that. 
THE WITNESS: She was almost as tall as I was. 
MR. WILLIAMS: How much did she weigh at the time of her 
death, do you know? 
MRS. HILL: 115. I have got a better picture here. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I would like to see a picture, if you have 
one, when we take a break. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) How did she relate to the other 
children? 
A Very well. 
Q Were there disputes more than the ordinary between her 
and the other children? 
MRS. HILL: Heavens no. She was the peacemaker. 
THE WITNESS: She was too kind-hearted. Even when she 
would get physically incapable of handling her older sister™ 
She couldn't fight. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Let's just take the year prior to her 
death, Mr. Hill. How much time did you spend with her alone 
on an average? 
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A That's a good question. Not as much as I would have 
liked. I usually waited up for her when she came home from a 
date. She was a real good kid that way. And sometimes we 
would sit at the table and talk after dinner. And on Sundays 
we spent some time together. Like I say, we had a good 
rapport. She had an understanding. I have had a better 
relationship with her than any of my other daughters. She had 
an understanding that was beyond her years. She was my 
confidant. 
Q You confided in her with some of your problems? Is that 
what you are saying? 
A Yes. 
Q That provided you some comfort, did it? 
A A lot of comfort. 
Q Would you say that you talked with her alone on a 
personal basis more than once a month during the year prior to 
her death? 
A Yeah. I even made a rule that she wouldn't go out so 
much. Because she was going out a lot with her friends, in 
cars. I have a piece of paper that I had her sign under 
objection that she would reduce her outings. Because at that 
age you want to be with your kids but you can't because 
they are out, running around with their friends. That was 
always a source of disappointment to me. She was so busy that 
I — she went out in the evenings. Sometimes I would work 
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1 evenings. I just couldn't. 
2 Q Other than Troy, who were her closest friends before she 
3 died? 
4 A Male or female? 
5 Q Both. 
6 A Well, there was Debbie Karren and there was Debbie Miles. 
7 MRS. HILL: Karen Cutler. 
8 THE WITNESS: Karen Cutler. Was Trent one of her close 
9 friends? 
10 MRS. HILL: He was Debbie's boyfriend. Trent Wolfert. 
11 And Wendy Poulsen was close to her at that time. 
12 THE WITNESS: Then that kid that went on a mission. 
13 MRS. HILL: Lance Rawl. 
14 THE WITNESS: He was a friend but not as far as the 
15 one — 
16 MRS. HILL: Whiting. What was his first name? 
17 MR. WILLIAMS: That's good enough. 
18 THE WITNESS: There was a whole group of kids that ran 
19 around together. 
20 Q (By Mr. Williams) Did she have any health problems? 
21 A None. 
22 MRS. HILL: She had had braces. 
23 THE WITNESS: That was not a health problem. She was the 
24 healthiest kid. 
25 MR. WILLIAMS: Mr. Hill, I appreciate that. That's all 
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I have. Thank you. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR, LAUCHNOR: 
Q Bob, after you hired Keith Nelson, as I understand it, 
and correct me if I am misstating anything, Keith related to 
you, that is Keith and his associate, that they had 
thoroughly, in their mind, checked out the possibilities of 
recovering anything against the bar or these older folks that 
were the parents of this young boy, and decided that there 
wasn't anything, any liability there that they could find to 
get any further funds? 
A That's right. That was the conclusion. 
Q As I understand it, when you went in to Keith, you had 
already been offered the policy limits on the CUMIS policy, 
and Keith took the case on the condition that if he could find 
some additional funds he would take a contingent fee. If he 
couldn't, he would withdraw and return the case back to you to 
settle? 
A That's right. I forgot that, but that's exactly what it 
was. 
Q I want to make sure I understand it, too. 
MR, WILLIAMS: Can I interrupt you a minute? 
MR. LAUCHNOR: Sure. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Do you have any problem with me going 
through his file while you ask him questions? 
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MR. LAUCHNOR: No. 
Q (By Mr. Lauchnor) Then from that point on, Bob, as I 
understand it, you were told by Greg Winget and Mary Cornevaux 
at CUMIS Mutual, when you went back to then to tell them that 
you were ready to take the money, that they had had a demand 
on the money by State Farm? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And the demand was for the collision to be taken out 
first, the collision money? 
A Right. 
Q Paid on the car and the death benefits paid under the 
PIP? They wanted that out of there first? 
A (The witness nods head in the affirmative.) 
Q Could you answer out loud, please. 
A Yes. 
Q Then, as I understand it, so it is clear, the matter was 
then taken up by Mr. Caldwell, going to State Farm, and, as 
you understood it, after a discussion that he had with State 
Farm, they agreed to not make a claim for their PIP or the 
death benefits, they would waive that, but they insisted on 
getting the money for the repairs of the car out of the 
benefits that were on the insurance policy --
A That's right. 
Q — of CUMIS? Was it at that time that you went back to 
CUMIS and, I understand it, they told you that they couldn't 
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1 release all of the funds with the claim of State Farm on there 
2 unless they included them on a check as well, State Farm? 
3 I A That's right, 
4 Q You employed me, and I negotiated that they release an 
5 even division of the funds that were available under the 
6 policy to you and Mr* Caldwell, with a separate check payable 
7 to Mr. Caldwell and State Farm, so that we could in other 
8 words litigate, if necessary, whether or not State Farm was 
9 entitled to that money; is that correct? 
10 A Yes. 
11 MR. WILLIAMS: Can I have a standing objection to all of 
12 these questions as being leading? 
13 MR. LAUCHNOR: Sure. You can as to the last one, anyhow. 
14 Q (By Mr. Lauchnor) Approximately how long would you say 
15 it was from the time you went back to CUMIS to get a 
16 settlement of the case, after talking to Keith Nelson, and the 
17 time you actually were able to get some funds with my help? 
18 About how many months? 
19 A It was at least four and a half months, I believe. If I 
20 could remember exactly the date of that deposition that this 
21 Brown took, that was the turning point. We got them to — we 
22 got Keith to release as quickly as possible. And I started to 
23 pursue that. 
24 Q Did State Farm know that you had filed a lawsuit against 
2 5 the boy and the other people involved? Did you tell them that 
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this was going on when you were talking to them? 
MR. WILLIAMS: I am not sure it is established that he 
talked to State Farm. 
Q (By Mr. Lauchnor) Did you ever talk to any adjusters at 
State Farm? 
A I am not sure I did. Dean was always talking to them. 
So he was — 
Q I am trying to find out, did you ever personally talk to 
any of the State Farm adjusters about your case? 
A Only Mr. Davis at the outset. 
Q At that time had a suit been filed? 
A No. 
Q Your only recollection is that you didn't talk to State 
Farm after that? It was Mr. Caldwell that did? 
A Yeah. I didn't need to. 
MR. LAUCHNOR: That's all I have. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WILLIAMS: 
Q Just a couple of things, quickly. I noted that you 
brought with you a file that contains some information. Can 
you describe for me just generally what this file was for? 
A It was just going through, looking for anything this 
morning that pertained to this. I just picked up what I 
thought might be helpful. It contained the officer's report, 
and the letter of Keith Nelson taking the case, and it had 
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some notes that I had taken, and it had a remittal slip from 
State Farm when they paid the death benefits, or $5,000 of 
them. Just things that pertained to the whole process from 
the time Tammy was killed. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Would you have any objection if we copied 
the contents of this file, attach them? 
MR. LAUCHNOR: Yes, I would. If you want to make a 
motion to produce. I haven't even seen it. I don't know what 
is in it. Maybe I won't, after I see it. I don't know if 
there is anything in there confidential from Keith. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I may not file a motion. 
MR. LAUCHNOR: I don't know. Rather than just say so, I 
would have an objection, at least until I have looked at it. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) There is one letter that I just — one 
set of notes that I would like to ask you about that is dated 
July 7 of 1982. It has a list of about 12 names with 
telephone numbers. 
A That's when the actual court case against Paul Bryan was 
to take place, and everybody — from the Caldwells we found 
out that everybody that had been in attendance at those court 
sessions were in favor of Paul Bryan, and there was no one 
there in support of our side. And so I didn't feel like going 
to the thing because I didn't want to see this Bryan. 
MR. LAUCHNOR: Is this the criminal case? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. So we called several people and asked 
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them if they would attend, friends and neighbors. So that's 
what I did. And those several of them did agree to attend. 
Some weren't able to. I just took notes of what happened. 
MR. WILLIAMS: That's all I have. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LAUCHNOR: 
Q Just one other question, Mr. Hill. Did you ever talk 
to Greg Winget at CUMIS Mutual when you went back to accept 
the funds as to why he couldn't give you all of the money? 
MR. WILLIAMS: It has been asked and answered. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. We went over that several times. 
Q (By Mr. Lauchnor) Have we already covered that today? 
A That was the basis of most of our conversations, was I 
don't think it is right, plus the fact that he wasn't about to 
pay any money. 
Q Did he say why he was withholding the money? 
A Well, yeah, because State Farm was contesting it. His 
hands were tied, I guess. 
MR. LAUCHNOR: That's all I have. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WILLIAMS: 
Q Let me follow up with just one additional question. Did 
he indicate to you one way or another whether he agreed with 
State Farm's position? 
A He may not have made a statement in so many words but 
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he -- by all of his actions and indirectly, he did, because 
the ultimate -- the outcome was he didn't change his 
position. There was one occasion where we — you know, it was 
pretty serious, as far as I am concerned, because there was 
some reasons given that I didn't even think were valid. 
Q Tell me about those. 
A Well, he lied to me on one occasion. 
MR. LAUCHNOR: Who is this? 
THE WITNESS: Greg. 
MR. LAUCHNOR: What did he say? 
THE WITNESS: I can't remember but it had something to do 
with his home office. They kept telling us that the checks 
were going to be done and then they never were. That's what 
it was. He kept telling me — I think we got to a point where 
they were going to make the checks or they were going to 
agree. And then they changed their position and went the 
other direction. And it was all home office. And that — 
yeah. That was — I think that was after the fact. Because 
it took a long time after we got these final depositions to 
get the check. Didn't we? 
MR. LAUCHNOR: I don't recall any depositions. 
THE WITNESS: Excuse me. These statements. 
MR. LAUCHNOR: Releases? 
THE WITNESS: These releases. 
MR. LAUCHNOR: It was after the releases. 
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THE WITNESS: It turned out to be a very poor 
relationship, 
MR. WILLIAMS: Thanks. 
(Whereupon, at 12:33 p.si. this deposition was concluded.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF ) 
COUNTY OF ) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have read the foregoing testimony 
consisting of 62 pages, numbered from 3 to 64, inclusive, 
and the same is a true and correct transcription of said 
testimony except as I have corrected it in ink, giving my 
reasons therefor and affixed my initials thereto. 
ROBERT KENT HILL 
• * * 
Subscribed and sworn to at , this 
day of , 1984. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My commission expires: 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the deposition of ROBERT KENT 
HILL, the witness in the foregoing deposition named, was 
taken before me, BRAD J. YOUNG, a Certified Shorthand Reporter 
and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, residing at 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
That the said witness was by me, before examination duly 
sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 
the truth in said cause. 
That the testimony of said witness was reported by me in 
Stenotype and thereafter caused by me to be transcribed into 
typewriting, and that a full, true and correct transcription 
of said testimony so taken and transcribed is set forth in the 
foregoing pages numbered from 3 to 64 inclusive, and said 
witness deposed and said as in the foregoing annexed 
deposition. 
I further certify that after the said deposition was 
transcribed, the original of same was held at the offices of 
Associated Professional Reporters, 420 Kearns Building, Salt 
Lake City, for the witness to read, signed before a Notary 
Public, and to be returned to me for filing with the Clerk of 
the said Court. 
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I further certify that I am not of k m or otherwise 
associated with any of the parties to said cause of action, 
and that I am not interested in the event thereof. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this 'pOij] day of -4uu, , 1984. 
My commission expires: 
December 8, 1986 
n 
<m^u Uiu^ / . 
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RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the payment to the u 
signed at this time of the sum of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND TWO 
FORTY FIVE AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($22,245.00), the receipt of 
is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned, being of lawful a 
individually, as parents, natural guardians, and represent 
of the estate of Tamara Elaine Hill, and for and on behalf 
heirs of Tamara Elaine Hill, deceased, do hereby release, 
and forever discharge KENNETH PAUL BRYAN, FARRELL L. BRYAN, 
M. BRYAN, NORMAN L. BROWN, dba THE SPOT II, their agents, 
servants, employees, and insurers, of and from any and all 
causes of action, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of 
services, loss of society, comfort, and companionship, exp 
loss of income or other compensation, on account of or in 
growing out of all known and unknown injuries and/or damag 
resulting or to result from that particular automobile ace 
that occurred on or about the 6th day of June, 1982, at or 
the intersection of 5900 South Street 
Lake County, State of Utah, wherein a 
Paul Bryan collided with a vehicle in 
was riding, resulting in her death. 
and 7th East Street 
vehicle operated by 
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THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY DECLARE AND REPRESENT that in 
making this release and agreement, it is understood and agreed 
that the undersigned rely wholly upon their own judgment, belief,; 
and knowledge of the nature and extent of said damages, and that j 
the undersigned have not been influenced to any extent whatsoever! 
in making this release by any representations or statements 
regarding the accident, or regarding any other matters, made by 
the persons, firms, or corporations who are hereby released, or 
by any person or persons representing them. 
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that this settle-
ment is the compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim, and that 
the payment made pursuant to this release is not to be construed 
as an admission of liability on the part of the parties released 
hereunder, by whom liability is expressly denied. 
THE UNDERSIGNED UNDERSTAND AND AGREE that the accident 
resulting in the death of Tamara Elaine Hill, described in this 
release of all claims, may have caused damages, the existence of 
which and the consequences of which are now unknown but which 
DEPOSITION 
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jmay become known in the future. The undersigned nevertheless 
[intend to and do release, for and on their own behalf, on behalf 
jbf the estate of Tamara Elaine Hill, and on behalf of all the 
jheirs of the estate of Tamara Elaine Hill, all claims for all 
injuries and damages to the undersigned, the estate and/or the 
heirs of the estate of Tamara Elaine Hill, whether now known or 
'unknown and whether now in existence or hereafter to arise. 
I! 
;' IT IS UNDERSTOOD that the above amount of TWENTY TWO 
'THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY FIVE AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($22,245.00) 
[represents TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($25,000.00) 
(policy limits less the collision claim of FIVE THOUSAND FIVE 
jHUNDRED TEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS by State Farm Mutual Insurance 
Company, wherein a controversy exists as to who is entitled to thu 
said amount, and that the matter will be resolved between the two 
jor by payment into court or by judicial determination. 
i! 
|| IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that should the 
jundersigned commence legal action against any third party, not 
'released under this release, for the injuries and damages 
[resulting from the accident and subsequent death of Tamara Elaine 
Hill as described in this release, that such third party will be 
'entitled to a setoff for the amounts paid under this release or 
[the percentage of responsibility that might be attributable to 
»the parties released herein, if any, whichever is greater, and 
ithis release is intended to comply with the provisions of Section 
1^8-27-42 and Section 78-27-43 of Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
i 
(• THIS RELEASE, contains the entire agreement between the 
:parties hereto, and the terms of this release are contractual 
:and not a mere recital. 
j THE UNDERSIGNED FURTHER STATE that they have carefully 
read the foregoing release and know the contents thereof, and 
jthe undersigned sign the same as their own free act. 
I DATED this day of March, 1933. 
(: ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually and 
H as Father, Natural Guardian, and 
jj Representative of the Estate and 
;i Heirs of Tamara Elaine Hill 
;
. i 
: » 
i * 
; I . . 
I) 
\\ 
i! -v . 
is 
JANET WEBER HILL, Individually and 
as Mother, Natural Guardian, and 
Representative of the Estate and 
Heirs of Tamara Elaine Hill 
Witness 
!, 
3-
TabH 
S's't* 
Glenn C. Hanni, A1327 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually 
and as personal representative 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE 
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, individually and as 
personal representative of the , 
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, ] 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ] 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
i MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I AS TO PLAINTIFF HILL AND 
I PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS 
) TO PLAINTIFF CALDWELL 
Civil No. C83-8099 
1 Judge Young 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH DEFENDANT 
STATE FARM CLAIMS NO GENUINE ISSUE EXISTS 
1. Plaintiff Lorin Dean Caldwell (hereinafter 
"Caldwell") at all times relevant to this action, was the owner of 
an automobile insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company (hereinafter "State Farm") which was involved in a 
collision on June 6, 1982, while Caldwell's son, Troy, was driving 
the automobile, and Robert Kent Hill's (hereinafter "Hill") 
daughter, Tamara, was riding as a passenger in Caldwell's 
0000211 
automobile. The automobile accident was with a vehicle driven by 
Kenneth Paul Bryan (hereinafter "Bryan"), and the collision 
resulted in the deaths of Caldwell's son and Hill's daughter, both 
minors at the time. [See Plaintiffs' Complaint, paras. 1, 3-6.] 
2. Hill had no ownership interest in the automobile 
driven by Troy Caldwell at the time of the accident. [Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, paras. 1, 9.] 
3. As a result of the accident, Caldwell's automobile 
was damaged, and State Farm paid Caldwell $5,510 under the terms 
of the insurance policy for collision damage to the automobile. 
[Caldwell Depo., p. 11.] 
4. Caldwell received no-fault benefit payments from 
State Farm of $6,539.00, and Hill received no-fault benefit pay-
ments from State Farm in the amount of $6,120.00. [See Affidavit 
of Grant Cutler attached to State Farm's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion For Summary Judgment dated 9-12-84, unsigned copy attached 
hereto as Exhibit B.] 
5. The policy of insurance between State Farm and 
Caldwell included a condition regarding subrogation which states, 
in pertinent part: 
Subrogation. Upon payment under this policy, j\ 
. . . the company shall be subrogated to all / 
the insured's rights of recovery therefor and W 
the insured shall do whatever is necessary to- j 
secure such rights and do nothing to prejudice I 
them. [Certificate of Certified Policy and / 
copy of policy attached hereto as Exhibit A.] [1 
6. Section III of the insurance policy, entitled 
"Physical Damage Coverages Insuring Agreements," provides for 
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collision coverage under Coverage G, which states: 
To pay for loss to the owned motor vehicle 
caused by collision but only for the amount 
of each such loss in excess of the deductible 
amount stated in the declarations as applicable 
hereto. If the deductible amount is $100 or 
less it shall not apply if the collision is 
with another motor vehicle insured with this 
company. 
7. The definitions contained in Section III of the pol-
icy include the following: 
Collision--means collision of a motor vehicle 
covered by this policy with another object or 
with a vehicle to which it is attached or upset 
of such motor vehicle. 
* * * * 
Loss--wherever used with respect to coverages 
D, F, G, R and Rl, means each direct and acci-
dental loss of or damage to 
(1) an owned motor vehicle, or 
(2) its equipment. 
Under coverages D, F, and G, loss includes 
direct and accidental damage to wearing apparel 
and luggage. 
Owner Motor Vehicle—Means the motor vehicle or 
trailer described in the declarations, and 
includes a temporary substitute automobile and 
a newly-acquired automobile. [See Exhibit A 
attached hereto.] 
The owned,motor vehicle applicable to the policy of 
insurance at issue in this case was a 1979 Honda two-door vehicle. 
That is the vehicle which was owned by Caldwell. [See Declaration 
Sheet of Exhibit A, attached hereto.] 
8. Cumis Insurance Society Inc. (hereinafter ,tCumis,,) 
S26 -3-
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was the insurer for Bryan. It had a $50,000 single limit 
liability policy and offered to pay its $50,000 limit to Caldwell 
and Hill ($25,000 each) in exchange for a complete and full 
release of all claims of Caldwell and Hill. This offer was made 
the first time Cumis1 representative talked to Caldwell and Hill, 
but Caldwell and Hill wanted to obtain legal advice and 
investigate other possible defendants and sources of recovery 
before signing any papers and did not accept the offer. [Caldwell 
Depo., pp. 14-15, 21-22; HillDepo., pp. 16-17, 24-25, 27-28.] 
9. After Hill's and Caldwellfs respective lawyers had 
completed their investigation of the matter and determined that 
pursuing a lawsuit would not be productive, Caldwell and Hill went 
back to Cumis expressing a desire to settle for the original offer 
of $25,000 each. Cumis had since been put on notice by State Farm 
of its subrogation claim for the $5,510 in property damage, and 
Cumis would not release the full $50,000 to Caldwell and Hill 
without also paying State Farm its $5,510. [Caldwell Depo., pp. 
22-23; Hill Depo., pp. 34-36.] 
10. Ultimately, Caldwell and Hill and their wives signed 
separate releases in favor of Bryan, Cumis and others. [Hill 
Depo., pp. 41-43, 45; Exhibit 1; Caldwell Depo., pp. 25-26, 31; 
Exhibit 1.] The release signed by Caldwell and his wife recited 
consideration of $27,755 and specifically stated that $5,510 of 
that recited consideration "represents damage to the undersigned's 
automobile and that such amount will be made payable by separate 
S26 -4-
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check to State Farm Mutual Insurance Company and Lorin D. 
Caldwell, wherein a controversy exists between State Farm Mutual 
Insurance Company and Lorin D. Caldwell as to who is entitled to 
the said amount, and that the matter will be resolved between the 
two or by payment into court or by judicial determination." 
[Caldwell Depo., Exhibit 1.] 
11. Caldwell and Hill demanded that State Farm waive its 
subrogation claim for the $5,510 in property damage to Caldwell's 
automobile. Litigation ensued in which plaintiffs Hill and 
Caldwell brought suit against State Farm to recover the $5,510 and 
further seeking punitive damages for State Farm's alleged bad 
faith obstruction of plaintiffs' settlement. Plaintiffs' 
complaint does not allege any independent tort cause of action 
against Sate Farm. [See generally Plaintiffs' Complaint.] 
12. State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment in 
this litigation as to all the claims of Hill and Caldwell on or 
about September 12, 1984. Judgment granting State Farm's motion 
for summary judgment was entered on October 22, 1984, from which 
plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's 
granting of summary judgment and remanded the case to the district 
court. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT HILL HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION 
AGAINST STATE FARM BECAUSE HILL WAS NOT AN 
INSURED AND THERE WAS NO PRIVITY OF CONTRACT 
BETWEEN HILL AND STATE FARM WITH RESPECT TO 
THE PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO CALDWELL'S VEHICLE. 
State Farm's right of subrogation under the terms of its 
policy with Caldwell grants to State Farm the right to "be 
subrogated to all the insured's rights of recovery" with respect 
to any payment made by State Farm under the policy. The $5,510 
payment at issue in this case was made by State Farm to Caldwell 
for the damage done to Caldwell's vehicle. Hill was not an owner 
of that vehicle. Hill had no claim for property damage to the 
vehicle against the tortfeasor Bryan. 
Therefore, as to the payment made by State Farm under the 
collision coverage provision of the policy, it was subrogated only 
to the rights of Caldwell, the owner of the vehicle. 
This fact was recognized by Cumis and Caldwell in the 
release Caldwell signed where it was specifically stated that a 
separate draft was being made payable to State Farm and Caldwell 
for the $5,510 representing property damage. 
83 C.J.S. Subrogation §1 defines subrogation "as the 
substitution of another person in the place of a creditor, so that 
the person in whose favor it is exercised succeeds to the rights 
of the creditor in relation to the debt." 
State Farm was substituting itself only in the place of 
S26 -6-
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Caldwell with respect to the $5,510 because Caldwell was the only 
one who had received that payment from State Farm. 
Therefore, insofar as the right of subrogation under the 
insurance policy is concerned, it only applied to the payment made 
by State Farm to Caldwell, and had no application whatsoever to 
Hill. Hill was not an insured under the policy for purposes of 
the right of subrogation asserted by State Farm because State Farm 
had not paid Hill anything for which State Farm was asserting a 
right of subrogation. 
Since the Supreme Court's decision reversing State Farm's 
summary judgment, State Farm has paid the $5,510 plus interest to 
^Caldwell Q Thus, the only remaining claims at this point are for 
bad faith and punitive damages. 
Plaintiffs' claims of bad faith arise in the context of 
a first-part^ insurance claim, i.e., the payment by State Farm of 
Caldwell's collision claim. Caldwell does not assert any bad 
faith conduct on the part of State Farm with respect to 
investigation of the property damage claim and payment thereof. 
Instead, Caldwell and Hill claim State Farm acted in bad faith by 
refusing to waive its subrogation claim and thereby obstructed 
Caldwell's and Hill's settlement with Cumis. Nonetheless, this 
claim of bad faith still arises out of the payment of a first-
party insurance claim even though the actions that are alleged to 
constitute bad faith occurred after payment of the claim. 
A similar situation arose in Arnica Ins. Co. v. Schebtler, 
S26 -7-
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768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989), which involved a claim of bad faith 
against the insurer for conduct which occurred after the insurer 
had paid the first-party claim. The Court of Appeals analyzed 
this case within the framework of Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 
701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), the seminal Utah case which held there 
was a contractual implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in 
first-party insurance claims. Beck refused to recognize any tort 
cause of action for bad faith in first-party insurance claims. 
In Schettler, Arnica fully paid Schettler's first-party 
claim, but Schettler alleged that Arnica acted in bad faith by its 
conduct subsequent to the time the first-party claim was paid. 
The Court of Appeals considered the allegation to be a first-party 
bad faith contract claim just the same as Beck. 
Thus, Schettler held that conduct by an insurer after 
payment of a first-party claim which is alleged to constitute bad 
faith is still subject to the principle set forth in Beck that 
such a claim is a contractual claim only and not a tort claim. 
In addition to asserting a claim against Arnica, Schettler 
also asserted a bad faith claim against defendants NATB and Black 
& Guiver. The trial court granted summary judgment as to those 
defendants. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed and stated: 
We find the claim against NATB and Black & 
Guiver without merit. There are no facts to 
establish (1) that a contractual relationship 
ever existed between Schettler and NATB or 
between Schettler and Black & Guiver, or 
S26 
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(2) that the third-party defendants owed 
Schettler an independent duty outside a 
contractual relationship. • . . 
* * * * 
In order to maintain an action under a 
contractual theory of insurer bad faith, the 
parties must be in privity of contract at 
the time of the alleged wrong. Ammerman v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 
576, 577 (1967). . . . [768 P.2d at 957-958.] 
Therefore, Schettler further holds that a party may not 
bring a bad faith claim unless that party stands in privity of 
contract to the insurer against whom the claim is being brought. 
Hill was not in privity of contract with State Farm as an insured 
with respect to the subrogation rights of State Farm under its 
policy with Caldwell. As a result, Hill cannot have a bad faith 
claim against State Farm for failure to waive its subrogation 
claim. 
With respect to the privity of contract requirement, the 
Court of Appeals in Schettler cited the case of Ammerman v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., supra. In Ammerman, the insured, and Eddie 
Soliz, a judgment creditor and party injured by the negligence of 
Ammerman, joined together to sue Farmers Insurance, Ammermanfs 
insurer. The predicate for their suit against Farmers was that 
Farmers had refused to settle Soliz' claims for $9,000 prior to 
trial. As a result of a trial between Soliz and Ammerman, Soliz 
obtained a judgment against Ammerman for $15,282. This judgment 
was affirmed on appeal. Farmers then paid $10,000, its policy 
S26 
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limit. Thereafter, Soliz sued Farmers to recover the $5,280 
balance of his judgment against Ammerman based on Farmers' alleged 
bad faith in refusing to settle prior to trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court found that Soliz had not been 
damaged by Farmers' action in that Farmers' refusal to settle for 
$9,000 actually resulted in Soliz recovering a judgment for 
$10,000 from Farmers and having a judgment for $5,180 against 
Ammerman. Additionally, and of vital importance to the instant 
case, the Utah Supreme Court held that Soliz had no standing to 
bring suit against Ammermanfs insurer: 
In assessing the claimed right of Soliz to take 
this cause of action for himself, the first 
problem presented is that at the time of the 
alleged wrong by the defendant company, it had 
no privity of contract with Soliz and therefore 
owed him no duty, so there could be no breach 
thereof. . . . [430 P.2d at 577] 
Although Ammerman involved a third-party claim of bad 
faith, the principle enunciated with respect to the need for 
privity of contract is valid even in the instant case where we are 
dealing with a first-party claim. The Utah Supreme Court again 
cited with approval the privity concept from Ammerman in the more 
recent case of Auerbach Co. v. Key Security Police, Inc., 680 P.2d 
740 (Utah 1984). If there is no privity of contract, there is no 
duty owed by State Farm to Hill, and there can be no claim for 
first-party bad faith by Hill against State Farm. 
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POINT II, 
NEITHER HILL NOR CALDWELL ARE ENTITLED TO 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES BECAUSE THEIR CLAIMS 
AGAINST STATE FARM ARE CONTRACT CLAIMS, AND 
THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT TORTIOUS CONDUCT. 
As indicated in Point I, above, the claims of bad faith 
asserted by plaintiffs in this case against State Farm arise out 
of State Farm's assertion of its subrogation right under its 
contract of insurance subsequent to payment of a first-party claim 
for property damage. Thus, plaintiffs' claims of bad faith are 
for bad faith in the first-party insurance context, as enunciated 
in Beck, supra. Punitive damages are not awardable for breach of 
contract. There must be some independent tortious conduct aside 
from the contract breach. In Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica, 
Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
We prefer the standard articulated by the 
Kansas Supreme Court . . . which states that 
breach of contract, standing alone, does not 
call for punitive damages even if 
intentional and unjustified, but such 
damages are allowable if there is some 
independent tort indicating malice, fraud or 
wanton disregard for the rights of others. 
7~r~T [657 P.2d at 750] ~^ 
In Beck, supra, the Supreme Court clearly stated that bad 
faith in a first-party insurance claim case is a breach of a 
contractual duty only, and does not give rise to a tort cause of 
action. The court further stated there is no fiduciary 
relationship between the insurer and the insured in a first-party 
insurance claim context. Beck also indicated that an insured in a 
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first-party bad faith claim can recover "both general damages, 
I.e., those flowing naturally from the breach, and consequential 
damages, i.e., those reasonably within the contemplation of, or 
reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract 
was made." [701 P. 2d at 801] Punitive damages are not general 
damages or consequential damages. 
In a concurring opinion in the case of Gagon v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 92 U.A.R. 21 (Sept. 28, 1988), Justice 
Zimmerman agreed with the Supreme Court's refusal to grant a 
petition for certiorari, but Zimmerman made very clear that bad 
faith in a first-party context does not give rise to a claim for 
punitive damages. He stated: 
Specifically, the trial judge may feel 
compelled to permit the jury to award 
punitive damages if Gagon shows nothing more 
than a breach of the Beck covenant of good 
faith. To do so would be error under Beck. 
In Beck, we were very careful to make it 
plain that a claim for an insurer's breach . 
of its implied covenant to act in good faith 
toward its insured did not, alone, give 
rise to a cause of action in tort; rather, 
the cause of action is one in contract. 
While consequential damages for breach of 
the covenant would be available, tort 
damages, including punitive damages, would 
not. To recover punitive damages, a 
plaintiff would have to show all of the 
elements of a separate tort. . . . 
Accordingly, under Beck, a plaintiff is not 
entitled to put on evidence of punitive 
damages unless he or she can make out a 
sufficient case to go to the jury on an 
independent tort theory. 
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There being no claim for any independent tortious conduct 
against State Farm in the instant case, there is no basis for 
punitive damages to be awarded, as a matter of law, for either 
Hill or Caldwell. 
SUMMARY 
State Farm owed no duty to Hill with respect to the 
subrogation provision in the insurance policy because Hill was not 
an insured for purposes of that provision and had no privity of 
contract with State Farm. State Farm was stepping into the shoes 
of Caldwell only when it asserted its subrogation right. There 
being no duty owed to Hill, all his claims for bad faith and 
punitive damages should be dismissed. 
There is no basis for a punitive damage award in favor of 
Hill or Caldwell because their claims arise out of contract and 
not tort. 
State Farm respectfully requests the court to grant 
summary judgment in its entirety as to all claims of Hill and to 
grant summary judgment as yp the punitive damage claim of Caldwell. 
S26-MSUMnh 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ day of May, 1989, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM 
was hand-delivered to: 
Wallace R. Lauchnor 
PAULSON, LAUCHNOR & DAVIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CSB Tower, Suite 500 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
3- vAsX$K 
Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF CERTIFIED POLICY 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I am custodian 
of the records pertaining to the issuance of policies by 
the Utah Division for State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company of Bloornington, Illinois. 
I further certify that the attached Policy #4653-327-D10-44A 
is a copy of the policy issued to Lorin Dean and LaRue Caldwell 
of 7311 Chris Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah 84121, together with 
any endorsements issued subsequently, based on our available 
records- This policy was in full force and effect on the 
r 
accident date of June 6, 1982,
 M \ 
Operations Superintendent 
STATE OF COLORADO 
COUNTY OF WELD 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this twenty second day of 
February, 1989. 
Vicki K. HughesJ 
Notary Public 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: August 21, 1991 
EXHIBIT A 
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THE ADDRESS OF THE REGIONAL OFFICE 
WHICH ISSUED THIS POLICY IS SHOWN 
AT THE TOP OF THE DECLARATIONS 
CONTINUED PAGE ENCLOSED HEREIN 
yf/////fhyff/. l/ty>Mr#/a/tbr 
•»s n 
DECLARATIONS 
1. POLICY PERIOD: The policy period shall be as shown 
under "Policy Period" and for such succeeding periods of 
six months each thereafter as the required renewal premium 
is paid by the named insured on or before the expiration of 
the current policy period. The "Policy Period" shall begin 
and end at 12:01 A.M.. standard time at the address of the 
named insured as stated herein. The premium shown is for 
the policy period and coverages indicated in the 
declarations. 
2. GARAGED: The owned motor vehicle will be principally 
garaged in the declared town and ttste. 
3. INSURANCE AND LICENSE HISTORY: Unless stated 
In the exceptions (a) no insurer has canceled vehicle 
Insurance Issued to the named insured or any member of his 
or her household within the past three years, and (b) no 
license to drive or registration has been suspended, revoked 
or refused for the named insured or any member of his or 
her household within the past three years. 
4. OWNER: The named insured is the sole owner of the 
described motor vehicle except as stated in the exceptions. 
5. L IENHOLDER: If a mortgage owner, condition/-" 
vendor, or assignee is named in the exceptions, lots, if an 
under coverages O. F and G shall be payable to the nameu 
insured and to such additional interest as such interest may 
appear, and this insurance as to such additional interest 
shall not be invalidated by any act or negligence of the 
mortgagor or owner, nor by any change in the title or 
ownership, nor by any error or inadvertence in the 
description of the motor vehicle until alter notice ol 
termination of the policy shall be given to such mortgage 
owner, conditional vendor, mortgagee or assignee stating 
when not less than 10 days thereafter such termination 
shall be effective; provided, the lienholder shall notify the 
company within 10 days of any change of interest or 
ownership which shall come to the knowledge of said 
lienholder and failure to do so will render this policy null 
and void. 
Whenever the company shall pay the lienholder any sum for 
lost under this policy and shall claim that, as to the named 
Insured, no liability therefor existed, the company shall, to 
the extent of such payment, be thereupon legally 
subrogated to all the rights of the party to whom such 
payment shall be made, under all securities held as 
collateral to the debt. The company may. at its option, pay 
off the mortgage debt and require an assignment thereof 
and of the mortgage or other lien and all such other 
securities; but no subrogation shall impair the right of tl 
lienholder to recover the full amount of its claim. 
6. PURPOSE OF USE: The purposes for which the owned 
motor vthlcl* it to be used are "pleasure and business" 
unless otherwise stated in the exceptions, la) The term 
"pleasure and business'* Is defined as personal, pleasure, 
family and business use. (b) The term "commercial" or 
"commercial-farm" It defined as use principally in the 
business occupation of the named insured as stated in the 
exceptions. Including'occasional use for personal, pleasure, 
family and other business purposes. 
7. UNDER COVERAGE S each insured resides in the 
named insured's household. 
: > * • -
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State Fann Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
REGIONAL OFFICE 
Mountain States Off Greeley Co 80631 
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STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILc INSURANCE COMPANY 
BLOOMiNGrON 
A Mutual insurance Company 
Agrees with the insured, named »n the declarations made \ 
and »n reliance uoon the statements in the declarations and 
(NOTE. The words in bold face italic type *r 
SECTION i-UABfUTY 
LLINOIS 
, Hereto Called the Company 
Dart hereof, m consideration of the payment of the premium 
jubject to all of the terms of this policy 
defined under Definitions within each Section.) 
COVERAGES 
INSURING AGREEMENTS 
COVERAGE A - 8 0 0 I L Y INJURY LIABILITY 
COVERAGE B-PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY 
To pay on behalf of the insured ail sums which the injured 
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
(A) bodily injury sustained by other persont;~ahd 
(81 property damage, 
caused by accident arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use, including loading or unloading, of (he 
owned motor vehicle; and to defend, with attorneys 
selected by and compensated by the company, any sun 
against the insured alleging such bodily injury or property 
damage and seeking damages which are payable hereunder 
even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, 
false or fraudulent; and the company may make such 
investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or 
suit, as it deems, expedient. The company shall not be 
obligated to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the 
company's liability has been exhausted bv payment of 
judgments or settlements. 
USE OF NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILES 
If the named insured is a person or persons and i f during 
the policy period such named insured owns a motor vehicle 
covered by this policy and classified as "pleasure and 
business'*, such insurance as is afforded bv this policy with 
respect to the owned motor vehicle under coverages A and 
8 applies to the use of a norhowned automobile by an 
insured, PROVIDED SUCH USE. OPERATION OR 
OCCUPANCY IS WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE 
OWNER OR PERSON IN LAWFUL POSSESSION OF 
SUCH AUTOMOBILE AND IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
SUCH PERMISSION, 
As respects the "use of non-owned automobiles" under 
coverages A and B. the definition of insured in Section I is 
changed to read: 
Insured means: 
(a) the \\t%\ person named in the declarations, or 
{b) that person's spouse or the relatives of either, and 
(cJ any person or organization not owning or hiring such 
automobile, but only with respect to his or her or its 
liability for the use of such automobile by an insured in 
(a) and (b) above. 
EXCLUSIONS-SECTION I 
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY UNOER: 
A AND 8 TO A NON-OWNED (a) COVERAGES 
AUTOMOBILE 
I I ) WHILE MAINTAINED OR USED 8Y ANY PERSON 
* .WHILE -SUCH PERSON IS EMPLOYED OR 
OTHERWISE ENGAGED IN AN AUTOMOBILE 
BUSINESS OF THE INSURED OR OF ANY OTHER 
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION. OR 
(21 WHILE USED IN ANY OTHER BUSINESS OR 
OCCUPATION, except a private passenger automobile 
operated or occupied by the first person named in the 
declarations, his or her spouse or any re/af/Vcof either; 
lb) COVERAGES A, ANO 8 WHILE THE OWNED 
MOTOR VEHICLE- IS RENTED OR LEASED TO 
OTHERS BY THE INSURED, USED AS A PUBLIC OR 
LIVERY CONVEYANCE. OR USED FOR CARRYING 
PERSONS FOR A CHARGE, but the transportation on a 
share expense basis in a private passenger automobile of 
friends, neighbors, fellow employees or school children 
shall not be deemed carrying persons for a charge; 
1
 (c) COVERAGES A AND B WHILE THE OWNED 
'; 'MOTOR VEHICLE IS USED FOR THE TOWING OF ANY 
;
 TRAILER (OTHER THAN A TRAILER AS DEFINED 
HEREIN) OWNEO OR HIRED BY THE INSURED AND 
: NOT COVERED BY LIKE INSURANCE IN' THE 
i COMPANY; OR WHILE ANY TRAILER COVERED BY 
, THIS POLICY IS USED WITH ANY MOTOR VEHICLE 
; OWNED OR HIRED BY THE INSURED AND NOT 
• -COVERED BY LIKE INSURANC£~IN THE COMPANY; 
"'(d) COVERAGES A AND B. 
I D TO LIA8ILITY ASSUMED BY THE INSURED 
UNOER ANY CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT; OR 
(2! TO ANY OBLIGATION FOR WHICH THE UNITED 
STATES MAY BE HELD LIABLE UNOER THE 
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT; 
(e) COVERAGES A AND 8. TO THE OWNED MOTOR 
VEHICLE WHILE USED BY ANY PERSON WHILE SUCH 
PERSON IS EMPLOYED OR OTHERWISE ENGAGED IN 
AN AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS OF TH&tNSURED OR OF 
ANY OTHER PERSON OR ORGANIZATION, but this 
exclusion does not apply to the named insured and spouse 
and this insurance applies only as excess insurance over any 
'other insurance., to a resident of the same household as the 
named insured, to a partnership in which said resident or 
the named insured is a partner, or to any partner, agent or 
employee of the named insured, such resident or 
partnership. 
3.. 
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(f) COVERAGE A. TO ANY EMPLOYEE WlThLRESPECT 
TO BODILY INJURY OF ANOTHER EMPLOYEE OF 
THE SAME EMPLOYER INJUREO IN THE COURSE OF 
SUCH EMPLOYMENT ARISING OUT OF THE 
MAINTENANCE OR USE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE IN 
THE BUSINESS OF SUCH EMPLOYER, but this exclusion 
does not aoplv to the named insured or spouse with respect 
to an injury sustained by any such fellow employee; 
(g) COVERAGE A, 
0 ) TO BODILY INJURY TO ANY EMPLOYEE OF 
THE INSURED ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE 
COURSE OF • - , 
(i) DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT BY THE INSURED, 
IF.BENEFITS THEREFOR ARE IN WHOLE OR IN 
PART EITHER PAYABLE OR REQUIRED TO BE 
P R O V I D E D UNDER / A N Y WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION LAW. OR , 
(ii) OTHER EMPLOYMENT BY THE INSURED; OK 
(2) TO ANY OBLIGATION FOR WHICH THE 
INSUREO OR HIS £)R HER INSURER MAY 8E HELD 
L I A B L E ' . U N D E R A N Y W O R K M E N ' S 
C O M P E N S A T I O N . U N E M P L O Y M E N T 
COMPENSATION OR DISABILITY BENEFITS LAW. 
OR UNDER ANY SIMILAR LAW; 
(hi COVERAGE A. TO BODILY INJURY TO ANY 
INSURED OR ANY MEM8ER OF THE FAMILY OF AN 
INSURED RESIDING IN THE SAME HOUSEHOLD AS 
THE INSURED; 
(i).COVERAGE B. TO INJURY TO OR DESTRUCTION 
OP PROPERTY OWNED OR TRANSPORTED BY AN 
INSURED, OR PROPERTY RENTED TO OR IN 
CHARGE OF AN INSURED other than a residence or 
private garage injured or destroyed by a private passenger 
automobile covered by-this policy. 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
Coverage A. The limit of liability stated in the declarations 
as applicable to "each person" is the limit of the company's 
liability for all damages arising out of bodily injury 
sustained by on* person in any one accident, and subject to 
this provision, the limit of liability stated in the 
declarations as applicable to "each accident" isMne total 
limit of the company's liability for all such damages for 
bodily injury sustained by two or more persons in any one 
accident. 
Coverage B. The limit of liability stated in the declarations 
as applicable to "each accident" is the limit of the 
'company's liability for all damages to all property of one or 
more persons or organizations in any one accidenL 
Under coverage? A and 8. the inclusion herein of more than 
one insured shall'not increase the limits of liability. 
SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS 
As respects the insurance afforded under coverages A and B 
and in addition to the aoplicable limits of liability to pay: 
(a) costs taxed against the insured in any such suit and. 
after entry of judgment, all interest accruing on the 
M 84 
enti.« amount thereof until the company has paid or 
tendered or deposited in court such part of such 
judgment as does not exceed the limit of the company's 
' liability thereon; 
(b) premiums on bonds to release attachments not tn 
excess of the applicable limit of liability, premiums on 
required appeal bonds, and the cost of bail bonds 
required of the insured because of accident or traffic law 
violation, not to exceed $250 per bail. bond, but without 
• any obligation to apply for or furnish any such bonds; 
(c) expense incurred by the insured for first aid to others 
at the time of an accident involving a motor vehicle 
insured hereunder; 
(d) reasonable expense incurred by the insured at the 
company's request, including loss of wages or salary not 
to exceed .$25 per day. if such loss is incurred because of 
the insured's attendance at trial of any civil lawsuit in 
defense against allegation of bodily injury; 
PROVIOED THAT THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT 
APPLY TO EXPENSE UNDER PARAGRAPH (c) OUE TO 
WAR. 
DEFINITIONS-SECTION I 
Automobile—means a four wheel land motor vehicle 
designed for use principally upon public roeds, but 
"automobile" shall not include a midget automobile, nor 
any vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises. 
Automobile Business—means the business'or occupation of 
selling, leasing, repairing, servicing, transporting, storing or 
parking of land motor vehicles or trailers. 
Bodily Injury-means bodily injury, sickness or disease 
including death at any time resulting therefrom. 
Damages—wherever used with respect to coverage A 
includes damages for care and loss of services. 
Insured- the unqualified word "insured" includes 
{1) the named insured, and 
(2) if the named insured is a person or persons, also 
includes the soouse(s), and 
(3) any relatives of the first person named in the 
declarations, or of his or her spouse, and 
(4) any other person while using the owned motor ~ 
vehicle, PROVIOED THE OPERATION AND THE 
ACTUAL USE OF SUCH VEHICLE ARE WITH THE 
PERMISSION OF THE NAMED INSURED OR SUCH 
SPOUSE AND ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SUCH 
PERMISSION, and 
(5) under coverages A and B any other person or 
organization, but only with respect to such person's or 
organization's liability for the use of such owned motor 
vehicle by an insured as defined in the four subsections 
above. 
Midget Automobile—means a land motor vehicle of the 
type commonly referred to as "midget automobile". 
"kart", "go-kart'\ "speedmobile" or by a comparable 
name, whether commercially built or otherwise. 
Newly Acquired Automobile—means an automobile, 
ownership of which is acquired by the named insured or 
spouse, if 
00002:,'! 
coverec this policy, or the company insures ail 
automobiles owned by the named insured and such 
spouse on the date of its deliver y,-,and . , . 
(2) PROVIDED THAT NO INSURANCE SHALL 8E 
APPLICABLE TO SUCH NEWLY ACQUIRED 
AUTOMOBILE UNLESS AS A CONQITION 
PRECEDENT THE NAMED INSURED WITHIN. 30 
OAYS .FOLLOWING SUCH OELtVfcRY DATE 
APPLIES TO THE COMPANY FOR INSURANCE ON 
SUCH NEWLY ACQUIRED AUTOMOBILE., 
If more than one policy issued by the'company could be 
applied to such automobile the named insured shall elect 
which policy shall apply. The named insured shall pay any 
additional premium required because of the application of 
the insurance to such newly acquired automobile. 
Non-Owned Automobile—means an) automobile,trailer or 
detachable Jivjog. quarters unit, other than a temporary 
substitute automobile, not 
.. (1) owned by, , * *"; • • : -y\ 
(2) registered in the name of, or •• t>- J -
(3) furnished or available for the frequent or-regular use 
of 
the named insured, spouse or any relative, 
•j 
Occupying—means in or upon or entering into or alighting 
from. ••' 
Owned Motor Vehicle-^ means *the motor vehicle or trailer 
described in the declarations, and includes a temporary 
substitute automobile,' a newly acquired automobile, and. 
provided the described motor vehicle is not classified as 
"commercial", under coverages A and B,'a trailer (as 
defined herein) or a detachable living quarters unit owned 
by the named insured or spouse. 
Person—means a natural person and not a corporation, 
partnership, association or business name. .\" .'' 
Private Passenger Automobile—means an automobile of the 
private passenger type designed solely for the 
transportation of persons and their personal luggage, and 
Includes station wagons. . .
 v .
w
. * . .
 t, . 
Property Damage—means injury to or destruction of 
property of others, including loss of use-thereof,' • '.* 
heii - i i twai i i a p-/*«-»#< IC IOICU io iiiw I>UHIUU I I D U I O J \ji 
spo\. ;y blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of 
the same household. • • ' " . . ' . *• • i 
Resident or Reside—when used with reference to the named 
insured's household, menns bodily presence in such 
household and an intention to continue to dwell therein. 
However, the named insured's unmarried • and 
unemancipated children, while away from his or her 
household attending school, are deemed to be residents of 
such household. 
Spouse—means a named insured's husband or wife, if a 
resident of the same household. 
State—includes the District of Columbia, a territory of 
possession of the United States and a province or territory 
•ofCanada.
 ># - .;•• 
^Temporary Substitute Automobile—means an automobile 
not owned by the named insured or spouse while 
J temporarily used with the permission- of the owner as a 
{substitute for the described motor vehicle when withdrawn 
from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, 
loss or destruction.
 x 
Trailer—means a trailer or semitrailer not so described if 
[designed for use with a private passenger automobile and if 
(•not 
( D a passenger trailer, ., 
(2) a trailer used for business purposes with other than a 
private p3ssenger automobile, of 
i (3) a trailer used as premises for office, store or display 
1
 purposes. , / * . . . . ' " • 
:
 Utility Automobile—means an automobile of the pick-up, 
^ panel or van body type with a load capacity of 2,000 
> pounds or less. ? 
War—means war, whether or not declared, civil war, 
i insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or any act or 
].condition incident thereto. 
SECTION II-PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE 
. . . INSURING AGREEMENTS 
COVERAGE P-PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
INSURING AGREEMENT ~ * ": 
To pay, in accordance with the Utah Automobile No-Fault 
Insurance Act, and all Acts amendatory or supplemental 
thereto, to each eligible injured person personal injury 
protection benefits consisting of: 
(a) medical benefits, 
(b) disability benefits, 
j(c} funeral benefits, and 
1(d) survivor benefits 
I 
(with respect to bodily Injury, caused by accident and 
'arising out of the use of a\ motorvehicle as* a motor vehicle 
•provided that the amount of benefits due under thl5 
^coverage shall be determined by agreement between the 
[eligible injured person, or the legal representative of such 
person, and the company, or if they fall to'agree, by 
•arbitration. ** * v . 
5 
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T H I S I N S T A N C E DOES NOT APPLY UNDEP 
COVERAGES: 
(a) TO BOOILY / W W ? V SUSTAINED BY ANY PERSON 
WHILE OCCUPYING OR THROUGH BEING STRUCK 
BY A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY THE NAMEP 
INSURED OR A RELATIVE WHICH IS NOT AN 
INSURED MOTOR VEHICLE: • 
(b) TO BOOILY INJURY SUSTAINED 8Y ANY*PERSON 
WHILE OPERATING THE INSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
WITHOUT THE EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONSENT 0 ^ 
THE NAMED INSURED OR SPOUSE OR WHILE SUCH 
PERSON IS NOT IN LAWFUL POSSESSION OF SUCH 
INSURED MOTOR VEHICLE; 
(c) TO ANY INJURED PERSON IF SUCH PERSON'S 
CONOUCT CONTRIBUTED TO HIS OR HER INJURY 
UNDER ANY OF THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCE^ 
(1) CAUSING BODILY INJURY TO HIMSELF OR 
HERSELF INTENTIONALLY.OR 
(2) WHILE COMMITTING A FELONY; 
(d) TO BODILY INJURY SUSTAINED BY ANY PERSON 
OTHER THAN THE NAMED INSURED OR A N ^ 
RELATIVE, WHILE NOT OCCUPYING ANY MOTOP 
VEHICLE, IF THE ACCIDENT OCCURS OUTSIDE THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
Regardless of the number of persons injured, policies 
applicable, vehicles involved, or claims made, there shall be 
no duplication of personal injury protection benefits, and 
the aggregate maximum amount pavable under this and a" 
applicable policies with respect to bodily Injury sustained 
by any one eliqibt€ injured person as a result of any ore 
accident shall not exceed: 
(a) for medial benefits, the amount shown under the 
applicable coverage designation in the schedule for each 
person who sustains bodily injury in any one accident; 
\b) 1or disability benefits, 
(i) 85% of any loss of income or the amount shown 
under the applicable coverage designation in the schedule 
per week, whichever is less, for not to exceed the numtotfi* f 
of weeks shown under the applicable coverage
 # 
designation in the schedule, after the date of suc^ '-
accident, provided that if the disability resulting in such 
loss of income includes only a part of a week, the 
company shall not be liable for a greater proportion tff 
such weekly limit than the number of days lost from 
work during the part week bears to the number of days 
In his or her full work week, and 
(II) for reimbursement for household services, the 
•mount shown under the applicable coverage designation 
In the schedule per day for not to exceed the number <?f 
days shown under the applicable coverage designation in 
the schedule; 
M 
tc) W 'tnerei ben 9t its, I he amount snown under i i l t ; 
appllc coverage designation in the schedule; and 
(d) for survivor benefits, the amount shown under the 
applicable coverage designation in the schedule; 
provided that any amount payable under paragraphs (a), 
lb), (c) and id) above shall be reduced by any benefits 
which such injured person is entitled to receive under any 
workmen's compensation law or any similar statutory plnn, 
and any amounts which such person is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because of 
military enlistment, duty or service. 
DEFINITIONS-SECTION I! .. 
The definitions of Bodily Injury, Damages, Newly Acquired 
Automobile, Occupying, Person, RelatNe, Resident or 
Reside end Spouse under Section I apply to Section II and 
under Section I I : 
Disability Benefits—means ' 
(i) reimbursement for 85% of any loss of gross income 
and loss of earning capacity per person from continuous 
inability to work during a period commencing three clays 
after the date of the injury and ending on the date such 
injured person is able to return to his or her usual 
occupation or dies, subject to a limit per injured person 
of not to exceed $150 per week for a period of 52 
weeks. If such disability continues for in excess of two 
consecutive weeks after the date of injury, such three 
day waiting period shall not apply; and 
(ii) In lieu of reimbursement for expenses which would 
have been reasonably incurred for services which, but for 
trie injury, the injured person would have performed tor 
his or her. household and regardless of.whether any of 
such expenses are actually incurred, an allowance of $12 
per day commencing three days after the date of such 
Injury-and ending on the date such person is able to 
perform such services, or dies, but in no event in excess 
of 365 days after the date of such accident If such 
disability continues for in excess,of .14 consecutive days 
after the date of injury, such three day waiting period 
shall not apply. 
Eligible Injured Person —means ** 
• (a) the named insured, spouse, or any relative of either if 
such person sustains bodily injury -, -• 
(1) while occupying a motor vehicle, or 
(2) while a pedestrian, as a result of physical contact 
with a motor vehicle or motorcycle; or 
lb) any other person who sustains bodily injury 
0 ) while occupying, with the permission of the named 
insured, the insured motor vehicle, or 
0000232 
(2J wi J pedmtrlen, as a result of an accident 
Involving..the insured motor vehicle. 
Funeral Benefits—means reimbursement for funeral, burial, 
or cremation expenses. 
Income —means salary, wages, tips, commissions, 
professional fees and profits from an individually owned 
business or farm. 
Insured Motor Vehicle—means the motor vehicle described 
in the declarations or a newly acquired automobile of 
which the named insured is the owner and with respect to 
which 
(a) the bodily injury liability coverage of the policy 
applies, and 
(b)M»verage is required to be maintained under the Utah 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act.• 
Medical Benefits—means reimbursement for the reasonable 
value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray, 
dental, and rehabilitation services, including eyeglasses, 
hearing aids, prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital and 
urslr\ vices and expenses for any non-medlcarremedlal 
re and treatment rendered tn accordance with a 
ecognlzed religious method of healing, 
lotor Vehicle—means any vehicle of a kind required to be 
Jstered with the Department of Motor Vehicles-under 
itie 41 of the Utah Code, except motorcycles. A motor 
hide does not include any vehicle owned by the. United 
tates or any state other than Utah, or any political 
bdlvlsion of either or any of their agencies on which the 
Wurl ty required by Section 5 o^-the Utah Automobile 
No-Fault Insurance Act is not maintained. 
pwner—means a perron who holds the legal title to a motor 
vehicle or in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of.a 
lecurlty agreement or lease with option to purchase, with 
the debtor or lessee having the right to possession, then 
such debtor or lessee shall be deemed the owner. 
Pedestrian—means a person who is not occupying or riding 
Upon a motor vehicle, excluding, however, any. person 
occupying or riding upon a motorcycle. 
i 
Survivor Benefits-means compensation on account ot the 
fteath of a person who qualified for medics/ benefits or 
disability benefits, payable to his or her heirs. 
SCHEDULE 
The applicable set of limits per eligible injuted person i$ indlcalmi bY t h c coverage designation shown in the decJarations 
Coverage designation P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
(a) medical benefits 
(b) disability benefits 
(?) loss of income per week 
number of weeks 
Ul\ household semoa, <ate $ex dap< 
number of days 
(c) funeral benefits 
(d) survivor benefits 
$2000 
$150 
52 
* \ 1 . 
•365 
$1000 
$2000 
,55000 
$150 
52 
$12 
365 
$1000 
$2000 
$10,000 
$150 
52 
$12 
365 
$1000 
$5000 
$25,000 
$150 
52 
%\2 
365 
$1000 
S5000 
$100.0CO 
$150 
-52 
S t 2 
365 
$1000 
$10,000 
SECTION ill - PHYSICAL DAMAGE COVERAGES 
INSURING AGREEMENTS 
COVERAGE D-COMPREHENSIVE 
(11 The Owned Motor Vehicle. To pay for loss to the 
owned motor vehicle EXCEPT LOSS CAUSED BY 
COLLISION but only for the amount of each such loss in 
excess of the deductible amount, if any, stated in the 
declarations as applicable thereto. The deductible amount 
shall not apply to loss caused by a fire or by a theft of the 
entire vehicle. Breakage of glass, or loss caused by missiles, 
falling objects, fire, theft, larceny, explosion, earthquake, 
windstorm, hail, water, flood, malicious mischief or 
vandalism, riot or civil commotion or colliding with birds or 
animals shall not be deemed to be loss caused by collision. 
(2) Wearing Apparel and Luggage. To pay for loss caused by 
fire, lightning, flood, falling objects, explosion, earthquake, 
or theft PROVJDED-THE ENTIRE VEHICLE IS STOLEN, 
to wearing aoparel and luggage owned by the first penon 
named in the declarations, his or her spouse and any 
nlative of either, while such property is in or upon the 
owned motor vehicle. 
D) Additional Benefits. In addition to the limit of liability, 
(a) the company, following a theft of the entire vehicle, 
• also will reimburse the named insured for transportation 
expenses, not exceeding $10 per day, incurred during the 
period starting 48 hours after the report of theft to the 
7 , 
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compar wd ending when the company offers 
settlemt. . »or the theft, and 
(b) the company will pay general average and salvage 
charges for which the insured becomes legally liable; 
because of the owned motor vehicle being transported. 
COVERAGE F-E1GHTY PER CENT COLLISION 
To pay 80% of the first $250 and 100% over that amount 
of tots to the owned motor vehicfe caused by coffision. If 
the coffision is with another motor vehicle insured with this 
company 100% of the loss shall be payable. 
COVERAGE G-DEDUCTJ8LE COLLISION 
To pay for loss to the owned motor vehicle caused by-* 
coffision but only for the amount of each such loss in-
excess of the deductible amount stated in the declarations 
as applicable hereto. If the deductible amount is $100 or* 
less it shall not apply if the collision ijwith another motor 
vehicle insured with this company. 
Collision-Wearing Apparel and Luggage 
If coverage F or G is provided by this policy, the company 
also agrees to pay for loss caused by collision to wearing 
apparel and luggage owned by the first person named in the 
declarations, his or her spouse and any relative of either 
while such property is in or upon the owned motor vehic/e, 
but only for the amount of each such loss in excess of the 
- deductible amount stated in the declarations. In the event 
of foss to the owned motor vehicfe and such property in the 
same accident, the deductible amount shall first be applied 
to the owned motor vehicfe, but only one deductible 
amount shall be applied. 
COVERAGE H-EMEHGENCY ROAD SERVICE 
To pay the reasonable expense incurred in connection with 
the owned motor vehicfe because of: 
(1) deliver/ of gasoline, oil. loaned battery, or change of 
tire. BUT NOT THE COST OF SUCH ITEMS; 
(2) mechanical first 3»d not to exceed one hour at the 
place of disablement; 
(3) towing to the nearest garage or service station where 
the necessary repairs can be made if the vehicle will not 
operate under its own power. 
C O V E R A G E R - M 0 T 0 R V E H I C L E R E N T A L 
REIMBURSEMENT 
In the event of a foss to the owned motor vehicfe, the 
company will reimburse the named insured for the expense 
incurred by such insured for the rental of a substitute 
automobile from a car rental agency or garage, incurred 
during a period starting with 
(1) the date and time of such foss if as a direct result of 
such foss such vehicle cannot be operated under its own 
power, or 
M * ^ o 
(' the vehicle is operable, the date and time such 
in*-.dd authorizes repairs to be made and delivers such 
vehicle to the garage for repairs; 
and ending
 t regardless of the policy period. 
(i) upon the date of the completion of repairs or 
replacement of the property lost or damaged, or 
(ii) upon such earlier date as the company makes or 
tenders settlement for such foss or damage, or 
liii) at 12:01 A.M. on the thirtieth day after the date of 
the commencement of such period. 
COVERAGE R1-AUT0MOBILE RENTAL AND. 
TRAVEL EXPENSE REIMBURSEMENT 
In the event of a foss to the owned motor vehicfe, the 
company will reimburse the named insured: 
A. Expense for Rental of a Substitute Automobile 
For the expense of the rental of a substitute automobile 
from a car rental agency or garage, not to exceed $14 per 
day, incurred during a period starting with 
(1) the date and time of such loss if as a direct result of 
such loss such vehicle cannot be operated under its own 
power, or 
(2) if the vehicle is operable, the date and time such 
insured authorizes repairs to be made and delivers such 
vehicle to the garage for repairs. 
and ending, regardless of the policy period. 
(i) upon the date of the completion of repairs or 
replacement of the property, or 
(ii) upon such earlier date as the comoany makes or 
tenders settlement for such loss or damage. 
B. Comprehensive or Collision Deductible 
For any deductible amount applicable to the 
comprehensive and collision coverages In effect on a 
substitute automobile rented from a car rental agency or 
garage, if the insured is legally liable for such deductible 
amount. 
CTravel Expense 
if the loss to the owned motor vehicfe occurs more than 50 
miles away from the named insured's residence, for 
(1) commercial transportation, expense incurred by 
(i) the named insured, 
(ii) the spouse, and 
(iii) any refstive, 
who was occupying such vehicle at the time of such foss, 
irom the site of such foss to the named insured's 
residence or to the named insured's destination (at the 
option of the named insured). 
(2) necessary extra expense incurred for meals and 
lodging by the named insured, spouse, and relatives 
during a period commencing on the date of such loss and 
!»000234 
endin » the date of arrival at the named Insured'* 
reside. or destination or 'at trie end of the fifth c^Y 
following the date of such loss, whichever occurs first. 
• • • « • ' • 
• (3) necessary extra expense "for meals, lodging. and 
• commercial transportation incurred by • the named 
insured or some other perron designated by the named 
insured for the purpose of returning the repaired o w r i ^ 
motor vehicle from where it was repaired to the named 
\nsurecY3Twidence or owt'maVion. . 
USE OF NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILES 
If the named insured is a person or persons and if during 
the policy period such named insured owns an autornobile 
covered by this policy and classified as "pleasure and 
business" such insurance as is afforded by this policy with 
respect to the*owned motor vehicle under coverages 0 , F, 
GA H, R and R1 applies to Iou to enon-owmd automobile 
provided • •
 v . 
(a) such vehicle is a
 pnvMt§ psssenger or utility 
automobile, a trailer as defined herein or. a detachaP'e 
living quarters unit and -•••"*.•.• - . . . : ; 
(b) such vehicle Is being operated by or is In the 
possession or custody of the- first person named in the 
• declaration*, his or her spouse or'any relative of either; 
PROVIDED SUCH 'OPERATION; • OCCUPANCY 0R 
CUSTODY IS WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE 0WN£R 
OR PERSON IN LAWFUL POSSESSION QF SUCH 
VEHICLE AND IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SUCH 
PERMISSION. AND THAT- SUCH F I R £ " T < N A M £ D 
INSURED, SPOUSE OR RELATIVE IS LEGALUY 
LIABLE TO THE OWNER THEREOF FOR THE LOSS TO 
SUCH VEHICLE. . ; , - : • : 
EXCLUSIONS-SECTION III \ : -•: . " :' 
THIS INSURANCE OOES NOT APPLY UNDER: 
(a) COVERAGES 0 . F . - G , ' H. R AND R f „ TO A 
NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE ' 
(1) WHILE MAINTAINED OR USED BY ANY PERSON 
WHILE SUCH PERSON IS EMPLOYED OR 
OTHERWISE ENGAGED IN AN AUTOMOBILE 
• BUSINESS OF THE INSURED OR OF ANY' 0TH6R 
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION, OR 
(2) WHILE 'USED, IN ANY OTHER BUSINESS OR 
OCCUPATION, except a private passenger automobile 
, operated or occupied by the Unt person named in the 
declarations, his or her spouse or any relative of either; 
(b) COVERAGES D. F, G, H, R AND R1 WHILE THE 
OWNED MOTOR VEHICLE IS RENTED OR LEASED TO 
OTHERS BY THE INSURED. USED AS A'.PUBLIC OR 
LIVERY CONVEYANCE, OH. USED FOR CARRYING 
PERSONS FOR A CHARGE, but the transportation on a 
sh •xpense basis In t prlvete passenger eutornobile of 
' friei«js, neighbors, 'fellow employees or school children 
shall not be deemed carrying persons for a charge; 
(c) COVERAGES D, F , G . H , R A N D R1: " '^ ! 
(1) TO LOSS DUE T O - TAKING BY ANY 
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY; >. 
(2) TO LOSS DUE TO RADIOACTIVE 
CONTAMINATION; . 
"(3) WHILE ' THE OWNED, MOTOR . VEHICLE IS 
SUBJECT TO ANY BAILMENT LEASE, 
CONDITIONAL SALE.'PURCHASE AGREEMENT, 
MORTGAGE OR OTHER ENCUMBRANCE, NOT 
DECLARED IN THIS POLICY; . ' • • 
(41 TO LOSS DUE TO WAR; 
(dJCOVERAGESD, F ,G, R AND R1: ""'• 
*. (1) TO ANY"LOSS TO THE OWNED MOTOR' 
VEHICLE OR- TO A NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE 
WHICH IS DUE AND CONFINED TO WEAR AND 
TEAR, FREEZING, MECHANICAL OR'ELECTRICAL 
BREAKDOWN OR FAILURE, unless such loss is the 
direct result of a theft, covered by this policy, of the 
entire motor vehicle; 
(2) TO'TIRES unless stolen',"damaged by fire, malicious 
• mischief or vandalism, or unless such loss be coincident 
with other loss covered by this policy; 
•(e) COVERAGES D / R AND R1 TO "LOSS .DUE TO 
CONVERSION, EMBEZZLEMENT'OR'SECRETION BY 
ANY PERSON IN POSSESSION OF THE OWNED 
MOTOR VEHICLE UNDER A* BAILMENT LEASE, 
CONDITIONAL SALE, PURCHASE AGREEMENT, 
MORTGAGE OR OTHER ENCUMBRANCE; ' . 
(f) COVERAGES R AND Rl TO THE EXTENT THAT 
ANY REIMBURSEMENT FOR TRANSPORTATION 
EXPENSE IS- PAID OR PAYABLE TO THE NAMED 
INSURED AS A RESULT OF THE THEFT OF A MOTOR 
VEHICLE INSURED BY THE COMPANY. 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
(1) Coverage* D, F and G. The limit of the company's 
liability for loss shall not exceed the actual cash value of 
the property, or if the loss is of a part thereof the actual 
cash value of such part, at time of loss, nor what it would 
then cost to repair, or replace such property with other of 
like kind and quality, less depreciation^*"d -deductible 
amount applicable. The limit of liability, for loss to all 
wearing apoarel and luggage, of one or mote persons shall 
not exceed $200 for each occurrence. 
The limit of liability on a non-owned trailer or a non-owned 
detachable living quarters, unit shall not exceed $500. 
The company may at its option pay for the loss in money 
or may repair or replace the property or such part thereof 
as aforesaid, or may. return any stolen propeny with 
payment for any resultant damage thereto at any time 
before the loss is paid or the property is so replaced, or may 
M 
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there shall be abandonment to the company. The • 
company may a\ .*$ option settle any claim for loss either 
with the named insured or the owner of the properry. 
(2) Coverage R. In no event shall the company be liable for 
more than $10 per day. ."» " 
(3) Coverage R1. The limit of the company's liability for 
reimbursement for all items of expense incurred by all 
persons under this coverage shall not exceed ihe total sum 
of $400 for any one occurrence. . ,. 
DEFINITIONS-SECTION III 
The definitions under Section I, except the definitions of 
Bodily Injury, Damages. Insured and Owned Motor Vehicle 
apply to Section III and under Section Ml: 
Collision—means collision of-a motor vehide covered by 
this policy with another object or with a vehicle to which it 
Is attached or upset of such motor vehicle. . •:.)'• 
incidenta the use and operation oJ.,the motor venicle as 
a vehicle, ..iduding a tape recorder or stereo tape player 
permanently installed by the manufacturer of the 
automobile and one tape. Equipment does not include a 
detachable living quarters unit, even though attached, if the 
acquisition of such unit has not been previously reported to 
the company and any required premium thereon paid. 
Loss—wherever used with respect to coverages D, F, G, R 
end R1, means each direct and accidental loss of or damage 
to . . . . . 
(1) an owned motor vehicle, or 
(2) its equipment. 
Under coverages 0 , F and G, loss also includes direct and 
accidental damage to wearing apparel and luggage. 
Owned Motor Vehicle—means the motor vehicle or trailer 
described in the declarations, and includes a temporary 
substitute automobile and a newly acquired automobile. 
SECTION IV-UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGE 
,., . INSURING AGREEMENTS 
COVERAGE U-DAMAGES FOR BODILY INJURY. 
CAUSED BY UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLES J .' •*-
To pay all "• sums which the Insured or the legal 
representative of such insured shall be legally entitled to 
recover as damages from the owner" or operator of art 
uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained 
by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured motor 
vehicle provided, for the purposes of this coverage, 
determination as to whether the Insured or such 
representative is legally entitled to recover such damages,-
and if so the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement 
between the insured or such representative and the 
company or, if they fail to agree, by arbitration. 
No judgment against any person or organization alleged to 
be legally responsible for- the bodHy injury shall be 
conclusive, as between the insured and the company, of the 
issues of liability of such parson-or organization or of the 
amount of damages to which the Insured^ legally entitled' 
unless' such judgment is entered pursuant to an action 
prosecuted by the insured with the written consent of the 
company. '' •-• . * 
EXCLUSIONS-SECTION IV 
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY: 
(a) TO BODILY INJURY TO AN INSURED, W I T H . 
RESPECT TO WHICH SUCH INSURED. THE LEGAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF SUCH INSURED OR ANY 
PERSON ENTITLED TO PAYMENT UNDER THIS 
COVERAGE SHALL. WITHOUT WRITTEN CONSENT 
OF THE COMPANY. MAKE ANY SETTLEMENT WITH 
ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE 
LEGALLY LIABLE THEREFOR; 
(b) TO BODILY INJURY TO AH INSURED WHTLE 
OCCUPYING OR THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY A 
LAND MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY THE NAMED 
INSURED OB ANY RESIDENT O F , THE SAME 
HOUSEHOLO, IF SUCH VEHICLE IS NOT AN OWNED 
MOTOR VEHICLE; - , . .> . - . .. ••
 v ,_ 
(c) SO AS TO INURE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO 
THE BENEFIT OF v ? . ; . \ 
(1) ANY WORKMEN'S' COMPENSATION- OR 
DISABILITY BENEFITS CARRIER, OR 
(2) ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION QUALIFYING 
AS A SELF-INSURER UNDER'ANY WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION OR DISABILITY BENEFITS LAW 
OR ANY SIMILAR LAW, OR. ^ 
(31 THE UNITED STATES. OR ANY STATE OR 
' POLITICAL SUBDIVISIOWTHEREOF. 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY •* " * \ 
(a) The limit", of liability stated in the declarations as 
applicable to "each person" is the limit of the company's 
liability for alldamages, including damages for care and loss 
of services, arising out of bodily injury sustained by one 
person in any one accident, and subject to this provision, 
the limit of liability stated in the declarations as applicable 
to "each accident" is the total limit of the company's 
liability for ail such damages for bodily injury sustained by 
two or more persons in any one accident. 
lb) Any/amount payable under this coverage because of 
bodily injury sustained in an accident by a person who is an 
insured under this coverage shall be reduced by: 
10 
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~\ 1/ ui. ju« • J on w<;cou"i o; JJC.'J bodily injury by or, 
on behalf ot - . < * ,* 
(i) the owner or operator of the uninsured motor . 
vehicle and '-: 
(ii) any other person or organization jointly or 
severally liable together with such owner or oocrator 
for such bodily injury including all sums paid under 
coverage A; 
(2). the amount paid and the present value of alt amounts 
payable on account of such bodily injury under any 
workmen's compensation law, disability benefits law or. 
any similar law; 
(3) all sums paid or payable on account of such bodily 
injury under coverage P of a policy issued by this 
company. 
(c) Any payment made hereunder to or for any insured 
shall be applied in reduction of the amount of damages 
which he or she may be entitled to recover from any person 
who Is an insured under coverage A. 
(d) The inclusion in this policy of more than one motor 
vehicle does not increase the limit of liability. 
DEFINITIONS-SECTION IV 
The definitions of Automobile, Bodily injury. Newly 
Acquired Automobile, Occupying, Owned Motor Vehicle, 
Person, Relative, Resident. - Spouse and Temporary 
Substitute Automobile under Section I apply to Section IV 
and under Section IV: 
Hit-and-Bun Motor Vehicle—means a land motor vehicle 
which causes bodily injury to an insured arising out of 
physical contact of such vehicle with the insured or with a 
vehicle which the insured is occupying at the time of tha 
accident, provided: 
(1) there cannot be ascertained the Identity of either the 
operator or owner of such hit-and-run motor vehicle; 
O . 
(2) the insured or someone on the insured's behalf shall 
have reported the accident within 24 hours to a police or 
judicial officer or to the Commissioner of Artotor 
•Vehicles, and shall have filed with the company within 
30 days thereafter a statement under oath that the 
insured or the insured's legal representative has a cause or 
causes of action arising out of such accident for damages 
against a person or persons whose identity is 
unascertainable. and setting forth the facts in support 
thereof; and 
(3) at the company's request, the insured or the insured's 
legal representative makes available for inspection the 
vehicle which the insured was occupying at the time of 
• th« accident. 
v 
Insured—The unqualified word "insured" means 
(1J the first person named in the declarations, his or her 
spouse and any re/stive of either; 
11 
8440 
, j(2) a. ther person while occupying an insured motor 
vehicle; and 
rt3) any person, with respect to damages such person Is 
[entitled to recover because of bodily injury to which this 
.coverage applies sustained by uninsured under (1) or (2) 
above. • • 
Injured Motor Vehide^means: 
i l l ) an owned motor vehicle provided the use thereof is 
[by such first named insured or spouse or any other 
person to whom such first named insured or spouse has 
given permission to use such vehicle if the use is within 
Jthe scope of such permission, or 
12) an automobile not owned by the named insured or 
V iy resident of the same household, other than a 
'temporary substitute automobile, while being operated 
b^y such first named insured or spouse, 
Ptrt the term insured motor~vehide shall not include any 
motor vehicle while being used as a public or livery 
conveyance, or any motor vehicle while being used without 
the permission of the owner. 
Uninsured Motor Vehicle— means: 
JU) a land motor vehicle with respect to the ownership, 
maintenance or use of which there is in at least the 
^mounts specified by the financial responsibility law of 
'the state in which the described motor vehicle is 
^principally garaged, no bodily injury liability bond or 
insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident 
Wvith respect to any person or organization legally 
Yesponsible for the use of such vehicle, or with respect to 
'-which there is a bodily injury liability bond or insurance 
policy applicable at the time of the accident but the 
company writing the same denies that there is any 
coverage thereunder or is or becomes insolvent; or 
(2) a hit-and-run motor vehicle as defined; 
i 
but the term uninsured motor vehicle shall not include: 
(i) a vehicle defined herein as an insured motor vehicle; 
lit) a land motor vehicle furnished for the regular use of 
\he named insured or' any resident of the same 
household; 
(Hi) a land motor vehicle which is owned or operated by 
a self-insurer within the meaning of any motor vehicle 
financial responsibility law, motor carrier law or any 
similar law; 
(tv) a land motor vehicle which is owned by the United 
States of America. Canada, a state, a political subdivision 
of any such government or an agency of any of the 
forsgoing; 
(v) a land motor vehicle designed for use principally off 
public roads except while being used on public roads; 
#(vi) a land motor. vehicle while .located for use as 
'premises. 
M 
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AND LOSS OrtSJGHT Cw * ERAGE 
INSURING AGREEMENTS 
C O V E R A G E , S - D E A T H I N O E M N I T Y , 
DISMEMBERMENT AND LOSS OF SIGHT 
Diviilon 1— Death Indemnity. To pay the amount stated is 
applicable to the insured designated for such coverage In 
the declarations In event of the death of each insured which 
shall result directly and independently of all other causes 
from bodily injury caused by accident and sustained by the 
/mured while occupying or through being struck b y ^ 
automobile, provided the death shall occur within 90 days 
from the date of such accident. 
Division 2—Dismemberment and Loss of Sight. To pay the 
highest amount slated as applicable in the Schedule, for lots 
as enumerated therein. In the event of bodily injury caused 
by accident and sustained by the insured while occupying 
or through being struck, by an automobile, provided toss be 
sustained by the insured within 90 days from the date of 
such acefdent. 
As respect! any insured, 
(1) any amount for which the company is obligated or 
has made payment under division 2 shall apply fn 
reduction of any amount for which the company h 
• obligated under division 1; 
] (2) payment bf "the amount" stated In the declarations 
•shall terminate all obligation of the company under 
divisions 1 and 2 of this coverage. 
Limit of Liability—Division 2. The company's" limit of 
liability shall not exceed the applicable amount as stated in 
the Schedule for each insured who sustains bodily injury \n 
any one accident. 
EXCLUSIONS-SECTION V 
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY TO: 
(a) BODILY INJURY SUSTAINED IN THE COURSE OF 
HIS OR HER OCCUPATION BY ANY PERSON WHILE 
ENGAGED 
(11 IN DUTIES INCIDENT TO THE OPERATION. 
LOADING OR UNLOAOING OF. OR AS AN 
ASSISTANT ON, A PUBLIC OR LIVERY 
CONVEYANCE. COMMERCIAL AUTOMOBILE, 
AMBULANCE, FIRE TRUCK. POLICE CAR CR 
.'OTHER EMERGENCY VEHICLE. OR 
(2) IN DUTIES INCIDENT TO THE REPAIR OR 
SERVICING OF AUTOMOBILES; 
(bl BODILY INJURY OR TO LOSS CAUSED BY OR 
RESULTING FROM DISEASE' except pus forming 
infection which shall occur through bodily injury to which 
this insurance applies; -.-. • •• . . 
ic) BODILY INJURY DUE TO SUICIDE. SANE OR 
INSANE. OR.TO ANY ATTEMPT THEREAT; 
Id) BODILY INJURr®U€ TO WAR; 
(e) BODILY INJURY SUSTAINED WHILE OCCUPYING 
(1) ANY VEHICLE BEING USED FOR RACING OR 
. (2) ANY MILITARY VEHICLE. 
Schedule ._-_«««-«_-»»», 
For Loss of 
Hands; feet; sight of eyes; one 
hand and one foot; or one 
hand or one foot and sight 
of one eye 
One hand or one foot; or sight 
of one eye 
Thumb and index finger on 
one hand; or three fingers on 
one hand 
Any two fingers on one hand 
1 f Amount under S
 ; 
In Declarations is 
$5,000 
$5,000 
2.500 
1.500 
1.000 
$10,000 
$10,000 
5.000 
3.000 
2.000 
DEFINITIONS-SECTION V 
The- definitions of' Bodily tnfuryl Occupying. Private 
Passenger Automobile, Utility Automobile and War under 
Section I apply to Section V and under Section V : 
Automobile—means a land motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer not operated on rails or crawler-treads, but does 
nor mean: 
( D a farm type tractor or other equipment designed for 
use principally off public roads, except while actually 
upon public roads, or 
(2) a land motor vehicle or trailer while located for use as 
a residence or premises and not as a vertirfe. 
12 
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Commercial A obJIe—means any land motor vehicle 
while used in \..- insured's business or occupation other 
than 
( D a private passenger automobiles 
(2) a school bus or 
(3) an owned utility automobile not used for wholesale 
or retail delivery. 
Insured— is the person or persons designated under 
"JPERSONw .NSUREO" in the declarations with a limit of 
liability indicated under the caption "AMOUNTS" 
applicable to such coverage or coverages. 
I 
Loss—means with regard to hands and feet, actual severance 
through or above wrist or ankle joints; with regard to eyes, 
entire and irrecoverable loss of sight; with regard to thumb 
and fingers, actual severance through 'or above 
ffietacarpophala npeal jo in ts. 
POLICY CONDITIONS 
CThe Policy Conditions Apply to All Coverages Unless 
Otherwise Noted) 
1. Notice 
(a) In the event of an accident or loss written notice 
containing particulars sufficient to identify the insured or 
eligible injured person and also reasonably obtainable 
Information respecting the time, place and circumstances of 
the accident, and the names and addresses of injured 
persons and available witnesses, shall be given by or on 
behalf of the insured or each eligible injured person, to the 
company or any of its authorized agents as soon as 
practicable. 
In the event of theft, larceny, robbery or pilferage prompt 
notice shall also be given to the police. 
(b) Coverages A and B. If claim is made or suit is brought 
against the insured, he or she shall immediately forward to 
the company every demand, notice, summons or other 
process received by him or her or his or her representative. 
(c) Coverage P. If any eligible Injured person, his or b?r 
legal representative or dependent survivors shall institute 
)eg*> *ct>or> to recover Js/7?j?*r for £>£>c?JJy to jury agj)r?s? j 
parson or organization who is or may be liable In tort 
therefor, a copy of the summons and complaint or other 
process served in connection with such legal action shall be 
forwarded immediately to the company by such person. 
(d) Coverage U. If before the company makes payment of 
loss under coverage U, the Insured or the legal 
reoresentative of such insured shall institute any legal 
action for bodily injury against any person or organization 
legally responsible for the use of a motor vehicle involved in 
the accident, a copy of the summons and complaint or 
other process served in connection with such legal action 
shall be forwarded immediately to the company by th* 
insured or the legal representative of such insured. 
2. Action Against Company. No action shall lie against the 
company: 
(a) Unless as a condition precedent thereto there shall 
have been full compliance with all terms of this policy. 
(b) Under coverages A and Bf until the amount of the 
Insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally 
determined either by judgment against the insured after 
actual trial and affirmed on appeal, if an aopeai has been 
taken from said judgment, or by written agreement of 
the insured, the claimant and the company. 
Any person or organization, or the legal representative 
thereof, having secured such judgment or agreement, 
shall be entitled to recover under this policy to the 
extent of the insurance afforded. Nothing contained in 
this policy shall give any person or organization any right 
, to join the company as a co-defendant in any action 
against the insured to determine the insured's liability. 
Bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or the insured's 
estate shall not relieve the company of its obligations. 
(c) Under coverages D, F. G. H. R. R1. S and U until 30 
days after the required notice of accident or loss has 
been filed with the company. 
(d) Under coverage P until 35 days after the required 
notice of accident or loss has been filed with the 
company. 
3. Assistance and Cooperation of the thsured. The insured 
sh^ H cooperate with the company and, upon its request, 
attend hearings and trials, assist in effecting settlements, 
securing and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of 
witnesses and in the conduct of any legal proceedings in 
connection with the subject matter of this insurance. The 
Insured shall not, exceot at the insured's own cost, 
voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or 
incur any expense other than for such first aid to others as 
shalt he imperative at the time of accident. 
4. Subrogation. Upon payment under this policy, exceot 
bnder coverages P and S. the comoany shall be subrogated 
to all the insured's rights of recovery therefor and the 
Insured shall do whatever is necessary to secure such rights 
and do nothing to prejudice them. p, ? ^ , ^ . i — ^ ^ ' 
5. Trust Agreement—Coverages f^and U. In the event of 
payment to any person under coverage P or U: 
(a) the company shall be entitled to the extent of such 
payment to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment 
that may result from the exercise of any rights of 
recovery of such person against any person or 
organization legally responsible for the bodily injury 
because of which such payment is made; 
(b) such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the 
com pony all rights of recovery which he or she shall have 
against such other person or organization because of the 
damages which are the subject of claim made under the 
coverages; 
(c) such person shall do whatever is proper to secure and 
shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights; 
(d) if requested in writing by the company, such person 
shall take, through any representative designated by the 
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compan\ ch action as may be necessary or appropriatev 
to recover such payment as damages from such other 
person or organization, such action to be-taken In the: 
name of such person; m the ev«nt of a recovery, the. 
company shall be reimbursed out of such recovery for 
expenses, costs and attorney's fees incurred by it in' 
connection therewith; 
(e) such person shall execute and deliver to the company.] 
such instruments and pooers as may be appropriate ?o! 
secure the rights and obligations of such person and the 
company established by this provision. 
Any payment made under coverage P to or for any injured^ 
person shall be applied in reduction of the amount of 
damages which he or she may be entitled to recover from 
the company for the same accident under either coverage A 
or coverage U of this policy. 
6. Medical Reports; Authorisations; Proof of 
Claim—Coverages P, S and U. 
(a) Medical Reports. As soon as practicable the person 
making claim or someone on that person*: behalf shall give 
to the company written proof of claim, including full 
particulars of the nature and extent of the injuries and 
treatment received and contemplated and other 
Information as may assist the company in determining the 
amount payable. The injured person shall submit to 
physical or mental examinations by physicians selected by 
the company and at the company's expense when and as-
often as the company may reasonably require and upon. 
each request by the company execute authorization to 
enable the company to obtain medical reports and copies of 
records. In the event of the injured person's incapacity or^  
death, the legal representative of such person shall execute, 
authorization for such reports and records. A copy of the 
medical report will be sent the injured person upon written 
request. 
(b) Loss of Wages-Coverage P. If benefits for loss of wages 
or salary (or in the case of the self-employed, their 
equivalent) are claimed, the person presenting such claim 
shall authorize the comoany to obtain details of all wage 
or salary payments, or their equivalent, paid to such person 
by any employer or earned by such person since the time of 
the bodily injury and during the year immediately 
preceding the date of the accident 
(c) Proof of Claim. Proof of claim shall be made upon 
forms furnished by the company unless the company shall 
have failed to furnish such forms within 15 days after 
receiving notice of claim. 
(d) Coverage U. The insured and every other person making 
claim shall submit to questioning under oath by any person 
named by the company and subscribe the same, as often as 
may reasonably be required. 
7. Payment of Claim-Coverages P, S and U. 
(a) Any amount due is payable 
(i) under coverage P w the efigibfe injured person, and 
Kinder coverages S and U to the insured, or 
M 
{» the eligible Injured person or Insured, is a minor or 
an incompetent person, to a perent or guardian, or 
(iii) if the eligible injured person or insured be deceased, 
to the surviving spouse „ , 
provided the comoany may. at its option, pay any such 
amount due to a person or organization authorized by law 
to receive such payment. 
(b) Coverage P. Payments under coverage P shall be made 
periodically on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred, 
after valid proof of loss has been submitted to the 
company. If such written proof Is not furnished to the 
company as to the entire claim, arty partial amount shall be 
paid within 35 days after such written proof is furnished to 
the company. Any pan or all of the remainder of the claim 
that is subsequently supported by written proof shall be 
paid within 35 days after such written proof is furnished to 
the company, provided that any payment shall not be due 
where the company has reasonable proof to establish that it 
Is not responsible for the payment, notwithstanding that 
written proof has been furnished to the company. 
(c) Coverage S. Any payment made under coverage S shall, 
to the extent thereof, constitute a complete discharge of 
the company's obligations hereunder and the company shall 
not be required to see to the application of the money so 
paid. 
The company shall have the right and oppoaunity to make 
an autopsy where it is not forbidden by law. 
8. Other Insurance. Under coverages" A, B, D, F; G, R and 
RLwith respect to any liability or loss to which this and 
any other automobile insurance policy issued to the named 
insured by the company also applies, the total limit of the 
company's liability under ail such policies shall not exceed 
the highest applicable limit of liability under any one such 
po/icy. 
Subject to the above paragraph, if the insured has other 
insurance against liability or/ocr covered by this policy, the 
company under coverages A, B, D, F. G. R and R l . shall 
not be liable for a greater proportion of such liability or 
loss than the applicable limit of liability bears to the total 
applicable limit of liability of all insurance againsi: such 
liability or loss. 
All of the foregoing provisions and ail coverages are subject 
to the following: 
(a) The insurance with respect to a newly acquired 
automobile SHALL NOT APPLY TO ANY LIABILITY 
OR LOSS AGAINST WHICH THE INSURED HAS 
OTHER INSURANCE APPLICABLE THERETO IN 
WHOLE OR IN PART. 
(b) The insurance with respect to 
(i) a temporary substitute automobile, 
(ii) a trailer, or 
(Hi) a nortowned automobile, 
shall be excess over other insurance: however, NO 
COVERAGE SHALL APPLY TO ANY LIA8IL ITY OR 
LOSS IF THE VEHICLE IS OWNED BY ANY PERSON 
^ 0 0 0 2 ^ 
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AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS AND IF THE INSURED OR 
OWNER HAS OTHER INSURANCE APPLICABLE IN 
WHOLE OR IN PART TO SUCH LIABILITY OR LOSS. 
(c) The insurance with respect to wearing apparel and 
luggage under coverages 0 . F and G shall be excess over 
other insurance. 
Under coverage P no person may recover benefits afforded 
under this coverage from more than one policy or company 
on a duplicate basis. If benefits are available to any person 
occupying or through being struck by the insured motor 
vehicle and benefits are also available to such person as a 
named insured or as a relative of a named insured under 
another policy providing similar benefits, the policy 
providing coverage on the insured motor1 vehicle shall be 
primary and the policy available to such person as a named 
insured or as a relative of a named insured SHALL NOT 
APPLY. 
Subject to The preceding paragraph. Jf two or more 
insurers are liable to pav benefits under coverage P or any 
simitar coverage, the maximum amount pevable under such 
coverage shall not'exceed the amount payable under one 
policy. In the.event that the company has paid more than 
its proportionate share of such benefits, it shall be entitled 
to recover the excess from each of the other insurers 
providing similarjjenefrts. 
Under coverage U with respect to bodily injury to an 
insured while occupying a motor vehicle not owned by a 
named insured under this coverage, the insurance hereunder 
Shall apply only*as excess insurance over any other similar 
Insurance available to such occupant, and this insurance 
shall then aoo'y only in the amount by which the 
applicable limit of liability of this coverage exceeds the sum 
of the applicable limits of liability of all such other 
Insurance. 
Subject to the foregoing paragraph, under coverage U if the 
insured has other similar insurance available to him or her 
against a loss covered by this coverage, then the damages 
shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable 
limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, 
and the company shall not be liable under this coverage for 
8 greater proportion of the applicable limit of liability of 
this coverage than such limit bean to the sum of the 
applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other 
Insurance. ' 
Under coverage U, any insurance provided thereunder shall 
be excess insurance over any benefits available, or which 
would be available but for the application of a deductible, 
under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance AcL 
9. Arbitration. If any person making claim under coverage 
U and the comoany do not agree that such person is legally 
entitled to recover damages from the owner oxooerator of 
an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury to the 
insured- or do not agree as to the amount payable 
hereunder, or if any person and the company do not agree 
as to the amount, if any, payable under coverage P, then 
each party shall, upon written demand of either, select a 
con>petet d dean teres ted arbitrator, the twu arbitrators 
no n*mi;ti . <M select a third arbitrator, or if unable to agree 
thereon within 30 days, then upon request of such parson 
making ctoirn or the company such third arbitrator shall be 
elected by a judge of a court of record in the county and 
state in which such arbitration is pending. The arbitrator; 
iiall then hear and determine the question or Questions so 
in dispute, and the decision in writing of any two 
arbitrators, shall be binding uoon such person making claim 
and the company, each of whom shall pay his or her or its 
ohosen arbitrator and shall bear equally the expense of the 
third arbitrator and all other expenses of the arbitration, 
•irovitied that attorney fees and fees paid to medical cr 
other expert witnesses are not deemed to be expenses of 
arbitration but are to be borne by the parry incurring them. 
Unless the parties otherwise agree, the arbitration shall be 
conducted in the county and state in which such person 
making claim resides and in accordance with the usual rules 
governing procedure and admission of evidence in courts of 
law. 
10. Named Insured's Duties When Loss Occurs-Coverages 
0. F. G, H. R and R1 . When loss occurs, the named insured 
also shall: 
(a) use every reasonable means to protect the damaged 
property covered by this policy from any further 
damage; reasonable expense incurred in affording such 
protection shall be deemed incurred at the company's 
request; 
(fa) upon the company's request, exhibit the damaged 
property to the company and submit to examinations 
under oath by anyone designated by the company, 
subscribe the same, procure and produce for the 
company's examination all pertinent records, receipts 
end invoices, or certified copies, if originafs be lost, 
permitting copies thereof to be made, alt at such 
reasonable times and places as the company shall 
designate. 
11. No Benefit to Bailee, Insurance under coverages D, F, 
G, R and R1 shall not inure to the benefit of any carrier or 
other bailee for hire liable for loss to the owned motor 
vehicle or a non-owned automobile. . 
12. Joint and Several Interests. If two or more insureds are 
famed in the declarations, each insured appoints the other 
insured or other insureds, jointly and severalty, as his or her 
attorney in fact for purposes of cancellation, termination, 
modification or changes of the coverages, or any other 
provisions of this policy, said appointment to remain valid 
and in full forca and effect until 20 days after receipt by 
the company of written notification from the insured of 
the termination of such appointment. The inclusion of 
mora than ona insured shall not operate to increase the 
limits of the company's liability. 
T3. Two or More Motor Vehicles-Sections I, It, HI and IV. 
When two or more motor vehicles are insured hereunder, 
the policy shall apply separately to each but a motor 
vehicle and a trailer or trailers attached thereto shall be one 
motor vehicle as resoects the limits of liability under 
coverages A, B, P and U. 
M 
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14. Change*. I r ms of this policy may not be waived or 
changed except w, policy endorsement attached hereto, 
signed by an executive officer of the company. 
15. Alignment. No Interest in this policy Is assignable 
unless the company's consent is endorsed hereon. If the 
named insured dies, this policy shall cover as named insured 
(a) the surviving spouse, 
(b) under Sections I, I I , Ml and IV any person having 
prooer temporary custody of the owned motor vehicle 
until the appointment and qualification of a legal 
representative, and thereafter the legal representative, 
but only while acting within the scope of his or her 
duties as such, 
(c) under Section V , any person who, but for such death; 
would have continued to be an Insured. 
Consent of the beneficiary under division 1 of coverage S is 
not a requisite to cancellation, assignment, change of 
beneficiary or any other change in the policy. • * > 
• •< u 
16. Cancellation. The named insured may cancel this policy 
by mailing to the comoany written notice stating when 
thereafter such cancellation shall be effective. 
The company may cancel this policy in accordance with the 
terms hereof by written notice, addressed to the named 
Insured and mailed to his or her address last known to the 
company or Its authorized agent stating when cancellation 
shall be effective. Such notice of cancellation shall be 
sufficient notwithstanding the death of the named Insured. 
The mailing of the notice shall be sufficient proof of notlca 
and the effective date and hour of cancellation stated 
therein shall become the end of the policy period. Delivery 
of written notice shall be equivalent to mailing. 
Unless, within 59 days of the effective date of this policy, 
th« company mails or delivers a notice of cancellation to 
th« named Insured In the manner provided in the two 
preceding paragraphs, the company agrees as to each 
coverage in force on such effective date: . •' •* 
A* to continue such coverage In force until the expiration 
. of the current policy period, and -, .. 
B;"to renew this policy for the succeeding policy period, 
. unless the comoany advises the named insured of its 
Intention not to renew this policy by notice sent to such 
Insured not less than 30 days before the expiration of the 
current policy period, in the same manner as is provided 
herein for notices of cancellation by the company. Such 
renewal shall be at the rates legally in effect at the time 
thereof. 
These agreements shall be void and of no effect: 
1 . If the named insured fails to discharge when due any 
of his or her obligations in connection with the payment 
of premium for this policy or any Installment thereof 
whether payable,directly or under any premium finance 
plan; or 
Z If the named Insured or any other operator who 
customarily operates a motor vehicle insured under the 
M 
policy dU nuu« nut ui ivci ^ iiLciiic ui'Uci du^ci i^iun 
or revo^ j n at any time:
 m » 
(i) during the policy period; or 
(ii) If the Oolicy Is renewed, during the current policy 
period or the 180 days immediately preceding its 
effective date. 
In the event that the policy Is canceled during the first 59 
days following the effective date of the policy, the notice 
of cancellation shall be mailed to the named insured not 
less than 10 davs prior to the effective date of such 
cancellation. After the policy has been in force for 59 days, 
subsequent notice of cancellation for non-payment shall be 
mailed to the named insured not less than 10 days prior to 
the effective date thereof. Notice of any other cancellation 
shall be mailed tp the named Insured not less than 20 days 
prior^to the effective date thereof. 
If the named insured "cancels, earned premiums shall be 
computed in accordance with the company's short rate' 
table and procedures. If the company cancels, earned 
premiums shall be computed pro rata. Premium adjustment 
may be made at the time cancellation is effected or as soon 
as practicable thereafter, but the.payment or tender, of 
unearned premiums is not a.condition of cancellation. 
17. Liberalization Clause. If the company revises its policy 
form to grant broader coverage without additional charge, 
such Insurance as is afforded hereunder shall be so extended 
or broadened effective upon adoption of such broader 
coverage by the company. 
18. Declarations. 8y acceptance of this* policy the named 
insured agrees that the statements in the declarations are his 
or her agreements and representations, that this policy is 
Issued in reliance upon the truth of such representations 
and that this policy embodies all agreements existing 
between himself or herself and the company or any of its 
agents relating to this insurance. 
19. Motor Vehicle Compulsory Laws or Financial 
Responsibility Laws 
A. Out-of-State Insurance—Coverages A, B and U. 
If, under the provisions of the motor vehicle compulsory 
Insurance law, motor vehicle financial responsibility law or 
any similar law of any xtaf*. anw, insured who Is a 
non-resident of such state must maintain insurance with 
respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of an owned 
motor vehicle or a non-owned sutomobile in such jrtJfe and 
the requirements of such insurance are greater than the 
insurance provided by this polic/, any Bodily Injury and 
Property Damage Liability, Medical Payments and 
Uninsured Motor Vehicle insurance afforded under this 
policy shall be deemed to comply with such requirements. 
Insurance so provided shall be in lieu of the insurance 
otherwise provided by the policy, but only to the extent 
required by such law and only with resoect to the 
ownership, maintenance or use of the owned motor vehicle 
or a norhowned automobile in such stMte. The insurance 
under this provision shall be reduced to the extent there is 
other collectible insurance under this or any other motor 
vehicle liability insurance policy. In no e^ent shall any 
person be entjtled to duplicate payments for the same 
elements of loss. 
i\ A A A n A ~-
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8. Financial Responsibility Laws-Cove rages A and 8. 
When certified as proof of future financial responsibility 
under any motor vehicle financial responsibility law and 
while such proof is required during the policy period, this 
policy shall comply with such law to the extent of the 
coverage 9nd limits required. The insured agrees to 
reimburse the company for any payment made by the 
company which it would not have been obligated to make 
under the terms of this policy except for the agreement 
contained in this paragraph. 
20. Policy Period. Territory. Under Sections I. I I . Ill and IV 
this insurance applies only to toss to a motor vehicle 
insured hereunder, other insured property and accidents 
which occur during the policy period in the United States 
of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada, or 
while such vehicle is being transported between ports 
thereof, provided the described motor vehicle is owned, 
maintained and used for the purposes stated in the 
declarations. 
This insurance also applies under Sections I, II and III to 
such accidents and toss in Mexico within 50 miles of the 
United S» -s boundary. Loss in Mexico under Section Iff 
shall be determined upon the basis of cost at the nearest 
United States point. 
U'Kter Section V this insurance applies to accidents during 
the policy period which occur anywhere. 
21 . Provisional Premium. It is agreed that in the event of 
any change in the rules, rates, rating plan, premiums or 
minimum premiums applicable to the insurance afforded. 
because of an adverse judicial finding as to the 
constitutionality of any provisions of the Utah Automobile 
No-Fault Insurance Act providing for the exemption of 
persons from tort liability, the premium stated in the 
declarations for any automobile bodily injury, automobile 
prooerty damage liability, automobile medical payments 
and protection against uninsured motorists insurance shall 
be deemed provisional and subject to recomputation. 
If the final premium thus recomputed exceeds the premium 
stated in the declarations, the named insured shall pay to 
the comoany the excess as well as the amount of any return 
premium previously credited or refunded. 
MUTUAL CONDITIONS 
1. Membership. The membership fees set out in this policy, 
which are in addition to the premiums, are not returnable 
but entitle the first insured named in the declarations to 
insure one vehicle for any applicable coverage, and to 
Insurance for any other coverage for which said fees were 
paid so long as this company continues to write such 
coverages and such insured remains a risk desirable to the 
company. 
While this policy is in force, the first insured named in the 
declarations is entitled to vote at all meetings of members 
and to share in the earnings and savings of the company in 
accordance with the dividends declared by the Board of 
Directors on this and like policies. 
2. No Contingent Liability. This policy is non-assessable. 
3. Annual Meeting. The annual meeting of the members of 
the company shall be held at its home office at 
Bloomington, Illinois, on the second Monday of June at ithe 
hour of 10:00 A.M., unless the Board of Directors shall 
elect to change the time and place of such meeting, in 
which case, but not otherwise, due notice shall be mailed 
each member at the address disclosed in this policy at least 
10 days prior thereto. 
In Witness Whereof, the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company has caused this policy to be signed by its 
President and Secretary at Bloomington, Illinois, and countersigned on the declarations page by a duly authorized 
representative of the Company. 
SECRETARY U 
^^^S^Sir 
PRESIDENT 
17 
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6328L AMENDATORY ENDORSEME. 
Nothing herein contained snail be held to *hcr. vary, waive or extend any of the terms, conditions, agreements or 
limitations of the undermentioned policy other than as stated below. 
Effective . 12:01 A.M. Standard Time. Attached to ard forming a port of 
policy number _ 
issued to-
by the STATE FARM MUTUAL AUT0M08ILE INSURANCE COMPANY, of Bloommgton, Illinois, nr the STATE 
FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, at Bloommgton, Illinois, as indicated by the company name on the policy of 
which this endorsement is a part. 
{The information above is required only when 
this endorsement is issued subsequent to the 
preparation of the policy.) 
Countersigned. 
By 
19 . 
Authorized Representative 
In consideration of the premium it which the policy is 
written, it ii aqreed that the "Limits of Liability" pro vision 
Of Section II ~ Personal Injury Protection Coverage, is 
deleted and replaced by the following: 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
Regardless of the number of persons injured, policies 
applicable, vehicles involved, or claims made, there shall be 
no duo'ication of personal injury protection benefits, and 
the aggregate maximum amount pavabie under this and all 
applicable policies with rev>ec: to bodily injury sustained 
by any one eligible injured person as a result of any one 
accident snail not exceed: 
(a) for medical benefits. the amount shown under the 
applicable coverage designation in the schedule for each 
perron who Sustains bodily tnjury in any one accident: 
provided, the amount payable for expenses Incurred for 
services furnished more than three years after the date of 
the accident is limited to a maximum of X2000 less any 
amount paid or payable for services furnished during the 
f ia t three years after the date of the accident. 
(b) for disability benefits, 
ft) 85% of any loss of income or the amount shown 
under the aoplicable coverage designation in the schedule 
per week, whichever is less, tor not to exceed the number 
of weeks shown under the applicable coverage 
designation in the schedule, after the date of such 
accident, provided that if the disability resulting in such 
loss of income includes only 4 p<*i t ol a w»?ck. lr*» 
company shall not ba liable lor j greater proportion o* 
such weekly limit than the numoer ol days fast from 
work during the part week bears to the number ol days 
in his or her full work week, and 
fit) for reimbursement lor household services, the 
amount shown undw the applicable coveraqe designation 
in the schedule per day for not to exceed the number ol 
days shown under the applicable coverage Designation in 
the schedule; 
(cl for funeral benefits, the amount shown under 
applicable coverage designation in the schedule; and 
the 
Id) for survivor benefits . the amount shown under the 
applicable coverage designation in the schedule; provided, if 
the death occurs more than three years after the date of the 
accident, the maximum amount payable is S2000, 
provided that any amount payable under paragraphs (a). 
lb), (c) and (d) above shall be reduced by any benefits 
which such injured person is entitled to receive under any 
workmen's compensation law or any similar statutory plan, 
and any amounts which such person is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because of 
military enlistment, duty or service. 
£^^3^^r 
President 
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C2S6G CB RADIO, TAPE RECORDER AND TAPE PLAYER THEFT EXCLUSION 
Nothing herein coni;iin«\J srwll be hold to alter, vary, waive or e»imd any of the terms, conditions, agreements or 
liinitati'vts of the under rum tioruxJ policy other thun us stated UHuw. 
CH/v-t.\n» l?:Ot A.M. Stand^d Time. Attached to and forming a port of 
policy numtvr " 
issued *«* 
by \U* STATE FARM MUTUAL AUT0M06 ILE INSURANCE COMPANY, oi Hfoomin»jton. Illinois, or the STATE 
FARM FINE ANO CASUALTY COMPANY, ot Blooming ton, Illinois, as indicated by th« conioany noma on the policy of 
which tins cndo«*«mam is .1 p»n \. 
(Th* information above is rrrjuirevl only when 
this endorsement is issued subsequent to the Countersigned _ _ _ — . 19 
preparation of the policy.) 
B y -
Authorized Representative 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed that the definition of equipment is amended to read: 
Equipment — means turn eouioment as is usual and incidental to the use and operation of the motor vehicle as a vehicle. 
It does not include a rieuu'tuhie living quarter* unit, even flwxjgh attaclied. if the acquisition of such unit has not been 
previously reported to the company and any required premium th«tf con paid. 
It Is further agreed that the following exclusions art added: 
1 . THIS INSURANCE DOGS NOT APPLY UNOEfl THE PHYSICAL OAMAGE SECTION TO LOSS OF ANY 
RECORDING TAPE. 
Z THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY TO LOSS 8Y THEFT OF; 
(a) A CITIZENS BAND RADIO. TAPE RECOROER OR TAPE PLAYER. OR 
lb) ANY ELECTRONIC DEVICE INCORPORATING ANY OF THE FOREGOING. 
unless permanently installed in the opening of the dash or console of the own$d motor y#n/c/# normally used by the 
motor vehicle marnjlactutcr for the installation of a radio. 
President 
62*>CG 
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Glenn C. Hanni , A1327 
R. S c o t t W i l l i a m s , 3498 
STRONG & HANNI 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendant & 
T h i r d - P a r t y P l a i n t i f f 
S i x t h F l o o r Boston B u i l d i n g 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, e t a l . , 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v s . 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Third-Party 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
KENNETH PAUL BRYAN, 
Third-Party 
Defendant . 
AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. C83-8099 
Judge Judith M. Billings 
I, Grant M. Cutler, do hereby state as follows: 
1. I am the claim superientendent for State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in Salt Lake City. 
2. I am personally familiar with payments made by 
State Farm under the No-Fault insurance policy provisions 
of State Farm's policy with Lorin Dean Caldwell arising out 
of an automobile accident which occurred on or about June 6, 
E X H I B I T B 0000246 
19 82, resulting in the deaths of Troy Caldwell and Tamara Hill. 
3. No-Fault insurance benefits were paid by State 
Farm to or for the parents of Troy Caldwell in the amount of 
$6,53 9.00 and to or for the parents of Tamara Hill in the 
amount of $6,123.00. 
4. I am personally familiar with the basic provisions 
of the insurance policy of Mr. Caldwell with State Farm. 
The policy included a condition entitled Subrogation, a copy 
of which condition is attached to this affidavit• 
Dated this day of September, 1984. 
Grant M. Cutler 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
September, 1984. 
Notary Public - Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
-2- 0000247 
Tab I 
o 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR (1905) 
Moffat, Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young 
Suite 300 
261 East Broadway 
Salt Lake CityV UT 84111 
Telephonist8(ft) 521-7500 
ROY A. JACOBSON, JR. (4480) 
V. ANTHONY VEHAR 
VEHAF., B EFPfcBRT—^  Alub S UN ,"LATERY-&-ROSE, P. C. 
P.O. Bex 139 
Kemmerer, WY 63101 
Telephone: (307) 877-3973 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually, 
and as personal representative 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE 
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, individually and 
as personal representative of 
the heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. C83-8099 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW, the Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel, and 
respectfully submit the following memorandum in opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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Defendant's motion for summary judgment should not be 
granted because: 
1 As to Plaintiff Hill there i:- : question of material 
f a c t i n t h a t P1 a i n t i f f H i 1 1 w a s • •. j f c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e 
Defendant as to the Defendant's payment of, and attempts to 
recover, P.I,P. payments made to Plaintiff Kill. 
2. As to Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the 
issue of punitive damages, the law is not clear, and Plaintiffs 
have moved for an order of this Court allowing them to amend 
their Complaint to set forth with more particularity the 
independent tort of interference with economic relations. 
I. PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Plaintiffs agree with the material facts set forth by 
Defendant a* paragraphs "! ? :\r 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 1 0, 12, and 
. . : '" ': " .- . . -.".v. and i n addition thereto rel/v • on 
the following unrefuted material facts. 
L The State Farm insurance policy included a provision for 
the recovery of Personal Injury Protection - no fault benefits at, 
paragraph f5f of the policy conditions, which states, in 
pertinent part: 
5. Trust Agreement-Coverages P [.Personal 
Injury Protection (P. I.P.)] and U. In the 
event of payment to any person under coverage 
P or U: 
(a) The company shall be entitled to 
the extent of such payment to the proceeds of 
any settlement or judgment that may result 
from the exercise of any rights of recovery 
of such person against any person or 
0000260 
organization legally responsible for the 
bodily injury because of which such payment 
is made; 
(b) such person shall hold in trust for 
the benefit of the company all rights of 
recovery which he or she shall have against 
such other person or organization because of 
the damages which are the subject of claim 
made under the coverages; 
• • • • 
2. State Farm intended and attempted to have withheld from 
the CUMIS payment to Plaintiffs, the money paid for P.I.P. 
(Affidavit of Wallace Lauchnor) . 
:> 3. It was necessary for Plaintiffs to hire an attorney to 
deal with State Farm relative to its claims for recovery of the 
P.I,P. monies and subrogation for the property damages. 
(Affidavit of Wallace Lauchnor). 
h* 4. Only upon intercession by Plaintiffs1 attorney did State 
Farm determine not to further pursue recovery of the P.I.P. 
monies. (Affidavit of Wallace Lauchnor). 
5. The CUMIS policy, with a single liability limit of 
$50,000.00, was not sufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs' wrongful 
death claims. (Affidavit of Wallace Lauchnor). 
6. P-ia-intjLf f sf attorney was told by the State Farm claims man 
for the Plaintiffs' claims, that if Plaintiffs wished to prove 
that the deaths of their children were worth $25,000.00 or more 
each, Plaintiffs would have to litigate the matter with the tort 
feasor and prove the children's worth to State Farm. 
3 
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.7. Plaintiffs1 attorney made it clear to the State Farm 
claims man that the costs of litigating the worth of the two 
children would exceed the recovery claimed by State Farm. 
Cn B. PiadrtfETffs1 attorney offered to let State Farm proceed 
with subrogation at State Farm's cost; State Farm refused. 
" 9. The release signed by Plaintiff Hill and his wife 
recited consideration cf $22,245.00 and specifically stated that: 
It is understood that the above amount of 
twenty two thousand two hundred and forty 
five and no/100 Dollars ($22,245.00) 
represents twenty five thousand and no/100 
Dollars ($25,000.00) policy limits less the 
collision claim of five thousand five hundred 
ten and no/100 Dollars ($5,510.00) by State 
Farm Mutual Insurance Company, wherein a 
controversy exists as to who is entitled to 
the said amount, and that the matter will be 
resolved between the two or by payment into 
court or by judicial determination. (Hill 
Depo., Exhibit 1.) 
10. No discovery has been conducted since the Utah Supreme 
Court rendered its opinion in Hill v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company, 765 P2d 864 (Utah 1988); Defendants 
Motion for Summary Judgment relies on the same facts that the 
Supreme Court determined were insufficient to sustain summary 
judgment in Hill v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company. ' 
II. PLAINTIFF HILL WAS IN PRIVITY OF 
CONTRACT WITH STATE FARM 
Plaintiffs complain of State Farm's actions in its attempts 
to enforce the subrogation and Trust Agreement provisions of the 
State Farm automobile policy. It is essential to recognize that 
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State Farm attempted to recover not only the monies it paid to 
Caldwell for property damage but also the monies it paid to Hill 
and Caldwell for P.I.P. It cannot be seriously argued but that 
State Farm was in privity of contract with Hill as to the 
recovery of P.I.P. monies under the "Trust Agreement" policy 
conditions. While State Farm asserts that it stepped into the 
shoes of Caldwell only in pursuing the subrogation claim for 
property damage, such contention is fatally flawed and must fail 
for the reality is State Farm's extortion was in violation of 
Utah's doctrine of "equitable subrogation" and it worked as a 
detriment to Hill in that he would receive less money from the 
settlement with CUMIS. 
Although State Farm restricts Plaintiffs' complaints of bad 
faith to its refusal to waive its subrogation claim, such 
restriction is not accurate. Plaintiffs' foremost bad faith 
complaint with State Farm arises out of State Farm's total 
failure to investigate whether the paltry CUMIS insurance monies 
were sufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs1 wrongful death claims. 
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) 
concluded that: 
. . . the obligation of good faith performance 
contemplates at the very least, that the 
insurer will diligently investigate the facts 
to enable it to determine whether a claim is 
valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, and 
will thereafter act promptly and reasonably 
in rejecting or settling the claim. 
The duty of good faith also requires the 
insurer ... to refrain from actions that will 
injure the insured's ability to obtain the 
benefits of the contract. (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added) 
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State Farm apparently did not investigate and without 
investigating State Farm was unable to determine, in good faith, 
(1) whether the CUMIS proceeds were sufficient to satisfy 
Plaintiffs' wrongful death claims, (2) whether State Farm's claim 
for subrogation was in fact valid under Utah law given the 
doctrine of "equitable subrcgaticn", and (3) whether Plaintiffs' 
claim that State Farm was not entitled to subrogation or 
repayment of P.I.P. benefits was valid. 
Plaintiffs assert that any reasonable investigation would 
show (a) that the $50,000.00 CUMIS policy was not sufficient to 
satisfy the Plaintiffs' wrongful death claims but in fact was 
wholly inadequate; (b) that Plaintiffs' attorneys had conducted 
investigations to determine the same matters; and (c) that 
Plaintiffs' attorneys had useful and valid information that State 
Farm could use in its investigation and in making its 
evaluations. 
Instead, State Farm made its evaluations, rejected 
Plaintiffs' claims and upheld its own claims based on no 
reasonable investigation of facts necessary to make fair 
evaluations and decisions. State Farm's determinations appear to 
be that: 
(1) Plaintiffs1 wrongful death claims were satisfied 
by the CUMIS payment of $50,000.00; that is to say Plaintiffs 
were made whole for the wrongful death of two (2) outstanding 
children by the total payment of $50,000.00. 
s 
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(2) Because Plaintiffs' claims were satisfied by the 
payment of $50,000.00, State Farm was entitled to satisfy its 
claim for subrogation as to the $5,500.00 paid to Caldwell for 
property damage and State Farm was entitled to reimbursement from 
Caldwell and Hill for P.I. P. payments in the sum of $12,622.00 
under the trust agreement provisions of the Caldwell policy. 
(3) Plaintiffs' claim that State Farm was not entitled 
to subrogation or repayment of P.I.P. benefits should be 
rejected. 
(4) There was legal burden and duty upon 
grief-stricken and devastated parents to file a lawsuit, relive 
the worst days of their lives and take that suit to judgment to 
show State Farm that the wrongful deaths of two outstanding 
teenage children were worth more than $25,000.00 each. 
(5) State Farm had no duty or burden to investigate 
whether its subrogation and trust agreement claims were good 
claims under Utah law given the unrefutable facts of this case. 
(6) State Farm could enforce its claimed rights to 
subrogation and recovery of the P. I. P. monies as such actions 
would not injure the insured's ability to obtain the benefit of 
the insurance contract. 
It has long been the law in this jurisdiction that summary 
judgment should be granted only when it is clear from the 
undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot prevail. Larson 
v. Wycoff, 624 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Utah 1981); Frisbee v. K & K 
Construction, 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984). State Farm's 
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contentions, as the Utah Supreme Court pointed out in Hill v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Supra at 868 
decision, place the burden on State Farm to prove that its 
contentions were in fact accurate and in good faith. Clearly, 
there are material questions of fact with respect to those 
contentions for which State Farm has the burden of proof. 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff 
Hill should be denied, 
III. UTAH LAW AS TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
FOR FIRST PARTY BAD FAITH IS UNSETTLED 
Defendant is correct in its evaluation of Beck v. Farmer's 
Insurance Exchange, 701 P2d 795 (Utah 1985) as not providing for 
punitive damages in the first party bad faith case. It is, 
however, not at all clear that the Utah Supreme Court is 
still of that opinion and it is clear that the Court of Appeals 
is not of that opinion. 
In Gacron v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 1194 
m m i i . • i • i i i • i i i i i 
(Utah App. 1987), the Court of Appeals (per Judges Greenwood, 
Bench and Billings) reversed and remanded a district court 
directed verdict in a First Party bad faith action. As part of 
his appeal, Plaintiff Gagon claimed that the district court 
improperly excluded evidence of punitive damages and 
consequentual damages, including attorney's fees. The court 
found no error in the excusion in that the parties had 
stipulated, and the district court had agreed, to exclude 
evidence of punitive damages until the jury had found State Farm 
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had acted in bad faith. The court concluded its opinion with the 
statement that: 
If lack of good faith is found on remand, 
consideration of punitive damages and 
consequentual damages will be appropriate. 
Id, at 1197. 
In Gaacn v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.
 f 771 P.2d 325 
(Utah 1988) , State Farm's petition for certiorari was denied 
without opinion by the Supreme Court although Justice Zimmerinan 
provided a concurring opinion, which opinion was quoted at length 
by Defendant in its brief. The concurring opinion is little more 
than a brief recitation of that part of the the Beck opinion 
which held that a plaintiff was not entitled to put on punitive 
damage evidence unless the plaintiff could make a sufficient case 
to go to the jury on an independent tort theory. What is, 
perhaps, more notable is the fact that a majority of the Court 
did not join in Justice Zimmerman's affirmance of that portion of 
Beck. Plaintiffs assert that based on the Gacon opinions, the 
Supreme Court will rule, in the appropriate case, that punitive 
damages are "appropriate" for "lack of good faith." As the law 
is not clear, Defendant's motion should be denied. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS1 ORIGINAL COMPLAINT SETS 
FORTH THE INDEPENDENT TORT OF INTERFERENCE 
WITH ECONOMIC RELATION 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint sets forth all the requisites of the 
tort claim for interference with economic relations. To state a 
claim for intentional interference with economic relations, the 
plaintiff must show: 
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(1) That the defendant intentionally 
interfered with the plaintiff's existing or 
potential economic relations, (2) for an 
improper purpose or by improper means, (3) 
causing injury to the plaintiff. Leigh 
Furniture and Carpet Co, v. Isam, 657 P.2d 
293, 304 (Utah 1982), 
While Plaintiffs' original Complaint did not, however, 
specifically claim for relief based upon intentional interference 
with economic relations, the material allegations and elements of 
the tort claim were indeed included in the Complaint, Plaintiffs 
have filed concurrently herewith their motion for an order 
permitting them to amend their Complaint to clarify that the 
original allegations and elements are indeed an assertion of an 
independent tort. 
Plaintiffs' claim punitive damages arising from the 
intentional interference alleging that Defendant's actions were 
malicious or were taken with wanton disregard for Plaintiffs' 
rights. Plaintiffs submit that the Court should not grant 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to punitive damages 
pending the Court's decision on Plaintiffs' motion to amend their 
Complaint, as well as further opportunity for discovery in this 
case. 
V. STATE FARM'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS PREMATURE; PLAINTIFFS 
SHOULD BE ALLOWED A REASONABLE TIME 
IN WHICH TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY 
Although Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit some years ago, 
little time has been available for discovery. This matter was 
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originally filed on November 18, 1983. Defendant's first motion 
for summary judgment was filed on September 12, 1984, and was 
granted by the trial court on October 22, 1984. A lengthy appeal 
followed with final disposition on November 1, 1988. Following 
the decision on appeal, Plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted 
settlement of this matter. On iMay 4, 1989, Defendant filed the 
present motions for summary judgment. At the same time, Mr. 
Lauchnor, Plaintiffs1 original attorney in this matter, 
determined that he would most likely be a witness and would have 
to withdraw as counsel. Defendant has filed its latest motion 
for summary judgment based on the same facts found insufficient 
to support summary judgment the first time around. 
Judicial economy and the interest of justice will be better 
served if Plaintiff's are allowed time to complete discovery. 
Concurrent with the filing of Plaintiffs1 memorandum in 
opposition to State Farm's latest summary judgment motion, 
Plaintiffs have filed a motion to amend their Complaint, together 
with concise and thorough interrogatories and requests fcr 
production. 
As Utah Courts have recognized, summary judgment should not 
be granted if discovery is incomplete since information sought in 
discovery may create genuine issues of material fact sufficient 
to defeat the motion. Averbach's, Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P2d 376, 
377 (Utah 1977). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's motion for 
ary judgment should be dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /Q day of June, 1989. 
I WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR (1905) 
Moffat, Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young 
Suite 300 
261 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Teler?hone: (801) 521-7500 
/ 
ROY A. /0AC OB S»N , JKTjtA 4 80) 
V. ANTHONY VEHAR J 
VEKAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON, LAVERY 
& ROSE, P.C. 
P.O. Box 18 9 
Kemmerer, WY 83101 
Telephone: (307) 877-3973 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR (1905) 
Moffat, Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young 
Suite 300 
261 East Broadway-
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-7500 
ROY A. JACOBSON, JR. (4480) 
V. ANTHONY VEHAR 
VEHAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON, LAVERY & ROSE, P.C. 
P.O. Box 189 
Kemmerer, WY 83101 
Telephone: (307) 877-3973 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually, 
and as personal representative 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE 
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, individually and 
as personal representative of 
the heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
C i v i l N o . C 8 3 - 8 0 9 9 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
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THE STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF ) 
1. Your affiant is an attorney at law, duly licensed to 
practice before all the Courts of this state, and is one of the 
attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
2. On or about February 1, 1983 Lorin Dean Caldwell and 
Robert Kent and Janet Hill came to me to see if they could obtain 
some help, after Mr. Hill and Mr. Caldwell were informed by State 
Farm that they would not permit them to accept settlement of 
insurance monies from CUMIS without litigation unless State 
Farm's claim for subrogation was honored by a payment to State 
Farm for their collision loss. The State Farm adjuster or claims 
manager also wanted to withhold from the payment the money paid 
under PIP no fault. 
3. I then contacted the claims manager for CUMIS to verify 
what I had been told concerning the subrogation demands of State 
Farm; he confirmed to me by telephone. 
4. On several occasions I contacted State Farm's claims man 
and discussed the matter with him, bringing to his attention the 
fact that under the Utah case law he was not entitled to claim 
any subrogation on the PIP payments. 
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5. State Farm's claims man finally conceded that perhaps he 
was not entitled to subrogation for PIP, but that he would not 
relinquish any claim whatsoever for the collision loss. 
6. I discussed with the State Farm claims man the fact that 
$25,000 per deceased child was certainly not an adequate award 
for their deaths by a drunken driver where the liability was 
absolutely clear. 
7. I further explained to the State Farm claims man that 
the claims department of CUMIS had agreed that their policy was 
inadequate to satisfy the claims, and, therefore, they were 
ready, willing and able to deliver their policy limits as soon as 
the plaintiffs would accept the money, with the hope that State 
Farm would not make any further claim for subrogation so that 
litigation could be avoided. 
8. I again contacted State Farm's claims man but was told 
that they would not relinquish their claim under any 
circumstance. He made it very clear to me that if we wished to 
prove that the deaths of the two high school students were worth 
$25,000 or more each, the Hills and Caldwells would have to 
litigate the matter with the tort feasor and prove to him that 
this be the case. 
9. I made it very clear to the State Farm's claims man that 
the amount involved would not warrant either Mr. Hill or Mr. 
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Caldwell spending such money to hire counsel, as the attorney's 
fees and court costs would exceed the recovery being claimed by 
State Farm. I further pointed out that the insureds were going 
to end up spending more money to try to prove State Farm's claim 
of subrogation than the claim was worth, and that this simply was 
unjust, 
10. I also then offered to let State Farm proceed with 
subrogation and pay their own counsel if they so desired but felt 
it was grossly unfair to expect the insured and Mr. Hill to foot 
the bill for this litigation where the money had already been 
offered by the tort feasor's carrier• He nevertheless refused to 
acquiesce in any of these suggestions. 
11. No discovery has been conducted since the Utah Supreme 
Court rendered its opinion in Hill v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company,^765 P2d 864 (Utah 1988) . 
DATED this \[.C day of V L [ iYl/ , 1989. 
R. LAUCZHNOR 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
/ 
/ 
> \ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ( j f. day of 
••,/ ) // r , 1989. 
WITNESS my hand and officral seal/. 
A. JW;, d i y 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires 
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Moffat, Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young 
Suite 300 
261 East Broadway-
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-7500 
ROY A. JACOBSON, JR. (4480) 
V. ANTHONY VEHAR 
VEHAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON, LAVERY & ROSE, P.C. 
P.O. Box 189 
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Telephone: (307) 877-3973 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually, 
and as personal representative 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE 
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, individually and 
as personal representative of 
the heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. C83-8099 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORDS: 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, and request an Order of this Court, 
pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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permitting said Plaintiffs, in the interest of justice, to amend 
their Complaint and to file their First Amended Complaint herein, 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit f,A" . Defendant 
further requests an expedited hearing date for oral argument on 
this Motion. 
This Motion is brought pursuant to Rule 15, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the pleadings, files and records herein, and the 
Affidavit of Roy A. Jacobson, Jr., which is attached hereto. 
DATED this A£> cay cf ^ ^ L,^ J. > w J • 
ROBERT KENT HILL, et al., 
Plaintiffs 
SOY A./JJACOBSGJS, JR. / 
VEHAR,(/BEPPLER, JACOBSON, 
LAVERY & ROSE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
P.O. Box 189 
Kemraerer, WY 83101 
Telephone: (307) 877-3973 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the At day of 'V^t C^,Q_ 
1989, I served the above and foregoing instrument upon Defendant 
by depositing a true and correct copy of the same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
R. Scott Williams, Esq. 
Strong & Hanni 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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VEHAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON, LAVERY & ROSE, P.C. 
P.O. Box 189 
Kemmerer, WY 83101 
Telephone: (307) 877-3973 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually, 
and as personal representative 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE 
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, individually and 
as personal representative of 
the heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. C83-8099 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
EXHIBIT "A" 
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned 
attorneys, and for their cause against the Defendant allege as 
follows: 
COMMON ALLEGATIONS 
1. On or about the 6th day of June, 1982, Plaintiff, Lorin 
Dean Caldwell, had an insurance policy with the Defendant, 
insuring an automobile owned by Plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, 
and the insurance coverage provided by the Defendant on the 
automobile included, among other things, collision damage and PIP 
coverage. 
2. Defendant is an insurance company licensed to do 
business within the State of Utah and the Plaintiffs are 
residents of the State of Utah. 
3. On or about the 6th day of June, 198 2, at or near the 
intersection of 3900 South Street, where the same intersects with 
700 East Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, a vehicle 
owned by Plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, and insured by the 
Defendant, was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle 
being driven by Kenneth Paul Bryan, and insured by the CUMIS 
Insurance Society, Inc. 
4. The collision was caused by the negligence and 
intoxication of Kenneth Paul Bryan. 
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5. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence and 
intoxication of Kenneth Paul Bryan, Troy Neil Caldwell, the 
driver of the vehicle insured by the Defendant, was killed by in 
collision; at the time of his death, Troy Neil Caldwell, was a 
minor under the age of eighteen (13) years. 
6. As a further direct and proximate result of said 
collision, the Plaintiff, Robert Kent Hill, suffered the loss of 
his daughter, Tamara Elaine Hill, who was accidentally killed 
while riding in the automobile with the minor decedent, Caldwell, 
as a passenger at the time of the accident. 
7. Neither the driver or the passenger of the Caldwell 
vehicle was negligent in any manner in causing the accident. 
8. As a direct and proximate result of the accident the 
above-named Plaintiffs brought suit against Kenneth Paul Bryan 
and others for the wrongful death of the above-named minors. 
9. As a proximate result of the accident, the automobile of 
Plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, was damaged in the sum of 
$5,510.00. 
10. Kenneth Paul Bryan was driving an automobile insured by 
the CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc., with a single limit liability 
insurance coverage on the automobile in the amount of $50,000.00. 
11. The wrongful deaths of the Plaintiffs' children far 
exceeded in value the sum of $25,000.00 per wrongful death, or a 
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total of $50,000 as insurance afforded by the single limit policy 
aforementioned. 
12. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful acts 
and omissions of Defendant herein, Plaintiffs have suffered the 
following damages: 
(a) Great physical, mental, and emotional distress, 
anguish, pain and suffering; 
(b) Necessary and reasonable attorney fees in excess 
of the sum of $25,000.00; and 
(c) Plaintiff Hill incurred substantial disability and 
lost earning capacity as a result of the loss of his daughter 
which disability was aggravated by Defendant's actions, to the 
damage of Plaintiff Hill; 
(d) Defendant's wrongful conduct impaired Plaintiff 
Hill's ability to mitigate and avert the loss of the family home 
and proximately resulted in the forced sale of the family home at 
a substantial economic loss to his family. 
COUNT I - BAD FAITH 
13. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference 
herein, the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 12 
above, and further allege as follows: 
14. Plaintiffs arrived at a reasonable compromise solution 
and settlement with Kenneth Paul Bryan in the sum of the policy 
limits of $50,000, but were unable to conclude their settlement 
of the litigation because Defendant failed and refused and still 
4 
0000283 
refuses to acknowledge that there was insufficient insurance 
coverage to satisfy the entire claim of the Plaintiffs for the 
loss of their children; instead, Defendant demanded that the sum 
of $5,510 in collision payment made to Lorin Dean Caldwell and 
the PIPS payments to Plaintiffs be reimbursed to the Defendant 
out of the insurance policy liability limits of Kenneth Paul 
Bryan. 
15• Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company failed to join in the litigation and refused to cooperate 
in settlement of the litigation by the Plaintiffs for the 
insufficient funds afforded by the insurance coverage evidencing 
bad faith towards its insureds in attempting to settle 
the litigation. 
16. Plaintiffs investigated the feasibility of litigation 
and possible recovery against Kenneth Paul Bryan, independent of 
the insurance coverage and determined that Kenneth Paul Bryan was 
insolvent. 
17. Defendant failed to investigate the feasibility of 
contingent litigation and possible recovery against Kenneth Paul 
Bryan, or in the alternative, knew that Kenneth Paul Bryan was 
essentially judgment proof and insolvent. 
18. Defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that 
the liability insurance coverage by CUMIS afforded Kenneth Paul 
5 
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Bryan was wholly inadequate to fully and fairly compensate 
Plaintiffs for the loss of their children. 
19. At all times material herein, Defendant wrongfully and 
in bad faith demanded of Plaintiffs that the PIPS and collision 
payments be subrogated and reimbursed to Defendant from the 
corpus of the $50,000 settlement with CUMIS and Kenneth Paul 
Bryan. 
COUNT II - INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT 
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
20. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 19 above and 
further allege as follows: 
21. Defendant knew, or should have known, that it had no 
subrogation rights as to Plaintiff Hill and that it had no 
subrogation rights as to Plaintiff Caldwell until such time as 
Plaintiffs had been fully and fairly compensated for the loss of 
their children. 
22. Defendant knew of Plaintiffs' negotiations and 
agreement with CUMIS. 
23. Defendant, by the actions set forth hereinabove, 
intentionally, and without justification, interfered with 
Plaintiffs' settlement with CUMIS by asserting that it was 
entitled to subrogation when it knew, or reasonably should have 
known, it was not so entitled for the improper purpose of forcing 
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Plaintiffs to relinquish a significant portion of the CUMIS 
insurance proceeds to which Defendant was not entitled. 
COUNT III - PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
24. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 23 above and 
further allege as follows: 
25. Defendant's actions were taken maliciously and/or with 
wanton disregard for the rights of the Plaintiffs and, therefore, 
punitive damages are appropriate. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendant 
for compensatory and punitive damages in an amount as supported 
by the allegations contained in this Complaint, for fees and 
costs of this action and for such other and further relief to 
which Plaintiffs may be justly entitled. 
DATED this //^day of <Z/es.t~-, , 1989. 
ROBERT KENT HILL, et al., 
Plaintiffs 
WiiU^j^ s/^i-t'i L BY; V" &V^#~C1 i •> ^ M ^ ^ t u ^ 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
Moffat, Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young 
261 East Broadway, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-7500 
/ 
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AND 
BY: 
ROY A. JACOBSON, JR. 
VEHAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON, 
LAVERY & ROSE, P.C. 
P.O. Box 189 
Kemmerer, WY 83101 
Telephone: (307) 877-3973 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 
i f day of 
1989, I served the above and foregoing instrument upon Defendant 
by depositing a true and correct copy of the same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to Defendant's attorney 
of record as follows: 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq, 
R. Scott Williams, Esq, 
Strong & Hanni 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Suite 300 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ROY A. JACOBSON, JR. (4480) 
V. ANTHONY VEHAR 
VEHAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON, LAVERY & ROSE, P.C. 
P.O. Box 189 
Kemmerer, WY 83101 
Telephone: (307) 877-3973 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually, 
and as personal representative 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE 
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, individually and 
as personal representative of 
the heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Civil No. C83-8099 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
AND ORDER THEREON 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
COMES NOW, Wallace R. Lauchnor, of the firm of Moffat, 
Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young, and respectfully moves the Court to 
allow him to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiffs in the 
above-entitled action on the grounds and for the reason that he 
may be called to act as a witness in this matter. Substitute 
counsel for Plaintiffs have made their appearance herein, and all 
pleadings to be served on Plaintiffs may be mailed to the 
following: 
Roy A* Jacobson, Jr. 
V, Anthony Vehar 
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose, P.C. 
P.O. Box 189 
Kemmerer, Wyoming 83101 
Telephone: (307) 877-3973 
DATED this / [ day of h & • 
IOR 
Moffat, Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young 
Suite 300 
261 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-7500 
000029;, 
ORDER 
The Court, having reviewed and considered the above and 
foregoing Motion to Withdraw, and good cause appearing therefore, 
and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Wallace R. Lauchnor, of Moffat, 
Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young, be, and he is hereby granted leave to 
withdraw as counsel for Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action. 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the sf day of iA^^__ 
1989, I served the above and foregoing instrument upon all 
interested parties by depositing a true and correct copy of the 
same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
R. Scott Williams, Esq. 
Strong & Hanni 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Robert Kent Hill 
6734 South 1560 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Lorin Dean Caldwell 
7311 Chris Lane 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
3 0000294 
TabM 
ROY A. JACOBSON, JR. (4480) 
V. ANTHONY VEHAR 
P.O. Box 189 
Kemmerer, Wyoming 83101 
Telephone: (307) 877-3973 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually, ) Civil No. C83-8099 
and as personal representative ) 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE ) Judge Young 
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN ) 
CALDWELL, individually and as ) 
personal representative of the ) 
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, 
deceased, ) F_LiINnFFS;_REPLY 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
Plaintiffs, ) —ramrrTTTT^mrnM— 
) TO"A~MOT"rWL~ATIT 
vs . ) " 
) 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE ) 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
COME NOW, the Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel, and 
respectfully submit the following reply memorandum in support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint. 
Although Defendant acknowledges that leave to amend is 
regularly granted, it has argued that a special rule of law would 
preclude the granting of leave to amend the Complaint in this 
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action. Plaintiffs strongly dispute that such a rule of law 
e x i s t s , but even if it does, leave to amend should be granted. 
THE CONSISTENCY OR INCONSISTENCY OF PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED 
AMENDMENT WITH THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING IS IRRELEVANT 
Defendant argues that amendments after remand should not be 
allowed where they are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's 
ruling. In support thereof Defendant cites for its only 
authority: "6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
Sec. 1498, states, in part: 
'Once the case has been remanded, the lower 
court will permit new issues to be presented 
by an amended pleading that is consistent 
with the judgment of the appellate court.'" 
Such quote is taken horribly out of context; Wright & Miller 
actually say: 
Although amendments to the original pleadings 
generally may not be made once the suit has 
reached the appellate level, if the court of 
appeals determines that the lower court 
impliedly tried the case on a theory not set 
forth in the pleadings, it may permit a 
conforming amendment - in effect under Rule 
15(b) (or at least by analogy to it) - to 
include that theory in the trial record. 
More importantly, if the appellate court 
decides that the district court abused its 
discretion in refusing to allow an amendment, 
or did not give a party a sufficient 
opportunity to cure the defects in his 
pleadings and state a claim for relief, it 
may remand the case with directions to allow 
the appellant to amend. Once the case has 
been remanded, the 1qw_ejr^cpurt_^ 
niejw LLLy.lL_JiP„J?i: presented by an amended 
Reading; that is consistent MWith_the_^dgmeiit 
of the appellate court. "[emphasis added) ~ 
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THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT IS NOT INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING 
While the consistency or inconsistency of the Supreme 
Court's judgment in the instant case is not relevant to whether 
Plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their complaint, the 
amendment sought is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's 
ruling. 
The Supreme Court's actual judgment in Hi 11 v. State Farm 
Ilii^il^^i^^Mli^IlIIHIiilii^oiIlEilL^' 7 6 5 p-2d 8 6 4 (Utah 1988) was 
that "Summary Judgment in favor of State Farm on Plaintiffs' 
Complaints and on State Farm's counterclaim is reversed." 
Plaintiffs original complaint set forth all the requisites 
for a claim for interference with economic relations. It did not 
specifically claim relief based on intentional interference with 
economic relations. The amendment sought clearly asks for such 
relief. 
Plaintiffs request the Court enter its order granting leave 
to Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th of November, 1989. 
ROY/AV 7XC0BSON, JR. ( T j 4 4 8 0 ~ iy 
V. /ANTHONf VEHAR 
P.O. Box 189 
Kemmerer, Wyoming 83101 
Telephone: (307) 877-3973 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the e ^ ^ d a y of November, 1989, a 
true and complete copy of the above and foregoing instrument was 
served upon Defendant by depositing a copy thereof in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
Strong & Hanni 
Sixth Floor Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
.^w 
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ROY A. JACOBSON, JR. [A4480] 
V. ANTHONY VEHAR 
VEHAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON, 
LAVERY & ROSE 
P.O. BOX 890 
EVANSTON, WYOMING 82931 
(307) 789-4200 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually 
and as personal representative 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE 
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, Individually and as 
personal representative of the 
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, 
DECEASED, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. C83-8099 
Judge David S. Young 
The plaintiffs,hereby give notice that they appeal the 
Court's judgment entered March 26, 1990. This Notice of Appeal 
is filed pursuant to Rule 4, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
0000352 
DATED thisp&Vk day of , 1990. 
VEHAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON 
LAVERY & ROSE 
Roy A. yacobson, Jr. 
V. Anthony Vehar 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument was mailed/-//first class, postage 
prepaid on this o{j~rQ day of M / , 1990, to the 
following counsel of record: r 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
HILL/GBF <fWf 
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Glenn C. Hanni #A1327 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7080 
MaM£idn; 
APR 2 6 1390 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually 
and as personal representative 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE 
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, Individually and as 
personal representative of the 
heirs Of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, 
DECEASED, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil NO. C83-8099 
Judge David S. Young 
Pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
defendant moves the court for summary judgment with respect to 
the remaining claim of plaintiff Caldwell for bad faith against 
defendant. This motion is made on the grounds that the 
pleadings, including prior judgment, and affidavits on file 
establish there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and 
that defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
1 0 0 2 9 0 
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law, as more fully set forth in defendant's memorandum in support 
hereof filed herewith. 
DATED this ^/ day of April, 1990. 
STRONC 
Glenn C. Hanni 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion for summary Judgment was mailed, postage 
prepaid, on April «A^ , 1990, to the following: 
Wallace R. Lauchnor 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
50 South Main #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Roy A. Jacobson, Jr. 
V. Anthony Vehar 
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose 
P. O. Box 189 
Kemmerer, WY 83101 
m A** 
*? / 
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Glenn C. Hanni #A1327 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7080 
(imMiE 
APR 2 6 1990 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually 
and as personal representative 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE 
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, Individually and as 
personal representative of the 
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, 
DECEASED, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil NO. C83-8099 
Judge David S. Young 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO 
WHICH DEFENDANT STATE FARM CLAIMS 
NO GENUINE ISSUE EXISTS 
1. The only issue remaining in this case is plaintiff 
Caldwell's claim against State Farm for bad faith. Caldwell's 
complaint against State Farm for bad faith is a first-party 
insurance bad faith claim. [Judgment, dated 3-26-90.] 
1 0 0 2 9 1 
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2. The issues raised by Caldwell's claim of first-party 
insurance bad faith against defendant are fairly debatable 
issues. [Judgment, dated 3-26-90.] 
3. The basic background facts relating to this matter were 
set forth in defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Motion For 
Summary Judgment As To Plaintiff Hill And Partial Summary 
Judgment As To Plaintiff Caldwell dated May 4, 1989, which has 
recently been considered by this court. Defendant reiterates and 
incorporates herein the statement of material facts from that 
memo. 
4. Plaintiff's complaint was originally filed on or about 
November 17, 1983. It was dismissed by way of summary judgment 
entered on October 22, 1984, which summary judgment was 
subsequently reversed by appeal to the Supreme Court. The case 
is now back in the District Court on remand, and this court has, 
by way of its judgment dated March 26, 1990, entered summary 
judgment dismissing all of plaintiff Hill's claims and dismissing 
plaintiff Caldwell's claim for punitive damages. [See Judgment 
dated 3-26-90. ] 
5. In its opinion reversing the District Court's initial 
granting of summary judgment, the Supreme Court indicated that 
the issue it was being asked to decide in this case was "to 
determine who is entitled to the settlement proceeds." [765 P.2d 
1 0 0 2 9 1 2 
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at 867] In conjunction therewith, the Supreme Court identified 
two issues of material fact as to the ultimate question of who 
was entitled to the disputed $5,510. First, whether plaintiffs 
were fully compensated for their wrongful death claims without 
receiving the $5,510; and, second, whether State Farm's 
subrogation right was prejudiced by plaintiffs1 settlement with, 
and release of, the tortfeasor. The Supreme Court held that if 
either of those fact issues were decided in favor of State Farm, 
then State Farm would be entitled to the $5,510. There is no 
indication whatsoever in the Supreme Court's opinion that State 
Farm acted in bad faith by refusing to simply let plaintiffs have 
the $5,510. 
ARGUMENT 
STATE FARM IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT DISMISSING CALDWELLfS 
CLAIM FOR FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE BAD 
FAITH BECAUSE THE ISSUES RELATING 
THERETO ARE FAIRLY DEBATABLE. 
Caldwell does not assert any bad faith conduct on the part 
of State Farm with respect to investigation of his first-party 
claim for property damage arising out of the accident which 
resulted in the death of his son. Instead, Caldwell claims State 
Farm acted in bad faith by refusing to waive its subrogation 
claim and thereby obstructed Caldwell's settlement with CUMIS 
Insurance Company, the insurer for the tortfeasor involved in the 
1 0 0 2 9 1 3 
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accident. This claim of bad faith arises out of the payment of a 
first-party insurance claim and is therefore a claim of first-
party insurance bad faith. This court specifically found that 
Caldwell's complaint against State Farm is a first-party 
insurance bad faith claim in its judgment dated March 26, 1990, 
where the court stated: 
State Farm's motion for partial summary 
judgment as to Caldwell's claim for punitive 
damages is granted on the grounds that 
Caldwell's complaint against State Farm is 
for first-party insurance bad faith, which is 
a contract claim, and for which no punitive 
damages may be awarded absent an allegation 
of independent tortious conduct. [emphasis 
added] 
That Caldwell's claim constitutes a first-party insurance 
bad faith claim is clearly shown in Arnica Ins. Co. v. Shettler, 
768 P. 2d 950 (Utah App. 1989) where the court held that conduct 
by an insurer after payment of a first-party claim which is 
alleged by the plaintiff to constitute bad faith, is still a 
claim of first-party insurance bad faith. 
In Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838 (Utah App. 
1987) the Utah Court of Appeals held that there can be no first-
party insurance bad faith, as a matter of law, if the claim is 
fairly debatable. The court stated: 
If the evidence presented creates a 
factual issue as to the claim's validity, 
there exists a debatable reason for denial, 
thereby legitimizing the denial of the claim, 
0000359 
and eliminating the bad faith claim. "When a 
claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is 
entitled to debate it, whether the debate 
concerns a matter of fact or law." . . . 
This general policy was explained by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Western Casualty & 
Surety Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423, 427 
(Utah 1980) : 
It would not comport with our ideas 
of either law or justice to prevent 
any party who entertained bona fide 
questions about his legal 
obligations from seeking 
adjudication thereon in the courts. 
[745 P.2d at 842] 
Callioux holds that when an issue is fairly debatable, an 
insurance company is entitled to debate it. Further, the 
insurance company cannot be found to have acted in bad faith for 
debating such an issue. 
The facts of Callioux are instructive on this issue. 
Callioux1 filed a claim with their insurer, Progressive, for the 
total loss of their Jeep which they claimed had gone "into an 
uncontrollable skid, rolled down a hill, and subsequently 
burned." [745 P.2d at 839] 
Progressive denied the claim because its investigation 
indicated "the loss was of incendiary origin, occurring by or at 
the direction of David Callioux." [Id. ] 
Callioux was eventually charged with arson and attempt to 
1 0 0 2 9 1 "•* 
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defraud an insurer. He was acquitted of the criminal charges, 
and Progressive paid the first-party claim in full after the 
judgment of acquittal. 
Callioux then sued Progressive on various theories, 
including "bad faith denial of a first-party insurance claim." 
[Id.] The trial court granted Progressive's motion for summary 
judgment, and Callioux appealed. The Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed as indicated above. The court concluded that Callioux' 
claim was "fairly debatable" as evidenced by the facts, and, 
therefore, they could not have established bad faith on the part 
of Progressive. Thus, Progressive was entitled to summary 
judgment. 
The same principle applies in the instant case. The issue 
as to whether State Farm was required to waive its subrogation 
claim and was not entitled to any of the $5,510, is and has been 
throughout the pendency of this case, a fairly debatable issue. 
Initially, Judge Billings, then of the Third Judicial 
District Court, agreed with State Farm's position and dismissed 
plaintiff's complaint in its entirety on summary judgment. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court reversed that decision, reversal 
was on the basis that there were factual issues with respect to 
who was entitled to the $5,510. The Supreme Court did not 
foreclose the possibility that State Farm might still be entitled 
1 0 0 2 9 1 6 
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to the disputed monies depending on the outcome of the factual 
issues. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's opinion did not give even 
the slightest indication of support to plaintiff claim of bad 
faith. It would have been contradictory for the Supreme Court to 
indicate State Farm might still be entitled to the money and at 
the same time suggest State Farm acted in bad faith by asserting 
its right to those monies. 
In its Judgment dated March 26, 1990, this court 
specifically stated: 
The court further finds that the issues 
raised by plaintiffs' claims of first-party 
bad faith against State Farm are and have 
been throughout the pendency of this action 
fairly debatable issues. [Judgment of 3-26-
90, p. 2, para. 6.] 
Since Caldwell's claim is for first-party bad faith, State 
Farm is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
State Farm respectfully requests the court to grant its 
motion for summary judgment and to dismiss Caldwell's remaining 
claim of bad faith against State Farm, with prejudice, on the 
merits, no cause of action. 
DATED this ^J O day of April, 1990. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
was mailed, postage prepaid, on April JXH , 1990, to the 
following: 
Roy A. Jacobson, Jr. 
V. Anthony Vehar 
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose 
P. O. Box 189 
Kemmerer, WY 83101 
Wallace R. Lauchnor 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
50 South Main #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
^n^yyZ^C^ 
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RECEIVED 
JUN 0 61990/ 
VEHAR, BEPPLER, LAVERY, 
GLENN C. HANNI, #A13 27 ROSE & BOAL. P.C. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually 
and as personal representative 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE 
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, Individually and as 
personal representative of the 
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ] 
Defendant. 
\ J. O P 
> Civil 
, Judge 
G M E N T 
No. C83-8099 
David S. Young 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to 
the remaining claims of plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, individually 
and as personal representative of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell, 
deceased, was filed in April, 1990, along with a memorandum in 
support of that motion. Plaintiff Caldwell failed to file a 
response to defendant's motion for summary judgment and memorandum 
in support thereof. Defendant at the time of filing its motion 
for summary judgment and memorandum in support thereof filed a 
request for oral argument. Defendant in May, 19 90, served and 
filed a notice to submit for decision. The court finds that the 
0000368 
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issues raised by the claims of bad faith against State Farm by 
plaintiff Lorin Dean Caldwell, individually and as personal 
representative of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased, 
are and have been througliout the pendency of this action fairly 
debatable issues. The court having considered the records and 
files of this case including defendants memorandum in support of 
its motion for summary judgment, and being fully advised, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. For the reasons set forth in defendant's memorandum 
in support of its motion for summary judgment, said motion is 
hereby granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of 
defendant and against plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, individually 
and as personal representative of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell, 
deceased, no cause of action. 
2. Defendant's request for oral argument is hereby denied. 
Dated this day of June, 1990, 
BY THE COURT: 
David S. Young, Judge 
0000360 
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have stated, we disagree with that proposi-
tion. Defendant does not respond to plain-
t iffs contention that the endorsement here 
does provide coverage beyond the territori-
ally limited coverage under the policy pro-
vision, we therefore do not address that 
issue. 
Affirmed. 
( b | K ! Y NUMBER SYSTIM^ 
74()r.App. 153 
Donald A. PANKOVV, Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Oregon, Respondent. 
CC 84-62; CA A32949. 
Court of Appeals of Oregon. 
Argued and Submitted March 18, 1985. 
' Decided June 12, 1985. 
Appeal from Circuit Court, Hood River; 
Donald L. Kalberer, Judge. 
Jan Peter Londahl, Portland, argued the 
cause and filed the brief for appellant. 
Robert M. Atkinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Salem, argued the cause for respondent. 
With him on the brief were Dave Frohn-
mayer, Atty. Gen., and James E. Mountain, 
Jr., Sol. Gen., Salem. 
Before BUTTLER, P.J., and WARREN 
and ROSSMAN, JJ. 
PER CURIAM. 
Affirmed. Stelts v. State of Oregon, 67 
Or.App. 364, 677 P.2d 1106, rev. allowed 
297 Or. 458, 683 P.2d 1371 (1984). 
( o |K(YNUMURSV$nN> 
BECK v. FARMERS INS. EXCHANGE Utah 7 9 5 
1 U C H H 7 0 I IV2J795 (Utah 1985) 
sufficient to prove a breach under appropri-
Wayne BECK, Plaintiff and Appellant, ate circumstances. 
v. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 18926. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 12, 1985. 
Insured brought action against insurer 
for alleged bad-faith refusal to settle a 
claim for insured motorist benefits. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Philip P. Fishier, J., entered summary judg-
ment for insurer, and insured appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held 
that: (1) in a first-party relationship be-
tween an insurer and its insured, the duties 
and obligations of the parties are contrac-
tual rather than fiduciary in nature and, 
without more, a breach of those implied or 
express dulies^ean give rise only to a cause 
of action in contract, not one in tort, and (2) 
question whether insurer breached its duty 
of good faith in rejecting insured's claim 
for uninsured motorist benefits without ex-
planation and in failing to further investi-
gate matter, such that insured was dam-
aged when it was forced to accept settle-
ment offered by insurer because of finan-
cial pressure caused by delay in resolving 
matter, was question of fact precluding 
summary judgment on contractual theory 
of failure to fulfill implied contractual duty 
to deal in good faith. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Insurance <&='602.1 
The good-faith duty to bargain or set-
tle under an insurance contract is only one 
aspect of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing implied in all contracts and is a 
duty which upon violation may give rise to 
a claim for breach of contract. 
2. Insurance <s=»602.2(l) 
Refusal to bargain or settle under an 
insurance contract may, standing alone, be 
3. Insurance <§=>602.1 
Practical end of providing a strong in-
centive for insurers to fulfill their contrac-
tual obligations to their insureds can be 
accomplished as well through a contract 
cause of action upon a failure to bargain in 
good faith without analytical straining ne-
cessitated by the tort approach and with 
far less potential for unforeseen conse-
quences to the law of contracts. 
4. Insurance <S=>602.1 
A tort cause of action does not arise in 
a first-party insurance contract situation by 
reason of a failure to bargain in good faith 
because the relationship between the insur-
er and its insured is fundamentally differ-
ent than in a third-party context. 
5. Insurance «=»602.1 
In a first-party relationship between an 
insurer and its insured, the duties and obli-
gations of the parties are contractual rath-
er than fiduciary in nature and, without 
more, a breach of those implied or express 
duties can give rise only to a cause of 
action in contract, not one in tort. 
6. Insurance e=> 156(1) 
As parties to a contract, the insured 
and the insurer have parallel obligations to 
perform the contract in good faith, obli-
gations that inhere in every contractual 
relationship. 
7. Insurance <s=»563 
The implied contractual obligation of 
good-faith performance contemplates, at 
the very least, that the insurer will diligent-
ly investigate these acts to enable it to 
determine whether a claim filed by its in-
sured is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, 
and will thereafter act promptly and rea-
sonably in rejecting or settling the claim, 
and also requires the insurer to deal with 
laymen as laymen and not as experts in the 
subtleties of law and underwriting and to 
refrain from actions that will injure the 
insured's ability to obtain the benefits of 
the contract. 
f)fi Utah 701 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Insurance 0=^602.2(1) 
Performance of the implied contractual 
mot ion of good faith is the essence of 
hat (he insurer has bargained and paid 
>r and, if breached, will render insurer 
tble for damages suffered in consequence 
tereof. 
Insurance e=>r>02.10( 1) 
Damages recoverable against an insur-
* for breach of its implied contractual 
(•ligation of good faith toward insured in-
ude both general damages, those flowing 
iiturally from breach, and consequential 
amages, those reasonably within contem-
lation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, 
arties at time contract was made. 
0. Insurance <S^602.I0(1) 
In an action against an insurer for 
reach of a duty to bargain in good faith, 
iven that insured frequently faces cata-
trophic consequences if funds are not 
vailable within a reasonable period of time 
[» cover an insured loss, damages for a loss 
/ell in excess of policy limits, such as for a 
iome or a business, may be foreseeable 
ml provable. 
1. D a n u i K c s <£=*{">«. 10 
la unusual cases concerned with an 
usurer's breach of a duty to bargain in 
jood faith, damages for mental anguish to 
nsured might be provable, but foreseeabil-
ty of any such damages will always hinge 
ipon nature and language of contract and 
•easonable expectations of parties. 
12. Judgment <S=>181(23) 
Question whether insurer breached its 
luty of good faith in rejecting insured's 
•hiini for uninsured motorist benefits with-
>ut explanation and in failing to further 
investigate matter, such that insured was 
lamaged when it was forced to accept set-
tlement offered by insurer because of fi-
nancial pressure caused by delay in resolv-
ing matter, was question of fact precluding 
summary judgment on contractual theory 
of failure to fulfill implied contractual duty 
to deal in good faith. 
Robert J Dcbry, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Don .1 Hanson, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
Zl MM RUM AN, Justice: 
Plaintiff Wayne Peck appeals from a 
summary judgment dismissing his claim 
against Fanners Insurance Kxchange, his 
automobile insurance carrier, alleging that 
Farmers had refused in bad faith to settle 
a claim for uninsured motorist benefits. 
We hold that on the record before us, Heck 
stated a claim for relief and a summary 
judgment was inappropriate. We reverse 
and remand for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
Peck injured his knee in a hit-and-run 
accident on January 10, 1982, when his car 
was stiuck by a car owned by Ann Kirk-
land. Ms. Kirkland asserted that her car 
had been stolen and denied any knowledge 
of or responsibility for the accident. Peck 
filed a claim with Kirkland's insurer, but 
liability was denied on April 20, 1982. 
At the time of the accident, Peck carried 
automobile insurance with Farmers. Un-
der that policy, Peck was provided with 
both no-fault and uninsured motorist insur-
ance benefits. On February 2H, 1982, while 
his claim against Kirkland was pending, 
Peck filed a claim with Fanners for no-
fault benefits. Sometime prior to May 26, 
1982, Farmers paid Peck $5,000 for medical 
expenses (the no fault policy limit) and 
$1,299.43 for lost wages. 
On .lime 23, 1982, Peck's counsel filed a 
claim with Farmers for uninsured motorist 
benefits, demanding the policy limit, $20,-
000, for general damages suffered as a 
result of the accident. His counsel alleges 
that the brochure documenting Peck's dam-
ages, submitted to Farmers with the June 
28rd settlement offer, established that his 
claim was worth substantially more than 
$20,000. Farmers' adjuster rejected the 
settlement offer without explanation on 
July I, 1!W>. 
Peck filed this lawsuit one month later, 
on August 2, 1982, alleging three causes of 
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action: first, that by refusing to pay his 
uninsured motorist claim, Farmers had 
breached its contract of insurance with 
him; second, that by acting in bad faith in 
refusing to investigate the claim, bargain 
with Peck, or settle the claim, Farmers had 
breached an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing; and third, that Fanners 
had acted oppressively and maliciously to-
ward Peck with the intention of, or in reck-
less disregard of the likelihood of, causing 
emotional distress. Under the first claim, 
Peck sought damages for breach of con-
tract in the amount of the policy limits; 
under the second, he asked for compensato-
ry damages in excess of the policy limits 
for additional injuries, including mental an-
guish; and under the third, he sought puni-
tive damages of $500,000. 
Sometime in August of 1982, Peck's 
counsel contacted Farmers' counsel and of-
fered to settle the whole matter for $20,-
000. This offer was rejected. Farmers 
filed an answer on September 1, 1982, and 
at the same time, moved to strike the pray-
er for punitive damages on the ground that 
they were unavailable for a breach of con-
tract. Farmers' motion was granted. On 
September 29th, the trial court bifurcated 
the case and agreed to try the claim for 
failure to pay uninsured motorist benefits 
independent of Peck's claim alleging 
breach of an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
Immediately after the trial judge bifur-
cated the case, Peck's counsel expressly 
revoked the previously rejected offer to 
settle the whole matter for $20,000. In-
stead, Peck offered to settle only the fail-
ure to pay the uninsured motorist benefits 
claim for $20,000, reserving the implied 
covenant or "bad faith" claim for separate 
resolution. 
On October 20, 1982, Farmers apparently 
counteroffered. Negotiations proceeded, 
and sometime in late November, the parties 
agreed to settle the uninsured motorist 
claim for $15,000. On December 6, 1982, 
the parties stipulated to dismissal of that 
claim and specifically reserved the bad 
faith claim for later disposition. 
In mid-December, Farmers moved to dis-
miss the reserved bad faith claim on two 
theories. First, Farmers asserted that un-
der Lyon v. Hartford Accident and In-
demnity Co., 25 Utah 2d .'HI, 480 l\2d 7.'i9 
(1971), it "had no duty to bargain with or 
settle plaintiff's uninsured motorist claim 
and, therefore, [could not] be held liable" 
for breach of contract or bad faith. Sec-
ond, Farmers argued that even if it had 
some duty to bargain or to settle the claim, 
the facts set forth in the pleadings on file 
did not establish that it had breached the 
duty. No memoranda or factual affidavits 
supported this motion. 
Farmers' motion was opposed by affida-
vits of Peck, his counsel, and a former 
insurance adjuster who worked for Peck's 
counsel as a paralegal. In his affidavit, 
Peck's counsel recited the dates and terms 
of the various settlement offers and the 
fact that they had been rejected without 
counteroffer. Peck's affidavit stated that 
he had accepted the $15,000 offer only be-
cause of financial pressures caused by the 
substantial expenses he had incurred in the 
ten months since the accident. The parale-
gal's affidavit stated that he had been an 
insurance adjuster for 19 years and that he 
had reviewed the settlement documentation 
submitted to Farmers in June when the 
claim was first filed. He expressed the 
opinion that a reasonable and prudent in-
surance company would have valued the 
claim at between $.'10,000 and $40,000 and 
attempted to settle the matter within 
weeks after the initial offer. The paralegal 
charged that the "only reason for such a 
substantial delay in settling this claim 
would be to put Mr. Peck in a situation of 
financial need and stress so that he would 
accept the first settlement offer," a tactic 
he characterized as acting in bad faith. 
Planners filed no rebuttal affidavits, and 
the trial court granted Farmers' motion 
without specifying the basis for its holding. 
Peck asks this Court to overrule Lyon 
and permit an insured to sue for an insur-
er's bad faith refusal to bargain or settle. 
He points out that many states now allow a 
tort action for breach of an insurer's duty 
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to deal fairly and in good faith with its 
insured. Assuming that we abandon Lyon, 
Beck argues that the affidavits submitted 
in opposition to Farmers' motion for sum-
mary judgment were sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact as to wheth-
er Farmers breached an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. 
Farmers does not now contend, as it did 
below, that it had no duty to bargain or 
settle. Instead, it argues that under Lyon, 
an insurer cannot be held liable for bad 
faith simply because it refused to bargain 
or to settle a claim; rather, it argues, to 
sustain such a claim a plaintiff must pro-
duce evidence of bad faith wholly apart 
from the "mere failure" to bargain or set-
tle. 
Our ruling in Lyon left an insured with-
out any effective remedy against an insur-
er that refuses to bargain or settle in good 
faith with the insured. An insured who 
has suffered a loss and is pressed financial-
ly is at a marked disadvantage when bar-
gaining with an insurer over payment for 
that loss. Failure to accept a proffered 
settlement, although less than fair, can 
lead to catastrophic consequences for an 
insured who, as a direct consequence of the 
loss, may be peculiarly vulnerable, both 
economically and emotionally. The tempta-
tion for an insurer to delay settlement 
while pressures build on the insured is 
great, especially if the insurer's exposure 
cannot exceed the policy limits. See Law-
ton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance 
Co., 118 N.H. G07, 392 A.2d 576, 579 (1978); 
Harvey & Wiseman, First Party Bad 
Faith: Common Law Remedies and a 
Proposed Legislative Solution, 72 Ky.LJ. 
141, 146, 167-69 (1983-84) (hereinafter cit-
ed as "First Party Bad Faith"); Note, The 
Availability of Excess Damages for 
Wrongful Refusal to Honor First Party 
1. The Court in Lyon considered only the ques-
tion of whether a claim of bad faith gave rise to 
a tort cause of action; however, to the extent 
that Lyon is philosophically inconsistent with 
our recognition today of a cause of action in 
contract, it is overruled. 
2. We use the term "first party" to refer to an 
insurance agreement where the insurer agrees 
Insurance Claims—An Emerging Trend, 
45 Fordham L.Rev. 164, 164-67 (Oct. 1976) 
(hereinafter cited as "Availability of Excess 
Damages"). 
[1,2] In light of these considerations, 
we now conclude that an insured should be 
provided with a remedy. However, we do 
not agree with plaintiff that a tort action is 
appropriate. Instead, we hold that the 
good faith duty to bargain or settle under 
an insurance contract is only one aspect of 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
implied in all contracts and that a violation 
of that duty gives rise to a claim for breach 
of contract.1 In addition, we do not adopt 
the limitation suggested by Farmers, but 
hold that the refusal to bargain or settle, 
standing alone, may, under appropriate cir-
cumstances, be sufficient to prove a 
breach. 
We recognize that a majority of states 
permit an insured to institute a tort action 
against an insurer who fails to bargain in 
good faith in a "first-party" situation,* 
adopting the approach first announced by 
the California Supreme Court in Gruen-
berg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 
510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.Rptr. 480 (1973). 
See, e.g., Bibeault v. Hanover Insurance 
Co., R.I., 417 A.2d 313 (1980); Craft v. 
Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 
565 (7th Cir.1978) (applying Indiana law); 
MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. Flint, 
Tenn., 574 S.W.2d 718 (1978). Apparently, 
these courts have taken this step as a mat-
ter of policy in order to provide what they 
perceive to be an adequate remedy for an 
insured wronged by an insurer's recalci-
trance. These courts have reasoned that 
under contract law principles, an insurer 
who improperly refuses to settle a first-
party claim may be liable only for damages 
measured by the maximum dollar amount 
to pay claims submitted to it by the insured for 
losses suffered by the insured. The present case 
involves such a first-parly situation. In con-
trast, a "third-party" situation is one where the 
insurer contracts to defend the insured against 
claims made by third parties against the insured 
and to pay any resulting liability, up to the 
specified dollar limit. 
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such a damage measure provides little or 
no incentive to an insurer to promptly and 
faithfully fulfill its contractual obligations. 
Accordingly, these courts have adopted a 
tort approach in order to allow an insured 
to recover extensive consequential and pu-
nitive damages, which tliey consider to be 
unavailable in an action based solely on a 
breach of contract. See Availability of 
Excess Damages, supra, at 168-77; First 
Party Bad Faith, supra, at 158. 
[3J We conclude that the tort approach 
adopted by these courts is without a sound 
theoretical foundation and has the potential 
for distorting well-established principles of 
contract law. Moreover, the practical end 
of providing a strong incentive for insurers 
to fulfill their contractual obligations can 
be accomplished as well through a contract 
cause of action, without the analytical 
straining necessitated by the tort approach 
and with far less potential for unforeseen 
consequences to the law of contracts. 
The analytical weaknesses of the tort 
approach are easily seen. In Gruenberg, 
the California court held that an insurer 
has a duty to deal in good faith with its 
insured and that an insured can bring an 
action in tort, rather than contract, for 
breach of that duty because the duty is 
imposed by law and, being nonconsensual, 
does not arise out of the contract. Gloss-
ing over any distinctions between first- and 
third party situations, the court concluded 
that the duty imposed upon the insurer 
when bargaining with its insured in a first-
party situation is merely another aspect of 
the fiduciary duty owed in the third party 
context. Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance 
Co., 9 Cal.3d at 573-74, 510 I\2d at 1037, 
108 Cal.Rptr. at 485. 
Although this Court, in Aynmerman v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 19 Utah 2d 
261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967), recognized a tort 
cause of action for breach of an insurer's 
obligation to bargain in a third-party con-
text, we cannot agree with the Gruenberg 
court that the considerations which compel 
the recognition of a tort cause of action in 
a third-party context are present in the 
In Am merman, we 
stated that because a third-party insurance 
contract obligates the insurer to defend the 
insured, the insurer incurs a fiduciary duty 
to its insured to protect the insured's inter-
ests as zealously as it would its own; con-
sequently, a tort cause of action is recog-
nized to remedy a violation of that duty. 
19 Utah 2d at 265-66, 430 I\2d at 578-79. 
[4] However, in Lyon v. Hartford Acci-
dent and Indemnity Co., we held that a 
tort cause of action did not arise in a first-
party insurance contract situation because 
the relationship between the insurer and its 
insured is fundamentally different than in 
a third-party context: 
In the [third-party] situation, the insurer 
must act in good faith and be as zealous 
in protecting the interests of the insured 
as it would be in regard to its own. In 
the [first-party] situation, the insured 
and the insurer are, in effect and prac-
tically speaking, adversaries. 
25 Utah 2d at 319, 480 I\2d at 745 (cita-
tions omitted). Sec also Lawton v. Great 
Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 392 A.2d at 
580-81. 
This distinction is of no small conse-
quence. In a third party situation, the in-
surer controls the disposition of claims 
against its insured, who relinquishes any 
right to negotiate on his own behalf. 
Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 
572 F.2d at 569. An insurer's failure to act 
in good faith exposes its itisured to a judg-
ment and personal liability in excess of the 
policy limits. Santilli v. State Farm Life 
Insurance Co., 278 Or. 53, 61-62, 562 P.2d 
965, 969 (1977). In essence, the contract 
itself creates a fiduciary relationship be-
cause of the trust and reliance placed in the 
insurer by its insured. Cf Hal Taylor 
Associates v. UnionAnienca, Inc., Utah, 
657 P.2d 743, 748-49 (1982). The insured is 
wholly dependent upon the insurer to see 
that, in dealing with claims by third par-
ties, the insured's best interests are pro-
tected. In addition, when dealing with 
third parties, the insurer acts as an agent 
for the insured with respect to the disputed 
etaim. Wholly apart from the contractual 
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obligations undertaken by the parties, the 
law imposes upon all agents a fiduciary 
obligation to their principals with respect to 
matters falling within the scope of their 
agency. Id. at 748; see generally 3 Am. 
Jur.2d Agency § 199 (1962). 
In the first-party situation, on the other 
hand, the reasons for finding a fiduciary 
relationship and imposing a corresponding 
duty are absent. No relationship of trust 
and reliance is created by the contract; it 
simply obligates the insurer to pay claims 
submitted by the insured in accordance 
with the contract. Santilli v. State Fai~m 
Life Insurance Co., 278 Or. at 61-62, 562 
I\2d at 969. Furthermore, none of the 
indicia of agency are present. See general-
ly Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual In-
surance Co., Mo.App., 665 S.W.2d 13, 18-
20 (1984). 
Clearly, then, it is difficult to find a 
theoretically sound basis for analogizing 
the duty owed in a third-party context to 
that owed in a first-party context. And 
wholly apart from any theoretical prob-
lems, tailoring the tort analysis to first-par-
ty insurance contract cases has proven dif-
ficult. The pragmatic reason for adopting 
the tort approach is that it exposes insurers 
to consequential and punitive damages 
awards in excess of the policy limits. How-
ever, the courts appear to have had difficul-
ty in developing a sound rationale for limit-
ing the tort approach to insurance contract 
cases. This may be because there is no 
sound theoretical difference between a 
first-party insurance contract and any oth-
er contract, at least no difference that justi-
fies permitting punitive damages for the 
breach of one and not the other. In any 
event, the tort approach and the accompa-
3. Wc recognize dial in some eases the acts con-
stituting a breach of contract may also result in 
breaches of duty that are independent of the 
contract and may give rise to causes of action in 
tort. Hal Taylor Assoc, v. UnionAnterica, 657 
I\2d at 750; lawton v. Great Southwest fire his. 
Co., 392 A.2d at 580. For example, the law of 
this state recognizes a duly to refrain from in-
tentionally causing severe emotional distress to 
others. Samms v. F.ccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 
P.2d 344 (1961). Thus, intentional and out-
rageous conduct by an insurer against an in-
sured, coupled with a failure to bargain, could 
nying punitive damages have moved rather 
quickly into areas far afield from insur-
ance. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying 
Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 
Cal.3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166-67, 206 
Cal.Rptr. 354, 362-63 (1984); Wallis v. Su-
perior Court, 160 Cal.App.3d 1109, 207 
Cal.Rptr. 123, 127-29 (1984); Gates v. Life 
of Montana Insurance Co., Mont., 668 
P.2d 213, 214-16 (1983). 
Furthermore, the courts adopting the 
tort approach have had some difficulty in 
determining what degree of bad faith is 
necessary to sustain a claim. E.g., Ander-
son v. Continental Insurance Co., 85 
Wis.2d 675, 692-94, 271 N.W.2d 368, 37(>-
77 (1978). From a practical standpoint, the 
state of mind of the insurer is irrelevant; 
even an inadvertent breach of the covenant 
of good faith implied in an insurance con-
tract can substantially harm the insured 
and warrants a remedy. 
[5, 6] We therefore hold that in a first-
party relationship between an insurer and 
its insured, the duties and obligations of 
the parties are contractual rather than fi-
duciary. Without more, a breach of those 
implied or express duties can give rise only 
to a cause of action in contract, not one in 
tort.3 This position has not been widely 
adopted by other courts, although a "re-
spectable body of authority" is developing. 
See Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual 
Insurance Co., 665 S.W.2d at 18-19, and 
cases cited therein; Lawton v. (heat 
Southwest Eire Insurance Co., 118 N.I I. 
607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978); Kewin v. Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 409 
Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980); Avail-
conceivably result in tort liability independent 
of (and concurrent with) liability for breach of 
contract. Additionally, the facts that give rise to 
a breach of the duty to bargain in good faith 
could also amount to fraudulent activity, ren-
dering an insurer independently liable for dam 
ages flowing from the fraud. See WetJterbcc i: 
United his. Co., 265 Cal.App.2d 921, 71 Cal.Rptr. 
764 (1968). Also, iindcr various unfair practices 
acts, there may be statutory requirements that 
give rise to independent causes of action. /:./?., 
U.C.A., 1953. §§ 31-27-1 to -24. 
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ability of Excess Damages, supra p. 4, at 
168-71. We further hold that as parties to 
a contract, the insured and the insurer have 
parallel obligations to perform the contract 
in good faith, obligations that inhere in 
every contractual relationship. State 
Automobile & Casualty Underwriters v. 
Salisbury, 27 Utah 2d 229, 232, 494 P.2d 
529, 531 (1972); Leigh Furniture & Car-
pet Co. v. Isom, Utah, 657 I\2d 293, 306 
(1982).4 
[7.8] Few cases define the implied con-
tractual obligation to perform a first-party 
insurance contract in good faith. How-
ever, because the considerations are sim-
ilar, we freely look to the tort cases that 
have described the incidents of the duty of 
good faith in the context of first-party in-
surance contracts. From those cases and 
from our own analysis of the obligations 
undertaken by the parties, we conclude 
that the implied obligation of good faith 
performance contemplates, at the very 
least, that the insurer will diligently inves-
tigate the facts to enable it to determine 
whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate 
the claim, and will thereafter act promptly 
and reasonably in rejecting or settling the 
claim. See Anderson v. Continental In-
surance Co., 85 Wis.2d at 692-93, 271 
N.W.2d at 377; Egan v. Mutual of Omaha 
Insurance Co., 24 Cal.3d 809, 818-19, 620 
P.2d 141, 145-46, 169 Cal.Rptr. 691, 695-96 
(1979). The duty of good faith also re-
quires the insurer to "deal with laymen as 
laymen and not as experts in the subtleties 
of law and underwriting" and to refrain 
from actions that will injure the insured's 
ability to obtain the benefits of the con-
tract. MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Flint, 574 S.W.2d at 720, quoting Mer-
chants Indemnity Corp. v. Egglcston, 37 
N.J. 114, 122, 179 A.2d 505, '509 (1962); 
accord Bowler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 
53 N.J. 313, 327, 250 A.2d 580, 587 (1969). 
These performances are the essence of 
what the insured has bargained and paid 
4. The duty to perform the contract in good faith 
cannot, by definition, be waived by cither party 
to the agreement. 
for, and the insurer has the obligation to 
perform them. When an insurer has 
breached this duty, it is liable for damages 
suffered in consequence of that breach. 
In adopting the contract approach, we 
are not ignoring the principal reason for 
the adoption of the tort approach—to pro-
vide damage exposure in excess of the poli-
cy limits and thus remove any incentive for 
breaching the duty of good faith. Despite 
what some courts have suggested, e.g., 
Santilli v. Slate Farm Insurance Co., 562 
I\2d at 969, and what some commentators 
have asserted, e.g., J. Appleman, Insur-
ance Law & Practice § 8878.15 at 421-26 
(1981), there is no reason to limit damages 
recoverable for breach of a duty to investi-
gate, bargain, and settle claims in good 
faith to the amount specified in the insur-
ance policy.5 Nothing inherent in the con-
tract law approach mandates this narrow 
definition of recoverable damages. Al-
though the policy limits define the amount 
for which the insurer may be held respon-
sible in performing the contract, they do 
not define the amount for which it may be 
liable upon a breach. Lawton v. Great 
Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 392 A.2d at 
579. 
[9] Damages recoverable for breach of 
contract include both general damages, i.e., 
those flowing naturally from the breach, 
and consequential damages, i.e., those rea-
sonably within the contemplation of, or rea-
sonably foreseeable by, the parties at the 
time the contract was made. Pacific Coast 
Title Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident 
& Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 379, 325 
I\2d 906, 907 (1958), citing Had ley v. Bax-
endale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng.Rep. 145 
(1854). We have repeatedly recognized 
that consequential damages for breach of 
contract may reach beyond the bare con-
tract terms. See, e.g., Pacific Coast Title 
Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident & 
Idcmnity, 7 Utah 2d at 379, 325 P.2d at 908 
5. In Ammerman, we suggested in dicta that in 
an action for breach of an insurance policy, the 
damages could not exceed the policy limits. 19 
Utah 2d at 264, 430 P.2d at 578. We expressly 
disavow this dicta. 
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torney fees incurred for settling and de-
eding claims were foreseeable result of 
ntractor's default); lie van v. JJl. Con-
uction Co., Utah, (»(»<) P.2d 442, 444 
)83) (home purchasers entitled to dam-
es for loss of favorable mortgage inter-
t rate resulting from builder's breach of 
ntract). 
[10,11] In an action for breach of a 
ity to bargain in good faith, a broad 
tnge of recoverable damages is conceiva-
e, particularly given the unique nature 
id purpose of an insurance contract. An 
isured frequently faces catastrophic con-
tinences if funds are not available within 
reasonable period of time to cover an 
isured loss; damages for losses well in 
xcess of the policy limits, such as for a 
ome or a business, may therefore be fores-
eeable and provable. See, e.g., Rcichcrt v. 
ieneral Insurance Co., 59 Cal.Rptr. 724, 
28, 428 P.2d 860, 8(>4 (1967), vacated on 
dher grounds, 68 Cal.2d 822, 442 P.2d 377, 
»9 Cal.Rptr. 321 (1968) (because bankrupt-
y was a foreseeable consequence of fire 
usurer's failure to pay, insurer was liable 
for consequential damages flowing from 
>ankruptcy). Furthermore, it is axiomatic 
that insurance frequently is purchased not 
jnly to provide funds in case of loss, but to 
provide peace of mind for the insured or his 
beneficiaries. Therefore, although other 
courts adopting the contract approach have 
been reluctant to allow such an award, 
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insur-
ance Co., 392 A.2d at 581-82, we find no 
difficulty with the proposition that, in un-
usual cases, damages for mental anguish 
might be provable.fi See Kewin v. Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 409 
Mich, at 440-55, 295 N.W.2d at 64-72 (Wil-
liams, J., dissenting); cf. Lambert v. Sine, 
123 Utah 145, 150, 256 P.2d 241, 244 (1953). 
The foreseeability of any such damages 
will always hinge upon the nature and lan-
guage of the contract and the reasonable 
expectations of the parties. J. Calamari & 
6. Clearly, damages will not be available for die 
mere disappointment, flustration, or anxiety 
normally experienced in the pioccss of filing an 
J. Perillo, Contracts § 14-5 at 523-25 (2d 
ed. 1977). 
With the foregoing principles in mind, we 
return to a consideration of the present 
case. The trial court granted summary 
judgment for the insurer in the face of 
affidavits of the insured, his counsel, and a 
paralegal who had been an adjuster for 
many years. In the absence of any respon-
sive affidavits, we take the assertions of 
the affidavits as true and view all unex-
plained facts in a light most favorable to 
Reck. It appears that the insurer was 
served with Heck's claim on June 23, 1982. 
On July 1st, the claim was rejected without 
explanation and without any request for 
additional facts. The insured heard noth-
ing more from the insurer until after Au-
gust 2d, when this suit was filed. The 
affidavits state that the insured accepted 
the settlement offered by the insurer in 
late October because of the financial pres-
sure caused by the delay in resolving the 
matter. The affidavits also offer the opin-
ion of the expert adjuster turned paralegal 
that the delay was in bad faith. 
From January until late June, Heck was 
apparently negotiating with the car own-
er's carrier and not with Farmers, for no 
claim was filed with Farmers until June 
23rd. Therefore, none of the delay be-
tween January and June 23rd can be attrib-
uted to Farmers. The unexplained delay 
thereafter, however, together with a flat 
rejection of plaintiffs offer, provides a fac-
tual basis for this cause of action sufficient 
to withstand summary judgment. Farmers 
had an obligation to diligently investigate 
and evaluate Heck's claim. It rejected the 
claim in one week, and we must infer that 
the insurer did nothing to investigate or 
evaluate the claim during the following 
month. 
[12J Under these circumstances and re-
solving all doubts in Heck's favor, we can-
not say that a jury could not find that 
Farmers breached its duty of good faith in 
rejecting Heck's claim without explanation 
insurance claim and negotiating a settlement 
with an msuter. 
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and in failing to further investigate the Affirmed. 
matter. Therefore, we remand the matter Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
to the trial court for further proceedings. 
HALL, C.,Ir, and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
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Assignee of second deed of t rust filed 
action requesting that he be awarded ex-
cess sale proceeds over amount due holder 
of first deed of trust. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkin-
son, J., found for assignee, and holder of 
first deed of trust appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Durham, J., held that affidavit of 
attorney representing assignee of second 
deed of trust establishing that bankruptcy 
judge dismissed assignee's complaint seek-
ing to stay trustee's sale because of se-
cured claims on debtor's property and be-
cause bankruptcy court had no interest in 
funds, and that bankruptcy judge had earli-
er favorably responded to statement that 
assignee would prefer to go to state court, 
demonstrated that bankruptcy court did 
not make adjudication on merits, and thus, 
bankruptcy court's dismissal was not res 
judicata so as to bar state court action by 
assignee seeking to recover excess sale 
proceeds over amount due holder of first 
deed of trust. 
1. Appeal and Er ro r <s=>2(M(t) 
In action brought by assignee of sec-
ond deed of t rust seeking to be awarded 
excess sale proceeds over amount due hold-
er of first deed of trust, holder of first 
deed of trust, by failing to interpose any 
objection at trial to use of affidavit of 
plaintiff's attorney, waived objection on ba-
sis of allegation that such affidavit was 
hearsay, and could not raise such issue for 
first time on appeal. 
2. Judgment <e=65f 
Finding that court does not have juris-
diction is not the sort of adjudication that 
can serve as basis for res judicata on mer-
its. 
3. Judgment <S=*829(3) 
Affidavit of attorney representing as-
signee of second deed of trust establishing 
that bankruptcy judge dismissed assignee's 
complaint seeking to stay trustee's sale 
because of secured claims on debtor's prop-
erty and because bankruptcy court had no 
interest in funds, and that bankruptcy 
judge had earlier favorably responded to 
statement that assignee would prefer to go 
to state court, demonstrated that bankrupt-
cy court did not make adjudication on mer-
its, and thus, bankruptcy court's dismissal 
was not res judicata so as to bar state 
court action by assignee seeking to recover 
excess sale proceeds over amount due hold-
er of first deed of trust. 
Edward M. Garrett, Joseph E. Hatch, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel-
lant. 
J. Steven Newton, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
The plaintiff, a mechanic's lien holder 
and assignee of a second position trust 
deed, filed a complaint with the federal 
bankruptcy court asking the court to stay a 
TabR 
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care would have incurred the risk, de-
spite his knowledge of it, and if so, 
whether he would have conducted him-
self in the manner in which the plaintiff 
acted in light of all the surrounding cir 
cumstances, including the appreciated 
risk. 
Hcobsen Constr. Co., 619 P.2d at 31J 
[8] It is well-settled that a plaintiff, act 
nig in a reasonanbly prudent manner, has a 
duty to foresee a danger, Moore v. Burton 
Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d at 870, 
particularly one that is plainly visible, and 
avoid it. Hindmarsh v. O.P. Skaggs Food-
liner, 21 Utah 2d 413, 416-17, 446 P.2d 410, 
412 (1968). If a plaintiff fails to see or 
sees but fails to avoid the danger, then the 
plaintiff acted negligently. See Pollesche 
v. K-Mart Enterprises of Utah, Inc., 520 
P.2d 200, 203 (Utah 1974) (plaintiff who 
sees and ignores the danger is guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of 
law); Hindmarsh, 21 Utah 2d 413 at 417, 
446 P.2d at 412; Whitman v. W.T. Grant 
Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 83, 395 P.2d 918, 920 
(1964) (plaintiff can be negligent either in 
failing to look or in failing to heed what he 
or she saw). 
Instruction twenty-five, when read to 
gether with all of the other instructions 
given on negligence, is a correct statement 
of a plaintiff's duty in a negligence action. 
Nowhere in instruction twenty-five, nor in 
any of the other remaining thirty-eight in-
structions, did the trial court intimate that 
if Deats was negligent then she was pre-
cluded from recovering. On the contra**y, 
the instructions, when read in their entire-
ty, adequately informed the jury of CSB's 
duty of care as a property owner, Deats' 
duty of care, and most importantly, of the 
procedure by which the jury must appor-
tion negligence if both parties were found 
to have acted negligently. 
The trial court properly denied Deats' 
motion for a new trial. The evidence sup-
porting the jury's findings was ample and 
convincing, and the verdict, therefore, was 
not unreasonable nor unjust. Roylance, 
737 P.2d at 234; Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 
t».»i nm TA<? (Utah 1982). 
Affirmed Coats to Commercial Security 
Bank. 
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
(o fKIVNUHBIR SYSTEM^ 
V> • i i Ray GAGON, ulntiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a/k/a State 
Farm Insurance Companies, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 860137-CA, 
Court of Appeals of I u* 
Dec. 18, 1987 
Insured brought action against auto-
mobile insurer for payment of claim and 
bad faith refusal to pay claim. The Dis 
trict Court, John A. Rokich, J., directed 
\erdict in favor of insurer on bad faith 
issue. Insured appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that evidence 
created jury question whether insurer re 
fused to pay claim in bad faith. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Insurance <&=>602.12(2) 
Evidence created jury questions wheth-
er insured should have known that oil 
pump was damaged after metal object fell 
from pickup truck and struck underside of 
car, whether insurer fairly evaluated claim 
for damage to engine as result of nonfunc 
tioning oil pump, and whether insurer re-
fused to pay in bad faith. 
2, Pretrial Procedure <3=752 
Evidence of punitive damages was in-
admissible in insured's action against insur-
er for payment oi claim and bad faith re-
fusal to pay claim where judge stated on 
GAGON v. STATE FARM MUT. AUTO. INS. CO. Utah H 9 5 
Cite M 746 P.2d 1194 (UUhApp. 1987) 
record immediately prior to trial that par 
ties and court agreed to exclude evidence 
of punitive damages unless and until jur> 
found bad faith, and where no objection 
was voiced by insured. 
3, Insurance <s=*602.12(2) 
Evidence of attorney fees were inad-
missible until insured established that in-
surer breached implied obligation of good 
*aith by refusal to pay claim. 
John D. Parken (argued), Marcella I 
Keck, Dart, Adamson & Parken, Salt Lakt-
City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Paul Belnap (argued), Strong & Hanr-
Salt Lake City, for defendant and respor 
dent. 
Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS 
and BENCH, JJ 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge. 
Plaintiff, William Ray Gagon, brought 
this action against defendant, State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
(State Farm), for payment of his insurance 
claim and for alleged bad faith refusal to 
pay his claim. Plaintiff appeals from the 
trial court's directed verdict against him on 
the bad faith issue. We reverse and re-
mand. 
On September 17, 1983, plaintiff was 
driving his 1979 Fiat Spider when a metal 
object fell out of the back of a pickup truck 
he was following and struck the underside 
of his car. Plaintiff stopped his car and 
noted that the plastic spoiler under the 
front grill had been broken, but he could 
see no oil or other evidence of damage to 
the car. Plaintiff then restarted the car 
and drove about three miles. While driv-
ing, he noticed that the car lacked power 
and that he was unable to drive faster than 
forty-five or fifty miles per hour. Towards 
the end of the three miles, he observed that 
the oil light was on. He stopped the car, 
tried to push it and briefly attempted to 
restart \t When the car would not start, 
plaintiff had it towed to Steve Harris Im 
ports where inspection revealed that the oil 
pump was broken. Because the oil pump 
stopped functioning, the engine was dam-
aged due to loss of lubrication, costing 
$1,517.99 to repair. 
Plaintiff reported the incident to State 
Farm on September 19, 1983. On Septem-
ber 23, State Farm's appraiser examined 
the vehicle and prepared a damage esti-
mate indicating that State Farm would only 
cover the external damage to the car and 
not the internal damage due to loss of 
lubrication. On October 5, 1983, plaintiff 
went to State Farm's office and signed a 
statement explaining the circumstances of 
the incident. On October 12, 1983, State 
Farm's claims committee determined that 
plaintiff's claim would be denied "for inter-
nal repairs to the engine because of me-
chanical failure—wear and tear." On Octo-
ber 18, 1983, State Farm informed plaintiff 
of its decision to deny coverage for internal 
repairs and allow coverage for only the 
external damage. In December 1983, 
plaintiff initiated this action alleging that 
State Farm's refusal to pay his claim was 
in bad faith. 
On the first day of trial, the parties 
stipulated that the case would be tried or> 
the bad faith issue, and if the jury found 
bad faith, plaintiff could then submit evi 
dence of punitive damages. On the second 
day of trial, the court disallowed plaintiff's 
evidence of attorney fees with the proviso 
that he would reconsider the admissibility 
of attorney fees if the jury found bad faith 
After the parties had presented their evi-
dence, both parties moved for a directed 
verdict. The trial judge granted State 
Farm's motion on the issue of whether 
State Farm acted in bad faith in refusing to 
pay plaintiff's insurance claim and denied 
plaintiff's motion regarding coverage un-
der the policy for engine damage. The 
judge then allowed the jury to determine 
whether plaintiff was entitled to all the 
damages resulting from the accident. The 
jury awarded plaintiff $1,517.99, less plain-
tiff's insurance deductible of $200, plus ten 
percent interest from September 17, 1983. 
Plaintiff appeals claiming that the trial 
court erred in granting State Farm's mo-
tion for a directed verdict on the bad faith 
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•laim since reasonable minds could have 
found that State Farm acted in bad faith. 
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court 
erred in excluding evidence of punitive 
damages and consequential damages in-
cluding attorney fees. 
I. 
[1J In reviewing a directed verdict, the 
court must examine all the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the losing party. 
Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728, 
732 (Utah 1984). If the evidence permits 
reasonable persons to reach different con-
clusions on the issues, the directed verdict 
should not be granted. Little Am. Re/. Co. 
v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 1982); 
Cerrit08 Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture 
No. i, 645 P.2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982). 
After the trial court granted State 
Farm's motion for a directed verdict on the 
bad faith issue, the Utah Supreme Court 
rendered Beck v. Farmers Insurance Ex-
change, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).1 In 
Beck, the Court held that "as parties to a 
contract, the insured and the insurer have 
parallel obligations to perform the contract 
in good faith." Id. at 801. The Court then 
defined the obligation of good faith as con-
templating that "the insurer will diligently 
investigate the facts to enable it to deter-
mine whether a claim is valid, will fairly 
evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act 
promptly and reasonably in rejecting or 
settling the claim." Id. In addition, the 
Court stated that the duty of good faith 
"requires the insurer to 'deal with laymen 
as laymen and not as experts in the subtle-
ties of law and underwriting' and to refrain 
from actions that will injure the insured's 
ability to obtain the benefits of the con-
tract" Id. 
With these principles in mind and view-
ing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to plaintiff, we examine whether reason-
able minds could differ as to whether State 
1. Beck overruled Lyon v. Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Co., 25 Utah 2d 311. 480 P.2d 739 
(1971) to the extent that Lyon was philosophical-
ly inconsistent with the Beck Court's recognition 
of a cause of action in contract for the insurer's 
failure to perform the contract in good faith and 
• - - i . . «k« nufdion of 
Farm breached its obligation of good faith. 
It was undisputed that State Farm denied 
coverage for plaintiffs claim because "the 
damages sustained to the internal parts of 
the engine were not a result of a collision 
loss but rather a result of a mechanical 
failure, wear and tear." However, State 
Farm's claims manual states: 
MOTOR DAMAGE FROM LOSS OF 
OIL: 
Claims for damage to the motor caused 
by the loss of oil following a roadbed 
collision will qualify for payment under 
any form of Collision Coverage. 
A roadbed collision shall be deemed to 
be any contact between the insured ve-
hicle and the roadbed, or any object 
fixed, frozen or imbedded in the road 
such as a rock, stump, or any other sta-
tionary object. 
There should be a reasonable compli-
ance with that condition of the policy 
which provides, 'When loss occurs the 
named insured shall use every reason-
able means to protect the damaged prop-
erty covered by this policy from any fur-
ther damage.' 
This has the effect of treating motor 
damage following a roadbed collision as 
a part of the direct damage, instead of 
indirect damage. Reference to the Con-
ditions Section is made because the pay-
ment should not include any amount for 
damage resulting from the further oper-
ation of the vehicle after damage to the 
oil pan or to the motor has become 
known to the operator, or after the exist-
ence of damage should have become 
known by the operator exercising reason-
able care. 
At trial plaintiff testified that he was in 
the wholesale jewelry business and had 
never worked on cars other than adding 
windshield washer fluid, radiator fluid and 
oil. He also testified that he had stopped 
whether a claim of bad faith gave rise to a tort 
cause of action. Beck, 701 P.2d at 798 n. 1. The 
Court characterized the ruling in Lyon as leav-
ing "an insured without any effective remedy 
against an insurer that refuses to bargain or 
settle in good faith with the insured." Id. at 
798. 
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hitting the metal object, tive damages and consequential damages his car after 
looked under the car and did not see any 
oil. After inspecting the car, he drove for 
another three miles before he noticed a loss 
of power, observed that the oil light was on 
and stopped the car. In addition, there was 
conflicting testimony as to whether the loss 
of lubrication occurred within seconds of 
impact with the metal object or whether 
plaintiff caused the damage by continuing 
to operate the vehicle. Plaintiffs witness, 
Gary Majnik, who repaired his car, testified 
that an engine in a Fiat Spider could be 
damaged by loss of lubrication within sec-
onds of hitting an object. Plaintiff also 
called another mechanic, Steve Crane, who 
testified that a person without general 
knowledge of mechanics, who hit some-
thing on the underside of a 1979 Fiat and 
dented the oil pan, would not know wheth-
er to continue driving the car other than as 
indicated by the warning systems in the 
car. He also stated that the warnings sys-
tems can malfunction. 
Based on these facts, we find that rea-
sonable minds could differ as to whether 
plaintiff, exercising reasonable care, knew 
or should have known that the oil pump 
was damaged and that he should not con-
tinue to drive the car. Further, we con-
clude that reasonable persons could reach 
different conclusions as to whether State 
Farm fairly evaluated the claim and acted 
reasonably in rejecting or settling the 
claim. Therefore, we hold that, in light of 
Beck, the directed verdict on the bad faith 
issue was improperly granted, and the is-
sue should have been decided by the jury. 
II. 
[2,3] The second issue is whether the 
court improperly excluded evidence of puni-
including attorney fees. Immediately prior 
to the trial in this case, the judge stated on 
the record that the parties and the court 
agr""d to exclude evidence of punitive dam-
ages unless and until the jury found that 
State Farm had acted in bad faith. No 
objection was voiced by plaintiff. There-
fore, we find no merit in plaintiffs claim 
that evidence of punitive damages was im-
properly excluded. On the second day of 
trial, the court stated that it would exclude 
evidence of attorney fees but would re-
serve the right to later admit evidence of 
attorney fees if the jury found bad faith. 
Generally, attorney fees are not chargeable 
to an opposing party unless there is con-
tractual or statutory liability for them. Es-
pinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 698 P.2d 
346, 348 (Utah 1979). However, according 
to Beck, consequential damages such as 
attorney fees may be recoverable in an 
insurance carrier lack of good faith case. 
Beck, 701 P.2d at 801-02. Therefore, we 
find no error in the exclusion of attorney 
fees until after plaintiff established that 
State Farm breached its implied obligation 
of good faith. If lack of good faith is 
found on remand, consideration of punitive 
damages and consequential damages will 
be appropriate. 
Reversed and remanded. 
BILLINGS and BENCH, JJ., concur. 
Kir HUMII* SYSTIM | > *yv^^V 5> 
TabS 
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damages, which consist of attorney fees, 
when it sent to the jury the separate ques-
tion of whether State Farm had breached 
the contract of insurance when it refused 
to pay the claim. The Court of Appeals 
then remanded the case to the trial court so 
that the question of breach of the Beck 
covenant could be sent to the jury. All this 
is an appropriate handling of the trial 
court's ruling. 
In the last sentence of its opinion, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals states: "If lack 
of good faith is found on remand, consider-
ation of punitive damages . . . will be ap-
propriate." 746 P.2d at 1197. While this 
statement is not part of the Court of Ap-
peals' holding, the trial court may consider 
this dictum binding on remand. Specifical-
ly, the trial judge may feel compelled to 
peVmit the jury to award punitive damages 
if Gagon shows nothing more than a 
breach of the Beck covenant of good faith. 
To do so would be error under Beck. 
Therefore, I think it important to state that 
this possibly casual remark by the Court of 
Appeals should not be considered an accu-
rate or binding statement of the law on the 
availability of punitive damages. 
In Beck, we were very careful to make it 
plain that a claim for an insurer's breach of 
its implied covenant to act in good faith 
toward its insured did not, alone, give rise 
to a cause of action in tort; rather, the 
cause of action was one in contract. While 
consequential damages for breach of the 
covenant would be available, tort damages, 
including punitive damages, would not. To 
recover punitive damages, a plaintiff would 
have to show all of the elements of a 
separate tort. Beck, 701 P.2d at 800-02 & 
n. 3. Accordingly, under Beck, a plaintiff 
is not entitled to put on evidence of puni-
tive damages unless he or she can make 
out a sufficient case to go to the jury on an 
independent tort theory. Id. 
William Ray GAGON, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant 
and Petitioner. 
No. 880060. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 28, 1988. 
Appeal from Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County; John A. Rokich, J. 
Paul M. Belnap, Stephen J. Trayner, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and petitioner. 
John D. Parken, Marcella L. Keck, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
ORDER 
The above-entitled petition for writ of 
certiorari having been heretofore con-
sidered, it is hereby ordered that the same 
be denied. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring in 
denial of certiorari): 
Defendant State Farm Mutual Insurance 
Company ("State Farm") seeks review of 
the Court of Appeals' opinion, 746 P.2d 
1194 (Utah App.1987), which reversed the 
trial court's grant of a directed verdict in 
favor of State Farm on plaintiff William 
Ray Gagon's claim that State Farm had 
acted in bad faith in refusing to pay an 
insurance claim. The Court today denies 
the writ. 1 agree that the holding below is 
correct; however, 1 write separately for 
the purpose of disavowing the implications 
of dicta in the last sentence of the Court of 
Appeals' opinion. 
The Court of Appeals first properly held 
that the facts were sufficient to go to the 
jury on the question of whether State Farm 
had breached the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing described in Beck v. Farm-
ers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). 
The Court of Appeals then properly held 
that, under the facts of this case, the trial 
court had not erred in excluding evidence 
of punitive damages and consequential 
DURHAM, J., concurs in the 
concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J. 
|KlYNUMBtRSYSUM> 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Karen Marie JOHNSON, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 870222-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 21, 1989. 
Rehearing Denied April 5, 1989. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District, Salt Lake County, Raymond S. 
Uno, J., of possession of controlled sub-
stance, and she appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Garff, J., held that: (1) motor 
vehicle passenger was seized within mean-
ing of Fourth Amendment when deputy 
sheriff who had stopped vehicle took pas-
senger's name and birthdate and expected 
her to wait while he ran warrants check, 
but (2) seizure of passenger, who became 
defendant, constituted temporary detention 
supported by reasonable articulable suspi-
cion that passenger had committed crime. 
Affirmed. 
Orme, J., filed dissenting opinion. 
1. Criminal Law «=»1030(2) 
Court of Appeals would not consider 
claim raised for first time on appeal, that 
Utah Constitution and law provide greater 
protection than Fourth Amendment of 
United States Constitution against unrea-
sonable search and seizure. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1, § 14; U.C. 
A.1953, 77-7-15. 
2. Arrest «=»68(4) 
Motor vehicle passenger was seized 
within meaning of Fourth Amendment 
when deputy sheriff who had stopped ve-
hicle took passenger's name and birthdate 
and expected her to wait while he ran war-
rants check; under totality of the circum-
stances, passenger was reasonably justified 
in belief that she was not free to go. U.S. 
C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
3. Automobiles <s=»349(17, 18) 
Fourth Amendment seizure of motor 
vehicle passenger constituted temporary 
detention supported by reasonable articula-
ble suspicion that passenger had committed 
crime; trial judge believed deputy sheriffs 
testimony that deputy believed there was 
possibility vehicle he had stopped for hav-
ing faulty brake light was stolen as driver 
was not registered owner and was unable 
to find vehicle registration, it was reason-
able to ask passenger her name to deter-
mine if her names corresponded with own-
er's name that had been learned prior to 
stopping of vehicle, and passenger was not 
detained for unreasonable period of time. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
Debra K. Loy, Joan C. Watt (argued), 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Dan R. 
Larsen (argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
Before DAVIDSON, GARFF and 
ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant, Karen Marie Johnson, ap-
peals the trial court's denial of her motion 
to suppress and her conviction for posses-
sion of a controlled substance.1 We affirm. 
On November 3, 1986, Deputy Sheriff 
Stroud stopped a vehicle for having a 
faulty brake light. Defendant was a pas-
senger in that vehicle. At the suppression 
hearing, Stroud testified that prior to 
stopping the vehicle, he ran a check on the 
license plate and obtained the name of the 
registered owner. He then approached the 
stopped vehicle and asked the driver for 
her license. The name on the license was 
not the name of the registered owner. 
1. At a bench trial, defendant was convicted on 
stipulated facts testified to at a previous hearing 
on defendant's motion to suppress. 
STATE v. JOHNSON 
Cite as 771 P 2d 326 (UtahApp. 1989) 
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When Stroud requested the registration 
certificate, the driver was unable to pro-
duce it. Stroud then asked defendant for 
identification, reasoning that there was a 
possibility the car was stolen because there 
was no registration and no owner present. 
After initially denying that she had any 
identification, defendant told Stroud her 
name and birthdate. 
Stating that he would be right back and 
expecting the driver and defendant to re-
main, Stroud returned to his vehicle and 
ran license checks on the two, determining 
that the driver was driving on a suspended 
license and that defendant had several out-
standing warrants. He did not, however, 
inquire as to whether the car was stolen, 
nor did he know of any reports of stolen 
cars matching that car's description. He 
then wrote a citation on the driver and 
requested a backup police officer. 
When defendant was informed that she 
was being arrested for outstanding war-
rants, she exited the vehicle, holding a 
backpack which had the name "Karen" on 
it. Defendant initially denied that the 
backpack belonged to her, but later admit-
ted that it was hers. Incident to her ar-
rest, the bag was searched and was found 
to contain amphetamines, drug parapherna-
lia and defendant's Utah identification. 
Defendant's version of the sequence of 
events varies from Stroud's. She testified 
that after Stroud received the driver's li-
cense, he asked defendant if she had any 
identification. She said that she did not. 
He told them to wait, that he would be 
right back, and returned to his vehicle for 
five or ten minutes, long enough for her to 
smoke a cigarette or two. When he re-
turned, he asked for the registration certif-
icate. When it could not be produced, 
Stroud asked defendant to return to his 
vehicle with him, where, at his request, she 
gave him her name and birthdate. He then 
sent her back to the other car. Fifteen 
minutes later, he came back to their car, 
gave the driver a citation, took defendant 
out of the car, frisked and handcuffed her, 
2. Utah has never drawn any distinctions be-
tween these two provisions and has "always 
considered the protections afforded to be one 
and the same." State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 
and put her in the front seat of the sher-
iff's car. She had possession of her bag at 
this time. Defendant stated that she gave 
Stroud her name and birthdate because she 
was required to do so, and did not believe 
that she could leave. 
The issues on appeal are: (I) whether 
defendant may raise, for the first time on 
appeal, the argument that state law and 
article 1 section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
provide greater protection than the fourth 
amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion against unreasonable search and sei-
zure; (2) whether defendant, a passenger 
in a motor vehicle, was seized within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment; and (3) 
if there was a seizure, whether it was 
reasonable. 
In considering the trial court's action in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress, 
we will not disturb its factual evaluation 
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987). The trial judge is in the best posi-
tion to assess the credibility and accuracy 
of the witnesses' divergent testimonies. 
State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154-156, 
(Utah Ct.App.1989); State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct.App.1988). How-
ever, in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon its factual findings, 
we afford it no deference but apply a "cor-
rection of error" standard. Oates v. Cha-
vez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988). 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE 
[ 11 Defendant claims that her detention 
violated the fourth amendment of the Unit-
ed States Constitution and article 1, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. She also ar-
gues that the legislative intent behind Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1980) was to provide 
greater protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures than is provided by 
the fourth amendment, and that her sei-
zure violated the provisions of both consti-
tutions.2 However, defendant failed to 
1221 (Utah 1988). However, in a footnote com-
ment, the court indicated that it has not ruled 
out the possibility of making such a distinction 
in a future case. Id. at n. 8. 
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brief or argue these issues at the trial level 
and first raised her statutory argument in 
her appellate brief. Nominally alluding to 
such different constitutional guarantees 
without any analysis before the trial court 
does not sufficiently raise the issue to per-
mit consideration by this court on appeal. 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987). "IWJhere a defendant fails 
to assert a particular ground for suppress-
ing unlawfully obtained evidence in the tri-
al court, an appellate court will not consid-
er that ground on appeal [MJotions to 
suppress should be supported by precise 
averments, not conclusory allegations " 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 
1985). Also, in State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 
53 (Utah 1981), the supreme court stated: 
There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the point now urged upon this Court 
was unavailable or unknown to defen-
dant at the time he filed his motion to 
suppress, and to entertain the point now 
would be to sanction the practice of with-
holding positions that should properly be 
presented to the trial court but which 
may be withheld for the purpose of seek-
ing a reversal on appeal and a new trial 
or dismissal. 
We, therefore, decline to consider this ar-
gument on appeal. 
SEIZURE 
[2] Defendant avers that she was 
seized within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment because she felt that she was 
not free to leave when Stroud told her to 
wait while he returned to his vehicle to 
check on the driver's license and to run a 
warranto check on defendant. "A seizure 
within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment occurs only when the officer by 
means of physical force or show of authori-
ty has in some way restricted the liberty of 
a person/' State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 
87 (Utah Ct.App.1987). Further, "[w]hen a 
reasonable person, based on the totality of 
the circumstances, remains, not in the spir-
it of cooperation . . . but because he be-
lieves he is not free to leave," a seizure 
occurs. Id.; see also United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 
1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Defen-
dant was, therefore, seized when Stroud 
took her name and birthdate and expected 
her to wait while he ran a warrants check. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, 
defendant was reasonably justified in her 
belief that she was not free to go. 
13] Now, the concern is whether the 
seizure was reasonable and permissible un-
der the fourth amendment. In State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (per 
curiam), the Utah Supreme Court adopted 
the reasoning in United States v. Merritt, 
736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984), wherein 
the Fifth Circuit specified three constitu-
tionally permissible levels of police stops: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long 
as the citizen is not detained against his 
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if 
the officer has an "articulable suspicion" 
that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime; however, the 
"detention must be temporary and last 
no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense has 
been committed or is being committed. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18. 
We conclude that the present case in-
volves a "level two" stop. Thus, to justify 
the seizure, Stroud had to have a reason-
able "articulable suspicion" that defendant 
had committed a crime. To determine if he 
acted reasonably under the circumstances, 
"due weight must be given, not to his in-
choate and unparticularized suspicion or 
'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable in-
ferences which he is entitled to draw from 
the facts in light of his experience." Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
At this point, we defer to the findings of 
the trial judge because of his preferred 
position in evaluating the witnesses' credi-
bility. See Arroyo, at 154-156. The 
record indicates that the trial court be-
lieved Stroud's testimony in concluding 
there was an articulable suspicion that de-
fendant had committed a crime. Prior to 
asking defendant for identification, Stroud 
STATE v. JOHNSON 
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believed that there was a possibility the car period of time, 
was stolen because the owner was absent 
and there was no registration. He knew 
that the driver was not the owner, but 
determined that it was reasonable to ask 
defendant her name to determine if it cor-
responded with the owner's name he had 
learned prior to stopping the vehicle. The 
fact that Stroud initially chose to do a 
warrants check instead of a stolen vehicle 
check is of no great significance because 
not all stolen cars are reported immediate-
ly. The trial judge stated that where there 
is a legitimate traffic stop, the driver has a 
suspended license, and there is "no way of 
telling who the owner of the vehicle is and 
whether they have permission to drive it 
because the owner is not present," a rea-
sonable officer would inquire regarding the 
identity of a passenger. In weighing the 
testimony, the court was justified in find-
ing that the amount of time defendant was 
required to wait, even though a passenger, 
was reasonable and did not take any longer 
than a normal traffic stop. 
Thus, there was substantial evidence for 
the trial court to find as it did. Although a 
seizure occurred, it conformed to constitu-
tional requirements in that Officer Stroud 
had a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
the car could have been stolen, and defen-
dant was not detained for an unreasonable 
Utah 329 
We, therefore, affirm de-
fendant's conviction. 
DAVIDSON, J., concurs. 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
Although the legal analysis applicable to 
this case is ably set out in the majority's 
opinion, I cannot agree with their ultimate 
conclusion that the arresting officer had an 
articulable suspicion that the automobile 
had been stolen, much less that defendant 
had in any way participated in the theft. 
The only facte relied on by the officer 
were that the driver's name was not the 
name of the registered owner and the driv-
er was not able to locate the registration 
certificate. These facte are just as consist-
ent with the more likely scenario that the 
driver borrowed the car from its rightful 
owner. Absent more—and this is all the 
officer pointed to—there was simply no 
articulable suspicion, as a matter of law, 
that the car had been stolen. 
I would accordingly reverse. 
[6 | *« *w*m SVSIIH) 
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Robert Kent HILL, individually and as 
Personal Representative of the heirs of 
Tamara Elaine Hill, deceased, and Lo-
rin Dean Caldwell, individually and as 
personal representative of the heirs of 
Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased, Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, 
Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Kenneth Paul BRYAN, Third-Party 
Defendant and Cross-Appellee. 
Nos. 20335, 20391. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 1, 1988. 
Subsequent to settlement of wrongful 
death action, personal representatives of 
persons killed in accident filed suit against 
automobile insurer. Insurer filed third-par-
ty claim against driver of second automo-
bile. The District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Judith M. Billings, J., granted summary 
judgment for automobile insurer on issue 
of subrogation and denied insurer's sum-
mary judgment motion against driver of 
second automobile. Personal representa-
tives and insurer appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Durham, J., held that (1) in deter-
mining allocation of amount received by 
insured from third-party tort-feasor for 
subrogation purposes, it is not assumed 
that the amount of the settlement is coex-
tensive with the amount of damages in-
curred; (2) in absence of specific contractu-
al terms in either the release and settle-
ment or the insurance policy, the insured 
must be made whole prior to any recovery 
by insurer against the tort-feasor; and (3) 
where personal representatives released 
driver of second automobile from further 
liability in order to obtain settlement, insur-
er's only recourse was to show either that 
the personal representatives were fully 
compensated or that personal representa-
tives' action in releasing second driver 
breached the insurance policy. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part. 
See also 709 P.2d 257. 
1. Appeal and Error <3=>934(1) 
In reviewing grant of motion for sum-
mary judgment, all doubts or uncertainties 
concerning issues of fact are viewed in 
light most favorable to party opposing 
summary judgment. 
2. Subrogation <3=>1 
Subrogation is equitable doctrine and 
is governed by equitable principles. 
3. Insurance <s=601 
In absence of express terms to the 
contrary, insured must be made whole be-
fore the insurer is entitled to be reim-
bursed from a recovery from the third-par-
ty tort-feasor. 
4. Insurance <^ »606(1) 
Where court record did not reveal ex-
tent of subrogation terms of automobile 
policy and it was not possible to ascertain 
intent of parties as to extent of their re-
spective rights under the subrogation 
clause, the doctrine of subrogation would 
be applied according to general principles 
of equity. 
5. Insurance <3=*606(10) 
Where personal representatives of mo-
torists killed in accident released driver of 
second automobile from further liability in 
order to obtain settlement with insurer of 
second automobile, they were not entitled 
to receive future compensation from driver 
of second automobile; thus, insurer of first 
automobile could only be reimbursed from 
personal representatives of persons killed 
in the accident and had no claim on driver 
of second automobile. 
6. Insurance s»601 
In determining allocation of amount 
received by insured from third-party tort-
feasor in order to determine insurer's right 
to subrogation, it is not assumed that the 
amount of the settlement is coextensive 
with the amount of damages incurred. 
HILL v. STATE FARM 
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7. Judgment <*=»181(23) 
Where amount of damages suffered by 
insured was disputed by insured and insur-
er, summary judgment on automobile in-
surer's subrogation claim was not appropri-
ate. 
8. Insurance <s=»601 
If plaintiffs' action in releasing tort-
feasor breaches insurance policy and insur-
er can show it could have recovered from 
tort-feasor, it will be entitled to proceeds as 
a matter of equity. 
Wallace R. Lauchnor, Salt Lake City, for 
Robert Kent Hill and Lorin Dean Caldwell. 
Glenn C. Hanni, R. Scott Williams, Salt 
Lake City, for State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. 
Co. 
J. Anthony Eyre, Heinz J. Mahler, Salt 
Lake City, for Kenneth Paul Bryan. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of defendant, 
arguing that numerous triable issues of 
fact exist and claiming bad faith. State 
Farm appeals from a judgment in favor of 
third-party defendant Bryan. We reverse 
the judgment against plaintiffs and affirm 
the judgment against State Farm. 
On June 6, 1982, an automobile owned 
and driven by Kenneth Paul Bryan, who 
was legally intoxicated, ran a red light and 
struck a vehicle owned by plaintiff Lorin 
Caldwell and driven by Caldwell's son. 
Plaintiff Robert Hill's daughter was an oc-
cupant in Caldwell's vehicle. The force of 
the impact was fatal to both Caldwell's son 
and Hill's daughter. At the time of the 
accident, Caldwell's vehicle was insured by 
State Farm; Bryan's vehicle was insured 
by Cumis Insurance International. State 
Farm paid $5,510 to Caldwell for property 
damage to his vehicle. Shortly thereafter, 
Cumis offered to tender the policy limits of 
$50,000 on Bryan's policy to plaintiffs in an 
attempt to satisfy plaintiffs' claims. State 
1, To arrive at these figures, the parties subtract-
ed the property damage amount from the total 
policy proceeds and divided the remainder 
equally between them. The disputed property 
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Farm thereupon notified Cumis of its sub-
rogation claim for the amount it had paid 
Caldwell for property damage. 
Both plaintiffs contacted attorneys, who 
filed separate suits against Bryan and inde-
pendently investigated the extent of his 
financial holdings. These investigations re-
vealed that, aside from the Cumis policy, 
Bryan was insolvent. After this discovery, 
Caldwell and Hill withdrew their suits 
against Bryan and made a claim with Cu-
mis for the policy proceeds, which were to 
be divided evenly between them. Cumis 
refused to simply deliver one-half to each 
plaintiff because of State Farm's subroga-
tion claim. Plaintiffs therefore sought a 
waiver of claim from State Farm, arguing 
that the value of their wrongful death ac-
tions far exceeded Bryan's policy limits. 
State Farm refused to waive its subroga-
tion claim and apparently urged plaintiffs 
to litigate their suits against Bryan so that 
the amount of their damages could be judi-
cially ascertained. Plaintiffs determined 
the cost of acquiring such a judicial deter-
mination to be prohibitive. 
Plaintiffs signed separate releases of 
claims in favor of Bryan, Cumis, and other 
possible defendants. In return, Cumis ten-
dered $22,245 to Hill and $27,755 to Cald-
well.1 
Because Cumis refused to proffer policy 
proceeds unless State Farm's subrogation 
interest was accounted for, its tender to 
Caldwell consisted of a check for $22,245 
made to Caldwell alone and a check for 
$5,510 made jointly to Caldwell and State 
Farm. The latter draft corresponded to 
the amount of property damage incurred 
by Caldwell and accounted for State 
Farm's subrogation claim. The release 
signed by Caldwell recognized the dispute 
surrounding the $5,510 by stating: 
[A] controversy exists between State 
Farm Mutual Insurance Company and 
Lorin D. Caldwell as to who is entitled to 
the said amount, and that the matter will 
be resolved between the two or by pay-
damage award was then added to Caldwell's 
portion because he was the owner of the dam-
aged automobile. 
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ment into court or by judicial determina-
tion. 
Plaintiffs and State Farm failed to reach 
an accord for more than one year after the 
release was signed. Plaintiffs filed suit 
against State Farm, seeking payment of 
$5,510 and alleging bad faith on behalf of 
State Farm for its refusal to waive the 
subrogation claim. In turn, State Farm 
filed a third-party claim against Bryan for 
subrogation and indemnity. State Farm 
also counterclaimed against plaintiffs for 
$5,510. 
State Farm filed a motion for summary 
judgment on both plaintiffs' complaints and 
on its own counterclaim. The trial court 
granted the motion, awarding State Farm 
$5,510, interest, and attorney fees. The 
court also decreed that State Farm had no 
caube of action against Bryan. 
[1] In reviewing a grant of a motion for 
summary judgment, all doubts or uncer-
tainties concerning issues of fact are 
viewed in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment. 
Mountain States TeL & TeL Co. v. Atkin, 
Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 
1984). Where a triable issue of fact exists, 
the cause will be remanded for determina-
tion of that issue. 
Defendant State Farm asserts that it is 
subrogated to the rights of plaintiffs and 
that State Farm should thereby recover the 
amount it paid for property damage from 
the amount plaintiffs recovered from the 
third-party tort-feasor. Plaintiffs argue 
that State Farm's subrogation rights do 
not arise until plaintiffs have been made 
whole. 
[2,3] Subrogation is an equitable doc-
trine and is governed by equitable princi-
ples. This doctrine can be modified by 
contract, but in the absence of express 
terms to the contrary, the insured must be 
made whole before the insurer is entitled to 
be reimbursed from a recovery from the 
third-party tort-feasor. Lyon v. Hartford 
Accident & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 
318, 480 P.2d 739, 744 (1971). Noncontrac-
tual subrogation rights will only be en-
forced on behalf of a party maintaining a 
superior equitable position, and the insur-
er's equitable position cannot be superior to 
the insured's unless the insured has been 
completely compensated. Transamerica 
Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505 
P.2d 783 (1972); see also Culver v. Insur-
ance Co. of S. Am., 221 N.J. Super. 493, 
535 A.2d 15 (1987); Westendorfv. Stasson, 
330 N.W.2d 699 (Minn.1983). 
When the amount of damages incurred 
by the insured has been judicially ascer-
tained, the extent of the subrogation right 
of the insurer is usually undisputed. The 
insured is not entitled to double recovery, 
and the insurer is equitably entitled to re-
cover any amounts from the insured that 
the insured recovered from the tort-feasor. 
When the insured settles with the tort-
feasor before the amount of damages has 
been judicially determined, it is more diffi-
cult to ascertain whether the insurer is 
entitled to recover all or any of the amount 
paid on the policy to the insured. See 
generally Comment, Subrogation in 
Pennsylvania—Competing Interests of 
Insurers and Insureds in Settlements 
with Third-Party Tort Feasors, 56 Temp. 
L.Q. 667 (1983). 
In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. 
Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 
(1972), this Court examined an insurance 
company's claim for subrogation against its 
insured where the insured had settled with 
a third-party tort-feasor. The insurance 
company asserted that the settlement cov-
ered the insured's entire claim and that the 
insurance company was therefore entitled 
to receive reimbursement for the medical 
expenses it had paid the insured. In revis-
ing the summary judgment, this Court not-
ed that a lump-sum settlement without ap-
portionment as Co specific items of damage 
is not sufficient to indicate whether the 
insured had received double compensation 
for the same injury. Id. 29 Utah 2d at 106, 
505 P.2d at 786. In order to ascertain what 
the settlement in Barnes was intended to 
cover, this Court reversed and remanded 
the cause for a trial. Id. 29 Utah 2d at 107, 
505 P.2d at 787. 
Setting forth the purpose and intended 
allocation of money given in the settlement 
HILL v. STATE FARM 
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is a simple matter. As this Court noted in 
Barnes, to the extent a negotiated settle-
ment was intended to include damages pre-
viously paid to the insured by the insurer, 
the tort-feasor who is aware of the insur-
er's subrogation claim should offer pay-
ment in two drafts: one draft for the in-
sured alone and a separate draft issued to 
the insured and the insurer jointly. Id. 29 
Utah 2d at 106, 505 P.2d at 787. In so 
doing, the apportionment of the settlement 
amount is clearly shown and the intentions 
of the parties can most effectively be en-
forced. 
[4] In the case now before the Court, 
the insurer's right to subrogation was set 
forth in the insurance policy. Unfortunate-
ly, the record does not reveal the extent of 
the subrogation terms, nor does it provide 
a complete copy of the insurance policy. 
We are thus unable to ascertain the intent 
of the parties as to the extent of their 
respective rights under the subrogation 
clause. Therefore, the doctrine of subroga-
tion should be applied in this case accord-
ing to general principles of equity. 
As suggested in Barnes, Cumis prepared 
two separate drafts when tendering pay-
ment to Caldwell under the settlement. 
The first draft was to Caldwell alone and 
the second draft, in the amount of $5,510, 
was made to Caldwell and State Farm. 
State Farm now argues that the joint draft 
was intended by plaintiffs and Bryan to 
cover plaintiffs' property damage. This 
contention is incorrect. The language of 
the release does not provide for the alloca-
tion of the $5,510. The release states that 
the parties have yet to determine the right-
ful owner of that amount because "a con-
troversy exists" between State Farm and 
Caldwell "as to who was entitled to the 
said amount, and that the matter will be 
resolved between the two or by payment 
into court or by judicial determination." In 
other words, at the time the draft was 
conveyed to State Farm and Caldwell, the 
parties had not agreed whether that 
amount was intended for property damage 
or to satisfy the wrongful death claim. 
Cumis acted properly in acknowledging 
State Farm's subrogation claim and in be-
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ing certain that, to the extent State Farm 
was justified in taking reimbursement from 
Cumis's policy limits, it would be able to do 
so. Nonetheless, the plain language of the 
release shows that neither Cumis nor plain-
tiffs intended the amount to be allocated to 
property damage without further negotia-
tion. 
[5] Because the parties have been un-
able to resolve the subrogation question, 
we are required to determine who is enti-
tled to the settlement proceeds. State 
Farm argues that the amount recovered by 
plaintiffs from Cumis represents the entire 
amount of plaintiffs' damages. Plaintiffs, 
on the other hand, argue that the amount 
received from Cumis only compensates 
them for a portion of their damages and 
therefore they are not obligated to reim-
burse State Farm until they receive a full 
recovery. Since plaintiffs released Bryan 
from further liability in order to obtain the 
settlement with Cumis, they are not enti-
tled to receive future compensation from 
Bryan. Thus, State Farm can only be reim-
bursed from plaintiffs and has no claim on 
Bryan. See 73 Am. Jur.2d Subrogation 
§ 106 (subrogee's rights are subject to limi-
tations placed on the rights of subrogor). 
[6] In determining the allocation of an 
amount received by an insured from a 
third-party tort-feasor, we do not assume 
that the amount of the settlement is coex-
tensive with the amount of damages in-
curred. Damages encompass the injuries 
suffered by a plaintiff. The amount of a 
settlement almost universally reflects the 
greatest amount that a plaintiff could have 
possibly received from a tort-feasor with-
out litigation. As the court in Janzcn v. 
Land O'Lakes, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 67 (Minn. 
1979), stated: 
[M]any considerations enter into settle 
ments. Respondent may have wished to 
avoid possibly protracted and frustrating 
legal battles; respondent may have need-
ed the money immediately; or respon-
dent may have been pressured into the 
agreement for other reasons. Thus, the 
amount of the settlement and compensa-
tion may not adequately reflect the actu-
al loss 
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Id. at 70; see also Cooper v. Younkin, 339 
N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn.1983); Florida 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Martin, 377 
So.2d 827, 830-31 (Fla.1979). 
One of the considerations which may lead 
an insured to settle with a third-party tort-
feasor for an amount less than its damages 
is that the tort-feasor is insolvent and less 
than adequately insured. Here, Bryan was 
personally insolvent, and his insurance poli-
cy was for an amount apparently insuffi-
cient to cover the full extent of plaintiffs' 
claims.2 
Several courts have noted the importance 
of a tort-feasor's solvency or adequacy of 
insurance in influencing the insured's deci-
sion to settle and will not allow an insurer 
to exercise a subrogation claim where the 
settlement was reached due to the tort-fea-
sor's inability to fully compensate the in-
sured. See, e.g., Government Employees 
his. Co. v. Graff, 327 So.2d 88, 91 (FJa. 
1976); Cooper, 339 N.W.2d at 554. 
In light of these principles and prevailing 
Utah law, we hold that in the absence of 
specific contractual terms in either the re-
lease and settlement or the insurance poli-
cy, the insured must be made whole prior 
to any recovery by the insurer against the 
tort-feasor. Where the insured settles with 
the tort-feasor, the settlement amount goes 
to the insured unless the insurer can prove 
that the insured has already received full 
compensation. 
Our holding does not undermine the sug-
gestion in Barnes that a settlement agree-
ment can effectively allocate the damages 
it is intended to cover through the use of 
multiple drafts made out to appropriate 
parties. Instead, where the language of 
the release leaves the allocation uncertain 
and where there is no controlling contractu-
al language to the contrary, the insured 
should be given the benefit of the doubt as 
to its damages and the burden will rest 
with the insurer to prove that the insured 
has been fully compensated. This proce-
dure has been used by other courts and will 
result in the most effective implementation 
of the equitable principles underlying the 
2. This is evidenced by Cumis's willingness to 
tender the full policy amount prior to litigation 
doctrine of subrogation. See, e.g., Auto-
mobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Conlon, 153 
Conn. 415, 216 A.2d 828 (1966); Dimick ex 
reL Dimick v. Lewis, 127 N.H. 141, 497 
A.2d 1221 (1985). 
[7] In the instant ca^e, the amount of 
plaintiffs' damages is a question of fact 
which has yet to be determined. There is 
no specific contractual language in the in-
surance policy which requires allocation of 
the settlement amount, nor does the re-
lease specify who should receive the $5,510 
paid jointly to State Farm and Caldwell. 
Because the amount of plaintiffs' damages 
is disputed by the parties, that amount 
should be set through judicial determina-
tion so that the proceeds from Bryan's 
policy can be equitably distributed. Th^t 
judicial determination will be factually 
based, and therefore summary judgment 
was inappropriate in this case. 
State Farm also claims that if it is not 
entitled to the $5,510 payment from 
Bryan's insurer, then the releases signed 
by Hill and Caldwell cannot act to extin-
guish its subrogation claim against Bryan. 
Allowing plaintiffs to extinguish State 
Farm's claims would be tantamount to a 
breach of the subrogation provision in the 
insurance policy. If, however, the amount 
of damages incurred by plaintiffs exceeds 
the amount paid by Bryan, then State Farm 
must also demonstrate that it could have 
recovered the $5,510 from Bryan, absent 
the releases and without relying on the 
insurance policy proceeds. See, e.g., Royal 
Indem. Co. v. Pharr, 94 Ga. App. 114, 117, 
93 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1956). As we stated in 
Barnes: 
The plaintiff [insurer] to establish a su-
perior equity and thus to be entitled to 
prevail must present proof which estab-
lishes that the damages covered by de-
fendant's settlement were the same or 
cover those for which the defendant has 
already received indemnity from plain-
tiff; otherwise, the receipt of payment 
from the tort-feasor does not entitle the 
plaintiff to the return of the payments 
made by it 
or serious negotiation over the amount of plain-
tiffs' damages. 
CRUZ v. 
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Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 106-07, 505 P.2d 
783, 787 (citations omitted). 
[8] We affirm the trial court's summa-
ry judgment in State Farm's claim against 
Bryan. State Farm's subrogation claims 
cannot rise above the claims of the subro-
gees, plaintiffs Hill and Caldwell. Because 
Hill and Caldwell released Bryan from any 
further liability, State Farm is unable to 
pursue its claim against him. Instead, as 
explained above, State Farm's only re-
course is to show either that plaintiffs were 
fully compensated and thus State Farm is 
entitled to be reimbursed from Bryan's in-
surance policy proceeds or that plaintiffs' 
action in releasing Bryan breached the in-
surance policy, and if State Farm shows it 
could have recovered from Bryan, it will be 
entitled to the proceeds as a matter of 
equity. 
Summary judgment in favor of State 
Farm on plaintiffs' complaints and on State 
Farm's counterclaim is reversed. Judg-
ment in favor of Bryan is affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., 
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ. 
( o ! KEY NUMB!* SYSrEM> 
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sortium claim, and wife appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that the 
constitutional open courts provision did not 
prohibit abolishment of a common law loss-
of-consortium cause of action. 
Affirmed. 
1. Constitutional Law <s=>328 
Open courts provision of constitution 
is not to be read as preserving every com-
mon law cause of action that may have 
existed prior to adoption of constitution. 
Const, Art. 1, § 11. 
2. Husband and Wife <S=»209(3, 4) 
Even if loss-of-consortium cause of ac-
tion did exist at common law, such cause of 
action was abolished by adoption of Mar-
ried Women's Act of 1898. U.C.A.1953, 
30-2-1 et seq., 30-2-4. 
Lori CRUZ and Nicholas A. Cruz, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Jed WRIGHT, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 20465. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 2, 1988. 
Husband sued negligent driver to re-
cover damages for injuries sustained in an 
automobile accident, and wife sued driver 
to recover for loss of consortium. The 
District Court, Fourth District, Utah Coun-
ty, Cullen Y. Christensen, J., granted de-
fendant's motion to dismiss the loss-of-con-
Samuel King, Jeffrey O. Burkhardt, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
D. Gary Christian, Gregory J. Sanders, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellee. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Plaintiff Lori Cruz appeals from the trial 
court's dismissal of her claim for loss of 
consortium arising out of injuries suffered 
by her husband in an automobile accident 
caused by defendant Jed Wright Her pri-
mary argument on appeal is that article I, 
section 11 of the Utah Constitution—the 
open courts provision—prevented the legis-
lature from abolishing the husband's com-
mon law cause of action for loss of consor-
tium and that we should extend a parallel 
cause of action to the wife. We adhere to 
our prior decisions and hold that in passing 
the Married Women's Act of 1898, the leg-
islature eliminated the common law loss-of-
consortium cause of action. We further 
hold that the 1898 Act did not run afoul of 
article I, section 11. 
Following an automobile accident in 
which Nicholas Cruz was injured, Nicholas 
and his wife, Lori, filed an action against 
the driver of the other car, Jed Wright, 
alleging that Nicholas was injured as a 
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Robert Kent H i l l , individually and 
as personal representa t ive of the 
h e i r s of Tamara Elaine Hill# 
deceased, and Lorin Dean Caldwell, 
i nd iv idua l ly and as personal 
r ep re sen t a t i ve of the heirs of 
Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased, 
P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants, 
v . 
state Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff-Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, 
v* 
Kenneth Paul Bryan, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Cross-Appellee. 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Judith h. Billings 
Attorneys: Wallace R. Lauchnor, Salt Lake City, for Robert 
Kent Hill and Lorin Dean Caldwell 
Glenn C* Hanni, R. Scott Williams, Salt Lake city, 
for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
J, Anthony Eyre, Heinz J* Mahler, Salt Lak* City, 
for Kenneth Paul Bryan 
DITRKAM, Justice: 
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's grant of summary 
j., Igment in favor of defendant, arguing that numerous triable 
issues of fact exist and claiming bad faith. State Farm 
appeals from a judgment in favor of third-party defendant 
Bryan* We reverse the judgment against plaintiffs and affirm 
the judgment against State Farm. 
On June 6, 1982, an automobile owned and driven by 
Kenneth Paul Bryan, who was legally intoxicated, ran a red 
light and struck * vehicle owned by plaintiff Lorin Caldwell 
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Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
and driven by Caldwell'* son. Plaintiff Robert Hill's 
daughter was an occupant in Caldwell's vehicle. The force 
of the impact was fatal to both Caldwell's son and Hill's 
daughter. At the time of the accident, Caldwell's vehicle 
was insured by State Farm; Bryan's vehicle was insured by 
Cumis Insurance International. State Farm paid $5,510 to 
Caldwell for property damage to his vehicle• Shortly, 
thereafter, Cumis offered to tender the policy limits of 
$50,000 on Bryan's policy to plaintiffs in an attempt to 
satisfy plaintiffs' claims. State Farm thereupon notified 
Cumis of its subrogation claim for the amount it had paid 
Caldwell for property damage. 
Both plaintiffs contacted attorneys, who filed 
separate suits against Bryan and independently investigated 
the extent of his financial holdings. These investigations 
revealed v it, aside from the Cumis policy, Bryan was 
insolvent. After this discovery, Caldwell and Hill withdrew 
their suits against Bryan and made a claim with Cumis for 
the policy proceeds, which were to be divided evenly between 
them. Cumis refused to simply deliver one-half to each 
plaintiff because of State Farm's subrogation claim. 
Plaintiffs therefore sought a waiver of claim from State 
Farm, arguing that the value of their wrongful death actions 
far exceeded Bryan's policy limits. State Farm refused to 
waive its subrogation claim and apparently urged plaintiffs 
to litigate their suits against Bryan so that the amount of 
their damages could be judicially ascertained. Plaintiffs 
determined the cost of acquiring such a judicial determination 
to be prohibitive. 
Plaintiffs signed separate releases of claims in 
favor of Bryan, Cumis, and other possible defendants. In 
return, Cumis "tendered-$22,2-43 t$--Kill tr.d -$27,755 to 
Caldwell.1 
Because Cumis refused to proffer policy proceeds 
unless State Farm's subrogation interest was accounted for, 
its tender to Caldwell consisted of a check for $22,245 made 
to Caldwell alone and a check for $5,510 made jointly to 
Caldwell and State Farm. The latter draft corresponded to 
the amount of property damage incurred by Caldwell and 
accounted for State Farm's subrogation claim. The release 
signed by Caldwell recognized the dispute surrounding the 
$5,510 by stating: 
IT* To arrive at these figures, the parties subtracted the 
property damage amount from the total policy proceeds and 
divided the remainder equally between them. The disputed 
property damage award was then added to Caldwell's portion 
because he was the owner of the damaged automobile. 
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[A] controversy exists between State Para 
Mutual Insurance Company and Lorin D. 
Caldwell as to who is entitlad to the said 
amount, and that the matter will be 
resolved between the two or by payment 
into court or by judicial determination. 
plaintiffs and State Farm failed to reach an accord 
for more than one year after the release was signed. 
Plaintiffs filed suit against State Farm, seeking payment 
of $5,510 and alleging bad faith on behalf of State Farm for 
its refusal to waive the subrogation claim. In turn, State 
Farm filed a third-party claim against Bryan for subrogation 
and indemnity. State Farm also counterclaimed against 
plaintiffs for $5,510, 
State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment on 
both plaintiffs' complaints and on its own counterclaim. 
The trial court granted the motion, awarding State Farm 
$5,510, interest, and attorney fees. The court also decreed 
that State Farm had no cause of action against Bryan. 
In reviewing a grant of a motion for summary 
judgment, all doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of 
fact are viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment. Mountain States Tel, S Tel, Co, v, 
Atkin, Wright & Wiles, 681 P,2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984). Where 
a triable Issue of fact exists, the cause will be remanded for 
determination of that issue. 
Defendant State Farm asserts that it is subrogated 
to the rights of plaintiffs and that State Farm should thereby 
recover the amount it paid for property damage from the amount 
plaintiffs recovered from the third-party tort-feasor. 
Plaintiffs argue that State Farm's subrogation rights do not 
arise until plaintiffs have been made whole. 
Subrogation is an equitable doctrine and is governed 
by equitable principles. This doctrine can be modified by 
contract, but in the absence of express terms to the contrary, 
the insured must be made whole before the insurer is entitled 
to be reimbursed from a recovery from the third-party tort-
feasor. Lyon v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 
311, 318, 480 P,2d 739, 744 (1971)- Noncontractual sub-
rogation rights will only be enforced on behalf of a party 
maintaining a superior equitable position, and the insurer's 
equitable position cannot be superior to the insured's unless 
the insured has been completely compensated. Transamerica 
Ins. Co, v. Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972); see 
also culver v. Insurance Co, of H« Am*, 221 N,J. Super. 493, 
535 A,2d 15, (1987)? Westendorf v, Stasson, 330 N,W.2d 699 
(Minn. 1983), 
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When the amount of damages incurred by the insured 
has been judicially ascertained, the extent of the subrogation 
right of the insurer is usually undisputed• The insured is 
not entitled to double recovery, and the insurer is equitably 
entitled to recover any amounts from the insured that the 
insured recovered from the tort-feasor. 
When the insured settles with the tort-feasor before 
the amount of damages has been judicially determined, it is 
more difficult to ascertain whether ths insurer is entitled to 
recover all or any of the amount paid on the policy to the 
insured. See generally Comment; Subrogation in Pennsylvania—-
Competing Interests of Insurers and Insureds in Settlements 
with Third-Party Tort Feasors, 56 Temp, L*Q. 667 (1983) • 
In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 
101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972), this Court examined an insurance 
company's claim for subrogation against its insured where 
the insured had settled with a third-party tort-feasor• The 
insurance company asserted that the settlement covered 
the insured's entire claim and that the insurance company 
was therefore entitled to receive reimbursement for the 
medical expenses it had paid the insured* In revising the 
summary judgment, this Court noted that a lump-sum settlement 
without apportionment as to specific items of damage is not 
sufficient to indicate whether the insured had received double 
compensation for the same injury* Id. at 106, 505 P.2d at 
786* In order to ascertain what the settlement in Barnes was 
intended to cover, this Court reversed and remanded the cause 
for a trial* IdL_ at 107, 505 P.2d at 787, 
Setting forth the purpose and intended allocation of 
money given in the settlement is a simple matter. As this 
Court noted in Barnes, to the extent a negotiated settlement 
was intended to include damages previously paid to the insured 
by the Insurer, the tort-feasor who is aware of the insurer's 
subrogation claim should offer payment in two drafts: one 
draft for the insured alone and a separate draft issued to the 
insured and the insurer jointly. Id. at 106, 505 P,2d at 
787• In so doing, the apportionment of the settlement amount 
is clearly shown and the intentions of the parties can most 
effectively be enforced. 
In the case now before the Court, the insurer's right 
to subrogation was set forth in the insurance policy-
Unfortunately, the record does not reveal the extent of the 
subrogation terms, nor does it provide a complete copy of the 
insurance policy. We are thus unable to ascertain the intent 
of the parties as to the extent of their respective rights 
under the subrogation clause. Therefore, the doctrine of 
subrogation should be applied in this case according to 
general principles of equity. 
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As suggested in Barnes, Cumis prepared two separate 
drafts when tendering payment to Caldwell under the 
settlement. The first draft was to Caldwell alone and the 
second draft, in the amount of $5,510, was made to Caldwell 
and State Farm* State Farm now argues that the joint draft 
was intended by plaintiffs and Bryan to cover plaintiffs' 
property damage. This contention is incorrect* The language 
of the release does not provide for the al) -nation of the 
$5,510* The release states that the parti ave yet to 
determine the rightful owner of that amoun* cause *a 
controversy exists* between State Farm and aldwell *as to 
who was entitled to the said amount, and that the matter will 
be resolved between the two or by payment into court or by 
judicial determination** In other words, at the time the 
draft was conveyed to State Farm and Caldwell, the parties had 
not agreed whether that amount was intended for property 
damage or to satisfy the wrongful death claim* Cumis acted 
properly in ackowledging State Farm's subrogation claim and in 
being certain that, to the extent State Farm was justified in 
taking reimbursement from Cumis's policy limits, it would be 
able to do so. Nonetheless, the plain language of the release 
shows that neither Cumis nor plaintiffs intended the amount to 
be allocated to property damage without further negotiation. 
Because the parties have been unable to resolve the 
subrogation question, we are required to determine who is 
entitled to the settlement proceeds. State Farm argues that 
the amount recovered by plaintiffs from Cumis represents the 
entire amount of plaintiffs' damages. Plaintiffs, on the 
other hand, argue that the amount received from Cumis only 
compensates-.tiiem for a portion of their damages and therefore 
they are not obligated to reimburse State Farm Until they 
receive a full recovery. Since plaintiffs released Bryan 
from further liability in order to obtain the settlement with 
Cumis, they are not entitled to receive future compensation 
from Bryan. Thus, State Farm can only be reimbursed from 
plaintiffs and has no claim on Bryan. See 73 Am. Jur. 2d 
Subrogation § 106 (subrogee's rights are subject to 
limitations placed on the rights of subrogor) • 
In determining the allocation of an amount received 
by an insured from a third-party tort-feasor, we do not assume 
that the amount of the settlement is coextensive with the 
amount of damages incurred* Damages encompass the injuries 
suffered by a plaintiff* The amount of a settlement almost 
universally reflects the greatest amount that a plaintiff 
could have possibly received from a tort-feasor without 
litigation* As the court in Janzen v. Land 0'Lakes, Inc., 278 
N.W.2d<67 (Minn* 1979) , stated: 
[M]any considerations enter into settlements* 
Respondent may have wished to avoid possibly 
protracted and frustrating legal battles; 
5 Nos. 20335, 20391 
respondent may have needed the money 
immediately; or respondent may have been 
pressured into the agreement for other 
reasons. Thus, the amount of the settlement 
and compensation may not adequately reflect 
the actual loss . • . . 
Id, at 70; see also Cooper v. Younkin, 339 N.W.2d 552, 554 
TRInn. 1983); Fl"oHda Farm Bureau Ins, Co, v. Martin, 377 so. 
2d 827, 830-31 (Fla. 1979}• 
One of the considerations which may lead an insured to 
settle with a third-party tort-feasor for an amount less than 
its damages is that the tort-feasor is ^solvent and less than 
adequately insured. Here, Bryan was pe, tonally insolvent, and 
his insurance policy was for an amount apparently insufficient 
to cover the full extent of plaintiffs' claims.2 
Several courts have noted the importance of a tort-
feasor's solvency or adequacy of insurance in influencing the 
insured's decision to settle and will not allow an insurer to 
exercise a subrogation claim where the settlement was reached 
due to the tort-feasor's inability to fully compensate the 
insured. See, e.g., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Graff, 
327 So. 2d 88, 91 (Fla. 1976); Cooper, 339 N.W.2d at 554. 
In light of these principles and prevailing Utah law, 
we hold that in the absence of specific contractual terms in 
either the release and settlement or the insurance policy, the 
insured must be made whole prior to any recovery by the insurer 
against the tort-feasor. Where the insured settles with the 
tort-feasor, the settlement amount goes to the insured unless 
the insurer can prove that the insured has already received 
full compensation. 
Our holding does not undermine the suggestion in 
Barnes that a settlement agreement can effectively allocate 
the damages it is intended to cover through the use of multiple 
drafts made out to appropriate parties. Instead, where the 
language of the release leaves the allocation*uncertain and 
where there is no controlling contractual language to the 
contrary, the insured should be given the benefit of the doubt 
as to its damages and the burden will rest with the insurer 
to prove that the insured has been fully compensated. This 
procedure has been used by other courts and will result in the 
most effective implementation of the equitable principles 
underlying the doctrine of subrogation. See, e.g., Automobile 
2~. This is evidenced by Cumis's willingness to tender the 
full policy amount prior to litigation or serious negotiation 
over the amount of plaintiffs' damages* 
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Ins, Co. of Hartford v« Conlonf 216 A-2d 828 (Conn. 1966); 
DlmicK ex rel. Dlmick v* Levis, 49? A.2d 1221 (N*H, 1985), 
In the instant case, the amount of plaintiffs' 
damages is a question of fact which has yet to be determined. 
There is no specific contractual language in the insurance 
policy which requires allocation of the settlement amount/ nor 
does the release specify who should receive the $5,510 paid 
jointly to State Farm and Caldwell. Because the amount of 
plaintiffs' damages is disputed by the parties, that amount 
should be set through judicial determination so that the 
proceeds from Bryan's policy can be equitably distributed. 
That judiclli'ir^ et^ rmijitftl>ari-iril-l--l&c factually based; and 
therefore summary judgment was inappropriate in this case. 
State Farm also claims that if it is not entitled to 
the $5,510 payment from Bryan's insurer, then the releases 
signed by Hill and Caldwell cannot act to extinguish its 
subrogation claim against Bryan. Allowing plaintiffs to 
extinguish State Farm's claims would be tantamount to a 
breach of the subrogation provision in the insurance policy. 
If, however, the amount of damages incurred by plaintiffs 
exceeds the amount paid by Bryan, then State Farm must also 
demonstrate that it could have recovered the $5,510 from 
Bryan, absent the releases and without relying on the 
insurance policy proceeds* See, e.g., Royal Indenu Co* v. 
Pharr, 94 Ga. App, 114, 117, 93 S.E,2d 784, 786 (1956). As we 
stated in Barnes: 
The plaintiff [insurer] to establish a 
superior equity and thus to be entitled to 
prevail must present proof which establishes 
that the damages covered by defendant's 
settlement were the same or cover those for 
which the defendant has already received 
indemnity from plaintiff; otherwise, the 
receipt of payment from the tort-feasor does 
not entitle the plaintiff to the return of 
the payments made by it« 
Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 106-07, 505 P.2d 783, 787 (citations 
omitted) . 
We affirm the trial court's summary judgment in State 
Farm's claim against Bryan. State Farm's subrogation claims 
cannot rise above the claims of the subrogees, plaintiffs Hill 
and Caldwell. Because Hill and Caldwell released Bryan from 
any further liability, State Farm is unable to pursue its 
claim against him- Instead, as explained above, State Farm's 
only recourse is to show either that plaintiffs were fully 
mmnensated and thus State Farm is entitled to be reimbursed 
from Bryan's insurance policy proceeds or thai plaintiffs' 
action in releasing Bryan breached the insurance policy, and 
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i f S ta te Farm shows i t could have recovered from Bryan/ i t 
w i l l be e n t i t l e d to the proceeds as a matter of e q u i t y . 
Summary judgment in favor of S ta te Farm on 
p l a i n t i f f s ' complaints and on State Farm's counterclaim i s 
reversed- Judgment in favor of Bryan i s affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hal l , Chief J u s t i c e 
Richard C Howe, Assoc iate 
Chief Just ice 
I . Daniel Stewart, J u s t i c e 
Michael D. Zimmerman, J u s t i c e 
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ad observed the defendant at close range 
>r a period of some five minutes under 
xcellent lighting conditions. The defend-
nt matched closely the description given 
y Ricks immediately after the robl>ery. 
/ithin eight days after the robbery, Ricks 
lentified the defendant at the lineup. Oas-
erson's identification matched closely that 
f Ricks. The minute divergence of his 
escription would certainly not reach a level 
o as "to give rise to a very substantial 
ikelihood of irreparable misidentification", 
>immons supra, at 384, but would merely 
;o to the weight of the evidence. Manson, 
upra. 
This state has from the beginning aligned 
tself with the constitutional guidelines set 
>y Stovall and its progeny and it continues 
,o do so today. See State v. Perry, 27 Utah 
M 48, 492 P.2d 1349 (1972); State v. Malm-
wse, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982). 
[2] In light of our holding that the out-
:>f-court identification of defendant met in 
all respects the guidelines set by constitu-
tional requirements and by this Court, we 
next address the issue of whether the in-
court identification of defendant made by 
Casperson and Ricks should have been sup-
pressed. There was nothing improper 
about the out-of-court identification to re-
quire independent in-court identification of 
the defendant, although the trial record re-
veals that that was done. 
[3] Both victims compared the appear-
ance of the defendant on the day of the 
trial with that on the day of the robl>ery. 
Both commented upon his dancing gait. 
Both gave their mnemonic impressions of 
his demeanor during the holdup and posi-
tively identified him as the gunman. Thus, 
even were we to hold (which we do not) 
that the out-of-court identification should 
have been suppressed, the in-court identifi-
cation was sufficient for the jury to find 
that the victims' courtroom identification 
"rested on an independent recollection of 
[their] encounter with the assailant, unin-
fluenced by the pre-trial identifications 
. . . " See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 
463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980). 
[4,5] Whatever divergence existed be-
tween Casperson's and Ricks' in- and out-
of-court identification had to be weighed 
and determined by the jury and went to the 
credibility of the witnesses, not to the issue 
of admissibility. State v. Casias, Utah, 567 
P.2d 1097 (1977); State v. Wilson, Utah, 565 
P.2d 66 (1977). It is not our province to 
measure conflicting evidence, credibility of 
witnesses, nor the weight to be given the 
one or the other. That responsibility be-
longs strictly to the trier of fact. State v. 
Logan, Utah, 563 P.2d 811 (1977), and the 
cases cited therein. The evidence before 
the jury in this case was substantial so that 
it could have pro|>erly arrived at a verdict 
of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[6J Appellant's argument that there was 
insufficient evidence to link the drugs 
found on his j>erson to the robbery at the 
Prescription Center North pharmacy must 
be rejected for the same reason as his argu-
ment that there was likelihood of misidenti-
fication. The jury heard Casperson testify 
that his pharmacy was missing a bottle of 
Seconal pills after the robbery. The only 
other pharmacy from which this bottle 
could have been taken (Prescription Center 
pharmacy in a medical center on 25th 
Street in Ogden) was not missing any Sec-
onal pills. The bottle found on defendant 
was part of the inventory of missing drugs 
made by Cas|>erson and Ricks after the 
robbery. Defendant's argument that it 
could have been stolen in any one of previ-
ous robberies went to the credibility, not to 
the admissibility of the evidence. Again, 
"[i]t is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses, and it is not 
within the prerogative of this Court to sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the fact-
finder." State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 
229, 231 (1980). 
[7,8] Appellant next contends that evi-
dence of alibi was improperly suppressed in 
the trial court and that the prosecution and 
his own attorney entered into a stipulation 
that certain hearsay evidence given by a 
witness (now deceased) could not l>e used at 
trial. This issue was not raised for determi-
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nation by the trial court and does not ap-
pear in the record. When a defendant 
predicates error to this Court, he has the 
duty and responsibility of supporting such 
allegation by an adequate record. Absent 
that record, defendant's assignment of er-
ror stands as a unilateral allegation which 
the review court has no power to determine. 
This Court simply cannot rule on a question 
which depends for its existence upon al-
leged facts unsupported by the record. See 
State v. Jones (1982), 657 P.2d 1263, and 
cases cited therein. See also Mcliridv v. 
State, Alaska, 368 P.2d 925, 929 (1962), 
cert, denied, 374 U.S. 811, 83 S.Ct. 1702, 10 
L.Ed.2d 1035(1963). 
The verdict below is affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM i S!EM> 
LEIGH FURNITURE AND CARPET 
COMPANY, Plaintiff, Appellant, and 
Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
T. Richard ISOM dba Richard's Fine 
Furnishings, Defendant, Respondent, 
and Cross-Appellant. 
No. 17264. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 10, 1982. 
Seller of furniture business sued buyer 
to repossess business, terminate buyer's in-
terest and obtain deficiency judgment, in 
which buyer counterclaimed for intentional 
interference with contractual relations. 
The Fifth District Court, Washington Coun-
ty, Robert F. Owens, Circuit Judge sitting by 
designation, entered judgment on jury ver-
dict for buyer but reduced punitive damages 
award, and appeal and cross appeal were tak-
en. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that: 
(1) Utah recognizes tort of intentional inter-
ference with prospective economic relations; 
(2) although individual interferences by sell-
er with buyer's business might have been 
justified as an overly zealous attempt to 
protect seller's contract interest, the ac-
tions, cumulatively, crossed the threshold of 
tortious conduct; (3) where intentional in-
terference was a step toward achieving goal 
of reselling the building free of buyer's 
interest the verdict could not be upheld on 
theory of improper purpose; (4) breach of 
contract for immediate puq>ose of injuring 
the other contracting party satisfies the 
improper means alternative of the tort; (5) 
evidence warranted conclusion that seller 
breached its express and implied contractu-
al duties for purpose of ruining buyer's 
business and obtaining possession, satisfy-
ing the "improjKir means" alternative; and 
(6) it was error to reduce punitive damage 
award to 20 percent of compensatory dam-
ages. 
Modified as regards punitive damages 
and affirmed. 
Howe, J., filed concurring opinion. 
1. Torts o=>12 
One party to a contract cannot be liable 
for the tort of interference with contract 
for inducing a breach by himself or the 
other contracting party. 
2. Torts <e=>12 
Right of action for interference with a 
specific contract is but one instance, rather 
than the total class, of protections against 
wrongful interference with advantageous 
economic relations, 
3. Appeal and Error c=> 1170.1 
Appellant has the burden of demon-
strating that any error has affected his 
substantial rights. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 61. 
4. Appeal and Error c=>930(1) 
Every reasonable presumption is exer-
cised in favor of validity of a general ver-
dict. 
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5. Trial to330(5) 
Where more than one cause of action 
has been submitted to a jury and where one 
of those causes of action was error free, 
supported by substantial evidence, and an 
appropriate basis for general verdict, the 
judgment on that verdict will be affirmed, 
even though the evidence was insufficient 
to sustain the verdict on one of the other 
causes of action submitted. 
6. Torts to 10(1) 
Tort of intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations reaches be-
yond protection of an interest in an existing 
contract and protects a party's interest and 
prospective relationships of economic ad-
vantage not yet reduced to a formal con-
tract and perhaps not expected to be. 
7. Torts tolO(l) 
Utah recognizes the tort of intentional 
interference with prospective economic re-
lations. 
8. Torts to26(2) 
In an action for tort of intentional in-
terference with prospective economic rela-
tions plaintiff must allege and prove more 
than the prima facie tort but is not required 
to negate all defenses of privilege, and priv-
ilege is an affirmative defense. 
9. Torts to26(2) 
To recover damages for tort of inten-
tional interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage plaintiff must prove that 
defendant intentionally interfered with 
plaintiff's existing or potential economic re-
lations, for an impro|>er purpose or by im-
proper means, causing an injury to the 
plaintiff, and privilege is an affirmative 
defense which is not an issue unless the acts 
charged would be tortious on the part of an 
unprivileged defendant. 
10. Torts <s=>28 
Instructions were sufficient to permit 
recovery on theory of tort of interference 
with prospective economic relations where 
although they did not expressly require 
proof of improper purpose or improper 
means they required proof that challenged 
action was "without justification" and defi-
nition of that term as requiring wrongful or 
malicious conduct was functional equivalent 
of improper means or improper purpose and 
instructions covered the privilege defense. 
11. Torts <s=>27 
There was sufficient evidence to sus-
tain jury verdict against seller of furniture 
business for intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations that caused 
injury to buyer in that seller intentionally 
interfered with and caused termination of 
actual or jwtenlial relationships between 
buyer and customers, suppliers and poten-
tial business associates by, among other 
things, causing customers to leave the store. 
12. Torts <£=> 10(3) 
Driving away an individual's existing 
or potential customers is the archetypical 
injury designed to be remedied by cause of 
action for intentional interference with pro-
spective economic relations. 
13. Contracts to 168 
Duty of good-faith performance in-
heres in every contractual relation. 
14. Torts <&=> 10(3) 
Although in isolation, furniture busi-
ness seller's interferences with buyer's busi-
ness might be justified as an overly zealous 
attempt to protect seller's interest under 
contract of sale, in total and in cumulative 
effect, as a course of action extending over 
three and one-half years and culminating in 
failure of buyer's business, the seller's acts 
crossed the threshold beyond what was inci-
dental and justifiable to what was tortious 
and actionable as intentional interference 
with prospective economic relations. 
15. Torts to27 
It could not l>e said that loss sustained 
by buyer of furniture business was due to 
unilateral decision to close after being 
served with seller's complaint rather than 
to seller's actions charged as intentional 
interference with prospective economic re-
lations as jury could have found that law-
suit was but another instance of seller's 
ongoing pattern of harassment and parties 
had reached an impasse in that seller had 
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refused to accept buyer's tender of payment 
in full and had refused to permit him to 
exercise option to purchase the building. 
16. Torts to26(2) 
Alternative of improper purpose, or 
motive, intent or objective, will supjvort a 
cause of action for intentional interference 
with prospective economic relations even 
where defendant's means were proper and 
that purpose will be satisfied where it can 
he shown that the actor's predominant pur-
pose was to injure plaintiff. 
17. Torts to 10(3) 
Where rielilierate interference by seller 
of furniture business with buyer's prospec-
tive economic relations with customers, sup-
pliers and |x>tential business associates was 
not an end in itself but an intermediate step 
to achieve long-range financial goal of prof-
itably reselling building free of buyer's 
lease interest, the seller could not be held 
liable for tort of intentional interference 
with prospective economic relations on basis 
of the alternative of improper purpose, i.e., 
to injure or ruin buyer's business merely for 
sake of injury. 
18. Torts to 10(3) 
The alternative requirement of improp-
er means to support an action for tort of 
intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations is satisfied where the 
means used to interfere with economic rela-
tions are contrary to law, such as violations 
of statutes, regulations or recognized com-
mon-law rules and such acts are illegal or 
tortious in themselves and are clearly im-
proper means of interference unless they 
consist of constitutionally protected activity 
like the exercise of First Amendment 
rights. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1. 
19. Torts to 10(3) 
Commonly included among the "im-
proper means" alternative of the tort of 
intentional interference with prospective 
economic advantage are violence, threats or 
other intimidation, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion, bribery, unfounded litigation, defama-
tion or discouraging falsehood, and means 
may also l>e improper or wrongful because 
they violate an established standard of a 
trade or profession. 
20. Malicious Prosecution <s=*39 
Process @=>168 
Torts to 10(3) 
Not only may institution of groundless 
lawsuits give rise to cause of action for tort 
of intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations but may also give rise to 
indejKjndent cause of action in tort for 
abuse of process and malicious prosecution. 
21. Torts to 10(3) 
A deliberate breach of contract, even 
where employed to secure economic advan-
tage, is not by itself an "improper means" 
which will sup|x>rt cause of action for tort 
of intentional interference with prosj>ective 
economic relations. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
22. Torts to 10(3) 
A party whose immediate purpose is to 
inflict injury does not satisfy the "improper 
purpose" element of the tort of intentional 
interference with prospective economic re-
lations so long as the long-range or predom-
inant purpose is to further a legitimate 
economic end. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
23. Torts to 10(3) 
Neither a deliberate breach of contract 
nor immediate pur|x>se to inflict injury 
which does not predominate over legitimate 
economic end will, by itself, satisfy the "im-
proper means" element of the tort of inten-
tional interference with prospective eco-
nomic relations but they may do so in com-
bination. 
24. Torts to 10(3) 
Breach of contract committed for im-
mediate purpose of injuring the other con-
tracting party is an "improper means" that 
will satisfy the improper means element of 
the tort of intentional interference with 
economic relations. 
25. Torts to 10(3) 
Seller of furniture business could be 
held liable for tort of intentional interfer-
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ence with prospective economic relations 
based on interference by improper means 
where it breached its express and implied 
contractual duties for the purpose of ruin-
ing the buyer's business. 
26. Damages <s=»94 
It was error to mechanically apply a 
ratio and reduce punitive damages award to 
20 percent of compensatory damages 
award. 
27. Damages <s=>94 
Amount of compensatory damages is 
only one of a significant number of factors 
in awarding punitive damages. 
28. Damages «=>94 
The jury or other fact finder has broad 
discretion in weighing the various factors in 
arriving at an appropriate award of puni-
tive damages. 
29. Damages <*=>94 
Where jury found $65,000 compensato-
ry damages for tortious interference with 
prospective economic relations and $35,000 
punitive damages, it was error to order the 
punitive damages reduced to 20 |>ercent of 
the compensatory damages, absent indica-
tion that punitive damages award was fla-
grantly excessive and unjust, especially in 
view of abundant evidence of interference 
by improper means. 
30. Damages «s=>91(l) 
Economic motives will not insulate a 
defendant from liability for punitive dam-
ages where he acts maliciously. 
Gary R. Howe, W. Clark Burt, Salt Lake 
City, for Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Clark R. Nielsen, Salt 
Lake City, for Isom. 
OAKS, Justice: 
In 1970, I,eigh Furniture and Carpet Co., 
a corporation, sold a furniture business in 
St. George to T. Richard Isom on a contract 
specifying a $20,000 down payment for im-
mediate possession, with the balance of 
$60,000 at $500 per month plus interest for 
ten years. 
In 1975, when the contract balance was 
$27,000, Leigh Furniture (hereafter "the 
Leigh Corjxjration") brought this action 
against Isom to repossess the business, ter-
minate his interest under the contract, and 
obtain a deficiency judgment for any sums 
due after liquidation. Isom denied that he 
was in default under the agreement, al-
leged his tender and the Leigh Corjwra-
tion's refusal to accept the sum due under 
the contract, and counterclaimed for $100,-
000 damages caused when the Corporation 
intentionally and maliciously forced him out 
of business and into bankruptcy. Isom also 
sought punitive damages. 
The jury found for Isom in all respects, 
including compensatory damages of $65,000 
and punitive damages of $35,000 on his 
counterclaim. The district court denied the 
Leigh Corporation's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, which chal-
lenged the legal and evidentiary basis for 
the verdict on the counterclaim. However, 
the court reduced the punitive damages to 
$13,000, and, upon Isom's accepting that 
remittitur, also denied the Corporation's 
motion for a new trial on the amount of 
punitive damages. Judgment was thereup-
on entered on the verdict against the Leigh 
Corporation (reduced as to punitive dam-
ages). The Corporation took this appeal, 
and Isom cross-appealed, challenging the 
reduction of punitive damages. 
The issues on this appeal are exclusively 
concerned with Isom's recovery on the 
counterclaim. They are: (1) whether Utah 
has a cause of action for intentional inter-
ference with prospective economic relations; 
and, if so, (2) whether that tort was proved 
on the facts of this case; and (3) whether 
the punitive damages should have been re-
duced. 
I. THE FACTS 
With all conflicts resolved in favor of the 
prevailing party and all evidence viewed 
and inferences drawn in the light most su[>-
portive of the verdict of the jury, Cintron v. 
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Milkovich, Utah, 611 P.2d 730, 732 (1980); 
Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sathcr, 
Utah, 605 P.2d 1240, 1245 (1980); Lamkin v. 
Lynch, Utah, 600 P.2d 530, 531 (1979), the 
facts were as follows. 
Leigh Furniture, a closely held family 
corporation, operated a main store in Cedar 
City and branch stores in Kanab and St. 
George. The principal owner and chief ex-
ecutive officer was W.S. "Dub" I^eigh 
(hereafter "Leigh"). In 1969, Leigh decided 
to sell the St. George store. He contacted 
T. Richard Isom ("Isom"), a Utah native 
then living in Washington State but desir-
ous of returning to Utah, as a possible 
buyer. Discussions ensued, and Isom 
moved to St. George and l>egan working as 
an employee in the Leigh store. On May 
14, 1970, Isom signed the contract to buy 
the St. George store from the l^eigh CorjK>-
ration. Isom agreed to maintain the inven-
tory, together with cash and accounts re-
ceivable, at a level of at least $60,(KM), and 
to provide the Leigh Corporation with an 
inventory each quarter and a financial 
statement each month. 
In the same document, the Ixugh Corpo-
ration leased Isom the parking lot and the 
first floor of the building containing the 
store, but expressly retained the second 
floor of the building, which consisted of 17 
apartments the Corj>oration had leased to 
others. As monthly rental, Isom agreed to 
pay 3% of his gross sales for the previous 
month, with a minimum of $500 |>er month 
the first year and $600 per month thereaft-
er. The lease term was ten years, with an 
option to renew for an additional ten years. 
The contract also granted Isom an option 
to purchase the entire building, including 
the upstairs apartments, exercisable once he 
had paid the $60,000 balance on his con-
tract. The option price was to be deter-
mined at the time of exercise by a commit-
tee of three appraisers, one to be appointed 
by each party and a third to be chosen by 
the other two. 
1. The court instructed the jury "that it has 
been established that W.S. Leigh was at all 
times acting as the agent for plaintiff, Leigh 
Furniture and Carpet Company, and within the 
scope of his authority at the time of the events 
Finally, the contract provided that if 
Isom defaulted in payment or performance 
of any term and the default remained un-
cured for 60 days, the Iveigh Cor|>oration 
could cancel the agreement, repossess the 
merchandise and real proi>erty, and retain 
all payments and rents as liquidated dam-
ages. 
For one year, relations between the con-
tracting parties were peaceful, but in June 
and July of 1971, Leigh began to complain 
about the contract and to state that he 
wanted to sell the entire building but pro-
spective buyers would not purchase it sub-
ject to Isom's long-term lease and option to 
buy.1 In a letter to Isom, Leigh complained 
that Isom was in default on his payments 
and was allowing his inventory to drop be-
low $60,000. (Isom was behind in his pay-
ments at that time but was within the 
60-day grace |>eriod in the contract and 
therefore was not in default.) At that 
same time, Ixiigh visited Isom in the store, 
verbally attacking him while he was with a 
customer and causing the customer to leave 
the store. 
Beginning in July, 1971, Leigh, his wife, 
and the Corj>oration's bookkeeper, acting as 
the Leigh Corporation's agents, began a 
continuous pattern of visiting Isom at least 
once a week while he was working in his 
store, questioning him concerning his opera-
tion of the business, and making demands 
and accusations. In addition to the visits, 
Iveigh wrote defendant letters criticizing 
various aspects of the business. In one 
week in the summer of 1971, Isom received 
four letters from Leigh, his wife, and his 
bookkeeper complaining alnjut the furnace, 
the heat, ami the delay in receiving the 
monthly financial statements. All of this 
conduct on Leigh's part had the cumulative 
effect of demoralizing and upsetting Isom 
and his employees, reducing their productiv-
ity, and impairing their ability to deal with 
the public and to conduct their business. 
out of which this action arose." That ruling, to 
which there was no objection, makes the Leigh 
Corporation fully responsible for all of Leigh's 
actions in this matter. 
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At the same time, despite the existing con-
tract with Isom, Ijeigh attempted to sell the 
building to two of Isom's employees. 
In December, 1971, the Leigh Corpora-
tion's attorney again informed Isom that 
Leigh was dissatisfied with the contract 
and Isom's performance under it, and de-
manded an audit of the store's inventory 
and books. Although no provision of the 
contract entitled the Leigh Corporation to 
audit Isom's business and Leigh's demand 
came during Isom's busy Christmas season, 
Isom agreed on condition that the audit be 
taken after the new year and that it be 
confidential. The audit was performed by 
a certified public accountant employed by 
the Corporation in its Cedar City store. 
Following the audit, the accountant called 
Isom's father, an attorney who represented 
Isom, to inform him that a change in Isom's 
business was needed and to recommend that 
Isom bring in a business associate who had 
expertise in furniture retailing and who 
could contribute some additional working 
capital to the business. 
The Corporation's weekly visits continued 
through the summer of 1972. In the spring 
of 1972, the Leigh Corporation's bookkeep-
er, on one of his visits to Isom's store, 
insisted that Isom date all his accounts re-
ceivable. Isom refused. Later that same 
summer, while visiting the store, Leigh ac-
cused Isom of subletting the parking lot in 
violation of the lease agreement and threat-
ened to terminate Isom's business and re-
possess the store. Isom had permitted a 
friend to fence a portion of the vacant lot 
on the property he leased from the Corpora-
tion to temporarily store some merchandise 
for a plumbing business. In response to 
Leigh's threats, Isom had his friend remove 
his merchandise and the fence. 
In June or July, 1972, Leigh again met 
with Isom's attorney (his father) to com-
plain about Isom's performance under the 
contract. Leigh said he felt Isom main-
tained an inadequate inventory to act as 
security, and to alleviate his feelings of 
financial insecurity he wanted to sell the 
building to someone else. He also suggest-
ed that Isom bring in an associate with 
additional capital and more experience in 
furniture retailing. Specifically, Leigh sug-
gested Brent Talbot, who had available cap-
ital and twenty years' experience in furni-
ture retailing. Leigh indicated that if Tal-
bot came in as a business partner "every-
thing would be all right." 
In response to this discussion, Isom's at-
torney began to pursue partnership discus-
sions with a Mr. Hayes Hunter, who owned 
and operated a furniture store in Cedar 
City. On one of two trips that he and 
Hunter made to inspect Isom's business, 
they were observed together in Isom's store 
by the Leigh Corporation's bookkeeper. A 
few days later, Isom's attorney received a 
phone call from Leigh, who angrily told him 
that if he had any ideas about bringing 
Hayes Hunter into the business, he "could 
forget it" because Leigh wouldn't have 
Hunter in the store. Thereafter, at Hunt-
er's request, neither Isom nor his attorney 
pursued any further negotiations with 
Hunter regarding a possible partnership. 
Approximately a month later, in August, 
1972, Leigh again told Isom's attorney that 
Isom needed to have Talbot as a partner 
and encouraged him to pursue negotiations 
toward that end. Leigh again complained 
about the long-term lease he had given 
Isom and stated that he "should kick [Isom] 
out" and sell the building. 
Shortly after this discussion, Leigh's at-
torney sent Isom's attorney a complaint 
Leigh intended to file in court to terminate 
the sale agreement and dispossess Isom. 
Oral and written negotiations ensued, dur-
ing which Isom attempted to arrive at some 
settlement of Leigh's complaints and re-
solve all the disputes embodied in the 
threatened lawsuit. 
On September 28, 1972, the parties signed 
a supplemental agreement, drafted by 
Leigh's attorney, which incorporated and 
supplemented the original contract. 
Among other things, it required Isom (1) to 
advance $20,000 toward the unpaid balance 
of the purchase price (a condition demanded 
by Leigh), half u}M>n execution of the sup-
plemental agreement and half on or before 
January 15, 1973; and (2) to obtain Leigh's 
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prior written approval of any person to 
whom Isom intended to convey any owner-
ship interest in the business whether as 
partner, investor, or corporation sharehold-
er.2 Isom paid the $20,000 in accordance 
with the supplemental agreement, which 
reduced the unpaid balance on the purchase 
price to $27,000 in January, 1973, and pre-
paid the monthly installments under the 
contract through December, 1975. 
The supplemental agreement was intend-
ed to resolve all the disputes l>etween Leigh 
and Isom. However, even after its execu-
tion, Leigh continued to pursue previously 
initiated lawsuits against Isom, causing 
Isom to incur the expense and effort of 
defending two groundless actions. In the 
first, Ijeigh sued Isom and a former employ-
ee, Francis Leany, for $4,000—the value of 
furniture Leany had purchased from the 
Leigh Corporation while employed in its St. 
George store. After trial in December, 
1972, the court found that the Corporation 
and Leany had offset their accounts long 
before Isom acquired the business and ruled 
that the Corporation had no right to the 
disputed $4,000. The suit was dismissed on 
January 26, 1973. 
In the second action, a plumbing company 
sued the Leigh Corporation and Isom to 
recover $2,000 worth of repair work it had 
performed on the furnace in the leased 
building. In accordance with the contract, 
Isom had paid the first $500 toward the cost 
of repair. Although the contract made the 
Corporation, as lessor, responsible for all 
costs in excess of $500, it refused to pay the 
balance of the repair bill, asserting instead 
that Isom was liable. After another trial, 
the court sustained Isom's position and re-
quired the Ijeigh Corporation to pay the 
balance of the repair bill. 
After the $20,000 prepayment and the 
execution of the supplemental agreement, 
Leigh continued to visit defendant to check 
on his operation of the business, but his 
visits, either in person or through his wife 
2. Contemporaneous with the execution of the 
supplemental agreement, Leigh gave his writ-
ten approval of two individuals whom Isom 
requested as prospective partners in the busi-
and employees, became less frequent and 
less demanding. Other than Isom's re-
quired defense of the two groundless suits, 
the period between October, 1972, and 
April, 1974, was relatively calm. Isom was 
able to devote himself to operating his busi-
ness, and the $27,000 net loss for the calen-
dar year 1970 was turned into a $17,000 net 
profit for the calendar year 1973. Isom's 
store continued to make a profit into the 
first part of 1974, accruing a net profit of 
$5,000 through August, 1974. 
In April, 1974, following the conclusion of 
the lawsuit by the plumbing company, 
Ijeigh renewed his questions and pressures 
on Isom. Leigh continually complained to 
Isom about the store's inventory, the air 
conditioner, the length of time it took 
Isom's accountant to prepare the monthly 
financial statements, and the format of the 
financial statements. Ijeigh refused to pay 
for a store window broken by customers of 
the adjacent bicycle shop, even though the 
contract gave the Corporation "the obliga-
tion of all exterior maintenance and repairs 
to the building." The heating bills began to 
accumulate because the Leigh Corjwration 
refused to pay its share in violation of the 
contract provision that required it "to pay 
60% of the cost of space heating, payable 
each month heat is furnished the apart-
ments." To resolve the matter, Isom was 
required to make trips to Cedar City. 
Leigh and other representatives of the 
Corporation continued to visit Isom while 
he was at work in the store, demanding 
that he produce various documents and rec-
ords and reiterating demands that he date 
his accounts receivable. Leigh renewed his 
threats to cancel the contract. Isom was 
required to spend a substantial amount of 
his time attending to these visits and re-
sponding to the demands. During this 
same time, sales l>egan to decline, and the 
store became unproductive. 
In the summer of 1974, Isom's attorney 
followed Leigh's prior suggestions by ap-
ness. For reasons unrelated to this lawsuit, 
neither of these men ever acquired any interest 
in the business with Isom. 
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proaching Brent Talbot about joining 
Isom's business. He wrote Leigh and his 
attorney requesting Leigh's approval, but 
Leigh did not respond. Isom's attorney 
again wrote to Leigh, outlining the advan-
tages of bringing Talbot into the business. 
Isom and Talbot eventually reached a ten-
tative partnership agreement, but Leigh re-
fused to approve Tall>ot unless Isom agreed 
to terminate his contract and his ten-year 
lease, "drop out" of the store completely, 
and turn it back to l*eigh. These terms 
being unacceptable to Isom, the negotia-
tions with Talbot were discontinued. 
Thereafter, Isom's attorney submitted re-
peated requests to associate a Mr. Apple-
gate in the business, but never received any 
response from Leigh. 
Leigh's continuing threats to evict Isom 
had a demoralizing effect on Isom and his 
employees. Isom devoted a considerable 
amount of time to responding to in-store 
visits by Leigh, his wife, and his bookkeep-
er. These visits interrupted sales activities, 
and provoked complaints from his custom-
ers. The business declined, dissipating the 
$5,000 profit of August, 1974. By Decem-
ber, 1974, the business showed a net loss of 
$6,500. Isom concluded that he would have 
to pay off the $27,000 remaining on the 
purchase price to keep Leigh from active 
interference in the affairs of the store. To 
raise the necessary funds, he was required 
to take additional time away from his busi-
ness. 
On December 29, 1974, Isom's attorney 
met with Leigh in San Francisco, where he 
informed Leigh of Isom's plans to pay the 
balance of the purchase price. Leigh re-
plied that Isom could do whatever he want-
ed. Isom's attorney again requested 
Leigh's approval of Talbot as a business 
partner after full payment of the purchase 
price and under the long-term lease and 
purchase option of the contract. Leigh 
again refused to approve Talbot as a part-
ner. He reiterated his regret at having 
granted a long-term lease and stated that 
he had to get the proj>erty back. He sug-
gested that Isom liquidate all the store's 
stock and turn the store back to him. 
Leigh also refused to appoint an appraiser 
as required by the original contract, so that 
Isom could exercise his option to purchase 
the property. 
Isom's attorney again met with Leigh 
and Leigh's attorney on February 14, 1975, 
and told them the $27,000 balance on the 
purchase price would soon be paid and that 
Isom planned to exercise his option to buy 
the property. Leigh stated he would not 
sell the property to Isom for its $130,000 
value (as determined by Isom's appraiser, 
subject to Isom's leasehold) because he had 
an offer to sell the property for $200,000 
free of Isom's lease and option. Although 
at the conclusion of the meeting Leigh 
agreed to appoint an appraiser to permit 
Isom to exercise the purchase option in 
accordance with the original contract of 
sale, he later refused to do so and, in fact, 
never did. 
On February 24, 1975, without notifying 
Isom of any default, Leigh filed the com-
plaint in this case, seeking to repossess the 
premises and terminate Isom's interest un-
der the contract. Three days later, un-
aware that the complaint had l>een filed, 
Isom tendered to Leigh the $27,000 balance 
due. He requested that Leigh give a re-
ceipt for the payment, appoint an appraiser 
to facilitate his exercise of the purchase 
option, and approve Brent Talbot as his 
business associate under the existing lease 
if the purchase of the building were not 
accomplished. 
Isom learned of the lawsuit before he was 
served with process. Though demoralized, 
he nevertheless continued to negotiate with 
Leigh and to operate the business through 
February, 1975. I,eigh never responded to 
Isom's tender of the remaining $27,000, al-
though he again told Isom's attorney that 
he would never approve Talbot's association 
with Isom under the long-term lease, even 
for the few months required to finance a 
purchase of the building, nor would he |>er-
mit a sale of the property for its appraised 
value of $130,000. When confronted by 
Isom's attorney and accused of being recal-
citrant so that Isom's business would fail 
and Ixjigh could reacquire the business and 
property, Leigh made no denial. 
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In March, 1975, while talking to a cus- formance of a contract . 
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tomer in his store, Isom was served with 
Leigh's complaint. This service of process 
despite his continuing efforts to negotiate, 
surprised and upset Isom so much that he 
dismissed the customer he had been helping. 
Upon reading the complaint, he noted that 
it apj>eared to l>e the same complaint Leigh 
had threatened to file in 1972 and that it 
reopened the disputes which the supplemen-
tal agreement and the prepayment of $20,-
000 had been intended to resolve. Because 
of the complaint's prayer for an order re-
straining Isom from doing further business 
until an audit could be conducted to deter-
mine if he was maintaining adequate secur-
ity for the $27,000 balance, Isom concluded 
he could do no further business. He there-
fore closed the store immediately after be-
ing served. Within the next week, Isom's 
suppliers contacted him to request return of 
their furniture. Isom replied that at that 
time he was unable to determine whether 
he would remain in business, but that he 
could not release any of his inventory until 
the dispute with Leigh was finally resolved. 
Isom declared bankruptcy shortly thereaft-
er. 
At trial, there was expert testimony that 
the value of Isom's leasehold was $45,000, 
and the net value of Isom's furniture retail-
ing business as of March, 1975, was $59,300. 
Isom testified that he paid the Leigh Corpo-
ration a total of $53,000 plus interest on the 
total $80,000 purchase price, none of which 
he recouped. He further testified that be-
cause of his bankruptcy he was never able 
to exercise his option to purchase the build-
ing. The record further indicates that 
through bankruptcy proceedings, the Leigh 
Corporation, as secured party, finally 
achieved its goal of reacquiring the busi-
ness, including inventory, accounts receiva-
ble, and the leased premises. 
II. INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT 
|1] Iveigh Furniture first contends that 
Isom's recovery cannot be sustained as an 
interference with contract because the evi-
dence showed no conduct which "intention-
ally and improj>erly interferes with the per-
between anoth-
er and a third person by inducing or other-
wise causing the third person not to j>er-
form the contract." Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 706 (1979). See also Bunnell v. 
Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P.2d 597, 602 
(1962); W. Prosser, Ilandlnok of the Law 
of Torts § 129 at 929 30 (4th ed. 1971); 
AnnoL, 26 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1952). In this 
case, the only contract in evidence was the 
contract between Isom and the lieigh Cor-
poration. It is settled that one party to a 
contract cannot lie liable for the tort of 
interference with contract for inducing a 
breach by himself or the other contracting 
party. Dryden v. Tri-Valley Growers, 65 
Cal.App.3d 990, 998, 135 Cal.Rptr. 720, 725-
26(1977); Cuker Industries, Inc. v. William 
L. Crow Construction Co., 6 A.D.2d 415, 178 
N.Y.S.2d 777 (1958); Houser v. City of /&?(/-
mond, 91 Wash.2d 36, 39, 586 P.2d 482, 484 
(1977); Kvenild v. Taylor, Wyo., 594 P.2d 
972, 977 (1979). Isom having failed,to 
prove a cause of action for intentional j in-
terference with contract, we cannot sustain 
the verdict on that theory. 
[2] However, the right of action for in-
terference with a s|»ecific contract is but 
one instance, rather than the total class, of 
protections against wrongful interference 
with advantageous economic relations. 
Sumwalt Ice Co. v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 
114 Md. 403, 414, 80 A. 48, 50 (1911); 1 F. 
Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 
§ 6.11 (1956); Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 766 comment c (1979); 45 Am. 
Jur.2d Interfcrtmce §§ 49 51 (1969). We 
therefore proceed to consider whether the 
jury's verdict for Isom can be sustained on 
the basis of the related tort of interference 
with prospective economic relations. 
[3—51 If so, we can affirm the judgment. 
Consistent with the well-settled principle 
that the appellant has the burden of demon-
strating that any error has affected his 
substantial rights, Utah R.Civ.P. 61; Star-
tin v. Madsvn, 120 Utah 631, 636, 237 I\2d 
834, 836 (1951), we follow the authorities 
that exercise every reasonable presumption 
in favor of the validity of a general verdict. 
Specifically, where more than one cause of 
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action has been submitted to a jury and 
where one of those causes of action was 
error-free, supported by substantial evi-
dence, and an appropriate basis for the gen-
eral verdict, the judgment on that verdict 
will be affirmed, even though the evidence 
was insufficient to sustain the verdict on 
one of the other causes of action submitted. 
Berger v. Southern I'acific Co., 144 Cal. 
App.2d 1, 5, 300 P.2d 170, 173 (1956); Gra-
none v. County of IA)S Angeles, 231 Cal. 
App.2d 629, 42 Cal.Rptr. 34, 51 (1965); Aar-
onson v. City of New Haven, 94 Conn. 690, 
110 A. 872 (1920); In re Van Houten's Will, 
147 Iowa 725, 124 N.W. 886 (1910); Watson 
v. Long, Mo.App., 221 S.W.2d 967, 971 
(1949); Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938 
(9th Cir.1980) (applying Cal. law); Adkins 
v. Ford Motor Co., 446 F.2d 1105, 1108 (6th 
Cir.1971) (applying Tenn. law). Sec gener-
ally 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 787 
(1962). 
III. INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPEC-
TIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
A. History and Elements of the Tort 
[6,7] The tort of intentional interfer-
ence with prospective economic relations 
reaches beyond protection of an interest in 
an existing contract and protects a party's 
interest in prospective relationships of eco-
nomic advantage not yet reduced to a for-
mal contract (and perhaps not expected to 
be). Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal.3d 815, 
537 P.2d 865, 86&-69, 122 Cal.Rptr. 745, 
748-49 (1975); Restatement, supra, § 766B 
comment c; W. Prosser, supra, § 130. Al-
though previously faced with arguments or 
circumstances presenting the issue, e.g., 
Searle v. Johnson, Utah, 646 P.2d 682, 683 
(1982); Soter v. Wasatch Development 
3. See, e.g., Estes, "Expanding Horizons in the 
Law of Torts—Tortious Interference," 23 
Drake L.Rev. 341 (1974); Harper, "Interference 
with Contractual Relations," 47 Nw.U.L.Rev. 
873 (1953); Perlman, "Interference with Con-
tract and Other Economic Expectancies: A 
Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine," 49 U.Chi. 
L.Rev. 61 (1982); Sayre, "Inducing Breach of 
Contract," 36 Harv.L.Rev. 663 (1922 23); "De-
velopments in the Law—Competitive Torts," 
77 Harv.L.Rev. 888 (1964); Note, "Tortious In-
Corp., 21 Utah 2d 224, 443 P.2d 663 (1968), 
we have never expressly resolved the ques-
tion of whether Utah recognizes this tort. 
We now resolve that question, in the af-
firmative. 
The plethora of decided cases and abun-
dant literature on the tort of intentional 
interference with prospective economic re-
lations has been helpful in our considera-
tion.*1 In summarizing the history of this 
tort, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 
37, "Interference with Contract or Prospec-
tive Contractual Relation" (1979), observes 
that its elements are a curious blend of the 
principles of liability for intentional torts 
(in which the plaintiff proves a prima facie 
case of liability, subject to the defendant's 
proof of justification) and for negligent 
torts (in which the plaintiff must prove 
liability based on the interplay of various 
factors). The disagreement and confusion 
incident to this blend of intentional and 
negligent tort principles has produced two 
different approaches to the definition of 
this tort. 
Influenced by the model of the intention-
al tort, many jurisdictions and the first 
Restatement of Torts define the tort of 
intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations as a prima facie tort, 
subject to proof of privilege as an affirma-
tive defense. To recover, the plaintiff need 
only prove a prima facie case of liability, 
i.e., that the defendant intentionally inter-
fered with his pros|>ective economic rela-
tions and caused him injury. As with other 
intentional torts, the burden of going for-
ward then shifts to the defendant to dem-
onstrate as an affirmative defense that un-
der the circumstances his conduct, other-
wise culpable, was justified and therefore 
privileged.4 This is the approach assumed 
terference with Contract: A Reassertion of So-
ciety's Interest in Commercial Stability and 
Contractual Integrity," 81 Colum.L.Rev. 1491 
(1981); "Interference with Contract Relations," 
41 Harv.L.Rev. 728 (1927 28); Annot., 9 A.L. 
R.2d 228 (1950); Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 9 (1981); 
Annot., 6 A.L.R4th 195 (1981). 
4. See, e.g., St. Louis-San Francisco Railwav Co. 
v. Wade, 607 F.2d 126, 132-33 (5th Cir.1979); 
liuckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal.3d 815, 537 I\2d 
8G5, 872, 122 Cal.Rptr. 745, 752 (1975); Alfred 
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in several Utah decisions describing the re-
lated tort of interference with contract. 
Bunnell v. Bi//s, 13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P.2d 
597, 602 03 (1962); Gammon v. Federated 
Milk Producers Association, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 
421, 426, 360 P.2d 1018, 1022 (1961), and 14 
Utah 2d 291, 295-96, 383 P.2d 402, 405 06 
(1963). This approach was also suggested 
in a subsequent case that described (though 
it did not formally adopt) the tort of inten-
tional interference with prospective eco-
nomic relations. Searle v. Johnson, Utah, 
646 P.2d 682(1982). 
The problem with the prima facie-tort 
approach is that basing liability on a mere 
showing that defendant intentionally inter-
fered with plaintiff's prospective economic 
relations makes actionable all sorts of con-
temporary examples of otherwise legitimate 
persuasion, such as efforts to persuade oth-
ers not to eat certain foods, use certain 
substances, engage in certain activities, or 
deal with certain entities. The major issue 
in the controversy—justification for the de-
fendant's conduct—is left to be resolved on 
the affirmative defense of privilege. In 
short, the prima facie approach to the tort 
of interference with prosj>ective economic 
relations requires too little of the plaintiff. 
Under the second approach, which is mod-
eled after other negligent torts, the plain-
A. Altimont, Inc. v. Chatelain, Samperton & 
Nolan, DC, 374 A.2d 284, 289 (1977); Owen v. 
Williams, 322 Mass. 356, 360, 77 N.E.2d 318, 
320 21 (1948); Carnes v. St. Paul Union Stock-
yards Co., 164 Minn. 457, 465, 205 N.W. 630, 
633 (1925); Baker v. Dennis Brown Realty, 
Inc., 121 NIL 640, 433 A.2d 1271, 1274 (1981); 
Mitchell v. Aldrich, 122 Vt. 19, 24, 163 A.2d 
833, 836-37 (1960); Calbom v. Knudtzon, 65 
Wash.2d 157, 162 63, 396 P.2d 148, 151-52 
(1964). This approach is also adopted by F. 
Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts, 
§§ 6.11-.12 (1956), Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 9 
§ 2[b] (1981); and 45 Am.Jur.2d Interference 
§ 56 (1969). 
5. The text of Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 766B (1979) states. 
One who intentionally and improperly inter-
feres with another's prospective contractual 
relation (except a contract to marry) is sub-
ject to liability to the other for the pecuniary 
harm resulting from loss of the benefits of 
the relation, whether the interference con-
sists of 
tiff must prove liability based on the inter-
play of various factors. The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts now defines an actionable 
interference with prospective economic re-
lations as an interference that is both "in-
tentional" and "improper." Id. a t § 766B.5 
Under this approach, the trier of fact must 
determine whether the defendant's inter-
ference was "impro|>er" by balancing and 
counterbalancing seven factors, including 
the interferor's motive, the nature of his 
conduct and interests, and the nature of the 
interests with which he has interfered. Id. 
at § 767. In those jurisdictions which have 
followed the negligence model, the plaintiff 
bears the burden of proving that in view of 
all of these factors the defendant's interfer-
ence was improper. This obviously inqwses 
a very significant burden on the plaintiff 
and magnifies the difficulty of resolving 
some contested issues on the pleadings. So 
far as we have been able to discover, only 
four states have specifically adopted the 
Restatement (Second) definition of the ele-
ments of this tort,* though others have ap-
parently applied some |>ortion of the Re-
statement formulation in their own defini-
tions.7 
In short, there is no generally acknowl-
edged or satisfactory majority (>osition on 
the definition of the elements of the tort of 
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third 
person not to enter into or continue the pro-
spective relation or 
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or 
continuing the prospective relation. 
6. Dolton v. Capital Federal Savings & Loan 
Ass'n, Colo.App., 642 P.2d 21, 23 (1981); Weit-
ting v. McFeeters, 104 Mich.App. 188, 304 
N.W.2d 525 (1981); United Wild Rice, Inc. v. 
Nelson, Minn., 313 N.W 2d 628, 632 33 (1982); 
Yaindl v. Ingersoll Rand Co. Standard Pump-
Aldrich Div., 281 Pa.Super. 560, 422 A.2d 611, 
621-22 & n. 11 (1980). 
7. See, e.g., Insurance Field Services, Inc. v. 
While & White Inspection & Audit Senice, 
Inc., Fla.Dist.Ct.App., 384 So.2d 303, 306 07 
(1980); Belden Corp. v. Internorth, Inc., 90 III. 
App.3d 547, 45 111 Dec. 765, 413 N.E.2d 98, 
101 02 (1980); St oiler Fisheries, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Title Insurance Co., Iowa, 258 N.W.2d 336, 
340 (1977); Anderson v. Dairyland Insurance 
Co., 97 N.M. 155, 637 l\2d 837 (1981). 
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intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations. In its historical review, 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts states 
that "the law in this area has not fully 
congealed but is still in a formative stage" 
so that the "several forms of the tort . . . 
are often not distinguished by the courts, 
and cases have been cited among them 
somewhat indiscriminately." Id., Introduc-
tory Note to ch. 37 at 5. We concur in the 
Restatement (Second fs rejection of the pri-
ma facie tort approach l>ecause it leaves too 
much uncertainty al>out the requirements 
for a recognized privilege ami the defend-
ant's burden of pleading and proving these 
and other matters. Id. Hut we also reject 
the Restatement (Second)'* definition of the 
tort because of its complexity. We seek a 
better alternative. 
Oregon has outlined a middle ground by 
defining the tort of interference with pro-
spective economic relations so as to require 
the plaintiff to allege and prove more than 
the prima facie tort, but not to negate all 
defenses of privilege. Privileges remain as 
affirmative defenses. This approach origi-
nated with Justice Linde's opinion in Top 
Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Insur-
ance Co., 283 Or. 201, 582 P.2d 1365 (1978). 
After summarizing the history of this tort 
and specifically refusing to require a plain-
tiff to prove that the interference was "im-
proper" under the balancing-of-factors ap-
proach specified in the Restatement 
(Second), the court defined the cause of 
action for "wrongful interference with eco-
nomic relationships" as follows: 
Either the pursuit of an improper ob-
jective of harming plaintiff or the use of 
wrongful means that in fact cause injury 
to plaintiff's contractual or business rela-
tionships may give rise to a tort claim for 
those injuries. . . . In summary, such a 
claim is made out when interference re-
sulting in injury to another is wrongful 
by some measure beyond the fact of the 
interference itself. Defendant's liability 
may arise from improper motives or from 
the use of improper means. 
Top Service Body Shop, Inc., 283 Or. at 205, 
209, 582 P.2d at 1368, 1371. A subsequent 
decision of that court restated and elaborat-
ed what the plaintiff must prove, as fol-
lows: 
In Top Service we decided that the de-
fendant's impro|>er intent, motive or pur-
pose to interfere was a necessary element 
of the plaintiff's case, rather than a lack 
thereof being a matter of justification or 
privilege to 1x3 asserted as a defense by 
defendant. Thus, to be entitled to go to 
a
 j»ry, plaintiff must not only prove that 
defendant intentionally interfered with 
his business relationship but also that de-
fendant had a duty of non-interference; 
i.e., that he interfered for an improper 
purj)ose rather than for a legitimate one, 
or that defendant used improper means 
which resulted in injury to plaintiff. 
Straulxi v. Larson, 287 Or. 357, 361, 600 
P.2d 371, 374 (1979). Cf. Anderson v. 
Dairyland Insurance Co., 97 N.M. 155, 637 
P.2d 837, 840 41 (1981) (nominally adopting 
the Restatement (Second) definition in Sec-
tion 766 B but using the Oregon elements of 
improper means or improper motive to 
define requirement that interference be 
"improper"). 
[8, 9] We recognize a common-law cause 
of action for intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations, and adopt 
the Oregon definition of this tort. Under 
this definition, in onler to recover damages, 
the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defend-
ant intentionally interfered with the plain-
tiff's existing or potential economic rela-
tions, (2) for an improper purpose or by 
improper means, (3) causing injury to the 
plaintiff. Privilege is an affirmative de-
fense, Searle v. Johnson, Utah, 646 P.2d 682 
(1982), which does not become an issue un-
less "the acts charged would be tortious on 
the part of an unprivileged defendant." 
Top Service Body Shop, Inc., 283 Or. at 210, 
582 P.2d at 1371. 
B. Jury Instructions 
In this case, the trial court apparently 
instructed the jury jointly on the separate 
intentional torts of interference with con-
tract and interference with prospective eco-
nomic relations. As noted in Part II, the 
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verdict cannot be sustained as to the for-
mer, so the only remaining question is 
whether the instruction and evidence per-
mit the verdict to be sustained as to the 
latter. 
So far as it related to the elements of 
proof of the two torts, the trial court's 
entire instruction was as follows: 
[Isom's] counterclaim is based on a theory 
of tortious interference with a business 
relationship and with contractual rights. 
Before you can find the [Corporation] 
liable for tortious interference, you must 
find that the following elements have 
been proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence: 
1. The existence of a valid contract or 
business relationship both existing 
and prospective; 
Knowledge of the contract or rela-
tionship by the alleged interferor; 
An intentional interference which 
causes a breach or termination of the 
business relationship or contract; 
Without justification; 
Which results in damage to the party 
whose business relationship or con-
tract has been disrupted. 
2. 
You arc instructed that if you find that 
the [Corporation] was reasonably acting 
to protect a legitimate economic interest 
of its own, arising out of or in conjunc-
tion with the May 14, 1970 agreement, 
was exercising its right to terminate the 
agreement, or was exercising its right to 
assert an honest claim, then the [Corpora-
tion's] conduct was justified and privi-
leged and not wrongful or malicious and 
[Isom] is not entitled to recover for any 
intentional interference with business or 
contractual relations. 
[10] As to the tort of interference with 
prospective economic relations, this instruc-
tion does not precisely mirror the elements 
we have just specified, because it does not 
expressly require Isom to prove "impro|>er 
8. In Coronado Mining Corp. v. Marathon Oil 
Co, Utah, 577 P.2d 957, 9C0 (1978), we stated: 
'The exercise of a legal right constitutes justifi-
purpose or improper means." However, the 
instruction does require Isom to prove that 
the Corporation's action was "without justi-
fication."8 Because of the way that term 
was defined in the instructions, we are sat-
isfied that the jury's verdict is premised 
upon findings that include each of the ele-
ments in the cause of action as we have 
defined it, and any disparity of phraseology 
between the given instruction and the new 
definition was not prejudicial. 
Under the trial court's definition of "jus-
tification," the jury had to find that the 
Corporation's conduct was "wrongful or 
malicious" before they could find for Isom. 
Those terms are functionally equivalent to 
"improper means or improper pur|>ose." 
Conversely, if the jury found that the Cor-
poration "was reasonably acting to protect 
a legitimate economic interest of its own, 
arising out of or in conjunction with the 
May 14, 1970 agreement" (such as its right 
to terminate the agreement or to assert an 
honest claim thereunder), then the Corjx>ra-
tion's conduct was "justified and privileged 
and not wrongful or malicious," and Isom 
was not entitled to recover. In view of this 
instruction, we conclude that the verdict for 
Isom was clearly based on the jury's finding 
that the Corporation was not reasonably 
acting to protect its legitimate economic 
interest under the agreement, and is tanta-
mount to a finding that the Corporation's 
conduct was "wrongful or malicious." The 
trial court's instruction imposed an even 
heavier burden on the plaintiff (here, the 
counterclaimant, Isom) than our definition, 
since it required the plaintiff to negate the 
existence of any justification. Consequently, 
we proceed to consider whether the evi-
dence was sufficient to sustain a verdict for 
the cause of action as we have defined it. 
C. Evidence of Intentional Interference 
and Causation 
[11,12] Reviewing the record, we con-
clude that there was sufficient evidence to 
sustain the jury's verdict against the Ixjigh 
cation and is a complete defense to an action of 
tortious intervention of contractual rights." ( 
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Corporation for intentional interference 
with prospective economic relations that 
caused injury to Isom. 
There was ample evidence that Isom had 
business relationships with various custom-
ers, suppliers, and |>otential business associ-
ates, and that Leigh, the former owner of 
the business, understood the value of those 
relationships. There was also substantial 
competent evidence that the Corporation, 
through Leigh, his wife, and his bookkeep-
er, intentionally interfered with and caused 
a termination of some of those relationships 
(actual or potential). Their frequent visits 
to Isom's store during business hours to 
confront him, question him, and make de-
mands and inquiries regarding the manner 
in which he was conducting his business 
repeatedly interrupted sales activities, 
caused his customers to comment and com-
plain, and more than once caused a custom-
er to leave the store. Driving away an 
individual's existing or potential customers 
is the archetypical injury this cause of ac-
tion was devised to remedy. E.g., Guillory 
v. Godfrey, 134 Cal.App.2d 628, 286 P.2d 474 
(1955); Tattle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 
N.W. 946 (1909); W. Prosser, Handbook of 
the Law of Torts § 130 (4th ed. 1971); Ke-
statement (Second) of Torts § 76613(a). 
Other actions by which the Leigh Corpo-
ration imposed heavy demands on Isom's 
time and financial resources to the detri-
ment of his ability to at tract and retain 
customers and conduct the other activities 
of his business included: numerous letters 
of complaint, Leigh's demand for an audit 
of Isom's books and inventory during the 
busy holiday season, his continued threats to 
cancel the contract and sell the building 
and business to another buyer, his refusal to 
pay the contracted share of the heating bills 
or the cost of repairing the furnace and the 
store's broken window, his refusal of the 
tendered payment of the balance due under 
the contract, and his suit for repossession, 
termination, and injunction. Leigh's refusals 
also prevented Isom from consummating 
potentially advantageous business associa-
tions with Hunter, with Talbot, and finally 
with Applegate, all experienced retailers 
able to contribute expertise and additional 
capital to Isom's business. 
[13,14] Taken in isolation, each of the 
foregoing interferences with Isom's busi-
ness might l>e justified as an overly zealous 
attempt to protect the Corporation's inter-
ests under its contract of sale. As such, 
none would establish the intentional inter-
ference element of this tort, though some 
might give rise to a cause of action for 
breach of sj>ecific provisions in the contract 
or of the duty of good faith performance 
which inheres in every contractual relation. 
Even in small groups, these acts might be 
explained as merely instances of aggressive 
or abrasive—though not illegal or tortious 
—tactics, excesses that occur in contractual 
and commercial relationships. But in total 
and in cumulative effect, as a course of 
action extending over a period of three and 
one-half years and culminating in the fail-
ure of Isom's business, the Leigh Corona-
tion's acts cross the threshold beyond what 
is incidental and justifiable to what is tor-
tious. The Corporation's acts provide suffi-
cient evidence to establish two of the ele-
ments in the definition of this tort: an 
intentional interference with present or 
prospective economic relations that caused 
injury to the plaintiff. 
[15] Focusing on the issue of causation, 
the I^eigh Corj>oration argues that Isom's 
losses resulted from his inadequate working 
capital or from his unilateral decision to 
close his store immediately after being 
served with the complaint and to file for 
bankruptcy shortly thereafter. These argu-
ments are unavailing tacause there was 
substantial evidence of causation to sup|x>rt 
the jury's verdict. For example, the jury 
could have found that the initiation of this 
lawsuit was but another instance of the 
Corporation's ongoing pattern of harass-
ment, which made it imjxmible for Isom to 
continue to o|>erate his business with any 
anticipation of success or profit. The par-
ties had reached an impasse: Ixiigh had 
refused to accept Isom's tender of payment 
in full and had refused to permit Isom to 
exercise his option to purchase the building 
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or to associate himself with experienced 
partners. Upon being served with the com-
plaint, Isom could reasonably have conclud-
ed that the Corporation's interference and 
harassment would continue to thwart his 
commercial efforts for the foreseeable fu-
ture. On analogous facts, a California 
court held in a case involving a seller's 
malicious interference with his buyer's busi-
ness that "it was reasonable for [the buyer) 
to have elected to close rather than to con-
tinue to accumulate operating expenses 
without receipts coming in to meet them." 
Drouet v. Moulton, 245 Cal.App.2d 667, 54 
Cal.Rptr. 278, 282 (1966). 
The evidence was also sufficient to sup-
port the verdict under the requirement that 
the intentional interference with prospec-
tive economic relations (in this case, Isom's 
relations with his customers, suppliers, and 
potential business associates) must have 
been for an improper purpose or by the use 
of improper means. These two alternatives 
are discussed in the next two sections. 
D. Improper Purpose 
[16] The alternative of improper pur-
pose (or motive, intent, or objective) will 
support a cause of action for intentional 
interference with prospective economic re-
lations even where the defendant's means 
were proper. In the context of the related 
tort of interference with contract, Prosser 
had this to say about improper purpose: 
Since Lumley v. Gye there has been 
general agreement that a purely "mali-
cious" motive, in the sense of spite and a 
desire to do harm to the plaintiff for its 
own sake, will make the defendant liable 
for interference with a contract. The 
same is true of a mere officious intermed-
dling for no other reason than a desire to 
9. On this same point, the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts holds that a competitor's interference 
with a prospective contractual relation is not 
improper if, among other things, "his purpose 
is at least in part to advance his interest in 
competing with the other." Id. § 768(d). The 
authors explain: 
The rule . . . developed to advance the actor's 
competitive interest and the supposed social 
benefits arising from it. If his conduct is 
directed, at least in part, to that end, the fact 
interfere. On the other hand, in the few 
cases in which the question has arisen, it 
has been held that where the defendant 
has a proper purpose in view, the addition 
of ill will toward the plaintiff will not 
defeat his privilege. It may be suggested 
that here, as in the case of mixed motives 
in the exercise of a privilege in defama-
tion and malicious prosecution, the court 
may well look to the predominant pur-
pose underlying the defendant's conduct. 
[Citations omitted; emphasis added.] 
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 
§ 129 at 943 (4th ed. 1971). 
Because it requires that the improper 
purpose predominate, this alternative takes 
the long view of the defendant's conduct, 
allowing objectionable short-run purposes 
to be eclipsed by legitimate long-range eco-
nomic motivation. Otherwise, much com-
petitive commercial activity, such as a busi-
nessman's efforts to forestall a competitor 
in order to further his own long-range eco-
nomic interests, could l>ecome tortious. In 
the rough and tumble of the marketplace, 
competitors inevitably damage one another 
in the struggle for personal advantage. 
The law offers no remedy for those dam-
ages—even if intentional—because they are 
an inevitable byproduct of competition. 
Problems inherent in proving motivation or 
purpose make it prudent for commercial 
conduct to be regulated for the most part 
by the impro|>cr means alternative, which 
typically requires only a showing of particu-
lar conduct.' 
The alternative of improper purpose will 
be satisfied where it can be shown that the 
actor's predominant purpose was to injure 
the plaintiff. St. Louis-San Francisco Rail-
way Co. v. Wade, 607 F.2d 126, 133 (5th 
that he is also motivated by other impulses, 
as, for example, hatred or a desire for re-
venge is not alone sufficient to make his 
interference improper. But if his conduct is 
directed solely to the satisfaction of his spite 
or ill will and not at all to the advancement of 
his competitive interests over the person 
harmed, his interference is held to be improp-
er. 
Id. § 768 comment g. 
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Cir.1979); Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. 
Aurora Air Service, Inc., Alaska, 604 P.2d 
1090 (1979); Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 
152 Iowa 618, 132 N.W. 371 (1911); Tuttle 
v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909); 
Wesley v. Native Lumlrer Co., 97 Miss. 814, 
53 So. 346 (1910); Huston v. Trims-Murk 
Services, Inc., 45 Or.App. 801, 609 P.2d 848 
(1980); Prosser, § 129, quoted supra. 
For example, in Alyeska Pi\>eline Service 
Co., supra, the parties had a contract under 
which RCA provided a communications sys-
tem along Aiyeska's pipeline. RCA, in 
turn, contracted with Aurora to furnish air 
transportation ?!ong the route. About a 
year later, Aurora lost its contract with 
RCA when Alyeska elected to take over the 
air transportation function under a contract 
provision that permitted it to do so. Auro-
ra thereufmn sought damages from Alyes-
ka, alleging that Aiyeska's decision, which 
caused RCA to terminate its contract with 
Aurora, had been motivated by spite, result-
ing from an earlier payment dispute and 
litigation between Alyeska and Aurora. 
Alyeska pleaded that it had acted to further 
its own economic and safety interests. The 
Alaska Supreme Court upheld a jury ver-
dict against Alyeska, explaining: 
[I]f one does not act in a good faith 
attempt to protect his own interest or 
that of another but, rather, is motivated 
by a desire to injure the contract party, 
he forfeits the immunity afforded by the 
privilege. [Authorities cited.] . . . In 
the case at bar, the central factual issue 
. . . was whether Alyeska was genuinely 
furthering its own economic and safety 
interests or was using them as a facade 
for inflicting injury upon Aurora. There 
was sufficient evidence upon which the 
jury could properly find that Alyeska was 
acting out of ill will towards Aurora, 
rather than to protect a legitimate busi-
ness interest. [Emphasis added.] 
604 P.2d at 1094. 
(17J As noted earlier, there is substan-
tial evidence that the Leigh Corporation 
deliberately injured Isom's economic rela-
tions. But that injury was not an end in 
itself. It was an intermediate step toward 
achieving the long-range financial goal of 
profitably reselling the building free of 
Isom's interest. Because that economic in-
terest seems to have been controlling, we 
must conclude that the evidence in this case 
would not sup|K>rt a jury finding that the 
Corporation's predominant purpose was to 
injure or ruin Isom's business merely for 
the sake of injury alone. 
However, because we will affirm the 
judgment on the general verdict on any 
ground for which there is substantial factu-
al support in the record, Berger v. Southern 
Pacific Co. and other authorities cited in 
Part II, supra, we must examine the record 
to determine whether the verdict can be 
supported on the basis of the alternative 
that the Corporation's interference was ac-
complished by impro|)er means. 
E. Improper Means 
118,19J The alternative requirement of 
improper means is satisfied where the 
means used to interfere with a party's eco-
nomic relations are contrary to law, such as 
violations of statutes, regulations, or recog-
nized common-law rules. Such acts are ille-
gal or tortious in themselves and hence are 
clearly "improj>er" means of interference, 
Scnrlc v. Johnson, Utah, 646 P.2d 682 (1982) 
(secondary boycott); Gammon v. Federated 
Milk Producers Association, Inc., 14 Utah 2d 
at 295 96, 383 P.2d at 405 06 (1963) (price 
fixing), unless those means consist of consti-
tutionally protected activity, like the exer-
cise of First Amendment rights. NAACP 
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., U.S. , 
102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982). 
"Commonly included among improper 
means are violence, threats or other intimi-
dation, deceit or misrepresentation, bril>ery, 
unfounded litigation, defamation, or dispar-
aging falsehood." Top Service Body Shop, 
Inc., 582 P.2d at 1371 & n. 11. Means may 
also l)e improper or wrongful because they 
violate "an established standard of a trade 
or profession." Id. at 1371. 
[20] By forcing Isom to defend what 
appear to have been two groundless law-
suits, the Leigh Corporation was clearly em-
ploying an improjKT means of interference 
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with Isom's business. Such use of civil liti-
gation as a weapon to damage another's 
business, besides being an intolerable waste 
of judicial resources, may give rise to inde-
pendent causes of action in tort for abuse of 
process and malicious prosecution. Crease 
v. Pleasant Grove City, 30 Utah 2d 451, 455, 
519 P.2d 888, 890 (1974) (abuse of process); 
Baird v. Intermountain School Federal 
Credit Union, Utah, 555 P.2d 877, 878 (1976) 
(malicious prosecution); Johnson v. Mount 
Ogden Enterprises, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 169, 
169-73, 460 P.2d 333, 334-46 (1969) (mali-
cious prosecution); W. Prosser, Handlxyok 
of the Law of Torts §§ 120, 121 (4th ed. 
1971). The jury's verdict can therefore be 
sustained on the ground that the Leigh 
Corporation intentionally interfered with 
Isom's economic relations by improper 
means. 
There is also another basis for affirming 
that verdict on the basis of impro|>er means. 
f21,22] A delilxjrate breach of contract, 
even where employed to secure economic 
advantage, is not, by itself, an "improper 
means." Because the law remedies breach-
es of contract with damages calculated to 
give the aggrieved party the benefit of the 
bargain, there is no need for an additional 
remedy in tort (unless the defendant's con-
duct would constitute a tort inde|>endent of 
the contract).10 
(23,24] Neither a deliberate breach of 
contract nor an immediate puq)ose to inflict 
injury which does not predominate over a 
legitimate economic end will, by itself, 
satisfy this element of the tort. However, 
they may i\o so in combination. This is so 
because contract damages provide an insuf-
ficient remedy for a breach prompted by an 
immediate purjwse to injure, and that pur-
pose does not enjoy the same legal immuni-
ty in the context of contract relations as it 
does in the competitive marketplace. As a 
result, a breach of contract committed for 
the immediate purpose of injurying the oth-
er contracting party is an improper means 
that will satisfy this element of the cause of 
10. Likewise, for reasons discussed in the pre-
ceding section, a party whose immediate pur-
pose is to inflict injury does not satisfy the 
action for intentional interference with eco-
nomic relations. 
Two cases illustrate how breach of con-
tract (or lease), when done with a purpose 
to injure, satisfy this element of the tort. 
In both cases, the defendant committed a 
breach not just to obtain relief from its 
obligation under the contract or lease (for 
which contract damages would have made 
the plaintiff whole), but to achieve a larger 
advantage by injuring the plaintiff in a 
manner not com|»ensable merely by con-
tract damages. In l>oth cases, the defend-
ant ruined the plaintiff's business by its 
breach, and in l)oth cases the plaintiff was 
given substantial damages for the tort of 
interference with prospective economic re-
lations. 
In Buxbom v. Smith, 23 Cal.2d 535, 145 
P.2d 305 (1944), a retail grocery chain con-
tracted with the plaintiff to publish and 
distribute a "shopping news." In order to 
do so, the plaintiff abandoned his printing 
customers and expanded his distribution or-
ganization. After becoming the plaintiff's 
sole customer and acquiring complete 
knowledge of his business, the retailer de-
liberately breached its contract in order to 
ruin the plaintiff's business by cutting off 
the work required to sustain it and then 
hired his employees. The California Su-
preme Court affirmed a verdict for the 
plaintiff, awarding damages for breach of 
contract and additional damages for "tor-
tious interference with his business" in or-
der to give him "complete recompense for 
his combined injuries . . . ." Id. at 546, 145 
P.2d at 310. The gravamen of the tort, the 
court explained, was the defendant's 
breaching its contract with plaintiff as a 
means of acquiring plaintiff's employees: 
Although defendant's conduct may not 
have been tortious if he had merely bro-
ken the contract and subsequently decid-
ed to hire plaintiffs employees, an addi-
tional factor is present in this case. 
From the evidence the trial court could 
reasonably infer that the breach, at the 
element of ''improper purpose" so long as the 
long-range or predominant purpose is to fur-
ther a legitimate economic end. 
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time it was made, was intended as a 
means of facilitating defendant's hiring 
of plaintiff's employees. A breach of 
contract is a wrong and in itself actiona-
ble. It is also wrongful when intentional-
ly utilized as the means of depriving 
plaintiff of his employees, and, in our 
opinion, constitutes an unfair method of 
interference with advantageous relations 
within the rule set forth above. [Empha-
sis added.] 
/(/. at 548, 145 P.2d at 311. 
In Cherberg v. Peoples National Bank of 
Washington, 88 Wash.&l 595, 564 P.2d 1137 
(1977), a lessor deliberately breached its 
duty to repair a structurally unsound wall 
on the leased premises in order to destroy 
the restaurant business of a lessee who had 
leased a portion of the premises. The les-
sor's purpose was to retake the entire build-
ing as soon as possible, demolish the struc-
ture, and erect a more profitable building. 
The jury gave a verdict of $42,000 against 
the lessor. Apart from the $3,100 damages 
for breach of the lease (economic losses 
from temporary closure of the restaurant 
business), this verdict represented a recov-
ery of damages for inconvenience, discom-
fort, and mental anguish for "the tort of 
intentional interference with business ex-
pectancies." The Washington Supreme 
Court sustained the verdict in an opinion 
that squarely relies on the combination of 
improper means and improper purpose in 
defendant's deliberate breach for the pur-
pose of injuring the plaintiff. 
After reviewing cases holding that a 
breach of covenants may also give rise to 
liability in tort, the court summarized: 
It appears to be the general view that, in 
those instances in which the conduct of 
the breaching party indicates a motive to 
destroy some interest of the adverse par-
ty, a tort action may lie and items of 
damage not available in contract actions 
will be allowed. 
Id. at 603, 564 P.2d at 1143. The court then 
acknowledged the "separate line of cases" 
holding that a breach of duty under a con-
tract or a lease does not constitute an inde-
pendent tort even where it interferes with 
the injured party's business relations. The 
court explained as follows: 
The distinguishing feature between the 
two lines of cases would seem to be 
whether the interference with business 
relations was a mere incidental conse-
quence of the breach or a motive or pur-
pose therefor. 
Id. at 604, 564 P.2d at 1143. In Cherberg, 
the court found that the defendant had 
breached its lease and interfered with the 
plaintiff's business not for the "privileged" 
reason of escaping from an unsatisfactory 
return on its investment in the leased prem-
ises (upon payment of contract damages), 
but for the imj>ormissible purpose of injur-
ing the tenant in order to secure an advan-
tage !>eyond the scoj)e of the lease: 
There is, instead, evidence in the record 
from which the jury could have inferred 
the lessor used the condition of the wall 
as a means to oust the petitioners and 
gain possession of the leased premises in 
order that the lessor might put those 
premises to a different and perhaps con-
siderably more profitable use. Proof of a 
breach based uf>on such a motive demon-
strates a failure to make a good faith 
effort to meet obligations under the lease 
and may give rise to liability in tort. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 605, 564 P.2d at 1143-44. 
As stated by the court in Schisgall v. 
Fairchild Publications, Inc., 207 Misc. 224, 
232, 137 N.Y.S.2d 312, 319 (1955): 
If the defendant acted merely as a con-
tracting party (at legal liberty |>erhaps to 
breach its agreement upon payment of 
damage), that is one thing. But if the 
defendant went further, and acted with 
intent to inflict injury beyond that con-
templated as a result of the mere breach 
of contract, I would hold that the con-
tract does not grant the defaulter immu-
nity from tort liability. [Emphasis add-
ed.] 
[25J In the case at bar, the Leigh Corpo-
ration breached its contract in various 
ways. 
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It breached its implied duty to exercise 
all of its rights under the contract reason-
ably and in good faith. Cahoon v. Cahoon, 
Utah, 641 P.2d 140, 144 (1982); Rio Algom 
Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., Utah, 618 P.2d 497, 505 
(1980); Ferris v. Jennings, Utah, 595 I\2d 
857, 859 (1979). Leigh's unexplained refus-
al to approve Isom's prospective business 
partners without consideration of their mer-
its indicates an absence of good faith and 
provides evidence that the Corporation's 
breach was intended to deprive Isom's busi-
ness of additional capital and valuable ex-
pertise which (at least with regard to Tal-
bot) Leigh himself had repeatedly urged 
Isom to acquire. Similar refusals to ap-
prove prospective subtenants under a con-
tract clause in order to injure the tenant 's 
business have been held to constitute tor-
tious interference with economic relations. 
Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, Ala., 
350 So.2d 1035 (1977); Nizzo v. Amoco Oil 
Co., Fla.Dist.Ct.App., 333 So.2d 491 (1976). 
In addition, Leigh, his wife, and his book-
keeper continually interrupted sales activi-
ties with their visits, tetters, threats, and 
demands, causing customers to comment 
and complain and sometimes to leave. Al-
though the contract entitled the Corj>ora-
tion, as lessor and secured party, to reason-
able supervision of Isom's business, the jury 
had sufficient evidence to conclude that this 
conduct constituted an unreasonable exer-
cise of contract rights and/or was done in 
bad faith for the purpose of injuring Isom's 
business relations. 
The Corporation also breached its con-
tractual duty by refusing Isom's tender of 
the balance of the purchase price and by 
refusing to appoint an appraiser to establish 
a price for the sale of the entire building, 
thereby preventing Isom from exercising 
his purchase option. There is evidence of 
Leigh's purpose in the fact that he openly 
regretted his contract with Isom and fre-
quently expressed his desire to "get Richard 
out" of the business and building. Further-
more, he continually contacted prospective 
buyers for the building, even approaching 
two of Isom's employees for this purpose. 
All of the above provide substantial evi-
dence from which the jury could have con-
cluded that the Cor|>oration breached its 
express and implied contractual duties for 
the purpose of ruining Isom's business and 
obtaining possession of the building in order 
to sell it more profitably elsewhere. By 
themselves, the Corporation's breaches 
would not satisfy the requirement of "im-
proper means," but they could do so when 
coupled with the improper purpose of injur-
ing Isom. In combination, a breach of con-
tract and an intent to injure satisfy the 
improj)cr means requirement for the cause 
of action for intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations. 
F. Summary 
In defining the tort of intentional inter-
ference with pros|>ective economic relations, 
we reject the two extremes of the prima 
facie tort and the balancing-of-factors ap-
proach. Instead, we adopt the Oregon defi-
nition, under which the plaintiff must prove 
that the intentional interference with exist-
ing or potential economic relations that 
caused injury to the plaintiff was done for 
an improper purpose or by improper means. 
The jury instructions in this case, which in 
effect required a finding that the Corpora-
tion's conduct was "wrongful or malicious," 
were sufficiently in harmony with this defi-
nition to permit the jury to return a verdict 
under it. There was sufficient evidence of 
intentional interference and causation. 
To satisfy the alternative of improper 
pur|>ose, the defendant's purpose to injure 
the plaintiff must predominate over all oth-
er pur|>oses, including the long-range pur-
pose of achieving some personal economic 
gain. Under this definition, the evidence is 
insufficient to justify a verdict against 
Leigh Corporation on the basis of improper 
purpose. Improper means refers primarily 
to actions that are contrary to law, such as 
violations of statutes, regulations, or recog-
nized common-law rules. The Leigh Corpo-
ration's pursuit of two groundless lawsuits 
against Isom was an improper means. A 
deliberate breach of contract for the pur-
pose of injuring the contracting party is 
also an improper means, and there is also 
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's ver-
dict on that basis. 
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IV. REDUCTION OF PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES 
26] Leigh Furniture challenges the pro-
ety of any damages on Isom's counter-
ing as discussed earlier, but advances no 
jument against the $35,000 verdict on 
nitive damages in particular. Isom's 
>ss-appeal challenges the remittitur by 
lich the district court reduced the puni-
e damages in reliance on the rule that 
^ amount of punitive damages "should 
linarily bear some reasonable relation to 
e actual damages sustained." Holdaway 
Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77, 79, 505 P.2d 295, 296 
)73). Following the "guide" of Kesler v. 
ygers, Utah, 542 P.2d 354 (1975), and 
ince v. Peterson, Utah, 538 P.2d 1325 
575), where this Court reduced punitive 
images to an amount equal to twenty and 
?hteen percent of the comj>ensatory dam-
fes, respectively, the district court found 
at $13,000 (exactly twenty |>ercent of the 
mpensatory damages awarded by the jury 
this case) would adequately accomplish 
e purpose of punitive damages, and re-
iced them by remittitur to that amount, 
om asserts error in this mechanical appli-
ttion of a fixed ratio as a basis for such 
;duction. We agree. 
The purposes of punitive damages are 
ell stated in Kesler v. Rogers, supra: 
They are: a punishment of the defendant 
for particularly grievous injury caused by 
conduct which is not only wrongful, but 
which is wilful and malicious so that it 
seems to one's sense of justice that mere 
recom|>ense for actual loss is inadequate 
and that the plaintiff should have added 
compensation; and that the defendant 
should suffer some additional penalty for 
that character of wrongful conduct; and 
also that such a verdict should serve as a 
wholesome warning \o others not to en-
gage in similar misdoings. 
42 P.2d at 359. Accord Branch v. Western 
'ctroieum, Inc., Utah, 657 I\2d 267 (1982). 
Vs reflected in this statement of purpose 
md in numerous other authorities, punitive 
11. We do not address the question of whether 
the theory of punitive damages would permit 
their award for an intentional tort, one of 
damages are awarded "where the nature 
of the wrong complained of . . . goes l>e-
yond merely violating the rights of an-
other in that it is found to be willful 
and malicious," Elkington v. Foust, Utah, 
618 P.2d 37, 41 (1980) (emphasis added), 
or a result of "reckless indifference toward, 
and disregard of" the rights of others. 
Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., supra.1* 
[27] We have recently had occasion to 
review the factors that the fact-finder 
should consider in determining the amount 
of punitive damages. See First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A. v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 
Inc., Utah, 653 P.2d 591 (1982). For pur-
poses of this case, we need only reemphasize 
that the amount of compensatory damages 
is only one of a significant number of fac-
tors to be considered in that determination. 
Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Insti-
tution, Utah, 605 P.2cl 314, 328 (1979), modi-
fied on another point, 617 P.2d 700 (1980). 
The district court's reduction of punitive 
damages solely on the basis of that factor 
was therefore in error. 
[28-301 The jury (or other fact-finder) 
has "a broad discretion" in weighing the 
various factors and arriving at its determi-
nation of an appropriate award of punitive 
damages. Ostertag v. La Mont, 9 Utah 2d 
130, 133, 339 P.2d 1022, 1024 (1959). The 
standards that guide a court in reviewing 
the jury's determination are also reviewed 
and reaffirmed in First Security Bank v. 
J.B.J. Feedyards, supra, and need not be 
r e l a t e d here. This jury found $65,000 
compensatory damages and $35,000 punitive 
damages. We find nothing in the ratio 
between those two amounts, or in the other 
circumstances of this case, to persuade us 
that the award of punitive damages was "so 
flagrantly excessive and unjust as to indi-
cate a disregard of the rules of law by 
which damages are regulated," or "so gross-
ly excessive and disproportionate to the in-
jury" or "so excessive as to be shocking to 
one's conscience and to clearly indicate pas-
whose elements is malice (improper purpose). 
That circumstance is not before us. 
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sions, prejudice or corruption on the part of 
the jury." First Security Bank v. J.B.J. 
Feedyards, supra, at ll .1 2 
The record contains abundant evidence 
that Leigh Furniture interfered with Isom's 
economic relations by improper means, in-
cluding breaching its contract with the in-
tent to injure Isom, a circumstance from 
which the jury could infer sufficient malice 
to justify their award of punitive damages. 
Economic motives will not insulate a de-
fendant from liability for punitive damages 
where he acts maliciously. Fury Imports, 
Inc. v. Shakespeare Co., 554 F.2d 1376 (5th 
Cir.1977), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 921, 101 
S.Ct. 1369, 67 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981); Cherne 
Industrial, Inc. v. Grounds & Associates, 
Inc., Minn., 278 N.W.2d 81 (1979). 
On Isom's cross-appeal, the judgment is 
modified to reinstate the full amount the 
jury awarded as punitive damages. 
As modified in respect to punitive dam-
ages, the judgment on the verdict for de-
fendant Isom is affirmed. Costs to respon-
dent. 
HALL, C.J., STEWART, J., and VcNOY 
CHRISTOFFERSEN, District Judge, con-
cur. 
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring): 
I concur in the majority opinion but ex-
press a reservation as to the following sen-
tence in Part II: 
[W]here more than one cause of action 
has been submitted to a jury and where 
one of those causes of action was error-
free, supported by substantial evidence, 
and an appropriate basis for the general 
verdict, the judgment on that verdict will 
12. Where appropriate, we have affirmed puni-
tive damage awards much in excess of the 
amount of compensatory damages awarded. 
See Elkington v. Foust, Utah, 618 P.2d 37, 41 
(1980) (compensatory $12,000; punitive $30,-
000); Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 152, 379 
P.2d 380 (1963) (compensatory $350 to one 
plaintiff and $1,000 to another; punitive 
$1,500); Ostertag v. La Mont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 
339 P.2d 1022 (1959) (actual damages $140; 
punitive $860); Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 
156, 161 64, 247 P 2d 431, 433 35 (1952) (gen-
be affirmed, even though the evidence 
was insufficient to sustain the verdict on 
one of the other causes of action sul>-
mitted. 
Under my view of the instruction given 
the jury, set out in Part III H, it is unneces-
sary to take any (K)sition on the principle 
above quoted l>ecause that principle is not 
involved in this case. Even though the 
instruction instructed jointly on the tort of 
interference with contract and the tort of 
interference with prospective economic re-
lations, it did not offer alternatives or 
choices to the jury as to the separate torts 
or theories of recovery. The jury could not 
have been conscious that they were being 
instructed on two separate torts. They 
were not told that they could choose be-
tween them. I agree with the majority 
opinion that the instruction properly 
defined the tort of interference with pro-
spective economic relations and we must 
presume that the jury followed the instruc-
tion in finding liability against the defend-
ant. The fact that the instruction may 
have also defined another tort which does 
not lie in this case is of no consequence. 
There was comi>etent evidence adduced to 
support the elements of interference with 
prospective economic relations as illustrated 
by the cases of Cherlterg v. Peoples Nation-
al Bank of Washington, 88 Wash.2d 595, 564 
P.2d 1137 (1977) and Buxbom v. Smith, 23 
Cal.2d 535, 145 P.2d 305 (1944). It should 
be noted that in both of those cases one 
contracting party committed that tort on 
the other contracting party. No third party 
was involved. 
While 1 recognize that the principle quot-
ed ai>ove, which is called the "two issue 
rule," is supported by the cases from the 
eral and special damages $900; punitive 
$1,000); Falkenbeig v. Nvff, 72 Utah 258, 270 
72, 269 P. 1008, 1013 (1928) (actual damages 
$362.50; punitive $1,500); and cases cited with 
approval in Holdaway v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77, 
79 80, 505 P.2d 295, 296 (1973). Moreover, in 
at least one case, we have held that punitive 
damages may l)e a wauled where only equitable 
relief was granted and no compensatory dam-
ages were awarded Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 
Utah, 585 P.2d 775(1978). 
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jurisdictions cited in the majority opinion, 
there is a contrary point of view exempli-
fied by the following cases: Bredouw v. 
Jones, Okl., 431 P.2d 413 (1967); Heinen v. 
Heinen, 64 Nevada 527, 186 P.2d 770 (1947); 
Martin v. Northern Pac. Ry., 51 Mont. 31, 
149 P. 89 (1915). Apparently this Court has 
not heretofore decided this question and I 
prefer to reserve an expression of opinion 
on it until it is squarely before us. See Ivie 
v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 336 P.2d 781 
(1959) and Watters v. Querry, Utah, 588 
P.2d 702 (1978) for examples of a somewhat 
similar situation arising because of conflict-
ing jury instructions. 
O I KHNUMBERSrSfCM) 
HELM v. SHAW Wash. 315 
Cite as, Wash., 657 P.2d 315 
98 Wash.2d 569 may discharge attorney at any time with or 
Melvin M. BELLI, Petitioner, without cause. 
v. 
Donald R. SHAW and Patricia Shaw, hus-
band and wife; and Walter B. Dauber 
and Joan Dauber, husband and wife, Re-
spondents. 
No. 48084-2. 
Supreme Court of Washington, 
En Banc. 
Jan. 13, 1983. 
In a suit involving a dispute over attor-
ney fees, the Yakima County Superior 
Court, Ted Kolbaba, J., rendered judgment 
for defendants notwithstanding a verdict 
for plaintiff. Plaintiff apj>ealed. The 
Court of Appeals, 29 Wash.App. 875, 631 
P.2d 980, affirmed. Appeal was taken. 
The Supreme Court, Pearson, J., hold that 
where there was undisputed evidence that, 
before the second trial in a defamation ac-
tion, the client entered into a contingent fee 
arrangement with two attorneys which ex-
cluded the plaintiff, the plaintiff was not 
entitled to recover attorney fees. 
Affirmed. 
Dore, J., dissented with opinion in 
which Dimmick and Hosellini, JJ. , joined. 
1. Attorney and Client <&=»76(1) 
Where, before second trial in defama-
tion action, client entered into contingent 
fee agreement with two attorneys which 
excluded plaintiff, that direct repudiation 
by client of his contract with plaintiff con-
stituted discharge of plaintiff from employ-
ment. 
2. Attorney and Client «=>134(1) 
Attorney discharged before completion 
of undertaking f^r which he was engaged 
may recover from his client reasonable com-
pensation for professional services actually 
rendered. 
3. Attorney and Client <*=>76(1) 
Unlike general contract law, under con-
tract between attorney and client, client 
4. Attorney and Client s=>76(l) 
Ordinarily, no s|>ecial formality is re-
quired to discharge attorney and any act of 
client indicating unmistakable purpose to 
sever relations is sufficient. 
5. Attorney and Client <s=>76(l) 
Employment of other counsel, which is 
inconsistent with continuance of former re-
lationship, shows unmistakable purpose to 
sever attorney and client relationship. 
6. Attorney and Client «=> 134(1) 
Plaintiff could not recover pursuant to 
fee agreement allegedly made in 1959 with 
former partner of firm after client's con-
tract with plaintiff was repudiated. 
7. Attorney and Client c=>134(l), 151 
Plaintiff could not recover attorney 
fees pursuant to "forwarding fee" arrange-
ment with another attorney where there 
was no evidence that client authorized 
plaintiff's continued participation in case 
after first trial in defamation action and 
plaintiff's involvement after that trial was 
minimal at most. CPU DR 2-107. 
James Hurley, Yakima, for petitioner. 
John Gavin, Rodney Smith, Yakima, Law 
Offices of Melvin Belli, Daniel Smith, San 
Francisco, Cal., for respondents. 
PEARSON, Justice. 
Plaintiff Melvin Belli appeals a Court of 
Appeals decision affirming a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict in his action for 
attorney fees. Plaintiff brought this action 
in 1977 against defendants, partners ' in a 
Yakima law firm, claiming $50,000 in attor-
ney fees pursuant to a fee agreement al-
legedly made in 1959 with J.P. Tonkoff, a 
former partner in the Yakima firm. The 
jury awarded plaintiff $50,000, but the trial 
court entered judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. The court concluded as a mat-
ter of law there was not sufficient evidence 
of a fee agreement which would entitle 
TabV 
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Ronald Dean Lancaster, pro se. 
David L. Wilkinson, Kimberly Hornak, 
Salt Lake City, for defendants and respon-
dents. 
PER CURIAM: 
Plaintiff filed, in propria persona, a pe-
tition for post-conviction relief in the trial 
court with respect to his guilty plea to and 
subsequent conviction of second degree 
murder. The trial court dismissed the peti-
tion as inappropriate, as plaintiff had not 
brought a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea and a collateral attack under rule 65B 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was 
therefore not permissible. We reverse and 
remand for entry of findings on the merits. 
In response to plaintiff's petition, the 
State brought a motion to dismiss on the 
ground that under the rationale of State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (UUh 1987), plain-
tiff was precluded from bringing a motion 
for post-conviction relief until he had first 
brought a motion to set aside his guilty 
plea. The trial court adopted that rationale 
in its order denying writ of habeas corpus, 
and the State repeats it before this Court in 
challenging the merits of plaintiffs habeas 
corpus petition. 
State v. Gibbons is inapposite here. Gib-
bons pleaded guilty to several charges and 
then appealed directly after the trial court 
had sentenced him to consecutive terms of 
imprisonment. He did not file a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea before perfecting 
his appeal, and the State argued that this 
Court should decline to consider the guilty 
plea issue because it was not raised below, 
740 P.2d at 1311. This Court declined to 
follow the State's request and remanded 
the case to enable Gibbons to file a motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea, retaining juris-
diction over the case for further action. 
State v. Gibbons did not represent a collat-
eral attack on the guilty plea. 
Conversely here, plaintiff filed a post-
conviction petition to challenge the validity 
of his guilty plea some nine years after the 
time for a direct appeal had run. It ap-
pears from his handwritten pleadings that 
he was originally charged with first degree 
murder, but pleaded to second degree mur-
der when the prosecution was unable to 
prove the aggravating circumstances with 
which he had been charged. In his habeas 
corpus petition, plaintiff appears to allege 
that he thought he had pleaded to "uninten-
tional murder" and that he should have 
been sentenced to one to fifteen years' 
imprisonment instead of five years to life. 
Plaintiff stated that he was innocent of 
knowingly and intentionally committing the 
offense and was therefore unlawfully im-
prisoned and that he had been denied due 
process and effective assistance of counsel. 
In addition, plaintiff challenged the consti-
tutionality of the statutes under which he 
was charged and sentenced. 
This Court has repeatedly stated that 
habeas corpus is not a substitute for and 
cannot be used to perform the function of 
regular appellate review. Porter u Cook, 
747 P.2d 1031, 1032 (UUh 1987); Codian-
na v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (UUh 
1983); Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 
702 (UUh 1979). But it has also recognized 
that review by habeas corpus is appropri-
ate in unusual circumsUnces to assure fun-
damenUl fairness and to reexamine a con-
viction when the nature of the alleged error 
is such that it would be unconscionable not 
to reexamine. Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1115 
(Stewart, J., concurring in result). More-
over, rule 65B(i) of the UUh Rules of Civil 
Procedure specifically provides that a pris-
oner who asserts a subsUntial denial of his 
constitutional righU "may institute a pro-
ceeding under this rule." See also Mar-
tinez v. Smith, supra, where this Court 
held a petition for habeas corpus reviewa-
ble without first requiring the withdrawal 
of a guilty plea. Given the allegations 
plaintiff made in his petition, it was there-
fore error for the trial court to dismiss the 
petition without granting a hearing. 
Without the benefit of findings, this 
Court is in no position to review the validi-
ty of plaintiff's claims. It is safe to as-
sume that trial courU prefer to give short 
shrift to the many post-conviction petitions 
which they decide lack merit. It is equally 
safe to assume that an appellate court will 
be unable to review the case in a vacuum 
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and will have to remand it where no ratio-
nale for dismissal or denial is given. A 
simple finding, on the other hand, will suf-
fice in the vast majority of cases to limit 
the judicial process to one review. The 
trial court's basis for dismissing plaintiff's 
petition in this case was erroneous, as sUt-
ed. The record is too sparse for this Court 
to determine whether the issues raised by 
the pleadings were legal, so that it could 
affirm tho trial court on the ground that 
the claims were properly resolved as a mat-
ter of law. See Gonzales v. Morris, 610 
P.2d 1285, 1286 (UUh 1980). Instead, it 
appears that plaintiff claims irregularity in 
the reception of his guilty plea, an issue 
that should have been considered by the 
trial court. 
The case is remanded for entry of find-
ings on the meriU. 
(o |«YHUHM«SVSUM> 
LLOYD'S UNLIMITED, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
NATURES WAY MARKETING, LTD., 
a corporation, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 860311-CA. 
Court of Appeals of UUh. 
April 21, 1988. 
Middleman brought action for breach 
of contract against supplier, seeking ac-
counting and judgment for sums due under 
contract. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., entered 
judgment in favor of supplier, and middle-
man appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Greenwood, J., held that: (1) trial court 
erred in denying middleman's motion to 
amend to include cause of action for refor-
mation of contract BO the commission 
schedules could be changed; (2) middleman 
was not precluded from seeking reforma-
tion of commission schedule under con-
tract; and (3) middleman was not entitled 
to recover costs of deposing two witnesses 
and serving subpoena on one witness. 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Pleading ®=>248(4) 
In breach of contract action in which 
middleman who sold "coffee extender prod-
uct" for supplier sought to recover commis-
sions under contract with supplier, trial 
court erred in denying middleman's motion 
to amend to include cause of action for 
reformation of contract so the commission 
schedules could be changed; issue of com-
mission schedules was not raised until sec-
ond day of trial and court did not allow 
middleman to submit evidence on issue of 
parties' intent in entering contract 
2. Reformation of Instruments «=>25 
Middleman who sold "coffee extender 
product" for supplier was not precluded 
from seeking reformation of commission 
schedule under contract with supplier be-
cause contract included integration clause. 
3. Reformation of Instruments <S=>36(1), 
45(1) 
Reformation of contract is equiUble 
remedy which must be pled with particular-
ity and esUblished by clear and convincing 
proof. 
4. Costs <s=*176, 193 
In middleman's action against supplier 
to recover commissions under contract with 
supplier, middleman was not entitled to re-
cover costs of deposing two witnesses and 
serving subpoena on one witness. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 54(d). 
5. Costs e=>207 
Party claiming entitlement to cost of 
depositions has burden of demonstrating 
that depositions were reasonably necessary 
and whether that burden is met is within 
sound discretion of trial court. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 54(d). 
6. Appeal and Error <S=>984(1) 
Trial court's ruling on whether to 
award party the costs of depositions is pre-
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sumed correct and will not be disturbed 
unless it is so unreasonable as to manifest 
clear abuse of discretion. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 54(d). 
Kevin J. Sutterfield (argued), Leslie W. 
Slaugh, Ray G. Martineau, P.C., Provo, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Terry M. Crellin (argued), M. Wayne 
Western, Thorpe, North & Western, Sandy, 
for defendant and respondent. 
Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS 
and BENCH, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Plaintiff, Lloyd's Unlimited (Lloyd's), ini-
tiated this action against defendant, Na-
ture's Way Marketing, Ltd. (Nature's 
Way), for breach of contract, seeking an 
accounting and judgment for sums due un-
der the contract. The court found that the 
parties had entered into a valid and en-
forceable contract and awarded Lloyd's 
$416.25. Lloyd's appeals, claiming that the 
court improperly denied its motion to 
amend the complaint to include a cause of 
action for reformation and that the trial 
court's findings of fact were clearly errone-
ous. Lloyd's requests modification of the 
lower court's award and entry of judgment 
against Nature's Way for $39,710.41. Al-
ternatively, Lloyd's requests that the judg-
ment be vacated and the case remanded. 
We reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
In early 1982, Lloyd Dowdle (Dowdle), 
president of Lloyd's, and Lynn Burning-
ham (Burningham), president of Nature's 
Way, began negotiating terms of a contract 
involving a "coffee extender product" 
(product). The contract was to provide 
that Lloyd's would receive a commission 
from Nature's Way for product sold to 
Yurika Foods Corporation (Yurika) by Na-
ture's Way in consideration of Lloyd's ef-
forts in inducing Yurika to purchase and 
market the product. In early August 1982, 
Dowdle drafted a handwritten document 
which stated that Lloyd's would receive 
$1.00 commission for each pound of prod-
uct sold. On August 11, 1982, after Dow-
dle and Burningham discussed the doc-
ument, Dowdle crossed out the commission 
paragraph he had drafted and inserted a 
new schedule in the handwritten contract 
which, as found by the trial court, provided 
the following commission schedule: 
1 unit—60 packets pack: .25$ 
1 unit—2 lb. bulk pack: .35* 
1 unit—5 lb. bulk pack: 50$ 
1 unit—37 lb. bulk pack: $1.00 
The parties then signed the agreement. 
Several days later, Dowdle's secretary 
typed the agreement from the handwritten 
version. The typewritten agreement set 
forth the same commission schedule as set 
out above except the commission on the 5 
lb. bulk pack was .50$ rather than 50$. 
The typewritten agreement also repeated 
verbatim the following clause from the 
handwritten agreement: "This agreement 
contains the entire understanding of the 
parties hereto and may not be altered, 
amended, modified, or discharged in any 
way whatsoever except by subsequent 
agreement in writing by all parties hereto." 
The parties then signed the typewritten 
agreement and Nature's Way paid Lloyd's 
$500, representing commission earned from 
April 24, 1982 to August 1, 1982. The 
parties did not make a formal accounting 
of the sizes or amount of the product sold 
to earn the $500 commission. 
Between August 1, 1982 and February 
28, 1984, Nature's Way received more than 
$625,000 for product sold to Yurika but 
failed to pay any commissions to Lloyd's. 
Subsequently, Lloyd's initiated this action, 
alleging in paragraph 5 of its complaint 
that Nature's Way owed it commissions 
based on the following commission sched-
ule: 
60 packets pack: $ .25 
2 lb. bulk pack: .35 
5 lb. bulk pack: .50 
37 lb. bulk pack: 1.00 
Nature's Way's answer to paragraph 5 
stated "Defendant denies the validity of 
the agreement and therefore denies the 
allegations in paragraph 5 of the Plaintiff's 
complaint to the effect that defendant is 
LLOYD'S UNLIMITED 
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obligated or indebted to Plaintiff in any 
sum of money." 
After two days of trial, the judge found 
the contract was enforceable and awarded 
commissions to Lloyd's based on the lesser 
commission amounts stated in the typewrit-
ten contract, rather than those set forth in 
Lloyd's complaint. Subsequently, Lloyd's 
filed a motion to amend its complaint to 
include a cause of action for reformation of 
the contract, stating that it was not aware 
until the second day of trial that Nature's 
Way contested the commission schedule 
Lloyd's had asserted in its complaint. 
After both parties filed extensive memo-
randa and several post-trial motions, the 
court ruled that the typewritten agreement 
was a valid, integrated and enforceable 
contract, awarded Lloyd's $416.25, and de-
nied the motion to amend the complaint. 
The court denied Lloyd's its requested 
costs incurred in taking Burningham's dep-
osition and in serving Burningham with a 
subpoena. 
On appeal, Lloyd's claims that: 1) the 
trial court erred in denying its motion to 
amend the complaint to include a cause of 
action for reformation; 2) the trial court 
erred in faihng to award Lloyd's its costs 
of depositions and service of subpoenas; 
and 3) the trial court's findings of fact are 
not supported by the evidence. 
I. MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
A. Amendment of Pleadings 
Lloyd's first contention is that the trial 
court erred in denying its motion to amend 
the complaint. Amendment of pleadings is 
specifically addressed in Utah R.Civ.P. 
15(b), which states: 
[1] When issues not raised by the plead-
ings are tried by express or implied con-
sent of the parties, they shall be treated 
in all respects as if they had been raised 
in the pleadings. Such amendments of 
the pleadings as may be necessary to 
cause them to conform to the evidence 
and to raise these issues may be made 
upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after judgment; but failure so to 
amend does not affect the result of the 
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trial of these issues. [2] If evidence is 
objected to at the trial on the ground 
that it is not within the issues made by 
the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended when the pre-
sentation of the merits of the action will 
be subserved thereby and the objecting 
party fails to satisfy the court that the 
admission of such evidence would preju-
dice him in maintaining his action or de-
fense upon the merits. The court shall 
grant a continuance, if necessary, to en-
able the objecting party to meet such 
evidence. 
There are two parts to Utah R.Civ.P. 
15(b). General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnice-
ro Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 505-06 
(Utah 1976). Under the first part of the 
rule, it is mandatory for the trial court to 
grant leave to amend pleadings to conform 
to the evidence to include issues tried by 
the express or implied consent of the par-
ties. Poulsen v. Poulsen, 672 P.2d 97, 99 
(Utah 1983); General Ins. Co., 545 P.2d at 
505-06. The second part of the rule is 
permissive and allows the pleadings to be 
amended when evidence is objected to at 
trial on the ground that it raises issues not 
framed by the pleadings. General Ins. 
Co., 545 P.2d at 506. Utah R.Civ.P. 8(b) 
states that "[w]hen a pleader intends in 
good faith to deny only a part or a qualifi-
cation of an averment, he shall specify so 
much of it as is true and material and shall 
deny only the remainder." Subsection (d) 
of the same rule further provides that 
"[a]verments in a pleading to which a re-
sponsive pleading is required, other than 
those as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive 
pleading." 
The Utah Supreme Court discussed the 
proper application and purpose of the 
pleading rules in Cheney v. Rucker, 14 
Utah 2d 205, 211, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963), as 
follows: 
They must all be looked to in the light of 
their even more fundamental purpose of 
liberalizing both pleading and procedure 
to the end that the parties are afforded 
the privilege of presenting whatever le-
gitimate contentions they have pertain-
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ing to their dispute. What they are enti-
tled to is notice of the issues raised and 
an opportunity to meet them. When this 
is accomplished, that is all that is re-
quired. Our rules provide for liberality 
to allow examination into and settlement 
of all issues bearing upon the controver-
sy, but safeguard the rights of the other 
party to have a reasonable time to meet a 
new issue if he so requests. 
Accord Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
656 P.2d 966, 970-71 (Utah 1982). 
B. Procedural Background 
In order to properly assess the validity of 
the trial court's rulings, we must first pro-
vide a rather detailed description of the 
procedural history of this case. 
The record reveals that proceedings in 
this matter focused on Lloyd's theory of 
lack of consideration, up until the second 
day of trial. As stated earlier, Nature's 
Way's answer to the complaint generally 
denied liability under the contract, without 
specifically addressing the commission rate 
amounts alleged in the complaint. The an-
swer also included an affirmative defense 
of lack of consideration.' Prior to trial, 
Lloyd's filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment, seeking judgment in the sum of 
$31,545.64 plus accruing interest. The mo-
tion was supported by the affidavit of a 
certified public accountant which calculated 
the amount due under the contract utilizing 
the commission schedule as alleged in the 
complaint and invoices of sales made by 
Nature's Way to Yurika. Lloyd's memo-
randum in support of the motion and 
"Statement of Uncontested Facts" again 
set forth the same schedule as in the com-
plaint. Nature's Way's memorandum in 
opposition to the motion for summary judg-
ment states "Defendant has no objection to 
what plaintiff has set out as uncontested 
facts other than that important uncontest-
ed facte were omitted." The memorandum 
then sets forth additional "facts" but does 
not mention the commission rate amounts. 
The court denied the motion for summary 
judgment. 
1. This testimony strikes us as inconsistent with 
Nature's Way's contention that the agreement 
During the first day of trial, the parties 
addressed, almost exclusively, the question 
of what consideration Lloyd's was to pro-
vide in order to earn the commissions. 
Burningham testified that he expected 
Dowdle to do a lot of traveling to procure 
sales for Nature's Way, and that in regard 
to payment of Dowdle's travel expenses, 
"That's the reason why I offered the com-
mission. And I offered that—I offered it 
to him because it would have been very 
lucrative for him." ! 
On the second day of trial, Burningham 
testified under direct examination as to 
what the contract said, as follows: 
Q. What does it state will be payable 
for one unit of the two-pound bulk 
pack? 
A. .25 cents. 
Q. .25 cents? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Quarter of a cent, I guess. 
On cross examination, Lloyd's counsel 
began to question Burningham about the 
intent of the parties on the commission rate 
amounts. The trial court sustained Na-
ture's Way's objection to such questioning. 
After trial, but before the court entered 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
Lloyd's filed a motion for an order grant-
ing leave to file an amended complaint to 
conform to the evidence to include a cause 
of action for reformation of the contract. 
Lloyd's also filed a post trial memorandum 
which included excerpts from the deposi-
tion of Burningham, as follows: 
Q. Had you made commissions to 
Lloyd's . . . you would pay him 35 
cents for each two pound bulk pack? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Based on the 300 figure? 
A. Correct. 
Q. For the five pound bulk you would 
pay him 50 cents based on the 180 
figure? 
A. Correct. 
Lloyd's also submitted Dowdle's affidavit 
which stated that he habitually noted deci-
yieldcd commissions of only $416.25 over the 
time period in question. 
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mal points erroneously, as was done on at 
least part of the handwritten agreement. 
Several months after the trial, the court 
entered findings of fact, which included the 
following: the handwritten agreement exe-
cuted by the parties had commission rates 
of .25c, .35c, 50*, and $1.00; the typed 
agreement executed by the parties had 
commission rates of .25c, .35c, .50c, and 
$1.00; and the intent of the parties with 
respect to commissions did not change be-
tween execution of the two agreements. 
Further, the court found that the parties 
had stipulated to the amount of product 
sold during the time in question. The court 
concluded that the typed contract was a 
valid, integrated and enforceable contract 
and entered judgment for $487.87 and costs 
of $138.77. 
The court denied the motion to amend 
the complaint to include a cause of action 
for reformation. 
C. Application of Law 
In this case, when, on the second day of 
trial, Burningham first testified that the 
commission for a sixty pound bulk pack 
was a quarter of a cent, Lloyd's attorney 
did not object to the testimony on the 
ground that it was not within the issues 
framed by the pleadings. Therefore, be-
cause no objection was raised, we conclude 
that there was implied consent to trying of 
the issue and the first part of Rule 15(b) 
applies, allowing consideration of the issue. 
On the other hand, Lloyd's had notice of 
the issue of commission rates only on the 
second day of trial, and by the court's 
rulings, had no adequate opportunity to 
meet the issue. We, therefore, also find 
that it was an abuse of discretion to con-
comitantly disallow Lloyd's to respond to 
the newly raised issue, by the court's refus-
al to consider evidence of intent and denial 
of the motion to amend the complaint to 
plead reformation of contract. There was 
no evidence of prejudice which would result 
to Nature's Way and, indeed, amendment 
would allow realization of one of the crite-
ria under Rule 15(b)—"presentation of the 
merits of the action." 
2. The court may have believed reformation was 
not available for other reasons, but the inte-
[1J Consequently, we hold that the trial 
court erred in denying the motion to amend 
to include a cause of action for reformation 
of the contract where the issue of commis-
sion schedules was not raised until the 
second day of trial and where the court did 
not allow Lloyd's to submit evidence on the 
issue of the parties' intent in entering the 
contract. Because the motion to amend 
should have been granted, we reverse and 
remand for further proceedings on the ref-
ormation issue. 
D. Reformation of Contract 
[2,3] We further note that the trial 
court apparently believed that the typewrit-
ten agreement could not, as a matter of 
law, be reformed, because of the inte-
gration clause included in the contract.2 
Reformation of a contract is an equitable 
remedy which must be pled with particular-
ity and established by clear and convincing 
proof. Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 772 
(Utah 1985). The Briggs court stated: 
A contract may be reformed for either of 
two reasons. First, if the instrument 
does not embody the intentions of both 
parties to the contract, a mutual mistake 
has occurred, and reformation is appro-
priate. Second, if one party is laboring 
under a mistake about a contract term 
and that mistake either has been induced 
by the other party or is known by and 
conceded to by the other party, then the 
inequitable nature of the other party's 
conduct will have the same operable ef-
fect as a mistake, and reformation is 
permissible. 
Id. at 772. Reformation has also been ap-
plied in instances of drafter error. "Refor-
mation is clearly appropriate where there is 
a variance between the written deed and 
the true agreement of the parties caused 
by a draftsman." Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 
P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984). 
On remand, the court should allow 
Lloyd's to present whatever evidence it can 
muster to establish its right to reformation 
of the contract. Moreover, it is not pre-
gration clause was the only rationale mentioned 
by the court. 
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eluded from doing so by the integration 
clause included in the contract. An inte-
gration clause may prevent enforcement of 
prior or contemporaneous agreements on 
the same subject, but "does not prevent 
proof of fraudulent representations by a 
party to the contract, or of illegality, acci-
dent, or mistake [PJaper and ink pos-
sess no magic power to cause statements 
of fact to be true when they are actually 
untrue." Corbin on Contracts, § 578 at 
405-07 (1960). 
II. COSTS 
[4-61 Lloyd's also contends that the 
court erred in failing to award it the costs 
of deposing Burningham and Webb and 
serving a subpoena on Burningham. Utah 
R.Civ.P. 54(d) provides that except as the 
rule otherwise provides, "costs shall be al-
lowed as of course to the prevailing party 
unless the court otherwise directs " 
The general rule is that under Utah 
R.Civ.P. 54(d) "costs" means those fees 
which are "required to be paid to the court 
and to witnesses " Frampton v. Wil-
son, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). How-
ever, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that the expenses of taking depositions are 
also allowable as costs if they were reason-
ably necessary. John Price Assoc, Inc. v. 
Davis, 588 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978). Dep-
osition costs are generally allowed as nec-
essary and reasonable "where the develop-
ment of the case is of such a complex 
nature that discovery cannot be accom-
plished through the less expensive method 
of interrogatories, requests for admissions 
and requests for the production of doc-
uments." Highland Constr. Co. v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984). 
The party claiming entitlement to the costs 
of depositions has the burden of demon-
strating that the depositions were reason-
ably necessary and whether that burden is 
met is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. Id.; First Sec. Bank of Utah 
N.A. v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563, 567 (Utah 
1974). The trial court's ruling on whether 
to award a party costs of depositions is 
presumed correct and will not be disturbed 
unless it is so unreasonable as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion. First Sec. 
Bank, 521 P.2d at 567. The Utah Supreme 
Court has declined to extend the rule, 
which allows recovery of the cost of taking 
a deposition, to expenses such as service of 
a subpoena. Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774. 
Lloyd's claims that the depositions of 
Burningham and Webb were essential for 
the development and presentation of the 
case and that Webb's deposition was taken 
because both parties anticipated that Webb 
would be unavailable to testify at trial. In 
addition, Lloyd's argues that because por-
tions of Burningham's depositions were 
used at trial, it should be awarded the costs 
of Burningham's deposition. Lloyd's also 
contends that it should have been awarded 
the costs of serving Burningham with a 
subpoena to insure his appearance at the 
deposition. Nature's Way had previously 
failed to appear at a hearing on a motion to 
compel discovery, and Lloyd's believed that 
the subpoena was necessary to secure 
Burningham's appearance at the deposi-
tion. 
Nature's Way, to the contrary, argues 
that because Lloyd's did not use Webb's 
deposition at trial and did not publish Burn-
ingham's or Webb's deposition at trial, the 
court properly denied Lloyd's the costs of 
the deposition. Nature's Way also con-
tends that Lloyd's could have avoided the 
cost of the subpoena by telephoning Na-
ture's Way's attorney to see if the corpora-
tion would produce Burningham for a depo-
sition, and, therefore, the trial court cor-
rectly denied Lloyd's the cost incurred in 
subpoenaing Burningham. 
We find that, in view of these argu-
ments, the trial court's decision to deny 
Lloyd's the costs of the two depositions 
was reasonable. Apparently, Lloyd's failed 
to prove that the deposition costs were 
reasonably necessary and could not be ac-
complished through less expensive means. 
Therefore, because the burden of proof 
was not met and because the trial court's 
decision was reasonable, we hold that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Lloyd's the costs of taking the 
depositions. 
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We also hold that the trial court's deci- Appeals held that petition failed to satisfy 
sion to deny Lloyd's the cost of subpoena- applicable requirements, 
ing Burningham was not unreasonable, in Petition denied, 
light of Frampton, where the court de-
clined to extend the rules for awarding 
deposition costs to expenses such as service Criminal Law <£»1071 
of subpoenas and vacated the trial court's Petition for certificate of probable 
award of such costs. Therefore, we hold cause lacked required affidavit of counsel 
that the trial court did not abuse its discre- or memorandum of law supporting defend-
tion in refusing to award Lloyd's the costs ant's position that issues presented on ap-
of serving the subpoena. peal were novel or fairly debatable. 
III. FINDINGS 
Lloyd's third claim of error is that the 
trial court's findings are not supported by 
the evidence. Because we hold that that 
the trial court erred in denying the motion 
to amend, we need not reach the issue of 
whether the findings are supported by the 
evidence. 
The judgment of the trial court is vacat-
ed and the matter remanded for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opin-
ion. 
BILLINGS and BENCH, JJ., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Dickie Lynn STUKES, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 880154-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 22, 1988. 
Following ruling of the Third District 
Court, Summit County, Pat B. Brian, J., on 
search issue, defendant filed petition for 
certificate of probable cause. The Court of 
Bradley P. Rich, Yengich, Rich, Xaix & 
Metos, Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, State Atty. Gen., 
Sandra L. Sjogren, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
Before JACKSON, ORME and 
GREENWOOD, JJ. (On Law and 
Motion). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on a 
Petition for Certificate of Probable Cause. 
Appellant's counsel filed the petition on 
March 10, 1988. It was accompanied by a 
brief Memorandum of Points and Authori-
ties, but was not supported by the affidavit 
of counsel required by State v. Neeley, 707 
P.2d 647 (Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme 
Court set forth the rationale for the proce-
dure mandated in Neeley as follows: 
The record of proceedings below is not 
available in this Court at the time such 
petitions are brought. In addition, the 
petitions filed by the defendants are gen-
erally conclusory and contain little infor-
mation concerning the case. The attor-
ney general, who is by law required to 
argue before this Court, is uninformed 
concerning the facts of the case or the 
proceedings taken in the court below and 
therefore finds it difficult to respond to 
petitions for certificates of probable 
cause. This Court is likewise un-
informed concerning the record until oral 
argument. In order that this Court may 
make an informed decision in issuing cer-
TabW 
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all witnesses who have not been exam-
ined. He may also cause the witnesses 
to he kept separate, and to he prevented 
from conversing with each other until 
they have all been examined. [Empha-
sis added.] 
'litis there is vested in the trial judge a 
eparatc discretion on both whether to ex-
lude the witnesses, and whether he should 
idmonish them to keep apart and not talk 
o each other. 
[3] We do not doubt that if there is 
some reason to exclude the witnesses, it 
would seem that in most instances the 
latter admonition should also be given. 
However, in this case, in addition to the 
fact that it was discretionary with the 
trial judge,11 there are additional reasons 
why we do not regard the omission of the 
admonition as reversible error: (1) there 
was no request for such an admonition; 
and (2) there is no indication as to how 
whatever may have been discussed (which 
is not shown except in generality) would 
have had any adverse effect upon the de-
fendant. 
[4, 5] As to point (3) : defendant at-
tacks his conviction on the ground of vari-
ance between the charge as made against 
him and the proof as to the ownership of 
the meat in question: that the information 
stated it belonged to (iary Hill, whereas 
the evidence showed that it belonged to a 
partnership of Mr. Hill and a Mr. d ran t 
Thompson. The reason this contention 
fails is that one who steals property has no 
standing to question the title of anyone in 
6. S«M» Stuff v. Keiuhuk . 2.'M Or. HI2. 
30S l \2d 471. 
7. SIM» IVoplo v. Edwards. 72 Cnl.Anp. 102, 
2:M» l \ '.Ml. 050 ; ItiirrHli v. State, 45.'? 
1\2<1 312 (Okl.Cr.lJMMM. 
8. See also Sir. 77 21 17, r.C.A.IWtf. 
which states with i-«'s|M»ct to nitrtnorsliip 
lawful possession from whom it is taken.1 
The court correctly stated to the jury that: 
* * * The state must establish either 
that (iary Hill was such owner, or that 
he had some kind of special ownership 
or special right of possession.8 
[61 In defendant's point (4) he argues 
that although Mr. Hill testified that meat 
was missing from his plant, he could not 
say exactly the amount thereof nor exactly 
when it was taken; and that though Hill 
saw the meat and his labels thereon in 
the county jail, it was not proved to be 
the same meat taken from the defendants 
by Officer Julian. However, Mr. Hill 
identified the meat to the best of Ins ability 
from the photographs of the packages tak-
en at the scene, and from the observations 
made of them at the county jail. Any lack 
of positiveness in his testimony could as 
well be regarded by the jury as indicating 
his honesty as it could in discrediting the 
evidence. In any event, the matter com-
plained of by the defendant goes to the 
credibility of the State's evidence, and not 
to its competency. Eroni that evidence, 
and the inferences that reasonably could be 
drawn therefrom, the jury could reason-
ably find, as its verdict indicated that it 
did: that the meat in question was stolen 
from the packing plant in Brigham City; 
that recently after its theft it was found 
in the possession of the defendant; that 
he made a false, and therefore ipso facto 
unsatisfactory, explanation of his posses-
sion, which facts justified the verdict of 
guilty of its theft.9 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
CALL1STER, C. J., and TUCKETT. 
HENRIOD and ELLETT, JJ., concur. 
property t ha t : '* * * * it is sufficient 
to refer to or ileseribe such property as 
IH'IOIIKUIK to any one or MI ore of .such 
partners * * *." (Emphasis added.) 
9. Sec. 7«»-:5X-1. r.<\A.1!>.r»:i: State v. 
I W l l o . 40 Ctah fit*, 11!) I \ 1023; State 
v. Allied, 1(1 Ctah 2d 41, 305 IV2.1 
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
David Craig CARLSEN, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 11876. 
Supreme Court of Ctah. 
Feh. 5, 1071. 
Defendant was convicted he fore the 
hirst District Court, Cache County, Lewis 
Jones, J., of attempted second-degree hur-
glary, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Tuckett, )., held that where trial court 
directed clerk to furnish defendant true 
and complete copy of documents, minute 
entries and transcript of proceedings with-
out cost to him and where defendant was 
notified that transcript filed in Supreme 
Court would he made availahle In him for 
purpose of aiding him in appeal, convic-
tion for attempted second-degree hurglary 
was not improper on ground that trial 
court failed to furnish defendant without 
cost copies of minute entries and transcript 
of proceedings of his trial. 
Affirmed. 
Criminal Law <3=»I077 
Where trial court directed clerk to 
furnish defendant true and complete copy 
of documents, minute entries and transcript 
of proceedings without cost to him and 
where defendant was notified that tran-
script filed in Supreme Court would he 
made availahle to him for purpose of aid-
ing him in appeal, conviction for attempt-
ed second-degree hurglary was not improp-
er on ground that trial court failed to fur-
nish defendant without cost copies of min-
ute entries and transcript of proceedings of 
his trial. 
David Craig Carlsen, pro se. 
Vernon K. Romney, Atty. den., Lauren 
N. Rcaslcy, Asst. Atty. C.en., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
The defendant was found guilty of at-
tempted second-degree hurglary, and from 
the verdict and the judgment of the court 
sentencing the defendant to a term in the 
Utah State Prison he has appealed. The 
sole hasis of the defendant's appeal is 
that the trial court failed to furnish him 
without cost copies of minute entries and 
a transcript of the proceedings of his trial. 
The record hclies defendant's contention 
in that it shows that the court helow did in 
fact make an order directing the clerk to 
furnish the defendant a true and com-
plete copy of the documents, minute entries 
and a transcript of the proceedings with-
out cost to the defendant. The record also 
shows that the defendant was notified that 
the transcript filed in this court would he 
made availahle to him for the purpose of 
aiding him in this appeal. 
It appears that the defendant's conten-
tions hefore this court are without merit 
and the verdict and judgment of the court 
helow are affirmed. 
CALLLSTER, C. J., and HENRIOD, 
E L L E T T and CROCKETT, J J., concur. 
(o ! «n IVHMn SVSICM) 
23 Utah 2d 311 
Barbara LYON, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNI -
TY COMPANY and Yoscmlte Insurance 
Company, Defendants and Appellant. 
No. 12068. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feh. 0, 1071. 
Injured passenger, after ohtaining 
judgment against uninsured motorist and 
another for injuries sustained in motor ve-
hicle collision, hrought action to recover 
henefits under uninsured motorist coverage 
of two policies. The Third District Court, 
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Salt Lake County, Gordon R. Hall, J., en-
tered judgment for the passenger. Her in-
surer appealed, and she cross-appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Callister, C. J., held 
that where policy contained uninsured mo-
torist endorsement with limit of $20,000 
per person hut contained provision that the 
endorsement applied only in amount hy 
which limit of liability exceeded applicable 
limit of liability of other similar insurance 
and where the passenger recovered under 
another policy containing $10,000 unin-
sured motorist endorsement, the former 
policy's excess-escape clause was effective 
and the passenger was only entitled to re-
cover on the former policy the difference 
between limits of the policies' endorse-
ments notwithstanding uninsured motorist 
statute, but that the passenger was entitled 
to interest on judgment on the policies only 
from time that judgment was rendered 
against uninsured motorist and another. 
Judgment reversed and cause remand-
ed with order to render judgment in ac-
cordance with opinion. 
Ilcnriod, J., did not participate herein. 
I. Insurance C=*53l.3 
Purpose of uninsured motorist statute 
is to provide protection only up to mini-
mum statutory limits for bodily injuries 
, and not to provide insured with greater in-
surance protection than would have been 
available had he been injured by insured 
motorist. U.C.A.1953, 41-12-5, 41-12-21.1. 
2. Insurance C=>53l.3 
Where one policy contained uninsured 
motorist endorsement with limit of $20,000 
per person but contained provision that the 
endorsement applied only in amount by 
which limit of liability exceeded applicable 
limit of liability of other similar insurance 
and where passenger recovered under an-
other policy containing $10,000 uninsured 
motorist endorsement the former policy's 
excess-escape clause was effective and the 
passenger was only entitled to recover on 
the former policy the difference between 
limits of the policies' endorsements not-
withstanding uninsured motorist statute. 
U.C.A.1953, 41-12-5, 41-12-21.1. 
3. Insurance C=>532 
Where insured's damages exceeded 
policy limits under uninsured motorist cov-
erage and insurer was not subject to dou-
ble exposure for the insured's medical ex-
penses, the insurer was not entitled to set 
off amount that it had paid under medical 
payment coverage against amount that it 
was deemed liable to pay under uninsured 
motorist coverage under provision of poli-
cy which stated that insurer was not obli-
gated to pay under uninsured motorist cov-
erage that part of damage which represent-
ed expenses for medical services. 
4. Insurance C=^606(4) 
Where insured remained uncompensat-
ed for her total damages, her insurer was 
not entitled to receive $2,000 paid into 
court by insurer of judgment debtor on ba-
sis of former insurer's right of subrogation 
for medical payments. 
5. Insurance O»607.l(8) 
Where insurer was not entitled to 
award from another insurer based on sub-
rogation rights for medical payments, 
judgment for $500 attorneys' fees as form-
er insurer's share of expenses in recover-
ing the medical payments could not be sus-
tained. 
C. Interest 03 9 (2 ) 
Where insurer's obligation to perform, 
under expressed terms of contract, did not 
arise until there was legal determination of 
liability of uninsured motorist and extent 
of damages sustained, insured was entitled 
to interest on judgment against the insurer 
under uninsured motorist provision only 
from time that judgment was rendered 
against uninsured motorist and another. 
7. Insurance O=>602.l 
Insured was not entitled to damage for 
insurer's failure to bargain with her or set-
tle her claim in connection with uninsured 
motorist. 
LYON v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT J 
CHrntH 
Harold G. Christensen, of Worsley, 
Snow & Christensen, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants-appellant. 
Robert M. McRae, of Hatch, McRae, 
Richardson & Kinghorn, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff-respondent. 
David R. Dee and Leonard \V. Hur-
ningham, Salt Lake City, Utah, Utah Trial 
Lawyers Assn., for amicus curiae. 
CALLISTER, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff sustained serious injuries in a 
motor vehicle collision. She was a passen-
ger in the automobile of one Martinez; 
Yoseniitc Insurance Company had issued a 
liability policy upon this vehicle which con-
tained an uninsured motorist endorsement 
in accordance with Sec. 41-12-21.1, U.C. 
A. 1953, as amended 1967. In a separate 
action plaintiff was granted a jury verdict 
of $70,830.75 against the operators of two 
other motor vehicles, who were deemed 
jointly and severally liable. One driver, 
Robert (i. Hutcher, was insured with All-
state, his coverage conformed to the statu-
tory minimum as provided in Sec. 41-12-5, 
$10,000 for bodily injury or death to one 
person. The other driver, Scott G. Nickel, 
was an uninsured motorist. 
Plaintiff was an insured under a policy 
issued to her father by Hartford Accident 
and Indemnity Company, which contained 
an uninsured motorist endorsement with a 
declared limit of $20,00X) per person. In 
addition, plaintiff was covered under a 
medical expense provision. At the conclu-
sion of the plaintiff's tort action, Allstate, 
the insurer of Hutcher, tendered $10,000, 
the limit of its coverage. Plaintiff re-
ceived $8,000; the other $2,000 was paid to 
the clerk of the court because Hartford as-
serted subrogation rights to the $2,000 that 
it had paid plaintiff under the medical ex-
penses coverage. 
Plaintiff initiated the instant action to 
recover the benefits under the uninsured 
motorist coverage of both the Yoseniitc 
and Hartford policies. The trial court 
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awarded judgment to plaintiff against 
Hartford for $20,000, the face amount of 
the uninsured motorist coverage in the pol-
icy it had issued in which plaintiff was a 
named insured. Plaintiff was awarded 
judgment against Yoseniitc for $10,000, the 
maximum coverage contained under its un-
insured motorist endorsement. In addition, 
plaintiff was awarded $500 for reasonable 
attorneys' fees incurred in assisting Hart-
ford in the recovery of $2,000 medical pay-
ments from Allstate. Hartford was 
awarded the $2,0(K) under its subrogation 
rights for medical payments. The trial 
court awarded plaintiff interest from the 
day of her original judgment except for 
the $500 attorneys' fees. Hartford appeals, 
and plaintiff cross-appeals. 
On appeal, Hartford asserts that under 
the terms of its policy its obligation to 
plaintiff cannot exceed $10,000, under its 
uninsured motorist coverage, which is the 
difference between the policy limits of 
Yoscmite and Hartford. The Hartford 
policy provides: 
With respect to bodily injury to an in-
sured while occupying an automobile not 
owned by the named insured, the insur-
ance under Coverage D--Uninsured Mo-
torists shall apply only as excess insur-
ance over any other similar insurance 
available to such insured and applicable 
to such automobile as primary insurance, 
and this insurance shall then apply only 
in the amount by which the limit of lia-
bility for this coverage exceeds the ap-
plicable limit of liability of such other 
insurance. 
In Russell v. Paulson * this court upheld 
the validity of an excess-escape clause con-
tained in an uninsured motorist provision, 
wherein the insurer was obligated to pay 
only that amount by which the limits of its 
policy exceeded the limits of all other 
available insurance. In other words, 
where the insured is injured in a non-
owned vehicle upon which there has been 
issued an uninsured motorist endorsement, 
I. 18 Utah LM 157, 117 I\2il 058 (11M0). 
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he coverage to the insured under his poli-
:y constitutes excess insurance. 
Subsequent to the decision in Russell v. 
Paulson, the legislature enacted Sec. 4 1 -
12-21.1, U.C.A.1953, as amended 1967, 
which provides: 
Commencing on July 1, 1967, no auto-
mobile liability insurance policy insuring 
against loss resulting from liability im-
posed by law for bodily injury or death 
or property damage suffered by any per-
son arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance or use of a motor vehicle, shall be 
delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed 
in this state, with respect to any motor 
vehicle registered or principally garaged 
in this state, unless coverage is provided 
in such policy or a supplement to it, in 
limits for bodily injury or death set 
forth in section 41-12-5, under provi-
sions filed with and approved by the 
state insurance commission for the pro-
tection of persons insured thereunder 
who are legally entitled to recover dam-
ages from owners or operators of unin-
sured motor vehicles and hit-and-run 
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease, including death, re-
sulting therefrom. * * * 
Plaintiff convinced the trial court that 
See. 41-12-21.1 indicated a legislative in-
tent to overrule the holding in Russell v. 
Paulson; she successfully contended that 
this excess-escape clause limited the pro-
tection afforded the insured in a manner 
contrary to the policy expressed by the leg-
islature and was therefore invalid. Plain-
t i f fs argument is sustained by case author-
ity, for there has been a marked diver-
gence of opinion among the judiciary as to 
the proper interpretation of these unin-
sured motorist statutes. The two views 
are succinctly expressed in 28 A.L.R.3d 
551, 554 Anno: Uninsured Motorists— 
"Other Insurance" : 
A number of courts have held that 
"other insurance" provisions, whether in 
the form of a "pro rata," "excess insur-
ance," "excess-escape," or other similar 
clause, are invalid as a part of uninsured 
motorist protection, on the ground that 
the statute requiring every liability poli-
cy to provide this type of protection will 
not permit the insurer to provide in any 
way that the coverage will not apply 
where other insurance is also "availa-
ble," despite the fact that the insured 
may thus be put in a better position than 
he would be in if the other motorist 
were properly insured. Other courts 
have stated, however, that the design and 
purpose of uninsured motorist statutes 
are to provide protection only up to the 
minimum statutory limits for bodily inju-
ries, and not to provide the insured with 
greater insurance protection than would 
have been available had he been injured 
by an insured motorist, and have held 
such "other insurance" provisions are 
valid where they do not reduce coverage 
below the minimum statutory limits. 
[1J The latter view appears to be in 
accord with this State's statutory scheme. 
Section 41-12-21.1 is part of the Motor 
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act; the 
minimum limits of uninsured motorist cov-
erage are correlated with the minimum 
limits of coverage required for an automo-
bile liability policy under Sec. 41-12-5, U. 
C. A. 1953. 
In Tindall v. Farmers Automobile Man-
agement Corp.2 the court rejected plain-
tiff's argument that an excess-escape 
clause contained in an uninsured motorist 
provision violated the Illinois uninsured 
motorist statute (paragraph 755(a) (Sec. 
143a) of Chap. 7$, Ill.Rev.Stat. (111.1ns. 
Code)). The court observed that the stat-
utory provision was designed to promote 
and encourage protection complementary to 
that afforded by the financial responsibili-
ty act, thereby affording coverage to the 
same extent as would have been in effect 
if the tort-feasor had complied with the 
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minimum requirements of the financial re-
sponsibility act.:t 
In Martin v. Christcnscn,4 this court 
held that the provisions of Sec. 41-12-21.1 
did not preclude the application of a clause 
providing that if the company had issued 
more than one policy to the insured, the in-
surer would be liable only up to the maxi-
mum coverage of its highest limit of any 
one policy for any one accident or loss. 
This court cited as authority M. F. A. Mu-
tual Ins. Co. v .Wallace5 in its rejection of 
the argument of insured, that the statute 
fixed the minimum coverage under each 
policy separately; and, therefore, the in-
sured was entitled to the maximum amount 
under both policies. 
In 52 Virginia Law Review 538, 554-557 
(1966), there is an incisive critique of the 
recent judicial trend of permitting the 
stacking of policies, i. e., the courts have 
allowed recovery up to the combined limits 
of each policy available to the injured in-
sured by ruling that "excess" or "other in-
surance" clauses were invalid. The author 
asserts that the Uninsured Motorist Acts 
are not being applied in a manner which 
places the victim of an uninsured motorist 
upon an equal footing with the victim of 
an insured motorist. In reference to the 
Virginia Act, the author states: 
In these cases the courts have looked 
only to the number of policies available 
to pay the judgment obtained against the 
uninsured motorist. No thought has 
been given to the fact that the act was 
intended merely to fill, not overflow, an 
insurance vacuum. Surely the (ieneral 
Assembly did not intend to foster a 
scheme whereby the innocent victim of 
an insured motorist may be penalized. 
It seems more logical that it intended to 
3. Also see lliin-is v. Southern Farm I'u-
reau Casualty Ins. Co., Ark., 4IS S.W.2.1 
052 (107O); M.RA. Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Wallace, 245 Ark. 230. 431 K.\\\2<1 742 
(100K) ; Jackson v. Stair Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co., La. A pp.. 235 So. 
2d 021 (11)70); Long v. 1'nitnl Stairs 
Fire Ins. Co., l.a.App., 23(1 So.24 521 
(107<M; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Howe, 
KM! X.ll . 422, 213 A.2.1 420 (1005); 
P.2.1 73J> 
guarantee a source from which an in-
sured could recover his damages up to 
limits of $15,0<K)/$30,(XK)/$5,(MX) with re-
spect to any accident. 
* * * * * * 
\\y their application of the Uninsured 
Motorist Act, the courts in many in-
stances have placed the innocent victim 
of an uninsured motorist in a superior 
position to that which he would have oc-
cupied if his wrongdoer had had liability 
coverage. The pendulum has made the 
full swing. Hefore the enactment of the 
Uninsured Motorist Act, one who had 
taken pains to protect the public against 
the effect of his own negligence by 
carrying insurance was himself left un-
protected against the effect of the negli-
gence of an uninsured motorist. Today 
the same person, through his uninsured 
motorist endorsement, is usually better 
protected and procedurally is in a better 
position if the wrongdoer is uninsured. 
12] A careful review of the case law 
reveals that the better reasoned cases give 
effect to an excess-escape clause contained 
in an uninsured motorist endorsement. In 
the instant action, the trial court erred by 
its refusal to apply such a clause in Hart-
ford's policy. Plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover only the difference between the lim-
its of the policies issued by Hartford and 
Yosemitc, i. e., $10,000. 
Defendant, Hartford, further contends 
that it is entitled to set off the $2,000 that 
it has paid under the medical payments 
coverage against the amount that it is 
deemed liable to pay plaintiff under the 
uninsured motorist coverage. Hartford 
cites the following provision in its policy: 
The company shall not be obligated to 
pay under Coverage I)—Uninsured Mo-
eonlra, Moreloek v. Millars' Mutual Ins. 
Assn.. 125 III.App.2«l 2*3. 2(»0 N.K.24 
477 (1070), wherein I In' court, Appellate, 
5th District, declined to follow the hold-
ings of the other Illinois Appellate Courts. 
4. 22 I t ah 2«l 415, 
(1000). 
5. Note 3, supra. 
17. 451 l\2il 204 
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orists that part of the damage which the 
insured may he entitled to recover from 
the owner or operator of an uninsured 
highway vehicle which represents ex-
penses for medical services paid or pay-
ahle under Coverage \\—Medical Ex-
pense. 
A similar provision was interpreted by 
le court in Taylor v. State Farm Mutual 
utomobile Ins. Co.6 as follows: 
* * * we consider it to he designed 
to protect the insurance company from 
double exposure for medical payments. 
Thus, it prevents an insured whose medi-
cal expenses have been paid under the 
Medical Payments Coverage from col-
lecting for those medical expenses once 
again, in the event that a judgment for 
general damages in his favor and against 
the insurance company under its Unin-
sured Motorist Coverage falls below the 
policy limits of that coverage. However, 
in a case such as Mr. Taylor's where the 
award for general damages exceeds the 
policy limits on Uninsured Motorist Cov-
erage, the insurance company must pay 
its insured the full limits of the policy, 
in this case $5,000 regardless of what it 
has paid him under the Medical Pay-
ments Coverage. We are fortified in 
our interpretation of this amendment by 
the fact that this is the only just mean-
ing that it could have. Mr. Taylor paid 
two separate premiums for two separate 
coverages. * * * To interpret the 
amendment as the company would have 
us do, would make the Medical Payment 
Coverage useless except in cases where 
the insured suffered physical injury as a 
result of his own negligence. * * * 7 
13] In the instant action, plaintiff's 
damages exceeded the policy limits under 
the uninsured motorist coverage, and Hart-
6. Ln.App., 237 So.2d 000, 093 (1070). 
7. Also Hvv Hutchison v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indemnity Co., 34 A.l».2d 1010, 
312 X.Y.S.2d 7S0 (1970). 
8. State Farm Mutual In.s. Co. v. FnrmerH 
Kxcluingc, 22 Utah 2d 183, 181, 450 P. 
2d 458 (1000). 
ford was not subject to double exposure 
for plaintiff's medical expenses. Under 
such circumstances, Hartford was not enti-
tled to offset the medical payments against 
the uninsured motorist coverage. 
Plaintiff in her cross-appeal asserts that 
the trial court erred in its award to Hart-
ford the $2,000 paid into the court by Alb 
state under Hartford's right of subroga-
tion for medical payments, when plaintiff's 
damages far exceed her recovery therefor. 
Subrogation springs from erpiity con-
cluding that one having been reimbursed 
for a specific loss should not be entitled 
to a second reimbursement therefor. 
This principle has been accepted in the 
insurance field with respect to property 
damage, and with respect to medical 
costs by an impressive weight of authori-
ty. * * *» 
The Hartford policy provides: 
In the event of any payment under 
Coverage II—Medical Fxpcnsc of this 
policy, the company shall be subrogated 
to all the rights of recovery therefor 
which the injured person or anyone re-
ceiving such payment may have against 
any person or organization and such per-
son shall execute and deliver instruments 
and papers and do whatever else is nec-
essary to secure such rights. Such per-
son shall do nothing after loss to preju-
dice such rights. 
Since subrogation is an offspring of eq-
uity, equitable principles apply, even when 
the subrogation is based on contract, ex-
cept as modified by specific provisions in 
the contract. In the absence of express 
terms to the contrary, the insured is enti-
tled to be made whole before the insurer 
may recover any portion of the recovery 
from the tort-feasor.9 If the one responsi-
ble has paid the full extent of the loss, the 
9. ProvidoiM'tt Washington Insurance (V>. v. 
I lowers. 07 N..l.Sni»er. 475, 171 A.2d 120, 
124 (10(H); First National Hank of 
Lnfayette v. Stovall, La.A pp., 128 So. 
2d 712. 717 (1061) ; 4(1 C.J.S. Insurance 
§ 1200, p. 155. 
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insured should not claim both sums, and 
the insurer may then assert its claim to 
subrogation.10 
[4,5] In the instant action, there are 
no terms in this general subrogation clause 
which would support Hartford's subroga-
tion claim to the $2,000, while plaintiff re-
mains uncompensated for her total dam-
ages. Furthermore, since Hartford is not 
entitled to the award, the judgment for 
$500 attorneys' fees as Hartford's share 
of expenses in recovering the medical pay-
ments cannot be sustained. 
Plaintiff further asserts that since this is 
an action in contract between an insured 
and an insurer, she is entitled to interest 
from the date of her loss, the date of the 
accident, and not from the date she was 
granted judgment against the tort-feasors. 
The insurance contract provides: 
The company will pay all sums which 
the insured shall be legally entitled to re-
cover os damages from the owner or op-
erator of an uninsured motor vehicle. 
* * * [Fmphasis added.] 
[6] Since Hartford's obligation to per-
form, under the express terms of its con-
tract with the insured, did not arise until 
there was a legal determination of the lia-
bility of the uninsured motorist and the ex-
tent of the damages sustained, the insured, 
plaintiff, is entitled to interest only from 
the time that judgment was rendered 
against the tort-feasors. 
[7] Finally, plaintiff contends that the 
trial court should have awarded her dam-
ages for Hartford's failure to bargain with 
her or settle her claim. She concedes that 
there is no case in point but asserts that 
this court should analogize her situation to 
that where a liability insurer refuses in 
bad faith to settle a claim with third parties 
within the policy limits and a judgment in 
excess of the policy limits is rendered 
against the insured.11 She reasons that by 
Hartford's failure to bargain, she was 
compelled to incur legal expenses for 
which she is entitled to be compensated. 
Plaintiff's analogy is untenable because 
of the distinction in the relationship be-
tween a liability insurer and its insured 
and that between the insurer and its in-
sured in connection with an uninsured mo-
torist. In the former situation, the insurer 
must act in good faith and be as zealous in 
protecting the interests of the insured as it 
would be in regard to its own.12 hi the 
latter situation, the insured and the insurer 
are, in effect and practically speaking, 
adversaries.13 
The judgment of the district court is re-
versed, and this cause is remanded with an 
order to render judgment in accordance 
with this opinion. Each party should bear 
its own costs. 
TUCK F I T , F L F F T T 
KTT, J J., concur. 
IIF.NRIOD, J., does 
herein. 
and CROCK-
not participate 
mitH> 
25 Utah 2d 310 
Jamas P. KNUCKLES, Plaintiff ««* 
Respondent, 
v. 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, De-
fendant and Appellant. 
No. 12254. 
Supreme Court of Ftah. 
Feh. 5, 11171. 
Action by insured against insurer for 
benefits under policy for loss of sight. 
The Seventh District Court, Grand County, 
10. MeCuiiiiell v. Coiiawny, 02 Ohio A pp. 
335, 23 N.R.2tl 070. 071 (1030). 
M. Ammonium v. Farmers fun. Kxchange, 
10 Ft.ih 2d 201, 130 l\2d f>70 (1007). 
4R0 P 2 d - 4 7 > ? 
12. Amincriuan v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 
note 11, supra. 
13. 7 Appleiiuin, Insurance Law and Prac-
tice, 1070 Supp., § 1331, p. 12S. 
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irnacy to b r i n g h im wi th in the class of 
pe r sons w h o a r c p e r m i t t e d to inher i t by 
the law of the s i tus is a ques t ion , not of 
descent o r d i s t r i bu t ion , but of personal 
s t a tus , and as such is g o v e r n e d by the 
persona l law of the child, and the exis-
tence or acquis i t ion of a l eg i t imate s t a tus 
by the ch i ld ' s pe r sona l law will be given 
effect u n d e r the i n h e r i t a n c e law of the 
si tus ( so long as such recogn i t ion does 
not v iola te the public policy of the forum 
or s i t u s ) , as will the denia l of such sta-
tus . 
And we th ink the eminen t Prof . Hcalc in 
bis "Conf l i c t s of L a w s , " Vol . 2, sec . 30-4.1, 
p. 1033, re f lec t s the le t ter and spir i t of our 
conclus ion and tha t of the A.U.K. c i ta t ion 
above , w h e n he said : 
If a b u s t a r d is legi t imized by the law 
of the domic i le , he may inher i t , and if 
the law of t he domici le finds him illegiti-
ma te he m a y not inher i t even though by 
the law g o v e r n i n g d i s t r ibu t ion he would 
inher i t . 
C A L U S T K R , C. J., and T U C K K T T , J., 
concur . 
C U O C K K T T , J., c o n c u r s in the result . 
K C L K T T , Ju s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g in the re-
su l t ) . 
I c o n c u r in the resul t . 1 low-ever, I can 
not see t h a t the l aws of I l l inois have any-
th ing to d o wi th the case . T h e deceased 
was a r e s iden t of U t a h , and his p roper ty is 
in U t a h . T h e r e f o r e , we need only look to 
Utah law to see w h o t akes . 1 
T h e r e is no ques t ion but wha t the moth-
er of appe l l an t s w a s i l legi t imate unde r 
Utah law as well as u n d e r Illinois law. 
T h e r e is a lso no ques t ion about her being 
a c k n o w l e d g e d by he r n a t u r a l fa ther . T h e 
fact tha t the r ecogn i t i on o c c u r r e d in Illi-
nois is of no i m p o r t a n c e . T h e law is s tat-
ed in 10 A m . J u r . 2 d B a s t a r d s § 159 as fol-
l o w s : 
1. •„».*{ Aiii..hir.lM I>»\srent ami Distribution 
g$ 1!> mid lit). 
2. Sertioit 71-4 10, U . C . A . I W K J . 
For purposes of i nhe r i t ance , 
a c k n o w l e d g m e n t o r recogni t ion may be 
suff icient , a l t h o u g h it took place in an-
o the r s tate w h e r e the fa ther res ided at 
the t ime, a n d in which the son might 
have no such r igh t to inher i t . . . . 
In Utah our s t a t u t e 2 p r o v i d e s : 
Rvery i l leg i t imate child is an heir of 
the person w h o a c k n o w l e d g e s himself to 
be the fa ther of such child, and in all 
cases is an he i r of his m o t h e r ; and in-
he r i t s his o r h e r es ta te , in whole or in 
pa r t , as the case may be, in the same 
m a n n e r as if he had been born in lawful 
wedlock. 
If the es ta te of the fa ther of the mother 
was being p r o b a t e d in U tah , these appel-
lants would t ake the s h a r e which would be-
long to their deceased mother . : t Howeve r , 
it is not the es t a t e of he r fa ther but r a the r 
is tha t of her blood half b ro the r , the legiti-
ma te son of he r fa ther , which is be ing pro-
bated. 
T h e d i s t r ibu t ion of the es t a t e must be 
m a d e p u r s u a n t to Sec t ion 7 4 - 1 - 5 , Subsec-
t ion (4) or ( 6 ) . 
Subsect ion (4 ) r e a d s : 
If t he r e is ne i the r issue, husband, 
wife, f a the r nor mo the r , t hen in equal 
sha re s to the b r o t h e r s and s i s te rs of the 
decedent , and to the ch i ld ren or g rand-
chi ldren of any deceased b r o t h e r o r sis-
ter by r igh t of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 
Subsec t ion (6 ) r e a d s : 
If the deceden t leaves ne i the r issue, 
husband , wife , fa ther , m o t h e r , brother 
nor sis ter , nor ch i ld ren or g randch i ld ren 
of any deceased b r o t h e r or s is ter , the es-
ta te mus t go to the n e x t kin in equal de-
gree , excep t i ng tha t w h e n t h e r e a r e two 
or more co l la te ra l k ind red in equal de-
gree , but c l a iming t h r o u g h different 
ances to r s , those w h o claim t h r o u g h the 
3. In r«' Chirr's Kstnte, 31 Utah 57, 8t» P. 
757 fHMXj). 
T R A N S A M E R I C A I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y v. B A R N E S 
cue us r<or» r.LM 7.s;i 
nea re s t a n c e s t o r m u s t be p r e f e r r e d to 
those c l a iming t h r o u g h an ances to r more 
r emote . 
U t a h 78;$ 
Now, the appe l l an t s t ake only t h r o u g h 
their m o t h e r . If she could not take , then 
her d a u g h t e r s c a n n o t t ake . 
At c o m m o n law i l leg i t imate ch i ld ren 
could not inher i t p r o p e r t y . 4 T h e c o m m o n 
law of Kuglaud is the law of U t a h except 
as it ha s been modi f ied by s t a t u t e ; and 
while the s t a tu t e p e r m i t s the i l legi t imate 
child to inher i t f rom its m o t h e r and from 
its fa ther if he a c k n o w l e d g e s the child to 
he his, the s t a t u t e m a k e s no p rov i s ion for 
inher i t ing from the b r o t h e r s and s i s te rs 
who a r c l eg i t ima te ch i ld r en of the i r fa ther . 
LM.» riahLM 10! 
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a California corporation, Plaintiff 
and Appellant , 
v. 
Earl R. BARNES, Defendant 
and Respondent . 
No. 12771. 
Supreme Court of ( ' tali . 
Nov. 17, l!>7*~\ 
Automobi le liability in su re r b rought 
ac t ion to en fo rce its c la imed r igh t of sub 
r o g a t i o n to ce r t a in funds received by <ie 
fendant in se t t lement of his tor t ac t ion for 
pe r sona l in ju r ies aga ins t th i rd pa r ty . T h e 
T h i r d Dis t r ic t Cour t , Sal t Lake County , 
Sect ion 74-4 11, U.C.A.1 ()53, seems to S t e w a r t M. H a n s o n , J., rendered s u m m a r y 
indicate a legis la t ive in tent that an illegiti j u d g m e n t for de f endan t , and plaint i f f ap 
mate canno t inher i t from col la te ra l half pealed. The S u p r e m e Cour t , Cal l is ter , <'. 
Mood re la t ives on the f a the r ' s s ide. It p ro- J., held that whe re record was insuff ic ient 
vides tha t the p r o p e r t y of an i l legi t imate to indicate w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t w h o had 
child w h o dies in t e s t a t e wi thou t l eav ing rece ived medical e x p e n s e p a y m e n t s from 
hushaud or wife or lawful issue will go to i n su re r , w a s paid twice for h is in ju r ies and 
his m o t h e r o r in case of he r dea th to her r ecord was i nadequa te to es tabl ish w h o had 
heirs at law. T h i s s t a t u t e p r e v e n t s the de- g r e a t e r equi ty and did not c lear ly es tabl ish 
cedent from p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the es ta te of tha t t o r t - f e a s o r s o r the i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
his half s is ter , and it would seem that the had ac tua l or cons t ruc t i ve knowledge of in 
legis lature in tended that she (o r in case of s u r e r ' s r ight of sub roga t ion , issues of fact 
her p r io r dea th , h e r d e s c e n d a n t s ) should were ra ised , p rec lud ing s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t 
not be able to s h a r e in his e s ta te . 
T h e appe l l an t s , t h e r e f o r e , canno t take 
under Subsec t ion (1 ) , sup ra , a s h a r e of the 
decedent ' s p r o p e r t y t h r o u g h the i r mo the r , 
nor can they t ake u n d e r Subsec t ion (6) 
above for the r ea son tha t they a r e not rec-
ognized in law as the " n e x t of k in ." T h e 
term "nex t of k i n " r e f e r s to neares t blood 
relat ives w h o would t ake the pe r sona l es-
tate of one w h o dies in t e s t a t e 5 and does 
not include b a s t a r d s . 0 S ince the i r m o t h e r 
for d e f e n d a n t . 
Reversed and r e m a n d e d for t r ia l . 
T u e k c l t , }., c o n c u r r e d in resul t , 
l l e n r i o d , J., d i s sen ted and filed opu 
Crocke t t , J., d i ssented and filed opin 
I. Insurance C=>606(4) 
W h e n ' an au tomobi le liability p o l i o 
could not inher i t any pa r t of the es ta te of did not specify occupan t of a vehicle beini, 
the decedent , the appe l l an t s l ikewise a re used by an insured as a "pe r son insured , " 
precluded from i n h e r i t i n g and , t he re fo re , de fendan t , who was such a pas senge r , w h o 
cannot be cons ide red as be long ing to the had been paid by in su re r unde r medical e \ 
class of " n e x t of k in . " pense c o v e r a g e and aga in s t w h o m insure r 
4. 2 Wendell's JJIaekstone ('niiuiieutaric.* 
p«B« 2M. 
5. Hallentihe h.nv I >i» -liumir.v inure NIJ.N. 
6. 10 C.J.S. Jln.stimfa § l ib 
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subsequently brought action to enforee its 
claimed right of subrogation to funds re-
ceived by defendant in settlement of his 
tort action for personal injuries against 
third party, was not an "insured" subject 
to insurer's subrogation rights under policy 
clause providing that insurer shall be sub-
rogated to all insured's rights of recovery. 
I Per (allister, ( . I., with one Justice con-
curring and oiK' Justice concurring in the 
result.) 
2. Insurance G^60G(I) 
Regardless of an express contract pro-
vision, an insurer may b< entitled to subro-
gation. (IVr (.'allister, C. J , with one Jus-
tic*' concurring and one Justice concurring 
in the result.) 
3. Subrogation C^l 
imputable principles apply to subroga-
tion. (IVr ( allister, < '. J., with our Justice 
concurring and one J list ice concurring in 
tin result. I 
4. Insurance C^GOfi(l) 
Insured is entitled to be made whole 
before insurer may recover any portion of 
insured's recovery from tort-feasor; if one 
responsible has paid full extent of the loss, 
insured should not claim both sums, and in-
surer may then assert its claim to subroga-
tion. (IVr I allister, ('. J., with one Justice 
concurring and one Justice concurring in 
the result.) 
5. Subrogation 0>l 
Subrogation is not a matter of right 
but may be invoked only in those circum-
stances wlure justice demands its applica-
tion. (IVr ("allister, < . J., with one Justice 
concurring and one Justice concurring in 
the result.) 
6. Subrogation C=>» 
Subrogation is not permitted where it 
will work any injustice to others. ( IVr 
(allister, C. J., with one Justice concurring 
and one Justice concurring in the result.) 
7. Subrogation C=>i 
To entitle one to subrogation, the equi-
ties of one's case must be strong. (IVr 
(allister, C. J., with one Justice concurring 
and one Justice concurring in the result.) 
8. Subrogation C=^\ 
The purpose of subrogation, as a crea-
tion of equity, is to effect an adjustment 
between parties so as to secure ultimately 
the pa\ incut or discharge of the debt by a 
person who in good conscience ought to 
pay for it. (IVr (allister, t'. J., with one 
Justice concurring and one Justice concur-
ring in the result.) 
9. Insurance C=»G06( 10) 
If third-party tort-feasor's settlement 
with person who had received payment 
from automobile liability insurer for medi-
cal expenses was intended to include the 
prior medical expenses paid for by insurer, 
two drafts should have been issued, one to 
insurer and person receiving benefits joint-
ly and one to that person alone. (IVr (al-
lister, ('. J., with one Justice concurring 
and one Justice concurring in the result.) 
10. Insurance C f^>0(i(IO) 
If settlement by third party tort feasor 
with person who had received medical ex-
pense payments from automobile liability 
insurer was made with knowledge, actual 
or constructive, of insurer's subrogation 
right, such settlement and release was a 
fraud on insurer and would not affect in-
surer's right of subrogation as against 
tort feasor or his insurer. (IVr (allister, 
C. J., with one Justice concurring and one 
Justice concurring in the result.) 
11. Judgment C=>IB5.3(I2) 
When record, in automobile liability 
insurer's action to enforce its claimed right 
of subrogation to certain funds received by 
defendant in settlement of his tort action 
for persnnal injuries against third party, 
was insufficient to indicate whether de-
fendant, who had received medical expense 
payments from insurer, was paid twice for 
his injuries and record was inadequate to 
establish who had greater equity and did 
not clearly establish that tort-feasors or 
their representatives had actual or con-
structive knowledge of insurer's right of 
subrogating issues of fact were raised, 
precluding summary judgment for defend-
ant. (Per (.'allister, C. J., with one Justice 
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY v. BARNES 
('h>Ks.r)fl.r» IV1M 7S.{ 
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concurring and one Justice concurring in 
the result.) 
12. Insurance €=3606(10) 
If an insurer has had an opportunity 
to assert its subrogation rights to third-
party tort-feasors who have entered into 
settlement with person against whom sub-
rogation rights arc claimed and insured has 
neglected to give notice or enforce its ele 
mauds, it may be determined under such 
circumstances that insurer's rights in equi-
ty are equal or inferior to those of person 
against whom subrogation is claimed. 
(IVr (allister, C. J., with one Justice con-
curring and one Justice concurring in the 
result.) 
13. Equity €=>54 
F.quity will not relieve one who could 
have relieved himself. (Per ('allister, (\ 
J., with one Justice concurring and one 
Justice concurring in the result.) 
14. Insurance G=>60l.2 
Insurer, to establish a superior equity 
against person who has received medical 
expense payments from insurer and there-
after recovered against third party tort-
feasors, and thus to he entitled to prevail 
in subrogation action, must present proof 
which establishes that damages recovered 
by defendant's settlement were the same or 
cover those for which defendant has al-
ready received indemnity from insurer; 
otherwise1, receipt of payment from tort-
feasor does not entitle insurer to return of 
payments made by it. (IVr Callister, (\ J., 
with one Justice concurring ami one' Jus-
tice concurring in the result.) 
Allan L. Larson, of Wen shy, Snow & 
("hrislensen, Salt Lake1 City, for plaintiff 
.mil appellant. 
William II. Henderson and Mark S. 
Miner, Salt Lake City, fe)r defendant and 
respondent. 
CAU.ISTKR, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff insurer initiated this action te> 
enforce its claimed right of subrogation to 
5U5 P.?d-'->0 
certain funds received by defendant in set-
tlement e>f his tort action for personal in-
juries against thirel parties. Hoth parties 
moved for summary judgment based em the 
pleadings, affidavits, admissions and an-
swers to interrogatories; the trial court 
granted judgment to the defendant. Plain-
tiff appeals therefrom and seeks judgment 
rendered in its favor. 
Defendant was a passenger in a motor 
vehicle, owned and operated by one Jen-
son; plaintiff had issued a policy of insur-
ance to Jenson. The vehicle was involved 
in a collision, and defendant sustained per-
sonal injuries. Plaintiff, under its medical 
expense coverage, paid defendant $1,()00, 
the maximum benefit under the policy. 
Thereafter, defendant filed an action 
against the alleged tort-feasors, whom he 
claimed by their negligence caused the col-
lisiem with the vehicle in which he' was rid-
ing. Defendant alleged that he' had sus-
taineel permanent injuries, auel sought 
$65,IMX> general damages anil $il),(X)0 spe-
cial damages. Plaintiff notified defend-
ant's attorney of its claimed subrogation 
right; however, plaintiff refused to partic-
ipate in defendant's action or te) permit his 
counsel to act on its behalf. Defendant 
has emphasized that the law firm that rep-
resents plaintiff also representee! the tort-
feasors, with whom defendant entereel into 
a settlement for a lump sum of $7,5(H). 
Plaintiff claims that it is entitled to reim-
bursement to the extent of $l,()00 less a 
reasonable attorney's fee and its propor-
tionate share of the costs from the fund 
recovered by defendant from the tort-fea-
sors. 
Plaintiff predicates its right e>f subroga-
tion on three alternative theories: one, on 
an express contract as provided in the in-
surance policy issued to Jenson; two, on 
an implied contract as money had and re-
ceiveel; or thirel, on a ejuasi contract for 
unjust enrichment. 
The insurance contract provided that the 
company would pay, "on behalf of the in-
sured," all reasonable medical expenses for 
bodily injury caused by accident and sus-
7 8 6 i[t» ,J 
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tained l>y any person while occupying an 
owned automobile while being used by an 
insured. The policy further defined an 
"insured" as a person or organization de-
scribed under "Persons Insured." l.'nder 
the express provisions of the policy, an oc-
cupant of a vehicle being used by an in-
sured was not specified as a "person in-
sured." The subrogation clause of the pol-
icy provided: 
In the event of any payment under 
the Liability or Medical Kxpense (over-
age or under Part II of this policy, the 
company shall be subrogated to all the 
insured's rights of recovery therefor 
against any person or organization and 
the insured shall execute and deliver in-
struments and papers and do whatever 
else is necessary to secure such rights. 
The insured shall do nothing after loss 
to prejudice such rights. | Kmphasis 
added. | 
[1,2] From the foregoing, defendant 
was not an "insured" under the express 
provisions of the contract; and, therefore, 
it may not be urged that as an insured he 
breached the contractual provisions of the 
subrogation clause. Regardless of an ex-
press contract provision, an insurer may be 
entitled to subrogation. 
Subrogation springs from emiity con 
eluding that one having been reimbursed 
for a specific loss should not be entitled 
to a second reimbursement therefor. 
This principle has been accepted in the 
insurance field with respect to property 
damage, and with respect to medical 
costs by an impressive weight of authori-
ty. . . .• 
| 3-81 Imputable principles apply to sub-
rogation, and the insured is entitled to be 
made whole before the insurer may recover 
any portion of the recovery from the tort-
1. Slat*' Farm Mutual I us. < V v. Farmers 
his. KM•liaiuie. 22 Flab 2d is:;. 1st. ir,o 
l\2d jr>S (1!MHh. 
2. L>on v. Hartford Are. iV Imlcm. Co., 2"i 
Ftah IM :sii. :ns , iso IMM IM 0071 >. 
3 Heaver County V. Home hidein. Co., NS 
Ftah i, :».u :i7. rvj IMM i:;r> do:;ri). 
feasor. If the one responsible has paid the 
full extent of the loss, the insurer should 
not claim both sums, and the insurer may 
then assert its claim to subrogation.2 Sub-
rogation is not a matter of right but may 
be invoked only in those circumstances 
where justice demands its application, and 
the rights of the one seeking subrogation 
have a greater equity than the one who op-
poses hini.:< Subrogation is not permitted 
where it will work any injustice to others. 
To entitle one to subrogation, the equities 
of one's case must be strong, as equity will, 
in general, relieve only those who could 
not have relieved themselves.1 The pur-
pose of subrogation, as a creation of equi-
ty, is to effect an adjustment between par-
ties so as to secure ultimately the payment 
or discharge of a debt by a person who in 
good conscience ought to pay for it.5 
Plaintiff urges that defendant's settle-
ment and release of his entire claim must 
necessarily include all of his medical ex-
penses, and therefore, he has received dou-
ble paxment to the extent that plaintiff 
paid under its medical coverage. On the 
other hand, defendant claims that he sus-
tained severe injuries, hut he was compelled 
to settle for a sum that inadequately com-
pensated him for the total damages sus-
tained. 
19. 101 The settlement was for a lump 
sum without apportionment as to specific 
items of damage. From the state of the 
instant record, there is insufficient evi-
dence to indicate whither defendant was 
paid twice. When the settlement was 
made, the tort-feasors or their representa-
tives apparently had actual or constructive 
knowledge that some of defendant's medi-
cal expenses had previously been paid by 
plaintiff. Perhaps the negotiated settle-
ment was reduced by this amount, particu-
larly when defendant's counsel had been 
4. Aslilou .b'likins his. I 'D. V. I.avion Sugar 
Co., so I i;1i, :\:\:\. :;:t7. :io l\2d 701 
(P.KIoL 
5. Holmsieail v. Abbott O. M. Diesel, In.-.. 
1!7 1 tali 'J.I 100. VX1 I'.iM r,2."i (VM2). 
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informed that he- did not represent plain-
tiffs interest. If the settlement were in-
tended to include plaintiff's prior medical 
expenses, two drafts should have been is-
sued, one to plaintiff and defendant jointly 
and one te> defendant, alone. If the settle-
ment were made with knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of plaintiff's subrogation 
right, such settlement and release is a 
fraud on the insurer and will not affect 
the insurer's right of subrogation as 
against the tort-feasor or his insurance 
carrier.8 
tort-feasor does not entitle the plaintiff to 
the return e>f the payments made by it." 
This cause is reversed and remanded for 
a trial in accordance with this opinion. 
N<J costs are awareled. 
KLFKTT, J., concurs. 
TUCKKTT, J., concurs in the result. 
HKNRIOD, Justice (dissenting): 
J elissent. The main opinion indulges 
generalities as substitutes for the facts in 
subrogation matters relating to insurance 
[11-14J The present state of the record contracts. 
inadequate to establish who has the 
greater equity. The record does not clear-
ly establish that the tort-feasors or their 
representatives had acttial or constructive 
knowledge e>f plaintiff's right of subroga-
tion. If such fact be established, they may 
not disregard plaintiff's known subrogation 
right in settling the liability. In such a 
case, the te>rt-fease>rs in good conscience 
should discharge the liability and plaintiff 
docs ne>t have a right in equity superior 
to defendant's. Furthermore, if plaintiff 
had nu opportunity to assert its subroga-
tion rights te> the tort-feasors and neglected 
to give' notice or enforce its demands, the 
trial court may determine under such cir-
cumstances that plaintiff's rights in equity 
are equal or inferior te> defendant's, i. e\, 
equity will not relieve one who could have 
relieved himself. The plaintiff tej establish 
a superior equity and thus to be entitled to 
prevail must present pre>e>f which establish-
es that the damages covered by defendant's 
settlement were the same or cover those 
for which the defendant has already re-
ceived indemnity from plaintiff; other-
wise, the receipt of payment from the 
The policy in this case provided two 
things pertinent to this ease: It insuied 
liarnes, defendant here, who was no signa-
tory to the insurance contract, but a bene-
ficiary thereof, by the happenstance- that 
he' was a passenger in the car owned by 
the insured who paid the premium. As 
such beneficiary he obtained no greater 
rights under the policy than did the in 
sured, and under the terms e)f the' policy 
the insurance company, plaintiff here, was 
I) required to pay medical benefits to the 
defendant, as passenger, and 2) was subro-
gated, in equity, which is the- ease here, to 
any recovery for such benefits made- by 
defendant.1 
Dcfcnelant, having full knowledge of the 
policy terms, after having been paid the 
maximum medical benefits of $1,000 by the 
plaintiff insurance' company, sued for both 
medical and general damages. At this 
point the insurance company, plaintiff 
here, notified Jiarnes of its equitable right 
of subrogation to recover back what it had 
paiel liarnes ($1,(KK)) for the medicals. 
Panics settled his suit against the tort-fea-
sor fe>r $7,500, giving a full release for all 
Hi dwell On Insurance 2d, § (>| :1J)7, |>|>. 
.'{IS .*>."»<>; Davenport v. State Farm Mu-
tual Auto. Ins. Co., 81 Nrv. .'Mil, -MM 
I MM 10 (1!Mjr>) ; Hospital Service Corp. 
of Khode Island v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 
101 It.l. 708, 227 A.2d 105, 111* (10071 ; 
Sentry Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 210 Ark. (ISO. 
1.10 S.YV.LM 707. 700 (1000) ; 0A Apple-
man Jus. Law & I'raetiee, § 1002, p. 210. 
7. 15 Itlashfield Automobile Law and l'rae-
tiee, $ ISI.U, p. 102. 
I. There was nothing therein requiring the 
company to sue for or assist Haines in 
recovering anything oilier than what the 
eompany had paid under the policy, the 
maximum $1,000. 
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claims, without insisting that the release 
include or exclude the medical payment of 
$1,000 already paid. In equity one is said 
to he required to do equity. If this he so, 
Harnes should have said "I have heen paid 
$1,000 on the claim for medical damages 
which I sued you for along with general 
damages, and therefore I cannot give you 
a release for all claims unless you either 
pay an additional $1,000 to the insurance 
company or make out two checks, one to it 
for its equitahle subrogation right of reim-
bursement of $1,000, leaving a second 
check to me for $6,500." Harnes having 
failed in equity either to notify the plain-
tiff company of its willingness to accept a 
sum for a "release of all claims," without 
condition or exclusion of the one claim,— 
the medical one,—is not responsive to the 
maxim that "lie who seeks equity must do 
equity."54 It is no answer for the main 
opinion to return this case to determine 
what Barnes's understanding with the de-
fendant tort-feasor's insurance carrier was, 
since such circumstances are quite irrele-
vant and inconsistent with any rights 
plaintiff and defendant here may have en-
tertained. Harnes, defendant here, cannot 
adjudge the conditions under which he may 
give a release for all claims, without reser-
vation, without being obligated to abide by 
the only contract that gave him any rights 
for medical payments at all—the insurance 
policy, and the only thing involved here. 
It seems silly for him to say that I am 
bound by the policy under which, though I 
was no signatory thereto, I am not bound, 
if the insurer doesn't intervene and protect 
me in some fantastic claim I made in my 
complaint, which I admitted in my brief 
that I, "Harnes, fearful of losing suit 
settled it for a lump sum of 
$7,500." To this author, this sounds like a 
first-class shakedown, and as icing on a 
cake that would give a double payment of 
$1,000 medical expense paid by the plain-
tiff insurance company, which latter in eq-
uity should have at least some kind of re-
lief, and which should be the amount paid, 
or $1,(XM) as compared to $7,500 settlement 
which should amount to 100% recovery, in 
my opinion, but at least a proportionate re-
covery from Harnes. Ib i s would seem to 
be equity, and there is no equity in sending 
this case back to determine any other equi-
ties between plaintiff and defendant, since 
such equities already were resolved in an 
insurance contract, to the terms of which 
Harnes was but a beneficiary, not a signa-
tory, and to which he was no party as to 
subrogation rights, and in which contract 
he was not entitled to lay down his own 
rules, but to whose terms, if he relies on 
its terms, lie must comply,—one of which 
is that certainly he cannot sign a release of 
all claims unless he recognizes the rights 
of the contract under which he has accept-
ed benefits, without reserving rights to the 
insurer in a release. 
CROCK KTT, J., dissents and files opin-
ion. 
CROCK KTT, Justice (dissenting) : 
It is important to bear in mind that, as 
correctly set forth in the main opinion, the 
defendant Harnes was not an "insured" un-
der Jensen's policy with plaintiff Traus-
america. Therefore Harnes and Trans-
america had no contractual relationship 
nor obligations to each other. Defendant 
Harnes simply became a third-party benefi-
ciary of Transamerica's promise to its in-
sured, Jensen, that it would pay up to 
$1000 medical to any occupant of his car 
who was injured. It should be assumed 
that Jensen both desired and paid for this 
protection to his passengers, of which 
Harnes became a beneficiary. Transameri-
ca received the premium for that protec-
tion and should fulfill that obligation and 
should not be permitted to sue and recover 
from the third-party beneficiary (defend-
ant Harnes). Allowing it to take the mon-
ey away from the intended beneficiary to 
reimburse itself results in failure to fulfill 
the promise for which it accepted the pre-
mium, and defeats the purpose for which 
its insured (Jensen) paid his money. 
2. State Farm Mutual v. Fnrmers Insurance Exchange, 22 Utah 2d 183, 450 l\2d 158 (Ji)Gi)). 
TRANSAMERIOA INSURANCE COMPANY v. BARNES IHnh 7 8 9 
The conclusion thus slated is affirmed 
by the well known authority, Couch on In-
surance, Sec. 61:172, 2d lul., wherein it is 
stated: 
It may be required by statute or con-
tract that some person other than the in-
sured shall have the benefit of the insur-
ance procured by the insured. When 
such is the ease, the insurer may not as-
sert any claim by way of subrogation 
against such person, [this is] on the 
theory that the policy is designed to af-
ford protection to such third person ami 
this purpose would obviously be defeated 
if the insurer could sue the third person 
to recover from him the payments made 
by the insurer to the third person. (Ci-
tation) [Kmphasis added.) 
It is also significant that Transamerica's 
policy contained numerous and ample pro-
visions for its own protection, including 
rights of subrogation expressly reserved to 
itself, but it did not include the right of 
subrogation against any third-party benefi-
ciary, therefore not against one in the po-
sition of the defendant Harnes. 
further, assuming without conceding 
that there may be some circumstances 
IMIil 7S.I 
where such a subrogation would be availa-
ble to this plaintiff, it certainly would he-
obliged at least to make it clearly appear 
that $1000 of the settlement received by 
Harnes in the other suit was for the medi-
cal expense plaintiff had paid. On the ba-
sis of the pleadings, affidavits, admissions 
and answers to interrogatories, the trial 
court could view the facts thus: that inas-
much as the settlement of Harnes (defend-
ant here) in the other case wherein he set-
tled his claim of $65,000 for $7500 was 
indicated as being for his personal in 
juries, and with no segregation nor indica-
tion as to separate medical expense, there 
therefore would exist no reasonable basis 
for a finding that the $1IXK) medical ex-
pense which had been paid by plaintiff 
Transamcrica was repaid in that settle 
incur. 
On the basis of what I have said above I 
think the trial court was justified in con 
eluding that there was no disputed issue of 
fact which if resolved in favor of the 
plaintiff would entitle it to prevail, and 
that accordingly, the summary judgment 
was proper in order to avoid the time, trou-
ble and expense of a trial. 
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whether the insurance should be only on 
Mr. Lewis or whether it should be on both 
of them. Being then undecided, the Lewis-
es told Mr. Pike that they would later con-
tact him and inform him of their decision as 
to whether they wanted joint insurance. 
Pike told them that insurance could be add-
ed any time after the loan was closed. The 
disclosure statement contains a section enti-
tled "Insurance" in which the following 
statement appears: 
Credit Life And Disability Insurance is 
not required to obtain this loan. No 
charge is made for credit insurance and 
no credit insurance is provided unless the 
borrower signs the appropriate statement 
below. 
Immediately below those sentences appear 
blanks for the borrower to indicate how 
much insurance he desires, and also a space 
is provided for the lw>rrower to sign if he 
does not want credit life or disability insur-
ance. In this case, these blanks were not 
filled in and the Lewises did not sign to 
indicate whether they did or did not desire 
the insurance. 
About 10 days later the Lewises returned 
to The Lockhart Company to pick up the 
check for the proceeds of their loan. They 
saw Mr. Pike and told him they were going 
to California and he wished them "a good 
trip." The subject of the insurance was not 
discussed. In early August Mr. Lewis re-
turned to Lockhart to see Pike. The latter 
was not there and Lewis left a note for him 
relating to insurance. Mr. Lewis thereafter 
also tried to contact Pike by telephone, but 
apparently was unsuccessful. Mr. Lewis 
made a second personal visit to discuss in-
surance with Pike but again failing to find 
him, left another note for him. In response 
to that note Pike's secretary sent Mr. Lewis 
a letter informing him that Pike was on 
vacation until August 28, and that when he 
returned she would give him Lewis' note 
and "tell him what you said." Pike claims 
that he tried several times to reach Mr. 
Lewis by phone but was unsuccessful. Mr. 
Lewis died of a heart attack on September 
17 without any credit life insurance having 
been put in force. 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court 
erred in granting a summary judgment 
against her because there were genuine is-
sues as to material facts with res|>ect to 
whether Pike's failure to provide insurance 
or follow up on requests and inquiries relat-
ing to insurance constituted negligence. 
She emphasizes that during the loan closing 
she informed both Pike and her husband 
that she did not want a loan which did not 
include credit life insurance on her hus-
band's life. Thus she argues Pike was neg-
ligent in not seeing that her demand was 
fulfilled prior to the issuance of the loan 
proceeds. The difficulty with the plaintiff's 
argument is that her firm resolution to 
have insurance on her husband was not 
carried into effect by her actions at the 
time of closing. She admits that the mat-
ter of insurance was to be left open until 
she and her husband got back to Pike and 
informed him of their decision with resj>ect 
to whether they wanted joint insurance. 
She knew that no premium had been 
charged as a loan cost. She also does not 
claim that when she left the closing she 
believed that insurance on her husband was 
then in effect. While there is no question 
that she wanted her husband insured, her 
actions in leaving the closing knowing that 
no premium had been charged by Lockhart 
for any insurance renders her earlier ex-
pressed intentions for naught. It is clear 
that no order was made at closing to Pike 
by the Lewises for any insurance. She and 
her husband later picked up the check for 
the loan proceeds in the presence of Pike 
but made no inquiry nor gave any order 
respecting insurance. 
Plaintiff further contends that Pike's 
failure to follow up on Mr. Lewis' requests 
and inquiries constitutes negligence on his 
part and is actionable by her because she 
was jointly and severally liable with him on 
the loan. This argument presupjx)ses that 
there was some legal duty on Pike to con-
tact Mr. Lewis and assist him in making a 
decision as to the Lewis's insurance require-
ments. Plaintiff has not cited us to any 
authority that in such an instance there is 
any legal duty on the part of an insurance 
agent to promptly follow up on inquiries. 
WKSTLEY v. FA RIME 
Cite as 6G3 P.2d 
Had Mr. Lewis at any time given a specific 
order for insurance to Pike and then had 
Pike negligently failed to put the insurance 
in effect, we would have an entirely differ-
ent case. The plaintiff does not claim that 
an order for insurance was ever given by 
her or her husband and thus there was no 
legal duty on Pike to put any insurance in 
effect. Had the lewises determined at any 
time what insurance coverage they desired, 
presumably other persons in Lockhart could 
have taken such an order. It is regrettable 
that Mr. Lewis and Pike missed each other 
and as a consequence the insurance which 
Mrs. Lewis so strongly desired was never 
put into effect. This case serves an illus-
tration of how important decisions and 
plans are often found unmade at the time 
of an unexpected death. 
The summary judgment is affirmed. 
Costs awarded to respondent. 
HALL, C I , and STEWART, OAKS and 
DURHAM, J.I., concur. 
Dave WESTLEY, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
FARMER'S INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
dba Farmer's Insurance Group, Deveaux 
Clark and Clark Young, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 18225. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 21, 1983. 
Insurance agent brought action against 
insurance company to recover for breach of 
contract and defamation. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal Tay-
lor, .1., entered summary judgment for com-
pany, and agent appealed. The Supreme 
R'S INS. EXCHANGE Utah 9 3 
93 (Utah 1983) 
Court held that: (1) trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying insurance 
agent's motion to amend complaint, since 
amendment would have delayed trial and 
the substance of agent's new allegation was 
known a full year earlier when agent dis-
cussed it in his dej>osition, and (2) insurance 
agent could not recover from insurance 
company for breach of contract as a result 
of company's withdrawal from agent of a 
series of policies for which agent had re-
ceived renewal commission, since the con-
tract and all evidence clearly indicated that 
the policies were never intended to be part 
of the agreement entered into between the 
parties. 
Affirmed. 
1. Pleading o=»2.16(1) 
Although Rules of Civil Procedure tend 
to favor the granting of leave to amend 
complaint, the matter remains in the sound 
discretion of trial court. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 15. 
2. Pleading <s=*236(2) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying insurance agent's motion to 
amend complaint filed against insurance 
company, since amendment would have de-
layed trial and the substance of agent's new 
allegation was known a full year earlier 
when agent discussed it in his deposition. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15. 
3. Insurance o=>85 
Insurance agent could not recover from 
insurance company for breach of contract 
as a result of company's withdrawal from 
agent of a series of policies for which agent 
had received renewal commission, since the 
contract and all evidence clearly indicated 
that the policies were never intended to be 
part of the agreement entered into between 
the parties. 
Lambertus Jansen, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Warren Patten, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants and respondents. 
* * . 
• <+ 
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PER CURIAM: 
This is an appeal from pretrial rulings of 
the trial court in an action between an 
insurance agent and his company (herein-
after "Farmer's"). 
In May, 1978, plaintiff became an agent 
for Farmer's. The parties signed a contract 
which set forth the terms and conditions of 
their relationship. Although not mentioned 
in the contract, Farmer's assigned plaintiff 
certain |>olicies known as "500 series," ! for 
which plaintiff received renewal commis-
sions. 
In the spring of 1979, plaintiff entered 
into a partnership with one Joseph Roberg 
as a private investigator. Thereafter, he 
admittedly worked only part-time for 
Furmer's. In September, the partnership 
was moved to the third floor of a building 
in downtown Salt Lake City. The tele-
phone was answered "law office" and later, 
"Boberg West ley." Farmer's advised plain-
tiff that it objected to the location of plain-
tiff's office, the manner in which the tele-
phone was answered, and plaintiff's part-
time status. When plaintiff failed to reme-
dy the situation, Farmer's withdrew from 
plaintiff the "500 series" policies and reas-
signed them to another agent. 
On April 23, 1980, plaintiff filed a com-
plaint setting forth two counts. In the first 
count, plaintiff alleged that Farmer's had 
breached its contract with him in taking the 
"5(H) series" policies from him. In the? 
second count, plaintiff alleged that Farm-
er's had defamed him. Depositions were 
taken and in November, 1981, Farmer's 
moved for summary judgment on both 
counts. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff re-
tained new counsel who immediately moved 
for a continuance of the trial scheduled for 
January 13, 1982. Plaintiff also moved to 
amend the complaint to include an allega-
tion that Farmer's had maliciously removed 
plaintiff's name from the list of agents in 
the telephone directory. After a hearing, 
1. Fxistin^ insurance policies written by former 
agents. 
the trial court entered an order which (1) 
denied plaintiff's motion to amend; (2) 
granted Farmer's motion for summary 
judgment on the first count of plaintiff's 
complaint; and (3) denied Farmer's motion 
for summary judgment on the second count 
of plaintiff's complaint. At a subsequent 
settlement conference, plaintiff agreed to 
dismiss the second count. 
[1,21 On appeal, plaintiff contends that 
the court erred in not allowing him to 
amend his complaint. Although Rule 15 of 
the Utah Rides of Civil Procedure tends to 
favor the granting of leave to amend, the 
matter remains in the sound discretion of 
the trial court.2 On the facts presented, we 
arc not convinced that the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to grant 
the requested leave to amend. An amend-
ment would certainly have delayed the trial 
and the substance of plaintiff's new allega-
tion was known a full year earlier when 
plaintiff discussed it in his deposition. 
|'l| Plaintiff also contends that the pres-
ence of factual issues precludes entry of 
summary judgment under Rule 56, Utah 
Rides of Civil Procedure. The integrated 
contract itself and all evidence as to the 
parties' understanding thereof clearly indi-
cate that the "500 series" policies were nev-
er intended to be part of the agreement. 
In plaintiff's deposition, the following inter-
change occurred: 
Q. What wjts your understanding of the 
500 policies as far as the company's rights 
to take them away from you? 
A. Well, I understood that as long as 
you were servicing the policies—or the 
policyholders~ that really there should be 
no problem. However, I also knew that 
if the company wanted I suppose they 
could take them back for just about any 
reason. 
Since there are no significant disputes 
present as to the contractual relationship of 
the parties, the summary judgment stands.3 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
3. Morris \. Mountain States Tel. & I el. Co., 
Hi ah. fi.58 l\2d I19!» (1983). 
2. Duplet v. Yates. 10 Utah 2d 251. :*5I P.2d «24 
(lfHJO). 
PATTERSON v. 
Citi» as 663 l\2d 
W*y»* M. PATTERSON, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
ALPINE CITY, a Municipal Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 18114. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 21, 1983. 
City appealed from summary judgment 
rendered by the Fourth District Court, 
Utah County, J. Robert Hullock, J., declar-
ing sewer connection fee invalid. The Su-
preme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) sewer 
connection fee assessed by city was not 
established as required by law and was, 
therefore, invalid where city had not by 
resolution or ordinance in writing estab-
lished the sewer connection fee, and (2) if 
sewer connection fee was to be used to 
retire bonded indebtedness, all users in the 
system had to be treated equally, and late-
comers could not be subjected to arbitrary 
increase whereby fee of $700 in first month 
was increased to $1,000 in second month 
and $1,500 in third mouth, which was not 
required to cover increased costs, but was 
done to induce early purchase of required 
510 connections to raise sum required to be 
deposited before funding was approved by 
appropriate federal agencies. 
Affirmed. 
t. Municipal Corporations c=»100(1) 
Language of statute requiring that all 
resolutions of municipal governments shall 
be in writing is mandatory. U.C.A.1953, 
10 3 500. 
2. Municipal Corporations <3^712 
Sewer connection fee assessed by city 
was not established as required by law and 
was, therefore, invalid where city had not 
by resolution or ordinance in writing estab-
lished the sewer connection fee. U.C.A. 
1953, 10 3 5<M, 10 3 717. 
ALPINE CITY Utah 9 5 
95 (Utah 198.1) 
3. Municipal Corporations c=>712 
Municipalities may make a reasonable 
charge for the use of a sewer system in 
order that it be self-sustaining, but no 
greater charge is authorized. U.C.A.1953, 
10 8 38. 
4. Municipal Corporations c=>7!2 
If sewer connection fee was to IK; used 
to retire bonded indebtedness, all users in 
the system had to be treated equally, and 
latecomers could not l>e subjected to arbi-
trary increase! whereby fee of $700 in first 
month was increased to $1,000 in second 
month and $1,500 in third month, which was 
not required to cover increased costs, but 
was done to induce early purchase? of re-
quired 540 connections to raise sum re-
quired to be deposited lie fore funding was 
approved by appropriate federal agencies. 
U.C.A.1953, 10 8 38. 
John C. Racklund, Provo, for defendant 
and appellant. 
Ray M. Harding, Pleasant Grove, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Defendant Alpine City appeals from a 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff 
declaring a sewer connection fee invalid. 
In 1976 Alpine City joined with American 
Fork, Lehi and Pleasant Grove in establish-
ing the Timpanogos Special Service District 
to create a waste water treatment facility 
serving the named cities. In 1977, after 
obtaining various loans and grants, Alpine 
City had to deposit the sum of $375,000 
before funding was approved by the appro-
priate federal agencies. Alpine City esti-
mated that with a projected hookup of 540 
sewer connections, the initial price j>er con-
nection would IK; $700, 
In 1978 Alpine City enacted an ordinance 
which provided that a fee for connection to 
the city sewer system could be fixed from 
time to time by resolution of the city conn-
UTAH RILES OF OVIL PROCEDURE Rule 15 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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I 269 at M»q( A.L.R.4th 33* 
CJS. — 37 C.J.S. PartiM M 72 tn 84. Kpy Numbers* — Parties *» 49 to 56. 
A.I*R« — Defendant's right to contribution 
Rule 15* Amended and supplemental pleadings* 
W Amendments. A party may amend hi? pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Othenvise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by 
•\ifc-plc-ad-iirg-urc-xr-icd by cxprcf ? or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even aP-er judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation hack of amendments, Whenever the claim or defense as-
serted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading* 
id) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall 
so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Comoilcr*t Nfttes, — ThN rule is substan-
tially identical to Hole 15, FR.C.P. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Amendments. 
—After pretrial order. 
—-Alternative to dismissal. 
——Payment of attorney fees. 
Prolix complaint. 
—Amendment of response. 
—Answer. 
To include counterclaim. 
—Complaint, 
To defeat motion for summary judgment. 
To include damage*. 
—Considerations. 
Prejudice. 
—Court's discretion, 
Abused. 
Not abused. 
—Dismissal without opportunity to amend. 
—Following dismissal. 
—Late Amendment. 
Day of trial. 
— —During or after trial. 
—Reply amounting to amendment. 
Amendment to conform to evidence. 
—Allowed. 
—Alternative to dismissal. 
—Amendment unnecessary. 
——Consent to try issue. 
Evidence supporting findings. 
Issue raised by complaint. 
—Consent to try issue. 
Not found. 
—Construction of rule. 
—Defense not pl*ad<H± 
Affirmative dufetiso. 
Issue tried by parties. 
—Failure to object to evidence*. 
•—lasUtJS net pleaded. 
Mutual mistake. 
—New cause of action. 
Child support. 
—New theory of recovery. 
—Not allowed. 
—Notice. 
—Prejudice. 
—Restriction to matter pleaded or tried. 
Relation back of amendments. 
—Adding or substituting parties. 
—Statute of limitations. 
—Untimely service of ordinal complaint. 
Supplemental pieadingn. 
—Answers. 
——Allowed. 
Not allowed. 
Cited. 
Amendments. 
—A/ter pretrial order. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in al-
lowing defendant to amend his answer to in-
clude as a defense an issue that had be*n spe-
cifically excluded as a trial issue by a pretrial 
order, where the amendment was made long 
before trial, the opposing party had adequate 
Opportunity to meet the additional issue raised, 
and neither party was placed in a position of 
any greater advantage or disadvantage or prej-
udice by virtue of the amendment to the plead' 
ing. Lewis v. Muullrcti, 627 P.2d 94 tUwh 
1981). 
—Alternative to dUmUsai. 
——Payment of attorney fees. 
Where, aa a condition to filing their fourth 
amended complaint, appellants agreed to pay a 
$150 attorney fee. it was neither coercive nor 
unfair to them and U not a ground for reversal 
regardless of whether or not the payment of 
such attorney's fees are authorized by the 
Rules. The alternative was to dismiss, and in 
granting a dismissal without prejudice trie 
court could stay any new action that might be 
commenced until costs of the action that had 
been dismissed including attorney's fees had 
been paid. The appellants invited the court to 
impose such conditions in order to avoid a dis-
missal and the necessity of starting over again. 
Tebbs k Tebbs v, Oiiveto, 123 Utah 158, 256* 
P.2d 699 (1953). 
Prolix complaint 
Where complaint was prolix rather than be* 
ing a short, concise statement of a claim as 
contemplated by Rules 8(a) and oXeKl), it was 
reasonable to permit plantiff to redraft plead-
ings rather than dismiss the action without 
prejudice. McGavin v. Preferred Ins. Exch., 7 
Utah 2d 161, 320 P.2d 1109 (1958). 
—Amendment of response. 
Whether a motion t/» amend a r**pons* tn an 
amended complaint should be allowed more 
than ten duys after the amended complaint 
was flled lies within the sound discretion of the 
Until court. Wasescha v. Terra, Inc., 5U8 P.2d 
802 (Utah 1974). 
—Answer. 
... — To include counterclaim. 
In personal injury action in which defen-
dants insurer was furnishing lawyer to defend 
insured and lawyer had not met defendant 
until just before taking his deposition und 
therefore did not know that defendant had in-
juries and believed plaintiff to have been at 
fault, refusal to allow amendment of answer to 
include counterclaim was an ubuso of dlscre* 
tion Bince case was one where "justice re-
quires* amendment. Gillman v. Hansen. 2b' 
U u h 2d 166, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971). 
^-Couipluint, 
To defeat mod 
ruent. 
An unverified arc, 
should not he allow* 
summary judgment if 
effect any substantia 
thoy were originally 
ing». DupW v, Yates, 
G24 UiWO). 
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Trial court did not 
to amend their enrnp] 
even though plaint! rtV 
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different cause of 
WhitUjnburtf, H'l Ui 
(1952). 
—Considerations, 
——Prejudice. 
A primary consider 
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whether leave should 
pleadings during trial 
side would h* put to u 
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not had time tn prepar 
v. Huth, 664 P.2d 45-: 
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v. Morgan. S89 P.2d 'i 
—Court's discretion. 
——Abused. 
Trial court abused its 
ther allowed the plaini 
plaint to conform Ui an :. 
time at trial nor allowe' 
raised is*ue, although L 
to trial oik the new isau. 
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--T-J ii*-fV *i -":>tion for summary* hH~ 
ment. 
H jpvenfiF-d amendment of a pleading 
i"-(-uid not he allowed to defeat a motion for 
2ii.Timarv judgment if the amendment dotri not 
effect on" substantial change in the issue? as 
they wprs cr'jr.nallv formulated in the plead-
ing. DMp.'^ r •. Vat*?, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 
624 ri9^» 
—-To include damages. 
Trial court did not en* in allowing plaintiffs 
to amend their complaint to include damacert. 
even though plaintiffs' anginal complaint was 
iniquity for an injunction, where such amend 
mimt did not import into the cape a new and 
different cause of action. Hjorth v. 
WhittenburR. 121 Utah 324. 241 P.2d 907 
(1952>. 
—C o ii s i d e r a t i o T i a. 
Prejudice. 
A primary consideration that a trial judge 
must take into account in determining 
whether leave should he granted to amend 
pleadings during tnal is whether Lhe opposing 
side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by 
having an issue adjudicated for which he had 
not had time to prepare. Bektna Bar V Ranch 
v. Huth, 6G4 P,2d 453 (Utah 1983V. 
Trial court did not err in refusing plaintiffs 
permission to amend complaint hy pleading ad-
verw»"possession, wnere yuiiuLiu3*Ti»u -corner 
indicated that they would not rely on adverse 
possession and had failed to show requisite 
payment of taxes on disputed parcels. Stratford 
v. Morgan. 680 P.2d 360 (Utah J084). 
—Court's discretion, 
—«—Abused. 
Ti iai court abused its discretion when it r.pi* 
ther allowed the plaintiff to amend his com-
plaint to conform to an issue raised for the first 
time at trial nor allowed him to try the newly 
raised !irf»jp. aithough both parties consented 
to rr;ai of 'he new i«yue. Lloyd's Unlimited v. 
V i t u r ^ vVa> Mk'z Ltd., 753 ?.2d 507 (Utah 
"' A?p. :9*$ . 
:"-i this rule tends to favnr granting 
:
 '.*«nd a pleading, the matter remain? 
i Jl=rr*»tion of the trial court; SUCH 
• a? n^t abused in refusing plain-
•on-.i^r^d IOBVP to amend his complaint 
'
;
*£ amenum^nt would have delaved the 
• e substance of plaintiffs n*"v alio-
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rou^ act**: within it? disruption :n 
rf*- :a plain tiffs motion to amend her com-
to include two additional defendants 
'h- '-ase had boen pending for over three 
aintiff waited until just before trial 
-r motion. Kelly v, Babcock & Wil-
c»r T4n P 2d 1189 (Utah Ct„ App, 1.987').,,, 
— Piam legal without opportunity to amend. 
Tr.al court did not abuse if.* discretion in dis-
missing an action without first allowing plain-
tiff an opportunity to amend where the record 
showed that plaintiff was allowed to amend his 
original complaint but no amendment of sub-
stance was contained in the amended com-
plaint and that the trial court granted contin-
uance* for plaintiffs convenience at the hear-
ings upon the motions to dismiss hut plaintiff 
never appeared at any of the hearings except 
the final motion to reconsider and set aaide the 
order of dismissal. Davis Stock Co. v. Hill, 2 
Utah 2d 20, 268 P.2d 98H, cert, denied. 348 
U.S. 900, 75 S CI. 221. 99 U Ed. 706 (1954). 
Tnal court, abused its discretion in dismiss-
ing an action with prejudice for failure to join 
indispensable parties, and not allowing an 
amendment or granting a continuance, even 
though defendant claimed no surprise but 
merely relied on the likelihood of increased 
costs and complexity if the amendment were 
granted, Intermountain Physical Medicine 
Assocs. v, Micro-Dex Corp., 739 F.2d 1131 (Ct. 
Apn 1PH~4 
—FoUoTving ci^n* «-
An ftrCer of aisir ** ' "J"""J:-*~*"inn, 
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Sterner v Star-e, 2" - . -C^ 
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Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 F.2d 1168 (Utah 
1983). 
——During or Alter trial. 
The rule permitting amendment of pleadings 
is to be liberally construed so us to further the 
interests of justice; howwer, the rule is to be 
applied with less liberality when the amend* 
menCd are proposed during or atler trial, rather 
than before trial. Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 
245 (Utah 1983). 
—Reply amounting to amendment. 
Trial court did not err in allowing the plain-
tiff to file a reply in the proceeding as it was 
nothing more than an amendment to plaintiffs 
complaint. It m the substance and not the 
name of a pleading that determines its charac-
ter. Wells v. Wells, 2 Utah 2d 241, 272 P 2d 
167 (19541 
Amendment to conform to evidence. 
—Allowed. 
In action to recover wages for services ren-
dered where complaint was based on both an 
express contract and on quantum meruit, and 
court struck quantum meruit after plaintiffs 
evidence was m, and reinstated it at the close 
of the defendant*' evidence, such ruling on the 
part of the court was not error in absence of 
showing that the employer was misled or pre-
vented from presenting all its evidence, since 
the ruling was equivalent to a rule permitting 
an ameudment to conform to proof. Morria v. 
Rusuell, 120 Utah 545, 236 P.2d 451, 26 
A.L.K.2d 947 (1951). 
—Alternative to dismissal. 
Allowing amendment of the pleadings to 
conform with the evidence adduced at trial is 
much preferred to the alternative of dismissal, 
especially where a trial has proceeded to con-
clusion on the existing pleadings and where 
the defendant has suffered no prejudice by rea-
son of any deficiency in the pleadings. Gill v. 
Timm. 720 P.2d 1.152 'Utah 1986). 
—Amendment unnecessary. 
——Consent to try i&aue. 
In quiet title action, trial court erred when it 
denied plaintiffs motion for leave to amend 
pleading to conform to evidence, but outcome 
was not affected since issues were before the 
court by consent of both parties. PouUen v. 
Pouisen, 672 P.2d 97 (Utah 1983). 
——Evidence supporting findings. 
Where pleading did noc fill the requirement 
of Rule <S;ai but the evidence supported finding 
that defendant did owe certain amount, failure 
u> amend luily the pleadings to this eifeci waa 
nonprejudicial in view of rule. Seaman* v. An-
dersen, 122 Utah 497, 252 P.2d 209 (1952). 
Issue raised by complaint 
Wholesaler's complaint that fishing boats 
were defective and not fit for purposes intended 
was sufficient to raise the is»ue of breach of 
express and implied warranty, without amend-
ment of the pleadings. Pacific Murine 
Schwabacher, Inc. v. Hydroswirt Corp., 525 
P.2d 615 {Utah 1974). 
—Consent to try issue. 
——Not found. 
Where the parties, in an action on an insur-
ance policy, stipulated in their pleadings that 
the value of a building was $2,000 and while 
the trial was in progress oue of the parties tes-
tified that he was to receive $1,000 for the 
building in a sale, such testimony did noc put 
the value of the building in issue, as alone it 
did not amount to consent to try the is*ue of 
the value of the building National Farmers' 
Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 
Utah 2d 7, 2a6 P.2d 249. 61 AL.R.2d 635 
(1955). 
—Construction of rule. 
Thi3 rule should be read as having two part*, 
the llr9t of which is applicable when issues not 
raised in the pleadings are tried by the express 
or implied consent of the parties, and the sec-
ond of which is applicable where a motion to 
amend is made in response to an objection to 
the introduction of evidence; in the first case 
the trial court has no discretion whether co al-
low amendment of the pleadings and must do 
so; only in the second case may the court deter-
mine whether prejudice, undue delay in 
amending or laches ought to prevent the 
amendment. General Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Carmeero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502 (Utah 
1976). 
—Defense not pleaded. 
-Affirmative defense. 
Defendant wa3 not entitled to an amend-
ment of tho pleadings under thb rule so as to 
assert the defense of a statute of limitation 
where ail of the facta necessary were pleaded 
and there was no new or different evidence. 
Defendant failed to assert the defense and it 
was waived. Apparently it waa defendant's in-
tention to waive the defense until it was dis-
covered during the trial that plaintiffs evi-
dence seriously weakened defendant'* defense. 
Goeltt v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 5 
Utah 2d 204, 293 P.2d 632 (1956). 
Although Rule 6(c) requires that affirmative 
defenses be pleaded, it must be looked to in 
light of the fundamental purpose of the rules of 
liberalizing pleading and procedure to the end 
that parties can present all their legitimate 
contentions; all that parties are entitled to is 
notice of the issues raised and an opportunity 
to meet them, therefore, where defendants did 
not plead Muta-
tive defense 10 
plaintiff, whose 
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not plead subsequent agreement as an affirma-
tive defence to action on prior agreement and 
plaintiff, whose objection to evidem-e on subsu-
quent agreement was overruled, sought no con' 
tinuance and did not claim surprise or disad-
vantage in meeting the new issue, trial court 
not only did not abuse its discretion in allow-
ing issue to be raised and receiving evidence on 
it but it would haw failed the plain mandate of 
justice had it refused to do so. Cheney v. 
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 3S1 P.2d W (1963». 
Failure to raise the defense of usury in an 
answer to a complaint constituted a waiver of 
the defence that could not be cured by amend-
ment of the answer after evidence had been 
presented. Meyer v. Deluke, 23 Utah 2d 74. 
457 P.2d 966 (1969) 
Under Subdivision <b,\ the fact that a de-
fense, even an affirmative defense, ha.? not 
been formally pleaded is immaterial if the is-
sue has been tried by express or implied con-
sent. General Ina. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dy-
nasty Corp., 545 P 2d 502 (Utah 1976) 
Although estoppel was an affirmative de-
fense which was nut raised m the pleading?, 
where the evidence offered at trial supported 
the principle, thu trial court's arrant of motion 
to amend the pleading* to conform to evidence 
of estoppel would not be overturned absent a 
gnawing of abuse of discretion. Big Butte 
Ranch,"inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977), 
——-Issue tried by parties. 
Underlying purpose of rule is that judgment 
should be granted in accordance with law and 
evidence a* ends of justice require, whether the 
pleadings are actually amended or not: even 
though defendants did not plead a particular 
defense, that should not have precluded them 
from relying on that defend if that was what 
justice required and if case was actually tried 
on a different issue or a different theory than 
was pleaded. First Sec. Bank v, Colonial Ford, 
Inc., 597 P.2d 859 (Utah 1979). 
Trial judge erred in concluding that defen-
dant waived a defense by failing to raise it in 
hja pretrial pleadings where the issue was 
tried bv the oartics. Loader v. Scott Constr. 
Corp., 68J P.2d 1227 (Utah 1984). 
'—r"Huurv to nbj«ot to evidence. 
Where defendant bad ample opportunity to 
present contrary evidence and did not object to 
plaintiffs evidence on grounds that it was not 
within issues of case, defendant could not com-
plain of findings bawd on this evidence. 
Draper v. J.3. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 121 Utah 
567, 244 P.2d 360 (1952). 
—Issues not pleaded, 
Mutual mistake. 
Even though the issue of mutual mistake 
was not roiled by the pleading?, »t would have 
been proper for the court, in consonance with 
RuJe 54(c)(1), to have reformed the contract if a 
mutual mistake of fact had been established by 
clear and convincing evidence. Mabey v. Kay 
Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P 2d 287 (Utah 
1934). 
—New cause of action. 
Amendment may he allowed if it does not 
change the liability sought to be unforced 
against the defendant. While in a technical 
sense it may be a new cause of action yet it 
may be allowed if it is not a wholly different 
cause of action or legal obligation. Wells v. 
Wells, 2 Utah 2d 241, 272 P.2d 167 U954*. 
——Child support 
Where wife brought independent action for 
child support claiming that prior child support 
award was void, but court held prior award 
valid, court did not orr in allowing wife to 
amend her complaint to seek arrearage on 
prior award since amended complaint would 
still deal with same cause of action, namely, 
child .support. Wells v. Wells, 2 Utah 2d 241, 
272 P.2d 167 (1954). 
—New theory of recovery. 
If a theory of recovery is fully tried by the 
parties, the court may base its decision on that 
theory and deem the pleadings amended, even 
if the theory WHS not originally pleaded or set 
forth in the pleadings or the pretrial order. 
However, that the issue has. in fact, been tried, 
and that thia procedure has been authorized by 
express or implied consent of the parties, must 
he evident from the record. Colman v. Colman, 
743 P.2d 782 (Utah CL App. 1987). 
—Not allowed. 
In bank's action to recover on promissory 
note guaranteed by defendants, trial court 
properly denied defendants' motion, made after 
presentation of all the evidence, to amend their 
answers to allege that they had signed their 
guaranty under mistake, since there was no 
change in theory of issue, and since trial court 
had found that defendants knew what they 
were signing. First Sec. Bank v. Colonial Ford, 
Inc., 597 P.2d 359 (Utah J979). 
—Notice, 
If an issue ia to be tried and a party's rights 
concluded with respect thereto, he must have 
notice thereof and «m opportunity fo meet it. 
When a party has had .such notice and opportu-
nity, trial of the issue raised is fair; this rule 
accordingly allows liberal amendments if the 
issue is tried "by express or implied consent of 
the parties." National Farmer*' Union Prop. 
erty & Can. Co. v, Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 2#6 
P.2d 249. fil A.L.R,2d 035 (1955), 
—Prejudice* 
A party must not be prejudiced in any way 
by the introduction of new issues, but where an 
unpieaded partnership issue wag raised at 
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trial, was not objected to by defendant, and 
both sides went into fucta of the partnership, 
then* was no error in finding on the issue since 
there was no indication defendant wad sur-
prised or minted by introduction uf the iswue. 
Buehner Block Co. v. Clcsos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 
310 P.2d 517 (1957). 
—Restriction to matter pleaded or tried. 
In action to set aside certain deeds, the 
prayer of thu complaint that the deed* "he de-
clared null and void" did not open the door to 
allow the trial court to fu\d the deeds invalid 
on any ground that might be urged at the trial: 
but it was restricted to the grounds set forth in 
the complaint, ar tried by the express or im-
plied consent of the parties. Mitchell v. Palmer, 
121 Utah 245. 240 P.2d 970 (1952). 
ooio+wftM luirk of amendments. 
—Adding or substituting parties. 
Generally, Subdivision (c) does not apply to 
amendments that substitute or add new par-
ties to those brought before the court by the 
original pleading, because such amendments 
amount to assertion of a new cause of action 
and defeat thu purpose of statutes of limita-
tions, but an exception to this rule exists, as to 
both plaintiff and defendant, when now and old 
parties have an identity of interest, so it can be 
assumed or proved that relation back is not 
prejudicial. Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 543 
P.2d 902 (Utah 1976); Vina v. JetTerson Ins. 
Co., 761 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App, 1988). 
The relation-back doctrine did not apply to 
amended third-party complaint where there 
was no identity of interest with the existing 
parties other than privity of contract, since 
privity of contract is insufficient identity of in-
terest for purpose of Subsection (c) of this rule. 
Parry v. Pioneer Whale. Supply Co., 681 P.2d 
214 (Utah 1984). 
Where plaintiff sought to amend complaint 
to include claims against third-party defen-
dant, but plaintiffs chums against third party 
were not comparable in theory or damage* 
sought to defendant's third-party complaint, 
third party aid nuv r^r^^.ti^:..^ ^v.;ntjfps 
potential claims against him within the period 
of the statute of limitations, nor did he have an 
identity of interest with those originally 
named as defendants. Consequently, the 
amended compluint did not relate back to the 
original complaint and was barred by the stat-
ute of limitations. Vina v. JetTerson ins. Co., 
761 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1986). 
—Statute of limitations. 
Amendments are allowed to complaints and 
process, even though the amendment relates 
back to the time of original filing and even 
though, but for the right to amend, the statute 
of limitations period would have run. Meyers v. 
Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879 (Utah 19811. 
—Untimely service of original complaint. 
The amendment of a complaint dismissed for 
untimely service must also be dismissed. Cook 
v. Starkly. 5-48 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976). 
Supplemental pleadings, 
—Answers, 
Allowed. 
in quiet title action it i* not error to permit 
amendment of defendants' pleadings to assert 
an interest in claims relocated after suit wus 
filed but before trial. Stevens v. Memmott, 9 
Utah 2d 37, 337 I\2d 418 (1959). 
——Not allowed. 
In taxpayers' suit seeking to set aside sale of 
part of tract of city property, where the com-
plaint urged that the sale was void for irregu-
larity of city council procedure and asked for 
an o»uci *!i»<. vl«v c!,~:::r~*a K" ™*niir*d to re-
move structures placed on the property, a mo-
tion of the defendants for permission to file a 
supplemental answer showing a subsequent at-
tempt to satisfy the requirements of H 10-8*8 
was properly denied since the supplemental 
pleading was not an answer to the facta alleged 
in the complaint, nor justification for denying 
the relief prayed, except that part of the com-
plaint that sought removal oi the structures. 
Rowley v. Milford City, 10 Utah 2d 299, 352 
P.2d 225 (1960). 
Cited in Murray v. Miller, 1 Utah 2d 43, 261 
P.2d 950 (1953); Ballard v. Buiat, 8 Utah 2d 
308, 333 P.2d 1071 (1959); Wilson v. Gardner, 
10 Utah 2d 89, 348 P.2d 931 (1960); Haiistrom 
v. Buhler, 14 Utah 2d Hi, 378 P.2d 355 (1963); 
Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 
14 Utah 2d 291, 383 P.2d 402 (1963); 
Falconaero Enter., Inc. v. Bowers, IS Utah 2d 
202, 398 P.2d 206 (1905); Hoidaway v. Hall, 29 
Utah 2d 77, 505 P,2d 295 (1973); Thomas J. 
Peck & Sons v. Lee Hock Prods., Inc., 30 Utah 
2d 187, 515 P.2d 446 (1973); Christopher v. 
Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 ?,2d 1009 (Utah 
1976); Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 
1977); L.A. Young Sons Constr. Co. v. County 
„:?czzl± 575 ? «M io:H (Utah 1978); Porter v. 
Porter, 577 P.2d 111 (Utah 1978); Howard v. 
Howard, 601 p.2d 931 (Utah 1979); First Inv. 
Co. v. Andersen. 621 P.2d 683 (Utah 1980); 
Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 
P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980); Bradford v. Alvey & 
Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah I960); Hales v. 
Hales, 656 P.2d 423 (Utah 1982); Alpine Credit 
Union v. Moeiler, 656 P.2U 988 (Utah 1982); 
Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 
P.2d 743 (Utah 1982); Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 
P.2d 372 (Utah 1983); Bushnell Real Estate, 
Inc. v. Nlelson, 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983); Call 
v. City of W<*st Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 
1986); Ebbert v. Ebhert, 744 P 2d 1019 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987); Newroeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 
P-2d 1276 (Utah VJ 
M d 1051 (Utah ( 
Chavez, 749 ?.2d 6 
Am. Jur. 2d. — i 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am* Jur. 3d. — tilA Am. Jar. 2d Pleading ing back to date of original pieodinff, under 
5? 289 to 295, 306 et seq., 329 to 331. Rule 15(c) of Federal Rule* of Civil Procedure, 
C.J.S, — 71 C.J.S. Pleading *$ 275 to 33$. so aa to avoid bar of limitations 12 A.L.R. Fed. 
A.L.R. — Right to amend pending personal 23.1. 
injury action by including action for wrongful What constituted "prejudice" to puny who* 
dcath after statute of limitations ha« run object* to evidence outride issue* made by 
aRainat independent death action, 71 A.L.R.3d pleadings go as to preclude amendment of 
933. pleadings under Rule 15fb) of Federal Rules of 
Amendment of pleac:r»ff after limitation h:t<? Civil Procedure, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 44$. 
run, so as to *el up subsequent appointment as Construction and application of Rule 15(d) of 
executor or administrator of plaintiff who pro- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure providing for 
fc?5ed to bring the action in that capacity with- allowance of supplemtntal pleading? setting 
out previous valid appointment, 27 A.L.R.4th forth transactions, occurrences, or event* sub-
198. sequent to original pleading, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 
Amendment of pleading to add, substitute, 129. 
or change capacity of, party plaintiff as relat- Key Numbers. — Pleading «* 229 to 296. 
Rule 16, Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and manage-
ment conferences. 
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court in its discretion or upon 
motion of a party, may direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepre-
sented parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial 
for such purposes as: 
(1) expediting the disposition of the action; 
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not 
be protracted for lack of management; 
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; 
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough prepara-
tion; 
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case; and 
(6) considering other matters as may aid in the orderly disposition of 
the case. 
(b) Scheduling and management conferences. In any action, in addition 
to any pretrial conferences that may be scheduled, the court in its discretion 
may direct that a scheduling or management conference he held. The court 
may direct the attorneys or unrepresented parties to appear before the court. 
Scheduling or management conferences may also he held by way of telephone 
conferencing between the court and counsel as the particular case may re-
quire. Decisions and agreements reached at scheduling and management con-
ferences may be formally made an order of the court. At the conference, the 
court may consider the following matters: 
(1) the formation and simplification of the issues, including the elimi-
nation of frivolous claims or defenses; 
(2) the necessity or advisability of joining additional parties or amend-
ment of pleadings; 
(3) the completion of outstanding discovery; 
(4) the time for filing and hearing of motions; 
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